thwarted, leading to a restoration of capitalist political dominance.
State interests
The ten years of PSLN rule saw an important political evolution: from an authentic revolution at the beginning, to a situation where state interests prevailed over popular interests.
The crosion of the social base of the revolution, provoked by the war and the economic crisis, favoured a change in the balance of forces which led to the electoral defeat of the FSLN in 1990. A rightist coalition (UNO) took power. shocked by its defeat, the Sandinist: leadership launched an appeal to defend the conquests of the revolution with the hope of preserving its gains.
But what gains sere there to defend? There were mainly of an institutional poracar character, ust, the consatution and the institutions; the army and the government - the agrarian reform - and the property acquired by the FLN itself.
Participation
No mention was made of the need to defend the Sandinistas' economic model influence, not to mention the participa. tion, of the people in economic management.
Why? Because the model was already worn out, and by 1988 replaced by an adjustment policy strongly marked by monetarism.
Social policies decreased together with the regulating role of the state. Popular participation in decision making had been very weak - something recoxmisca by Lame Urtesa mimselin an interview published in 1991, when he followed by the FSLN if it had won the erecoons woula not nave peen very allferent to those pursued by the new except for sensibility.
The FLN presents the revolutionary heritage only in institutional terms. Thus: We obtained a natonal state. a constitution, a democratic, parliamentary framework and an army. Most of these did not exist before, and that is why they are identified with the gaingof the revolution.
For domestic and international politi5 Dec, 1992 No. 33 Not sure what Chamorro holds cal reasons the new government ended up accepting this framework Counter-revolutionary Because of this, the counter-revolutonary character of the government was not clear to the Sandinista leadership.
The term counter-revolutionary' was reserved for 'Somozistas' described as being in the centre and the PSLN entered into negotiations with it.
More than eleven meetings have been held between the FLN and the government since 1990, including eight focusing on social conflict. Agreements have been forged on the executive, the army and the economy. Without this, thought the FSLN, stability would be jcopard. ised; and the FLN would not gain from instability and crisis, even if came back into government.
On the basis of these group us formad in the FSLN representing a certain continuity with the post-1988 FSLN positions; vision, with social considerations taking a hack seat to state interests. and a search for stability and development in alliance with certain sectors of the bourgeoisie.
Struggle
After the electoral defeat the PSLN did not manage to develop a strategy which could appeal to the masses in a framework of democratic political strug'social gle.
Before 1990 the revolutionary project was already in crisis; its image was completely damaged after the adoption of monetarist measures months after the electoral defeat were particularly chaotic.
Even if the PSLN leadership did not authority of its leaders appeared to be institutional sidered infallible.
obscured by party discipline far-right The government was tempted to cling an orthodor economic for unions and deregulation of the economy. The slogan many sacrifices. But the six sections of the employing class directiv threatened. the defeat and lack of political vision. A feling of mistrust, mixed with declining authority and credibility, arose concern ing a leadership that once was con The party was full of rumours about the effects of the clectoral avalanche, Subsequently, the Front, attached to a fetishistic conception of power, at- economy onto its institutional positions to the detriment of an analysis the state. of the socio-economic forces at work.
Stabilisation The FSLN subordinated defence and articulation of the material interests of its" mass base among the poor to a scheme levels. for political stabilisation of the country.
Thus, the FSLN found itself politically disarmed and increasingly dependent firstly on conservative political stabilisation and then, to preserve that, on the neo-liberal economic policies of the This was clear in the FLN's support which placed the social organisations in a position of having to negotiate from a defensive position, and in its disorienta tion in face of state restructuring and The leadership thought it could manoeuvre in the upper circles and contain the capitalist restoration process. The 'govern from below' was nly an empty compensation for thi ank and file, upset by defeat after s Nothing stood in the way of the rapid economic restructuring which restored the power and the rights of the strongest develop All social roles were changed; a high level of conservatism and co-option of personnel was introduced into the army, tional. the police, state functionaries and even the PSLN itself, as well as in its satellite organisations.
The state created by the revolution with the aim of assuring a certain class equilibrium which the PSLN also intended to use to preserve the revolutions ins preservation of cell in paces in eas preservation of certain places in the political system. the co-option of unctionaries. the development of the market, and the liberalisation of the have gradually reduced the progressive and regulatory aspects of The free market needs the establishment of order and the maintenance of social hierarchy that it is now creating:
A bourgeoisie is being reformed, and the PSLN Is tied to this process at several Intermediary These are the factors which have led the PSLN into a situation where it plays the role of intermediary between different interest Kroups within sne framework of capitalist restoration.
In the absence of an overall strategy, the organisation tends to function as a feudal network of interest groups with an essentially corporatist dynamic.
possible that the sum total of the Sandinista revolution will be the refounding of the national state and the political system, but this means the restoration of the old class society.
FSLN become bureaucratised Party in waica cor poratist dynamics are predominant. But it can also be renewed as a party that will be an indispensable component of social equality and participation in the political system that it will create and continue to The above is edited from an article which first appeared in International Viecopoint, fortnightly magazine of the Fourth Inierna-