ALL BUT ONE of the parties in the north of Ireland are to participate with the Dublin and London governments in a process of negotiation.
Secretary State Peter Brooke appears to have pulled off a coup in initiating the first significant round-table talks on Northern Ireland in 18 years.
The bottom line' has been the objective or a new partuonist settlement based on devolution, and the exclusion of Sinn Fein. The initiative should be opposed on this basis alone.
Excluded
It excludes both a party repre senting 10% of the six county population and the aspiration of the majority of the Irish people (confirmed in recent opinion polls) for national unity and independence.
Simultaneously the British are drafting in military reinforcements ano tion (the 1991 preparing legisla- Emergency Powers Bill) to add new unprecedented repressive powers to uphold the border.
The last such initiative was the 1974 Sunningdale Agree ment. That was based on a combination of 'power-sharing' (government of the six counties by majority rule, but with the 'minority' given minor executive responsibilities) with an 'All-Ireland Council'.
The Unionists' desire for a return to the unfettered secmilitant republicanism. It failed. Support for Sinn Fein was not significantly eroded. The Unionists were intransigently opposed. If anything, violence increased.
Softened up
But the Accord did help to soften up the constitutional nationalists into accepting further political compromise. Under Sunningdale the all-Ireland dimension was there at the beginning as an integral ele ment of the devolved powersharing package.
Under the current talks there will be three stages that will ensure an internal settiement 1s -agreed between the Northern parties, before discussions begin with Dublin. The SDLP will thus have to agree to a devolved six-county government without any guarantees about the South.
At stage two (North-South talks) the Unionists, will refuse to countenance any institutional set up giving Dublin a say. But the trap will be set. By then it will be difficult for the SDLP or Dublin to withdraw, as the former will already have stated it's acceptance of the internal settlement.
The final stage, LondonDublin talks, will formally se the seal on the whole deal.
Thus, contrary to the media's hype, the initiative is not about a Unionist climbdown. It's success would be in drawing constitutional nationalism into the first devolved partitionist administration since the tall of Stormont. How has Brooke done it?
First, the Accord not only softened up the SDLP, but also helped to marginalise the Republicans. After the mass mobilisations around the 1981 hunger strikes and the electoral rise of Sinn Fein, Republicans failed to mobilise against the Accord.
Underestimated
Indeed, they underestimated the threat it posed. The period since the early 1980s has seen a decline in the mass struggle. The SDLP can now enter a new arrangement with less fear of a Republican-led boycott.
Second, politics in the South are on the move. The long-term effects of a national debt of Latin American proportions and the erosion of its electoral base, have forced the Fianna Fail government to rethink its strategic alliances.
Bangladesh is regularly inunSinn Fein's failure to fight the Accord has helped to marginallse their Influence on the situation • It can no longer rely on its traditional role as majority party, the occasional token nationalist posture, and an alliance with the church. Political stability and a partnership with British, European and International capital are essential to stave off economic crisis.
Hence Haughey, who posed the Malvinas war and the Accord and described the six counties as a 'failed non-entity', has done a U-turn.
Gulf War He breached the 26 counties' neutrality by allowing Bush refuelling facilities in the Gulf war; he has embraced the new talks; and is now offering articles two and three of the constitution (embodying the aspiration to Irish unity and independence) up for negotiation.
third, European unity is on the horizon. ost-1992 socio economic harmonisation with the North and Britain poses a type of economic unity that is far more attractive to the Irish capitalists than the risk of national unity, with the dangers of instabilitv and a reunified working class.
The result will be a historic compromise of the Irish people's rights to self deterBangladesh was exploited by West mination, independence and unity. The package will be sold as 'democratic' - with the backing ofall major British and Irish parties. Even the loyalist paramilitaries have guaranteed not to our a spanner in un works. So far the silence of any (particularly from British Labour) has been deafening Nonetheless, it remains a high-risk strategy for Britain. A resurgence of mass nationalist struggle in the North remains a possibility and could challenge the acquiescence of the SDLP Southern politics are very unstable - especially given a strengthening of the left, reflecting dissatisfaction with Haughey's vicious austerity programme. Even in Britain, the Irish vote will be important in the forthcoming election.
Link-up
between the left and the Irish community could help crack the appearance of consensus. Socialists in this country need to build such an opposition and expose the lie that this is a democratic peace process, rather than another neo-colonial settlement imposed undemocratically and upheld by force. ment facility.' So they give with one