THIS YEAR'S Bloody Sunday demonstrations will be the first since the IRA declared its ceasefire over four months ago.
In January 1972 in Derry, the British army murdered thirteen people on a peaceful mass demonstration protesting against internment wimoul inal.
Historically, the annual commemorations of this event have been something of a ritual, symbolising a lack of political strategy rather than mass political resistance to British rule in Ireland.
But in recent years they have been used by the republican movement to experiment with a new strategy that has now emerged more clearly with the ceasefire.
In particular, the "Bloody Sunday Initiative', in which Sinn Fein members took a leading role, was one of the first united front campaigns on the national question to be set up by republicans which openly tied itself to non-violent methods of campaigning.
As a major show of strength of the militant wing of the nationalist community, this year's march will reflect any new political direction of the republican movement and its ability to mobilise the community behind its new course.
New questions Since the ceasefire little has happened to contradict what appears to be the British viewpoint that the republican movement's leadership has abandoned the armed struggle as a method of achieving its historic aims. But new questions have arisen.
Has armed struggle been replaced by mass action as the strategic orientation? Or is an alliance with the governments of Dublin and Washington the new central tactic?
Does the movement envisage achieving Irish self-determination through campaigning for unconditional British withdrawal and Irish unity? Or is the perspective one of a process in which these are only later stages?
Is Irish self-determination still defined in terms of the people of the island as an indivisible whole acting without British interference? or has Sinn Fein nuanced distinction between the "consent' of the unionists and a unionist veto become, along with, a new conception of the British state as potential 'persuaders', a cover for agreeing to accept de fact partition as part of a new settlement?
These questions have all been thrown up by Sinn Fein's public stance over the past year or so. Although they are very unlikely to be answered in any explicit way through the Bloody Has republican laadership abandoned armed struggle for mass action? Sunday marches, the commemoration is particularly symbolic this year for a number of reasons.
Until 1972 there had been a mass civil rights movement. Although flawed in many respects, it involved mass action, mobilised the whole nationalist comon the streets, and commanded extensive support in the South and internationally.
The Bloody Sunday shootings represented the high point of a British terror campaign that effectively drove mass action politics off the agenda for almost a decade.
The result was an increasingly depoliticised movement and the strengthening of its militarist tendencies.
The 1969/70 split in the republican movement widened the gap between a militarist 'provisional' wing and a political, increasingly anti-nationalist, 'official' wing.
Hunger strikes
The hunger strikes of 1980/81, the accompanying mass campaign and the turn towards an electoral strategy repoliticised the movement. But it failed to develop a strategic mass orientation out of these openings.
The mass action did not outlive the hunger strikes. The electoral strategy reached its limits by the mid 1980s, and the main strategy since has been to seek alliances with bourgeois nationalist parties and call for negotiations with the British.
Since the ceasefire, Sinn Fein's insistent focus has been on two demands: an acceleration of the process towards round table talks that include Republicans; and the need for symbolic but substantial gestures towards British demilitarisation.
British strategy
If Bloody Sunday represents a key moment in the history of mass resistance to British rule, it is also seen as symbolic of British strategy itself. Behind it lies everything from murder campaigns to curfews and mass raids; emergency laws denying fundamental civil rights, and disinformation and censorship.
Immediately after Bloody Sunday there was an official inquiry by Lord Widgery. It is now widely accepted that this was a whitewash that exonerated the British army and blamed the victims, using lies and smears. Army officers in charge on Bloody Sunday have been promoted and decorated.
Although the official position has been thoroughly discredited, the state has yet to utter the smallest word of recognition or apology for what can only be described as a war crime equivalent to recent atrocities in Nationalists of many hues demand that a precondition for any 'demilitarisation' must involve the British government removing the military and accompanying oppressive strategies.
The British state will not have seriously begun to turn its back on such strategies until the truth about events such as Bloody Sunday is publicly acknowledged. If the 'peace process' itself is to mean anything, the symbolism of Bloody Sunday cannot be taken for granted.
Meanwhile, despite the ceasefire, harassment and intimidation by British forces continue on a daily basis.
Though soldiers are no longer patrolling the streets in daylight hours, the enormous military presence remains, the vast panoply of emergency powers remains untouched, and the RUC and UDR remain armed to the hilt as local sectarian militias.
Negotiations
Sinn Fein has finally reached a negotiating table of sorts. Substantive round table talks may begin this year (with or without the Paisleyites).
A form of words may be found to enable republican participation without a surrender of arms (the RUC having indicated their view that this should not be Dublin document providing a framework for a new settlement will emerge. Sinn Fein paper Republican News has rightly described 1995 as a 'Year of Decision'. The question is - what will be decided? Having got the talks, what hope is there that they will lead to a real expression of Irish self-determination and a British withdrawal? The history of British involvement and the majority of parties involved suggests an extremely depressing answer. After all, what pressure can Sinn Fein bring to bear that would lead to meaningful progress? The only answer seems to be to trust London, Dublin and Washington. Militant nationalism will only come out of the process better off if the balance of forces outside the negotiating room are strengthened in favour of genuine Irish self-determination. Hence the importance of Bloody Sunday and other initiatives this year. Withdrawal movement The withdrawal movement in this country faces similar issues. Having suffered from a process of disorientation and decline over the last five years, it has been wracked by division over the ceasefire. The leadership of TOM (the main organisation), breaking with its traditional opposition to British organisations taking positions on the tactics of the Irish struggle, has unsuccessfully sought to transform the movement into a campaign for negotiations and a support group for Sinn Fein's new strategy. Organisational and political differences continue. It is un- IRELAND UNFREE clear whether 1995 will see the continued existence of a viable British-based solidarity movement. This year's Bloody Sunday demonstration in Manchester will be an important signpost, as will events in Ireland. A good mobilisation from the left and the labour movement may well be decisive. 1995 Bloody Sunday Memorial March Saturday 28 January 12 noon Platt Fields MANCHESTER SPEAKERS include Labour MPs Jeremy Corbyn and Bill Etherington, Sinn Fein, a relative of a Bloody Sunday victim, Bloody Sunday Justice Group. Details: TOM 0171-609-1743
SOCIALIST OUTLOOK No.76. 21 January 1995, Page 12 Yitzhak Rabin visited Oman, Vanunu, a former nuclear