The crisis in the Six Counties and the various peace proposals have cast a spotlight on the evolution of the whole Irish nationalist tradition.
Irish nationalism took its main reference point from 1916 Proclamation, which called for an Ireland not merely free but Gaelic as well'.
But its practical application and most visible shape came from the Fianna Fail Party and its founder Eamon De Valera, which ruled almost without interruption from 1932 to 1973.
De Valera's austere vision was much mocked by the historical 'revisionists' like Roy Murphy and John A. Foster who came to the fore in the late 1970s.
As the economic crisis of the 26 counties began, they raised doubts about the wisdom of the original break with Britain.
Though the Six County State was dismissed as a failed political entity, the same seemed to becoming true of the 'Free' State.
Aided and abetted by some of a more left wing persuasion, they explained the causes of the great Famine, not so much by the actions (or rather the inaction) of the British, but by the internal relations of class and politics in Ireland.
The correction (perhaps necessary) of the 'imbalance' in the teaching of history in De Valera's Republic, soon led to an attack on Republicanism and even a nostalgic yearning on the part of some of the Dublin intelligentsia for a return to the 'United Kingdom'.
Recanting
The latest to beg forgiveness for the fervour of his nationalist views is Tim Pat Coogan, author of a famous book on the IRA and long-time former editor of the De Valera's Irish Press newspaper, who sets out to debunk the De Valera role in 20th century Irish history.
Such was the influence of the revisionists and the self-doubt among the mainstream Fianna Fail nationalists that ANALYSIS there were no official celebrations in 1981 of the 75th Anniversary of the 1916 Rising which led to the foundation of the cate It is against this background that the prospects for a so-called 'pan-nationalist alliance', stretching apparently from the IRA, through John Hume's SDLP to Dick Spring and Albert Reynolds in the Dublin Government, can be assessed.
Hume' stalks with Adams arose out of his desperation at the fact that in the Brooke/Mayhew talks, he was being offered a deal worse than the 'power sharing' but short-lived Sunningdale Agreement of 1974 - some kind of devolved Government with a token input from Dublin.
Hume knows that a return to Unionist Gerry Adams rule as existed before 1972 is not acceptable to the nationalist community in northern Ireland. He needs to bring in Sinn Fein and to try to get a green coating on a deal by involving Dublin as a guarantor the position of the nationalists.
His talks with Adams put Major under a certain amount of pressure to talk peace, but given Major's deal with the Unionists at Westminster and pressure from the right of the Tory Party, Major seems unlikely to make any concessions.
Adams saw the talks as a way breaking out of Sinn Fein's isolation and the limitations of the 'long war' strategy - while the IRA could fight the British to a standstill they couldn't drive them out by military means alone.
The strategy in the South was alliances, where possible, with Fianna Fail. Even after Haughey's betrayal of the Hunger Strikes showed the dangers of that policy, Sinn Fein failed to link with "There is no certainty that the British are capable of doing such a deal even on favourable terms. This is after all the Conservative and UNIONIST Party. It is weak and divided, relying on the Unionists to survive in parliament. Even the mildest concessions to nationalism would cause screams of betrayal from a section of the Party" the southern working class and allowed themselves to become isolated from feminist, anti-clerical and other progrescive Torred Now they are having to throw themselves at the tender mercy of Fianna Fail.
The Shankill bomb, while undoubtedly the result of pressure on the IRA to Loyalist workers: pressure on Tories do something about the murderous attacks on nationalists by the UFF and the UVF, was a serious tactical mistake.
It removed whatever limited gains Sinn Fein might have made as a result of the Hume/Adams talks and allowed Major off the hook, allowing him not to respond to the call for peace talks. He promptly called for complete surrender by the IRA.
While the Shankhill bombing and its aftermath has not affected the fundamental balance of forces in the north of Ireland it does reveal the true relationship of forces on the nationalist side.
The biggest gains in the aftermath of the bombing and the sectarian bloodletting of the loyalists were made by the Dublin government.
They are carefully preparing the way for constitutional changes in the South, dropping the historic claim of the republic to the Six Counties, in return for whatever limited role they might get as 'protectors' of the nationalists.
The Hume/Adams principles were hijacked and diluted by Deputy Taoiseach Dick Spring; and were unrecognisable in the six principles agreed between Taoiseach Albert Reynolds and John The general perception that the nationalists are willing to make concessions has led to calls on Major to take the Hume/Adams talks more seriously -some believe Major's original stance was a negotiating ploy to re-assure the Unionists in advance of more talks - and not to miss a 'historic opportunity for crisis of the British state. It may be the right time for a deal, given the perception of weakness and demoralisation among nationalists. vious and the price to be paid by the British may be small in comparison to what the war has cost them, and not just But there is no certainty that the British are capable of doing such a deal even on such favourable terms. This is after all the Conservative and Unionist Party. It is weak and divided, relying on the even the midest concessions to nationalism would cause screams of beHome Rule for Ireland, despite the Liberal Government's belief that Home Rule would save the Union. Party will, once again, block a settlement which is in the interests of the British ruling class and thereby save the nationalists from the historic submission for which they seem to be preparing themselves.
The second historical precedent is even bleaker: the 1921 Agreement, which led to the partition of Ireland and the creation of the Orange State, led also to civil war.
Peace is a long way off.
Liberation!
10p when sold • For a Red, Green and Feminist Youth Movement • November 1993 TUC NHS