The western media has focused on demonstrations in Serbin against Milosevic's electoral fraud. Protests in Croatia against the authoritarian regime of Franjo Tudjman have largely been ignored - a good indication of the importance the west attaches to Tudjman to guarantee stability in former Yugoslavia.
aac similarity between the is. sues that have led to protests in Croatia and serbia is striking Tudiman too has refused to recog mise ciccuon results. In 1993 in the local elections opposition parties won in all the major towns and cities of Croatia.
Nominations
For over a year Tudjman has refused to accept any of the opposidons nominations for mayor of Zagreb. In fact he attempted to impose a member of his own HDZ party as mayor but had to back down when she was charged with corruption.
In the past Tudiman has attempted to close down independent radio stations, particularly in the region around Rijeka where the opposition is strong, and has harassed the Feral Tribune newspaper.
Faced with growing protests about electoral fraud in November of last year Tudjman again atscupico to close radio stations in several cities. The closure of Za. greb's Radio 101 brought 100,000 people out on to the streets. Like Milosevic, Tudjman was forced to back down. And like Milosevic he was aiso undoie to prevent news of protests being broadcast via the There is also a similarity in those taking part in the protests. In Croatia, as in Serbia, opposition in the streets has come largely from students and the intelligentsia. working class has so far remained OPPOSITION demonstrators Guns and nationalist bigotry are the main props of the Croatian regime largely on the side-lines. In Croatia, where independent unions are much stronger, the potential for working class action is much The Croatian opposition does not raise any demands for the right of Serbs expelled from the Krajina o return. wor are lacy likely to hand over indicted war criminals who are protected by Tudiman.
By and large they maintain silence over the fate of Croatia's Serbs or the role of Croat forces in Bosnia. The failings of the Croatian opposi. tion to confront the nationalism of their own state mirrors that of their counterparts in Serbia.
Although the problems con.
It gained a parliamentary major. fronting Tudjman are similar to those facing Milosevic and the methods used to deal with them are virtually identical, there are important differences.
Tudjman, unlike Milosevic, is a convinced nationalist. He interferes in every aspect of Croatian cultural life. Whether it's rewriting history, renaming streets or designing the strip for the Croatian national football team, Tudiman is involved. In particular he has claimed that Croatian is a distinct language and has imposed the use of medieval terms in place of supposedly Serb' words.
Despite promises nothing has been done to encourage the return to Croatia of Serbs who fled when the Croatian army recaptured the Krajina region in the summer of 1995. Tudjman's attempts to create an ethnically and culturally pure Croatian state are hardly likely to persuade Serbs that they can return.
The issue of Bosnia has, howcver, been used by Tudiman in a to tally different way. While Milosevic has abandoned the Bosnian Serbs, Tudjman has sucasiacaco nis finks with bis Bosnian Croat supporters.
He attempted to bolster electoral support by giving Bosnian Croats the right to vote in Croatian elections and making Bosnia a central issue. Milosevic, by contrast, tried to prevent Bosnia being an election issue and refused to allow Bosnian Serbs a vote in Serbian elections.
Despite the Dayton accords and tac musum-Croat couty in Bosnia,. Tudjman has refused to dismantle the structures of HercegBosna, which continues to operate as an independent 'statelet' within Bosnia.
Reunification
In Mostar Tudjman's supporters refuse to implement the Dayton accords - which require the reunifica. tion of the city. HDZ officials in west Mostar continue to expel Muslims in a drive to create an ethnically pure west Mostar. Ar best Tudjman does nothing to stop this: more likely it is actively encouraged from Zagreb.
Despite these important differ. ences Tudjman has supported Milosevic against protests in Serbia. The official line from Zagreb is that the anti-Miloseric campaign is or. chestrated by the west. Once Mi losevic goes, the west will turn its attention on destabilising Croatia.
Tudiman knows that to a large extent his regime depends on Milosevic maintaining power in Serora. baca accos the other as a potential 'bogeyman' that can be used to divert protests at home.
However, the situation in Croatia is complicated by Tudiman's serious illness he has cancer The ultra-nationalist Gojko Susak, a former businessman in Canada and the man previously thought most likely to succeed Tudjman has also been seriously ill. Events in Serbia, therelore, are exacetbating an already serious crisis within Croatia's ruling party.
It is nighly unlikely Franjo Tudiman will remain in power until 1997. The only question is whether cancer or mass protest finishes him off first.