This month is the 60th anniversary of Hitler's accession to power. Sixty years on, the spectre of fascism is far from dead, especially in Germany. In the first of the three-part series TOM HAGEN looks at how Hitler's Nazi party took power. ON THE EVENING of 30 January 1933 Berlin was taken over by tens of thousands of Nazi Bownshirts in a torchlit march to celebrate their leader becoming Chancellor. They were joined by thousands of members the Stalhelm ('Steel Helmets), the paramilitary force of the extreme right-wing nationalist German National Peoples Party (DVPP).
Like everyone eise, the street thugs of Nazism were stunned by the case with which Hitler had come to power. For there had been no Nazi insurrection, no fighting of Brownshirts and Blackshirts at barricades against the Reichsavr, police, the Social Democratic Iron Front or even against the Communist Red Fighters Front. Hitler had simply been appointed Chancellor of a coalition government in a legal way by the ageing President Hindenburg.
The response the social democratic SPD and the Communist KPD was catastrophic. Spontaneous strikes broke out. Delegations of social democratic workers rushed to their party headquarters demanding a last ditch open fight against the Nazis. A minority in the leadership of the KPD demanded in a stormy meeting at the giant Karl Liebknecht House headquarters, far too late, a united front with the social democrats to crush the But the SPD leadership replied that civil war would only aid the Nazis; and the KPD leadership replied with the infantile slogan 'after Hitler, , us' insisting that Nazi rule would be a short interlude. Sections hat aer would be a Sections of the right wing prisoner of the coalition, a pathetic delusion. For Hitler immediately ordered that the police and army laborate fully with the Brownshirts against the workers' movement.
The burning down of the Reichstag (parliament) building, probably by the Nazis themselves, was used as the justhicanon for a witch aunt asanst ail workers' organisations. The powerful Prussian police force was pu: under laz соло.
January 1ä : 990 Ac. 33 In this atmosphere of witch hunt, new elections were called for March met again, many of the SPD and Communist deputies were not present; either dead, already in concentration camps or having fled into exile.
Dead democracy
Parliamentary democracy. was by March 1933 stone cold dead. Astoundingly the Communist international and the underground KPD leadership continued to claim that Nazi rule would be short-lived, and that the Communists would soon come to power.
How had this catastrophe hap pened? The Nazi victory combined three things; the winning over of central sections of the big German bourgeoisie to anti-parliamentarism; the building of a mass Nazi movement out of the ranks of the frenzied middle classes and impoverished lumpen proletarial; and he insane tactics adopted by the SPD and KPD leaderships.
But for all these factors to come together required the construction of a counter-revolutionary leadership with ense da pros or tacos, organi n, propaganda and subterfuge. TH around him. The tragedy was that Hitler faced a Communist Party whose leadership had been lobotomised by Germany emerged from the first world war defeated and impoverished. Socialist revolution broke out in November 1918, and the two main socialist parties, the SPD and the more left wing USPD (Independent Social Democrats) took the power in coalilion, based on the strength of workers' councils.
Capitulation
The question the workers' movement faced was precisely what to do with the parliamentary democracy? The rightwing SPD leaders decided on the latter course, and the centrist leaders of the USPD capitulated, resulting in the split by Rosa Luxemburg to form the small German Communist Party.
Incensed by the drift of events, Berlin workers rushed into an ill-advised attempt to seize power through a putsch The SPD leaders, in carly 1919, called in the counter-revolutionary Freikorps to crush the workers Out of the defeat of the 1918-19 revolution parliamentary democracy, * Wema: Republic, was re-founded. But economic and social stability was elusive. Economically. ravaged, faced huge Weimar Germany also reparation payments to the allies as a result of the war The ongoing crisis reached a climax 1 92. Dy ten the maway or the USPD had been won over to fuse with the KPD, forming a mass revolutionary communist party. In October 1923 the KPD, under contradictory orders from Moscow, flunked a pre-revolutionary crisis, calling off an attempt to seize Communists engaged in a week of bitter street fighting, but were eventually crushed.
Germany's default on reparation payments also led in January 1923 to the French occupation of the Ruhr Alarmed by Germany's continued inoisy, international smocraus ecided on decisive action to bolste the German economy and stabilise the political system.
Thus in 1924, under the Dawes plan, the United States began to pump huge loans into German industry, and national and local government. For the first time since 1919 the SPD was ejected from any participation in On the basis of these huge loans German industry began Moreover, SPD local authontes enab ea mumapa works i be expanded. The number of unemployed fell, and 'municipal socialism' flourished.
