FOLLOWING THEIR narrow defeat in Brazil's 1989 presidential elections the Workers' Party (PT) believed that outright victory in 1994 was possible, and that it would represent a "qualitative leap forward for the Brazilian popular democratic movement" in their struggle for central government.
But though the PT significantly increased its initial vote, in comparison with 1989, it was not enough to prevent defeat at the first hurdle. In contrast, incoming President, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, forged an alliance which succeeded where the PT did not.
In the face of PT timidity Cardoso was able to present himself as the more credible alternative to the corruption and fraud which had characterised the Collor's administration, without for all that proposing any changes in economic direction.
In excerpts from the document below, the national committee of the influential Socialist Democracy tendency (which identifies with the positions of the Fourth International) of the PT opens the postelection debate with a critical examination of the Party's mistakes and the necessity for these to be corrected quickly.
The full text is available in the November issue of International Viewpoint, the Fourth International's English language review, available from "Outlook International", PO Box 1109, London N4 2UU, price £2.00. THE BRAZILIAN people, and the Brazilian left have suffered an important defeat. The bourgeoisie are now better placed than before to advance their project of "development" for a third of the population (and increasing the exclusion of the other two thirds); they want to make Brazil part of the neo-liberal "normality" of present-day capitalism.
However, neo-liberal adjustment is a long and conflictual process. It will meet with widespread social resistance. The role of the PT in the organisation of this resistance will be crucial to preventing Brazil becoming aligned with the dominant international economic, social and political bosses.
Decisive test
These elections have been not just a great battle but a decisive test for us. We have ended them on the defensive, having committed many mistakes. The PT turned out to be incapable of winning central government on the basis of Lula alone. It underestimated the degree of resistance which would be shown by the bourgeoisie. It also neglected aspects such as building the Party, • the ideological battle, co-ordination and encouragement of the social movements and the linking of our work in municipal apparatuses with the global political battle.
Given the structure of Brazilian society and the existing conditions of class struggle, we will only win central government with a much more cohesive and better organised party, which has the support of a larger, more active and more politicised social movement.
We cannot minimise the defeat potential for intervention in the socia movements.
Central role of PDSB The most important factor in our defeat was the Brazilian Social-democratic Party [PDSB - which despite its name is not linked to a popular democratic movement, and is situated half-way between social-democracy and liberalism]. Led by Cardoso it built a solid conservative allance.
A resolution passed by the PT's 8th national meeting defined the PDSB as a party where neo-liberal ideology predominated, but which also included some turned out to be marginal in importance. Their party has undergone a qualitative change, moving from the centre to the right to strengthen the leadership of the ern, dynamic and pro-active right, with the most coherent anti-popular project The PT must stand in clear opposition to the new government if we are to gain support for our programme. It will be an even more dangerous adversary than the previous government, due to its more organic links with the bourgeoisie and its greater legitimacy in the eyes of a party which is larger and more influential than that of Collor. From now on [the PDSB1 is to be regarded as a right-wing current even more dangerous than the traditional right.
Mistakes made by PT Throughout May and June the PT believed that the political situation was more favourable, when this was not the case. The bourgeoisie were completely occupied in forming an alliance.
But in the PT a triumphalist atmosphere prevailed. Speeches predicted a first- round victory, and increased the pressure for our campaign to be stretched to the maximum at the earliest possible moment. Much energy was wasted in preparing for a future Lula government.
The campaign carried out by most of the party was not within the framework of the resolutions made at the 8th and 9th national meetings - which were centred around structural reforms, the confrontation between the different projects for society and the proposal of a democratic line agreed at the last two national meetings and a (vain) attempt to present the party as a party of the poor while also trying to engage the confidence (or at least the neutrality) of the rich. This wavering was decisive in demobilising miliVillas. system - even the calamitous state of public healthcare, helped to create.
