In January the Liverpool docks dispute ended. For 28 months the dockers fought heroically to get their jobs back, providing an inspiration to other struggles in Britain and to dockworkers worldwide.
They were defeated primarily because the leadership of their union, the Transport and General Workers' Union (TGWU) consistently undermined their struggle. This, together with their own failure to develop an adequate strategy to defeat the leadership, left them feeling there was no way forward.
The dispute began in September 1995 when dockworkers working for Torside docks company were sacked for refusing to break a negotiated agreement and work a ship at short notice without overtime payments. The Torside workers picketed the main Seaforth container terminal and other dockworkers refused to cross. All the dockers were then sacked by the Mersey Docks and Harbour Company (MDHC).
In previous dockers struggles in Britain it was almost automatic that workers in other ports walked out in support, at least until the union bureaucracy had managed to restore control of the situation. This time things were different. Thatcher had scrapped the National Dock Labour Scheme (NDLS), a milestone in ending casual labour on the docks. Previously dockworkers had had an unofficial, militant national docks shop stewards organisation independent of the union leadership. The scrapping of the NDLS destroyed the stewards organisation and left few ports even unionised.
The straitjacket of the Tory anti-union laws meant that the Liverpool dockers' action was `illegal' because they had not balloted before taking action. Solidarity action by other workers, including portworkers, would be unlawful because they were employed by other companies.
The TGWU limited its `support' to paying money into a hardship fund, hiding behind the restrictions of the anti-union laws. This lack of official support made it easier for other union leaders to oppose support for the dockers. Worse, Morris appears to have seen his job throughout the dispute as one of attempting to get a deal with MDHC over the heads of the dockers.
Wherever the dispute was raised the dockers got support from other workers. Support groups were set up in most towns, raising the political issues of the dispute as well as money. Support was forthcoming for mass pickets of the Liverpool docks and Drake International, which recruited scabs to work in the dockers place.
Demonstrations were held in Liverpool and London. The radical environmental grouping, Reclaim the Streets became involved bringing a new dynamic to the dispute. After one of the demonstrations the group occupied the MDHC headquarters building ensuring high profile media coverage.
The dockers formed solid links with embattled strikers from Magnet and Hillingdon hospital. They spread the word about the other disputes and even donated part of their hardship fund to the Hillingdon workers!
As with many other recent disputes, a women's' support group, Women of the Waterfront, was established. WoW provided speakers at many meetings, both in Britain and internationally, and their banner became a regular on demonstrations. Given the hardship faced by the dockers and their families, this support, and that of the dockers' children, was crucial.
Yet much more was needed if MDHC was going to be forced to back down and reinstate them. The dockers found a ready audience amongst port workers internationally.
Starting in December 1995 with a picket of U.S. docks, the Liverpool workers gathered support across the world. Dockers internationally recognised the merits of Liverpool case and the similarities with their own situation. The casualisation of dock labour is an international issue.
International days of action were held with action ranging from extended meetings to discuss the situation to 24-hour stoppages. Many refused to unload ships which had been loaded by scabs in Liverpool. The highlight was the story of the Neptune Jade, which sailed in vain from continent to continent in search of a port where dockers would offload it. Dockworkers in the U.S.A. are currently facing court action over their boycotting of the Neptune Jade, and the Liverpool dockers are returning their support.
Dockers from Liverpool flew around the world for pickets and meetings and leaders of dockers from Japan, the U.S.A. and elsewhere became regular visitors to Liverpool.
This amazing international solidarity, on a scale previously unheard of, had several by products. Dockworkers in some places, inspired by the Liverpool example, won their own unionisation and recognition disputes. A virtual `dockworkers international' was set up within the International Transport Federation (ITF). The Liverpool dockers became committed internationalists. They took up broader issues such as the question of human rights in Turkey and the threat of war against Iraq.
As a result of this international solidarity MDHC made several `final offers' to buy out the dockers. They came under pressure from big shipping companies to settle or lose their trade.
The dockers stuck to their principles. The response to any offer was to be made by a mass meeting of the dockers, not postal ballots which individualise people. Weekly mass meetings were held from the beginning. The struggle was to get their jobs returned under the previous conditions. That meant all jobs, those employed by MDHC and those employed by Torside.
Not surprisingly, the employers did not like these principles. Nor did Bill Morris. Several times he went behind the dockers backs to do a deal with MDHC and bounce them into acceptance. Each time they rejected Morris' deals.
