By Charlie van Gelderen The ANC has agreed to talks with the South African government over 'security' matters in the wake of the Ciskei massacre.
But after the fusillade which slaughtered 27 people on the borders of the puppet homeland' on 8 September the 'moderate' leaders of the ANC face enormous difficulties in re-opening the CODESA talks on a political solution.
All the evidence, and the eyewitness account of the neutral National Peace Secretariat, confirms that the Ciskei troops fired indiscriminately at the unarmed marchers.
A great number of the marchers were still on the South African side of the border when they were killed or wounded.
The South African police, escorting the marchers, disappeared shortly before the shooting started. They claimed they had to go to protect whiteowned homeland roperty in the Formal negotiations ground to a halt after the Boipatong massacre in July, although the talks continued between ANC Trying to bridge the gap - Nelson Mandela general secretary Cyril Ramaphosa and the Minister of Law and Order Hernus Kriel.
Manoeuvres The negotiations strategy of the ANC, begun when Nelson Mandela was still in jail, will no longer be accepted by a large section of the rank-and-file, already exasperated by what they see as the stalling manoeuvres of the regime and their own leadership.
The so-called 'homelands' amount to one of the key issues facing the liberation movement in its struggle for a democratic They were the very foundation of Verwoerdian apartheid. Areas were put aside and designated as the homelands' of various black nations.
Whole populations, some of whom had no contact with these so-called homelands for generations, were unPeruvian left. tion to complement the noose. a periphery of 100,000.
ceremoniously driven out of their homes, their dwellings bulldozed, and dumped in these territories. There they were forced to stay, trying to eke outan existence in very difficult conditions, unless their labour was required in the farms, mines, factories and homes of the white ruling class. The Pretoria government usually made sure that obedient puppets were installed in the seats of power in these territories. Obnoxious Ciskei leader Brigadier Oupa Ggozo was a particularly obnoxious and servile puppet of the Pretoria regime. Áfter he came to power in a coup in March 1990 he ruled as an absolute dictator, subject only to the whims of his masters in Pretoria. Even the mildest criticism could land the perpetrator in prison for five years. Pretoria saw in him a willing ally in its plans for a federal constitution in which minority rights (read: white privileges) would be safeguarded. South Africa has denied responsibility for the thrived. Layers of the poor and leftist intellectuals saw them as the only effective opposition.
The Peasant Confederation (CCP) port. and the General Confederation of Peruvian Workers (CGTP) were forced underground, with little experience of clandestine operation. The same is true of much of the Pol Pot.
Having increased their urban presence, particularly in Lima Sendero believes itis on the threshold of the strategic offensive for taking This is the fifth and final stage ability. Sendero theory dictates for the Peruvian revolution; full scale civilwar in which the people's army will move in from the countryside to surround the towns, with urban insurrec Such a view considerably overestimates Sendero's real backing, perhaps 5,000 cadre and No. 28 De Klerk - blood on his hands massacre on the grounds that the Ciskei is an independent staté' - although one recognised only by Pretoria! Oupa Goozo's coup, which overthrew the former dictator Lennox Sebe, originally aimed to align the Ciskei with the ANC. Alarmed Pretoria sent Col. Hugo of the South African defence Force to head the Ciskei's military intelligence and to turn the new dictator. Within weeks this strategy had succeeded. Anton Niewoudt, an officer in charge of South Africa's military intelligence, set up International Research as the brigadier's personal intelligenceorganisation. It organised the African Democratic Movement on the same lines as Buthelezi's Intkatha freedom Party. Funds and arms were provided to bolster Goozo's power. The De Klerk government's hands are dripping with the blood of the victims. They will be avenged. Not so shining now - captured Sendero guerrillas Initially, Sendero's violence was directed at families who had ruthlessly dominated whole communities for centuries. This won them supBut with the increase in their activity, Sendero began attacks on left-wing opponents. Many Peruvian leftists began to characterise them as followers not so much of Mao but of Kampuchea's With its often indiscriminate bombing campaign in Lima, Sendero are now probably respon-. sible for most deaths.
Squeezed between the military and Sendero are the poor and the democratic workers' and peasants' organisations. Their immediate response has been self-defence, based on independence from both bodies of armed men, and genuine structures of democracy and accountBut in other areas the military have been organising peasants' groups of the same name under the pretext of fighting Sendero.
Democratic self-defence organisations deserve and need our solidarity. Despite a real decline in struggles they have a potential to become centres of an alternative popular power - a third force that in the future will be better placed to assert itself in a chaotic Peru.
26 Sept, 1992