However we were incapable of putting forward a Lula proposal for fighting inflation at the most favourable moment, when he was ahead in the opinion polls and the currency had not yet been changed. We did not recognise inflation as one of the most important issues of the campaign.
This underestimation was coupled with differences and errors of analysis concerning the short-term effect of the introduction of the new currency. The predominant vision foresaw a number of short-term problems for the Real, notably that it would lead to recession and a serious loss of purchasing power.
Up until the end of July, and even into the beginning of August, it counted upon favourable moment and did not recognise inflation as one of the most important issues of the campaign."
a change of opinion on the part of the population when they received their salaries for July (the month when the Real was introduced).
This was the main point of conflict between the left and right wings of the party. It is completely untrue that, under the leadership of the left, the PT would have had only a narrow policy on alliances! In these elections all possible alliances were made. Where alliances were not made, this was because those with whom it was proposed that we should ally did not want an alliance with the PT, or alternatively would have imposed unacceptable conditions. There was also discussion of the type of alliance where we would abandon our political project and place ourselves in the position of subordinate partner to bourgeois hegemonic currents. The confusion in our relationship with the PDSB challenged the entire project of the PT. Yesterday's "ally", rapidly transforming itself into today's enemy was a decisive factor in disarming us. Cardoso was already the main proponent of PDSB entry into the Collor government and became Lula's chief adversary from the moment when he became Finance Minister. He gained in strength before our very eyes, yet the PT did not combat this, continuing FOURTH INTERNATIONAL to treat him as a privileged partner. Affirming the necessity to broaden our appeal amongst the middle class, by moderating our proposals, ignores the figures.
Majority
We have lost because, once again, we have been incapable of addressing ourselves in a meaningful way to the majority of the electorate, the "shirtless ones", the unorganised popular mass which brought Collor to power in 1989. It was this majority of the excluded who, deceived by the Real, allowed Cardoso to be elected.
The electoral battle has revealed a dilution of the socialist perspective of the party. Equally it has shown that the party has only a fragmented and partial understanding of what is meant to be the centrepiece of our programme: universal citizenship for all.
The real majorities, women and black people, and important minorities, such as lesbians and gay men and youth, did not appear in the project which we put forward for society. Finally, the concessions made to conservative forces, such as the Catholic Church and the armed forces, revealed an ambiguous approach.
The relationship between the party leadership and the deputies in the federal parliament is an old problem which has never been resolved. During the debate over revision of the Constitution, the leadership put forward the party line in the face of opposition from the parliamentary party.
This cost us a great deal of effort and a long and devastating argument in the press. The impetuous declaration made in the media by front-ranking deputies had a negative effect upon our campaign at critical moments.
They knew why they fought. Unofficial Struggles and Leadership on the Docks 1945-1989, by Bill Hunter Reviewed by Keith Sinclair, Secretary Hull Trades Council RADIO Humberside has just reported the "success" of the DSS in catching workers claiming the dole whilst working on Hull Docks. This is the reality of life in 1990s dockland.
Hull's docks have returned to the pre-war days - no job security, no union rights. The details may be different, but we are back to a time when workers scramble for the right to a day's work with low wages and appalling conditions.
The struggle of Britain's dockers for decent wages and conditions is a vital chapter in the history of the British working class.
The early battles to establish trade unionism on the docks have been well documented. Less well covered has been the post-war fight to improve the pay and conditions of dockers.
War Bill Hunter's book covers the period from the end of the second world war to the defeat of the 1989 strike against the abolition of the National Dock Labour Scheme. He explains how many dockers returned from the second world war determined to improve conditions on the docks.
The National Dock Labour Scheme of 1947 led fo improvements for dockers. However the Transport & General Workers Union representatives on the Dock Labour Boards were remote from the rank and file.
Of particular interest is Bill Hunter's account of the "prison break" of Northern dockers to join the National Amalgamated Stevedores and Dockers Union (NAS&D) in the 1950s. Thousands of Northern dockers left the TGWU to join the NAS&D. Hunter outlines the build-up of frustration of the dockers at the TGWU's bureaucracy.
