no narrow economic interest for staying in northern Ireland, but it has immense political interests there, and it has huge economic interests in Ireland as a whole, and thus an interest in political "stability" in the north.
There is no way in which Britain can allow itself to be seen to be defeated by the forces of Irish Republicanism — any more than Mrs Thatcher could allow Britain to be defeated by General Galtieri over the Malvinas Islands.
The idea therefore that Britain could rapidly allow a united Ireland is wishful thinking. Of course, there is no reason in theory why Britain could not accept a united capitalist Ireland at some future point — but there are immense political obstacles to that for the foreseeable future. The main one is the social and political force represented by Loyalism, and its reserves of support inside the British ruling class and the Tory party.
Ascendancy
The basis of Loyalism has always consisted in two things - the union with Britain and the Protestant ascendançy. Much has been made recently of the fact that in many ways Protestant and Catholic workers share the same conditions. But a recent survey, published only two weeks ago, showed that discrimination against Catholics is still widespread.
Although in an economic recession its form may be modified, the Protestant ascendancy is intact, and this demonstrates the continued oppression of Catholic workers on a national basis.
Loyalism retains the political support of the overwhelming majority of Protestants, including Protestant workers. The idea that they can be "persuaded" into a united Ireland by the British government, as Sinn Fein appears to think, is ridiculous.
For the Tory government there is no need to do any persuading of the Loyalists. All the Downing Street declaration does is promise to accept a united Ireland - if the people of the north and the Irish republic both separately want it. This is, in fact, no change in the British position — Ted Heath was saying the same thing when he was Prime Minister twenty Armed struggle? People's politics? Revolution? Where are they now? sycars ago.
But this brings us to the crux of the matter, the central contradiction of the "peace process". The Republican movement has always demanded self-determination for the Irish people as a whole. It is this position which has been modified by the apparent acceptance of the "constitutional" road to Irish unity.
While Sinn Fein demands that Britain plays the role of "persuader" of the Loyalists, in fact it has accepted, for an indefinite period, the Loyalist veto on unification. All the Downing Street declaration does is promise to accept a united Ireland - if the people of the north and the Irish republic both separately want it. This is, in fact, no change in the British position - Ted Heath was saying the same thing when he was Prime Minister twenty years ago.
Far from being a factor to persuade the Loyalists to accept unification, their constitutional veto gives them the indefinite mechanism to hang onto the ascendancy and the union with Britain.
This immediately poses the question of how exactly socialists see the allegiance of the Protestants to the Orange state being broken, and that in turn raises the whole issue of the strategy for Irish national liberation.
Most Protestant workers don't want to go into a united capitalist Ireland, and that view is not entirely irrational. What benefits can the Protestant workers be expected to see in going into a reactionary clerical state? In fact there are none.
That's why for socialists national question has always been linked to the social question - the view that the road to Irish national unity and the road to socialism are inseparable. Socialists argue for a 32-county workers republic - the slogan of the socialist leader of the 1916 rebellion, James Connolly.
Breaking sections of the Protestant workers from Loyalism cannot be done on a purely nationalist basis, and certainly not on the basis of building an alliance with the architects of the 26county clerical state against them. It can only be done on the basis of linking the question of class struggle and class demands with national demands against discrimination and against the artificial border.
most advanced fighters from the Catholic ghettos have always understood that the aim of their struggle was a workers' republic, simple integration into the Dublin темне A socialist assessment of the IRA ceasefire must therefore adopt a critical stance to the whole Republican strategy of capitalist unity, and a broad "nationalist" front with the reactionary forces of Fianna Fail and the SLP, that it assumes.
In return for integrating themselves into the pro-capitalist pan-nationalist front, the Republicans have given up the armed struggle and handed a considerable victory to imperialism.
Socialists of course should not defend the "old" strategy of "the Armalite and the ballot box". That strategy in fact meant relegating the masses to a role of passive voting for Sinn Fein, and being passive applauders of the military exploits of the IRA.
Self defence
But despite the limitations of that strategy, armed self-defence remains crucial when the Catholic ghettos are faced with Loyalist death squads and British state forces.
Republican strategy had reached an impasse, and was long overdue for a major rethink. That rethink has gone in the wrong direction — towards pro-capitalist, pan-nationalist unity, and not towards redefining the national struggle in terms of an overall socialist strategy, D) which would have as its objective the long-term building of maximum unity with Protestant workers and with workers in the south.
The net result will not be any rapid resolution of the national question, but solely the demobilising of the national struggle.
The linchpin of imperialist strategy remains the Loyalist veto. British socialists should demand that the veto goes, that British troops are withdrawn and that nationalist prisoners of war are releasedf the national struggle in the Six