Peace in Ireland was to be the crowning achievement of Major's term as Prime Minister.
Perhaps the end of the cease-fire was simply a blunder by the British. After all, they and the Unionists could have had a very favourable deal. Sinn Fein had accepted the motion of Unionist "consent"" and it is clear from at least the 1995 Ard Fheis, that they were coming round to the idea of an internal settlement, which would of course be "stepping stone" 10 preschico as d eventual unity There are lois of arcas where treat ing the whole island as a single entity makes sense, not least in relation to European Union Structural Funds.
Business leaders have already made big strides towards 'unifvine" the country. A few committees looking at agriculture, tourism and economic development worn and sout, togcurt with a built-in role for Dublin in guaranteeing the position of the Nationalwould probably have been enough.
"Self determination would be exercised by simultaneous referendums North and South to produce the necessary consent. No British withdrawal, no ending of partition and the copper-fastening of the border. A John Major success. Exit stage Right.
There are other possibilities apart from the blunder theory. Perhaps, beset by enemies all round, leadership elections and Scott Inquiries, Honest John just let Ireland slip to the back of his mind.
Perhaps he has been a fervent Unionist all along and is only now showin as true nuc But none of these make any sense given the ocal the tones could nave got and at so little cost. All they had to do was to get the Unionists to the nekotaung toic If the IRA had signed up, as seemed likely. to the "Six Principles" of the Mitchell Report they would have had not only to renounce violence and give up their arms over a period. They would also have had to commit themselves, in advance, to going along with wherer agreement came out of uk all-party negotiations.
in effect, Mitchell demanded a higher price for entry to negotiations tres of technical excellence than in previous British documents.
Yet Major side-stepped in favour of Unionist leader David Trimble's "elections" stunt and attempted to stuff it down the throats of Dublin and the SDLP as well as Sinn Fein. Careless behaviour, at the very least, from someone who regularly parrots on about "consent".
The conclusion is stark: Major was looking for a break and decided that breaking on elections would be prefer. able to breaking over the report of an British won't be prodded into negotiations ony more than they were forced into making concessions by 25 years of ormed struggle issued ahead of Bill Clinton's visit to Ireland, promised talks by the end of February.
The British reaction to the report of the Mitchell Commission was the last straw for Republicans because it took away any prospect of those talks. In the end, there was not split in the IRA over ending the cease-fire.
Ending the cease-fire was a mistake. The British will not be prodded into negotiations any more than they could be forced into making concessions by 25 years of armed struggle.
More importantly, the negotiations will not deliver what republicans want-British withdrawal and a united Ireland. Because even before going of an international commission. into the negotiations Sinn Fein had made concessions to the Unionist veto.
Republicans have got themselves hopelessly caught up between two strateries which have now beenscento l fail. The alternative to armed struggle was the pan-nationalist alliance includine Clinton and Bruton as well as John Hume of the Social Democratic and Labour Party who was its main architect. What they are after is stabilisation. not Irish unity and British withdrawal.
There was an alternative to bombing London. however attractive that tactic might have seemed to Republicans seeling with frustration over we pic dictable Blish ano Unionist antics since the cease-fire.
The Six County State was imposed and is maintained by the British against the wishes of the majority of the people in Ireland. Its very design was undemocratic and it depends on the British to It cannot be reformed. No infernal settlement will work. The rightsaof the Unionist minority on the island me profico in any seillement: the no veto on unity.
No settlement is possible without withdrawal of British armed force.
It's been clear for some time, as the British raised one obstacle after another to even talking to Republicans. that they believed they could gain through clever political tactics what they could not achieve through armed force - a re-enforcement of partition underpinned by "democratic" elec. tions and guaranteed by Dublin.
All these too-clever-by-hail tactics growing opinion even among nonnationalists in Ire. and honest brokers but were part of the problem.
Sina Fein were too spellbound by the movers and shakers in Dublin and Washington to recognise what was happening or to do anything to mobilise and build on this. In the end, only mass action. North and South, will force the British to leave.
There is a clear danger of civil war in Ireland as a whole now. The British will continue to support the Unionists and Loyalist murace gangs. They would be quite happy if this led to a decisive defeat for Republicans. They would be only too pleased to play "peacekeeper" and "honest broker" in whatever settlement comes out of that.
It could be the first case of "re-colonisation" the British have managed. Those in the Republican Movemen: who believe in "pure" armed struggle uncomplicated by "politics" should remember this February I1 1996
Major decided that breaking on elections would be preferable to breaking over the report
Sinn Fein were too spellbound by Dublin and Washington to recognise what was happening