He explains clearly the anger that was directed at full-time officials, who were seen to have more in common with the employers than the workers who they were supposed to represent.
One interesting question Hunter does not deal with are the differences between the Merseyside ports and Hull. On Merseyside, the unofficial leaders were clearly influenced by Trotskyism, indeed the Birkenhead Port Workers Committee voted to affiliate to the Fourth International in 1951. The position in Hull differed in a key respect, the role of organised Trotskyists in 1954 was on a much lesser scale.
The early seventies saw the struggle against the Tory Industrial Relations Act. It was a time when union strength was growing and the miners defeated the Tories in both 1972 and 1974. Dockers came into conflict with the legislation when they took action against the threat of containerisation.
Pentonville Five In 1972 the "Pentonville Five", dockers' leaders, were jailed. Seven dockers had originally been accused. It is indicative of the times that, in clearing two of the dockers, the court's president stated "We have not the slightest doubt that both will be as astonished, and perhaps a little hurt, the hear that we cannot be sure that either has broken the Court's orders". Support for the "Pentonville Five" was tremendous. The pressure from the ranks lead to the TUC general voting council to call a one day general strike.
Throughout the seventies and early eighties, the dockers were one of the best organised and most militant sections of the working class. Dockers showed solidarity to workers in dispute both this country and internationally. In Hull, for example, they responded to calls for international solidarity on Chile, Spain and South Africa.
Solidarity
I remember, in 1977, receiving a letter from a dockworker who was a member of the Swedish section of the Fourth International. It asked Hull dockers to refuse to handle a ship. Swedish dockers came across to Hull, solidarity action was delivered and the Swedish dispute won.
In 1972, the national dock strike continued after the release of the Pentonville Five against the spread of containerisation. The Jones-Aldington report was the outcome. It was a sell-out.
As Hull docker Terry Turner wrote, at the time, "I think the Special Committee has not done enough and that Jack Jones should not have called for a dock delegates' conference until greater guarantees about registered dockers' futures had been given".
The aftermath of the JonesAldington saw the reduction in the number of registered dockers from 60,000 to around 9,000 by the late eighties.
During the miners' strike of 1984-85, there was a very real opportunity to open a 'second front'.
Members of the Iron & Steel Trades Confederation (ISTC) were used to unload iron ore going to Ravenscraig. At Immigration on Humberside contract labour was used to unload iron ore for Scunthorpe steelworks.
It was decided to call a naPakistan army in 1971. tional docks strike from 9 July. All 13,000 registered dockers came out, as did a significant number of unregistered dockers. The dockers were in a very powerful position.
The involvement of ACAS, however, led to an agreement. Attempts to build a fighting unity with the miners were hampered. A victory on the docks could have changed the balance of forces in the miners' strike, ultimate defeat of which made it so much harder to fight in 1989 when the Tories came for the final abolition of the National Dock Labour Scheme.
On 7 April 1989, the Tories published a Bill to abolish the Dock labour Scheme. It was met by unofficial action in a number of ports. The rank and file leaders were preparing to fight to defend the scheme:
However the union nationally had made no serious preparations for a fight. The TGWU hesitated and the employers pressed their advantage, threatening the union and individuals with court action.
Abolished
Having failed to build on the spontaneous action, the TGWU re-balloted and got a three to one majority, but the result came after the scheme had been abolished.
Tilbury stewards were sacked, never to return to work. Previously solid ports crumbled. Hull and Southampton returned to work. The strike was broken, and with it the last remaining power of organised dock workers.
Bill Hunter's book is an im-. portant contribution to recording the history of dockers. It is recommended to anyone wanting to understand the processes that have been at work in Britain's ports over the last half century and how workers have organised to fight the bosses. nounced talk of Hindus leav-