From 1924 onwards the KPD, under orders from Moscow, began to adopt the insane theory that social democracy was the left wing of fascism' and the rent of working class leftism, borne out of hatred of the SPD for its counterrevolutionary role in the 1918-19 revoluton Right turn This ultra-leftism was briefly abated in 1926-7, when the Comintern made a 'right turn, and joint activities were taken up with the SPD. Most successful was a joint campaign for the expropriation of the ultra-rich German princes; one of his worst political defeats.
But the short-lived boom conditions brought about by the Dawes plan did not lead to a lessening of the class strug gle. On the contrary, big business attempted - along with the bourgeoisie in all major imperialist countries - to 'rationalise' through the fusion of firms into big trusts and by closing down inefficient plants.
Hitler's movement was until the mid-lyzus very small. rus anemr to seize power in the 1924 Munich beer hall putsch' was a fiasco, routed by a detachment of 100 armed police. Hitler, sentenced to five years in jail, served less then one, during which he wrote Mein Kampf.
By the mid-1920s Hitler had decided that the path to power lay through the winning or support amons die caues of the giant c capitalist trusts He had mass base, using elements of anticapitalist demagos backers that he with assuring potential capitalist would maintain capitalism intact, while defeating Marxism -ie the KiD and SPD, and the giant ADGB trade union federation.
In 1927 he decided upon two things which would ensure breakthrough. away from trying to build the Nazis in the big industrial towns, towards the rural population. Nazi agitation had fallen on stony ground among the workers in the big cities. But hard-hit farmers, classic petit-bourgeois small owners, proved a more fruitful recruiting ground. Among them the Nazis found support for denundation of the 'Jewish' bankers and the socialist parties.
Second Hitler turned to politically defeat the 'anti-capitalist' elements in his own party, the left fascists led by Otto and Gregor Strasser, supported for period by Goebbels. Taming the wilder elements the Brownshirts was vital to sustaining a base among big industrialists. This conflict was never fully resolved until the 1934 'night of the long knives' when the Bownshirt leaders were murdered by the rival SS.
Countryside Recruitment in the countryside pushed Nazi strength towards the 100,00 mark - still a small party by the standards of the mass workers' parties; In the 'red' inner-city strongholds the Nazis never approached leaders. It was the KPD, and above all the Nazis, who attracted the new unemployed. But the Nazis also began to build a base among the ruined urban middle classes. after all, the SPD had at this point one million members. sened in 1928 fierce labour battles broke out. The coalition goverment led by Catholic Centre Party Chancellor Wil. helm Marx, proposed sweeping reductions of unemployment pay.
When a compromise proposal was rejected by the ADB social democrat union federation, it was clear that Marx was in big trouble with the right wing unable tame the workers. Peace in the ketchstas Marx resigned.
But the 1928 elections were a disaster for the bourgeoisie: the social democrats and Communists won more than million votes between them (3.7 million for the Communists), and all the right wing parties lost out. The Nazis were reduced to 810,000 votes. The SPU formed a coalition government with one of their own members, Mueller, as Chancellor.
There now opened up a completely new political situation. Mueller was a prisoner of his centre and right-wing coalition partners. His government carried out a series of cutbacks attacking the workers, as well as agreeing huge expenditure for the military.
But this was not enough for big business, alarmed by the strong showing of the workers' parties. Constant pressure to adopt ever more right wing polices was piled on Mueller.
Hitler now made a big political turn, totoards a 'united front of the right wing'. It was becoming increasingly clear that the big bourgeoisie was split on the very issue of paritamentary democracy and the Weimar republic. Hitler turned to to make a common front with the leader of the DVPP right wing, Hugenberg, who had the loyalty of the paramilitary Stal. helm.
This united front, topped off with a huge joint demonstration of the Brownshirts and Stalhelm Harpsburg, gave Hitler immense prestige among the right-wing bosses, who began to see him as the leader of a serious movement who could defend their interests.
For Hitler, the united front tactic was a way of building a solid force in German politics which would split the bourgeoisle on the issue of parliamenWhile the alliance with the Stalhelm forces was immensely unpopular with some of the more "radical' SA Brownshirt streetfighters, temptuous of old-fashioned right-wing monarchism. it was in tact a brilliant tactical move. Hitler had constructed a the most dynamic force, the only ones capable of constructing a mass counter revolutionary movement.
