the banning of strikes and growing repres sion.
Left repressed
From 1976-8 the Dergue fought a bloody battle to repress the far-left Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Party, and eventually the more moderate All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement (M'eison). The Congress of Ethiopian Unions was also repressed.
All the forces in this conflict made reference to Marxism, utilising. Maoist-type rhetoric. But despite radical measures, including nationalisations and a brutal collectivisation imposed on an unwilling peasantry, the Dergue never represented a force for socialism. It was a radical, authoritarian petty-bourgeois political force, which crystallised a new privileged class based on the state bureaucracy.
The real face of the Dergue was most vividly shown in its long war against the peoples of Eritrea and Tigre. This war was fought with utter brutality, making attacks on the ivilian population as a matter of course Norse, the Dergue showed utter disregard for the consequences of its military campaign in disrupting aid to the millions of victims of Succeesive tamine.
While the country remained war torn and hundreds of thousands died of starvation, Mengıstu lavishea state resources on prestige projects and sumptuous buildings in Addis Ababa.
It seems unlikely that the hostile demonstrations which greeted the entry to the capital of the ERDPF enjoyed real mass support. It appears that they were organised by the tiny groups of people who supported the Mengistu regime. Nonetheless, the violence with which they were met is not a good sign for the future.
Under Brezhnev the USSR backed Mengistu in return for military bases. The danger is that the new regime will be coerced into a pro-Western role.
The example of neighbouring Somalia shows that a pro-Western stance is no guarantee that aid to enable the new regime to stave off famine will be forthcoming.
by Charlie van Gelderen IT WOULD SEEM that even deadlines must have a deadline. After weeks of prevarication, it was only the initiative of African National Congress hunger strikers that pushed the leadership nto taking action.
In December of last year the Consultative Conference of the ANC called for the implementation of the agreements with the • principally the release of all political prisoners and amnesty for returning exiles.
It set April 30 as the date showdi be these lf ent, the which these demands ANC would organise mass actions, consumer boycotts and hunger strikes among political prisoners still ba hind bars.
April 30 came and went and the only thing that hap pened was that the ANC eadership issued a new ultimatum to the government. They demanded the sacking of the two ministers in charge of defence and security, Malan and Vlok.
No action They again threatened action if these demands were not met by May 9. This deadline also passed. The minicrore Maro not carker No mass actions took place.
On May Day, howawer there were limited demonstrations against the continued imprisonment of olitical prisoners. Abou 350 members of the ANC Youth League were arrested in rallies in various parts of the country and about 30 of it's activists occupied the provincial offices of the ruling National Party in Cape Town for three hours, before being evicted by the police.
In his now well-established role of maintaining contact with the government behind the scenes. Nelson Mandela telephoned Security Minister Adriaan Vlok late at night and ob tained the release of the youth who were arrested.
Hunger strikes
But at the beginning of May, six political bonsoners started a hunger strike, to be joined by others later. Initially, one of them, Rafiq Rohan, was released from hospital because he was so weak that he could hardly stand. The prisoners condition was said to be critical, and on the brink of kidney damage. further six prisoners were released some three weeks later, to coincide with the opening of De Klerk's 'Peace Conferencé' This hunger spurred the ANCleadership into action. The entire leadership joined ANC members nationwide in a 24 hour fast. Whether this will be enough to satisfy the militant elements inside the ANC remains to be seen.
It is also symbolic of Mandela's pragmatic and conciliationist style of leadership that while there were demonstrations against Margaret Thatcher, feted by white South Africa for her heroic (sic) stand against sanctions, Nelson Mandela had a forty minute telephone conversation with her.
'Peace talks'
The problems confronting the ANC leadership are growing. It is increasingly seen by rank and file members and supporters as initiative in negotiations with the Pressure from the ranks and the increasing evidence that the security forces are conniving with Inkatha violence against the ANC seems, at last, to have had an effect. The ANC, as well as the COSATU union federation, refused to take part in the 'Peace Talks' convened by the government under the chairmanship of President De Klerk, at which the right wing Conservative Party and Inkatha were represented.
Demonstrations It also called for demonstrations in support of the prisoners in the few days refore the 'Poare Talks', in which both Winnie Mandela and ANC Chief of Staff Chris Hani were arrested.
But there can be no doubt that De Klerk now feels he has the upper hand in his dealings with the ANC. It is true that his white electoral No. 3 constituency is being steadily eroded. in a recent by-election in the Orange Free State, the Conservative Party candidate more than doubled his majority.
So De Klerk has had to look around for new alliances. Buthelezi has replaced Mandela as a potential partner in a future 'nonracial' government. This lespite the fact that a recent opinion poll showed that he commands only 10% support among black South Africans. It is even doubtful that he has thesupportof the majority of Zulus.
Confident
The 'coloured' Labour Party has now merged with the previously all-white National Party, thus assuring De Klerk of a majority in the event of the three, at present racially constituted, chambers merging in the future.
That is why De Klerk could confidently declare, in an interview with the Financial Times that the National Party 'will have its hands on the tiller of government for a very long time to come'.
He is however, prepared to put his power on the line with elections on the basis of a universal franchise - one person, one vote - across the colour bar. Instead he is hoping that the orchestrated violence now weeping ine colinrr will tamnede morprata niac. into his camp as the only alternative to the savagery going on in the townships. June 8, 1991
Serbian nationalists rallied against Milosevic's communists Croatian military police prepare for battle PHOTOS: David Stewart-Smith (Insight)
This limits the authority of the federal government, which survives only by agreement of the republics. The influence of Ante Markovic, federal prime minister, thus derives mainly from the upport he enjoys abroad - in the USA, JSSR and Common Market countries -who for their own reasons wish to preserve Yugoslavia's political integrity In recent months however Markovic's position has been boosted by support from the Yugoslav army leadership.
Until a few weeks ago, the commander-in-chief of the army was the collective head of state - the Yugoslav presidency. The presidency was made up of one representative from each of the eight federal units, elected by secret ballot of their respective assemblies. Its decisions were made bv maioritv vote On 15 May each year, the presidency would elect a president from among its Guide to main ethnic groups i Serbians SLOV Slovenes Croats HUNG Hungarians Muslims MONT Montenegrins Albanians MAC Macedonians Turks Other demonstrations erupted in Serbia. Milosevic asked the army to introduce a state of emergency throughout Yugos lavia, but the army refused without an express order from the presidency. This was denied.
Two things immediately followed: Serbia decided to destroy the national presidency and the army turned to federal prime minister Markovic. should be stressed that the conflict is not an ethnic conflict. The Serbian regime's hostility to Croatia is not based on eth-