THE DRAMATIC events in Russia have resuited in a victory for the most ruthless free-market proponents of capitalist restoration and will ensure a deepening attack on the (very limited) democratic gains of glasnost.
The half-cock attempted putsch by the parliamentary forces handed Yeltsin and his most uncompromising supporters like Gaidar victory on a plate. Far from being a serious attempt at taking power, Rutskoi's orders to supporters to seize government buildings was an act of desperation.
Yeltsin's decision to close down parliament was an open step towards instituting dictatorial power. The promise to hold parliamentary elections in December would not have stemmed the trend towards an ever-greater concentration of power in presidential hands.
The underlying reason for the drift towards an authoritarian state, now dramatically accelerated, is obvious; divisions inside the bureaucracy and resistance from the working class double the already-difficult task of imposing free-market, pro-capitalist reforms.
In Russia and beyond there has been growing talk of a 'Chilean solution' - the need for harsh, semi-military government to crush all resistance to the drive to restore capitalism.
As reported by our Moscow correspondent on page 4, the whole of the Russian left opposed Yeltsin's anti-parliamentary coup. As an elementary step to oppose dictatorship this was correct; but any political support to Yeltsin's main opponents, people like Rutskoi and Khasbulatov, would have been misplaced.
The political alliance of semi-Stalinists and nationalists which backed the parliamentary leaders represents not a working class alternative, but sections of the industrial and military bureaucracy. These people are not principled oppo nents of capitalist restoration, but are worried about its pace and impact on their bureaucratic role and privileges.
Doubtless a military victory for Rutskoi would have slowed down the pace of attempted pro-market reform, but not blocked it altogether. But there is no guarantee that it would have led, eventually, to a more democratic outcome. The Stalinist and nationalist forces are deeply mired in authoritarianism and vicious opponents of working class self-organisation and workers power.
But Rutskoi did not win and indeed could not have won. The reason can be simply seen by comparing the Rutskoi grab for power with the Romanian revolution four years ago. Yeltsin could easily win, as Causcescu could not, because the armed insurgents in Moscow were backed by perhaps ten thousand demonIn Russia and beyond there has been growing talk of a 'Chilean solution' - the need for harsh, semi-military government to crush all resistance to the drive to restore capitalism. strators, whereas the Bucharest insurgents were backed by millions.
It is not armed groups that make real revolutions but armed groups supported by insurrectionary general strikes, by really mass demonstrations, by the actions of millions. But the overwhelming majority of the working class, in Moscow as well as in the rest of Russia, were passive spectators of these events.
The lack of involvement of most workers represented a sober estimate of reality on their part. While disillusionment with Yeltsin is widespread, very few had any confidence in the parliamentary leaders. As Colin Mead and Pohl Funders-Larsen explain elsewhere in this issue, the parliamentary leaders had in the past themselves been complicit with market reforms which have dramatically worsened working class living standards, and made alliances with Yeltsin when it suited their careers.
So the mass of workers ignored the calls by the various union federations for strikes; and while thousands turned up outside the White House to protest Yeltsin's actions, they were a minority - and not even all of these protestors supported Rutskoi and Khasbulatov.
Doubtless there was some passive support for the rebels, but all reports talk of this being concentrated among pensioners, people with a strong nostalgia for the Stalinist past and for the triumphant Socialist Great Russian nationalism of the Stalinist period.
The passivity of the workers, and the deepening attack on democracy represented by the outcome of these bloody events, tragically highlights the weakness of independent workers self-organisation and the political organisation of the left.
Up till now the only substantial left' organisation has been grouped around Trudovia Rossia ('Labour Russia'), dominated by the Stalinist Communist Workers Party of Russia, which has tens of thousands of members, and by hardline nationalist forces.
Weak unions
Groups like the Party of Labour and the smaller Marxist and anarchist groups have a few hundred supporters, if that, and the trade unions are very weak. There is a long, hard struggle ahead to build a real working class alternative. Such an alternative will not prepare the basis for a really mass opposition to capitalist restoration if it fails to break with the Stalinist past.
The immediate future for Russia is grim. The road is open to dictatorial rule and to further misery for tens of millions as pro-capitalist reforms further deepen unemployment. The danger of the breakup of Russia has been brought nearer.
But there is one qualification to this grim scenario which has all the Western leaders quaking, even as they hand out hypocritical plaudits to the "democrat' Yeltsin. For Yeltsin has conquered in a conflict in which the working class was not engaged, in which the working class had no confidence in his opponents, and in which its mighty power did not move. In this sense, the early panic in the confrontation with Rutskoi revealed Yeltsin's weakness not his strength.
The gigantic strength of the Russian working class has yet to be brought into play - when it is Yeltsin will be revealed for what he is - a temporary and weak figure.
SOCIALIST OUTLOOK No. 50, October 9 1993, Page 4