Nazi breakthrough
Mueller's fall was a matter of time; the collapse of his government led to the 14 September 1930 general election in which the Nazis made their spectacular breakthrough, leaping votes in 1928 to 6.4 million. This represented the end of the new relationship of forces which had been established in 1928 by the upsurge of the workers' parties. It also represented the effects of the 1929 stockmarket crash, and the huge economic crisis now exploding in Germany.
To prepare for this situation Hitler had made his turn towards big business, to the amance with the magendorg right wing, and to building a mass rural base; a mass force and powerful rightw ing bloc had been established for the next stage of the push for power.
On the other hand the SPD had been compromised by the role of Mueller in government; and the KPD hamstrung by its crazy theory that the SPD was the left wing of fascism' and its refusal to make a united front with the SPD.
Now the SPD was evicted from the government, and Bruening of entre Party became Chancellor. Unable to get a pariiamentary majority on key proposals, he began to resort to government by decree; Trotsky called is government 'Bonapartist, a form o authoritarian government, dispensing ing not to dear of hering toe treme ence, for fear of letting in the extreme ight. In confidence motions, only th PD and Nazis voted solidly agains Bruening.
'Third period'
The KPD was now fully in the grip of the 'third period" ultra-leftism, which held all parties but the Communists were now part of fascism, and the SPD 'dangerous' Neumann and Remmele, the key KPD leaders, unleashed 'storm in the streets KPD fighters fought against Nazis and social democrats allke. Occasionally the KPD and Nazis would make a secret pact to disruptSPDmeetings. Localattemptsto make common cause with social democratic workers were stamped on.
But the SPD held its grip on the big majority of class conscious workers. The KPD embarked on the crazy 'red unions' attempt to forge their own unions outside the ADGB; and ad. vanced the 'united front from below which refused to address demands to theSPDleaders, but urged SPD workers to join KPD front organisations - ie to put themselves under the leadership of the KPD!
For the leaders of big business, increasingly discachantca wiw bourgeois democracy, Breuning's Bonapartist regime was not right wing enough. Eventually he suffered the fate of Mueuet, and was repaced by aren reac tionary von Papen.
The salami tactics of the right-wing bloc were now clear. At each parliamentary crisis a new, more right-wing government, was installed only to be further undermined from the right.
Failure
The failure of the bourgeoisie to build a single, stable party representing rightparliamentary coalition open to being Within the right-wing bloc the Nazis were easily the most dynamic force. The 1929 crisis had opened up the road from the rural mass base built in 1927-29, to a new orientation to the unemployed in were now engaged in a life-or-death battle to prevent the Nazis building an urban mass base.
In fact, in the 'red' inner-city strongholds the Nazis never approached the parties. But the Jesperate unemployed were repelled by the capitulations of the SPD leaders. It was the KPD, and above all the Nazis. who attracted the new unemployed. But the Nazis also began to build a base among the ruined urban middle classes.
In order to sustain the march back to the cities, Hitler was compelled to allow support for some workers' struggles, most notoriously the 1932 Berlin transport workers strike, when Nazis and Communists jointly staffed the picket lines and fought the police. The PD also crazily supported the Nazi attempt to bring down the Social Democratic Prussian regional government, dubbing the vazi-inspired referend um the 'red referendum' With von Papen in power, and using a KPD attack on a Nazi march in Altona as the excuse to dismiss the SiD government in Prussia, Hitler's road to power was open. but ar te ass tree erecoons in November 1932 the workers parties still polled more than the Nazis.
Now only a joint call by the workers' organisations for a united front to defeat the fascists could win the day. That call Plebeian base Hitler came to power because decisive sections of big business, fearful of proletarian revolution, abandoned bourgeois democracy. He came to power because he masterminded a right-wing blocin which the Nazis were the decisive force, building a plebeian base for counter-revolution.
Once the bourgeoisie had abandoned democracy, onlya left united front, with the KPD as its propelling core, could stop the march of the fascists and open the road to socialist revolution. Bone-headed ultra-leftism and sectarianism prevented that from happening.
The craven role of social democracy was predictable. Added to it the suicidal line of the Stalinised KPD, directed from Moscow, brought the historic defeat the world's most powerful labour movement, sealed the fate of Europe's Jewish population, and made the second world war inevitable. In our next issue: Trotsky, the KPD and the united front. No. 35 January 16, 1993 Page 7
sixth successive election to win International News
'main enemy. Ultra-leftism in the KPD was also propelled by a genuine cur-
the power of the workers' parties. But the desperate unemployed were repelled by the capitulations of the SPD