The dockers attitude to the TGWU leadership swung between strident criticism and a refusal to speak out, both from loyalty and the fear of losing what little support they were getting.
For much of the strike they rejected fighting to make the dispute official because they wanted to retain control of their own struggle. This meant that Morris was able to withhold more tangible support while attempting to sell them out.
The crunch in terms of the TGWU came at the union's biennial delegate conference last summer. There was uproar when the chair declared the executive's statement on the dockers' dispute carried. Half the conference refused to leave until the chair conceded a re-vote which was then clearly defeated. The scale of support for the dockers, once given a focus, was clear.
Morris and the executive still refused to carry out conference policy to campaign through the ITF for solidarity action and demand that the Labour government use its shareholding in MDHC to get the dockers jobs back.
He re-opened negotiations with MDHC without reference to the dockers or even the executive. Before the dockers knew of this, ballot papers went out to be returned in a few days. The papers stated that the deal would be declared accepted even if a majority voted `no', if they were a minority of those eligible to vote!
The stewards called a mass meeting and won overwhelming rejection of the deal. This verdict was repeated in the postal ballot.
The dockers and their supporters in the TGWU organised resolutions to the General Executive Committee condemning Morris and calling for the conference policy to be implemented. For the first time they organised a lobby of the executive.
Then the chair ruled the resolutions out of order and a challenge to this was defeated. The stewards began to realise they lacked a response to the TGWU leadership's attempts to sell them out.
Earlier they had sought a way out by putting forward the idea of a Labour Supply Organisation which would provide the MDHC with dock labour. This had many flaws, and would have let the MDHC off the hook on reinstatement. The idea was opposed by many supporters in Britain and internationally. However the issue was dropped because the MDHC weren't interested.
The dockers had hoped that the election of a Labour government, owning shares in MDHC, might see some pressure to settle. However, ministers avoided meeting the stewards and Morris made little effort to push the issue. With notable exceptions among local and Left MPs and the rank and file, the dockers met a blank wall with the Labour Party.
With no prospect of new developments in Britain and support among dockers internationally beginning to wane, the stewards saw no way forward. In January they proposed the acceptance of a slightly improved version of the offer rejected last year.
It would be the height of arrogance to claim that another strategy would definitely have won, but no sustained attempt was made to tackle the lack of support from the TGWU. Morris' claim that his concern was to `protect the fabric of the union' was always hollow.
Even remaining within the strict limits of the anti-union laws, Morris and the TGWU leadership could have done a lot more. Appeals could have encouraged contributions to the hardship fund or even levies. The union paper, the TGWU Record, had next to no coverage of the dockers dispute.
Morris did little to get media coverage for the dispute. His most fervent intervention was to denounce John Pilger and Jimmy McGovern who attempted to break the media blackout and were critical of the TGWU.
The TGWU could have built a campaign against the anti-union laws, but Morris has not even criticised the Labour government for failing to repeal them.
But in the end what value the `fabric of the union' if it doesn't exist to support members defending their jobs and working conditions. If Morris and the TGWU had made a stand by making the dockers' strike official and campaigning widely for support, this could have led to the defeat of the anti-union laws. The law provided a convenient smokescreen for Morris.
The TGWU Broad Left (BL) was no help. A secretive body almost exclusively concerned with winning union posts, it has had a majority of the TGWU executive for many years. You wouldn't notice as it has never used this to further members struggles or challenge the rightward drift of the Labour Party.
The BL reportedly could not even decide on the eve of TGWU conference which side to support in the debate on the dockers. At the December Executive they were also divided.
The dockers stewards began to challenge the TGWU leadership's stranglehold late in 1997, when Morris' attempt to bounce a deal on them made his role patently obvious. The campaign of resolutions and lobby of the Executive were an attempt to deal with the problem, but the stewards had no answers when the resolutions were blocked.
The only answer would have been to mount a massive offensive within the TGWU. The dockers needed to call their supporters within the union together independently of the Broad Left. Their failure to do so meant ultimately that not only did they not win, but that other struggles will face the same problem in the future.
As well as saluting the dockers for the heroic and tenacious struggle they put up, reviving the spirit of international solidarity, we have to learn the lessons of their struggle. The best memorial to the dockers would be a fighting rank and file organisation in the TGWU which would seriously challenge the cowardice of its leaders.