THE 49-51 per cent partition of Bosnia Hercegovina under the Dayton agreement, rammed down Bosnian President Izetbegovic's throat in 21 days of "negotiations", and now being enforced by 60,000 mainly NATO troops - including 20,000 Americans and 30,000 British - implements what has been the objective of Western/UN policy from Vance Owen to the Five Na. tion Contact Group: "peace" via the division of Bosnia along ethnic lines.
Formally Bosnia will remain a sinue saro cuetauon up to now a hollow shell - and a Serb Republic. In reality they will be completely separate states with their own armed forces and a border between them which will be the most tortticd and inaccessible in Europe, shaped out of the current front lines.
Izetbegovic described it as "not a just peace but more just than the continuation of war". In a reference to the pressures put on him he went on "In the situation as it is, and in the world as it is. a betler peace could not have boen achieved".
The deal has created not a peace but the cessation of the war: an armed truce under Uncle Sam's big stick.
This cynical carve up was signod on behalf of the Pale regime by Milosevic who had decided that 49 per cent of Bosnia was the best that could be anicco: parucurany gaven the cricets growing military strength of the BosniThe deal infuriated Serbian nationalists bent on no compromise. Vojistav Seseli, the leader of the neo-fascist Serbian Radical Party, denounced it as "the greatest treason in the history of the Serbian nation"
If it lasts the settlement constitutes a serious defeat for the Bosnian poople and multi-ethnic society for four years against near impossible odds-including an invasion by the Yugoslav army and a revolt by a section of the Serbian population whipped up by Milosevic.
They fought almost without weapons and initially without an army, in the face of a highly effective arms embargo.
It is true that Karadzic has not got everything he wanted - like the whole of Bosnia or enouch of it to make !! non-viable as a country. He also failed, at this point, to gain the right to federate with Serbia. But the conditions are flexible and he may well achieve it in the future if the deal holds.
Those who have supported the defence of a multi-ethnie Bosnia must condemn the carve up under the Daytoo agrecmient, we cannoc, now cier, be against tne cessation of the war. Unly those who must fight such a war can decide to continue it.
There has never been a unified wester policy, but several policies, within publicly in conflict with each other and often in complete disarray.
This made the role of the US crucial at Dayton. Through its bases in Turkey and its Middle East oil interests the US has consistently appeared more proBosnian than any of the major Euro. pean powers. This stance, hollow as it was. put the US in a strong position to force an agreement on the Bosnian delegation.
The NATO bombing which followed the bloody events aroand the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa badly damaged the Serbian military infrastructure. The military balance, however, had been shifting for some time. The Croatian proved weapoary (although not to the level of the Yugoslav army), and the was better organised with more light weapons.
These factors produced the Bosnian/Croatian offensive in September and October which liberated big areas of westem Boseis and estatisted a division of the country close to the 49-51 per dent being advocated by the five nation contact group.
It was at this point the US proposed the Dayton meeting and applied mas1995: Soldiers loyol to righeit leader Fiket Abolk taking a breck from fighting — alangside Serb nacionalsts — north of Bihoc sive pressure onto the Bosnian Government to hait the offensive and negottate.
Both this offensive and the Dayton agreement have altered the political balance in ex-Yugoslavia enhancing Tudjman. The agreement strengthens the Croat component of the Bosnia Croat Federation - the previous HVO controlled territory of Herceg-Bosnia -which will further strengthen the Crostian position.
The Dayton agreement provides for a point bosniac rost pressacncy anu a joint Government for the Federation. This will weaken the Bosnian Government and provide a means for the direct influence of Tudiman over Bosnia afUp to now the Foderation has been an empty shell. The Croat side has been lukewarm, content to make money out of taxing the southern route from Split which crosses its territory.
Internationally the agreement has strengthened the hand of the USA. Clinton has bean able to nose as the bringer of "peace" in the Middle East and Bosnia, even in Ireland, and cover up previous disasters such as Somalia.
Both the UN and the EU were made to look inefffective. Russian obiections | were brushed aside.
Srebrenica and Zepa are (shamefully) handed over to the Serbs. The Bosnian Government is to control Sarajevo and the remaining Bosnian enclave of Gorazda is to be linked to Bosnian territory by a land corridor: the Serbs were given land around Mrkonjic Grad in "compensation". Serb demands for the widening of the Posavina corridor at Broko were unresolved and The agreement also covers Eastern Slavonia - the remaining Croat territory occupied by Serbian forces - and Tudiman has agreed to accept its reinPartition and the violation of national rights are rarely the basis for long term peace - as events in Chechenya currently show tegration into Croatia over a two year period. Had this not been agreed Tud.
The agreement also contains a "guarantee" of the right of return for all refugces, a clause which is likely to be honoured by Bosnia since it is deTendme a muni-cabic sociesy, bol lg nored by the Serbs who will be building The UN has now handed over to NATO and the UNPROFOR has become IFUK-Ine NA IU Implementation Force. IFOR troops are now deploying throughout Bosnia and the US troops are already in Tuzla, having opened the short northern route over the river Sava-involving the biggest pontoon bridge constructed in Europe since the end of the Second World War.
The agreement gives IFOR troops the powers of an army of occupation: Incy can snoor wno tncy nke ih rusy to uphold the agreement.
Opposing the Dayton agreement also means opposing IFOR and its presence in the region. We call for the position of the arms embargo.
This is not to say that the agreement will end the war, although the course of events are hard to predict. There is an enforced settlement which is manifestly unjust and is hardly the basis for a long term settlement. Partition and the violation of national richts are rarely the basis for long term peace as events in Chechenya currently show.
Nearly 300,000 people have died during the four years of the war, most Bosnian. The war has created over three million refugees - two million ture, rape mass murder and genocide in of all nationalities feel that they should not have died or suffered in vain.
NIGEL DANBY reviews "The Rise of Militant' by Peter Taffe ALTHOUGH I would hesitate to recommend "The Rise of Militant™ it is useful in that it illustrates how their flawed approach to politics has distorted their practice over the past 30 years.
Their miscalculation rests upon the idea of the Labour Party as being potentially capable of delivering socialism.
Taffe makes much of the way exMilitant leader Ted Grant failed to respond to the new realides of Labour swing to the right. It would be truer to say that both Taaffe and Grant share illusions.
This is exemplified in the rapture over Scargill's plans for a Socialist Labour Party. Scargill wants to leave Labour because it was once a socialist party but is no longer. According to Militant they left Labour because they thought they could no longer trans. form it into a socialist party.
These contradictions were important in making my mind up to leave Militant and become a supporter of Socialist Outlook. Socialists need to remain inside Labour Party fighting to defend it as a mass party based on the working class, even though it is led by the worst type of reactionaries.
Another of Militant's defining fea. tures has been their "plague on all your houses" attitude to anti-imperialist struggles.
From Vietnam to Ireland they have had the same theme. On Bosnia they nave argued that only war manger would profit from arming the Bosnian people. They may as well argue that the only ones to pront trom sending a consignment of haddock to Bosnia would be fishmongers!
This refusal to come out explicitly on the side of those in the front line of fighting imperialism is echoed in Millcant's work in the unions and among the specially oppressed.
Instead they substitute their own party building project for the interest of those they seck to organise.
This is the only way to explain how the "deepest" of entryist groups in Brit. ain could drop the key ideas it had Socialist Outlook 95 • January 20 1996. fought for decades in order to adopt opposite positions-with an equal degree or stridency The strength of this book is that it acknowledges the contribution that Militant members have made as individuals. There are many comrades in he oranston who co not are the sectarianism of the central leadership. These are the people we work with on the ground in day to day struggles.
It is only through this experience in will be broken from the politics of their or. ganisation's leadership.