BEFORE December's Duma elections, Yeltsın nad to temporarıly puli back from his most extreme liberal policies. He introduced measures to marginally improve the conditions of those most affected by the privatisations and cuts because of a growing wave of discontent. They failed to stop the reconstituted CPRF from making dramanc Callis.
Yeltsin also sacked those ministers most associated with the failed market reforms. The new men were more cauHOUS. They wanted to postpone the Presenta eecnons in oreer to butaa new coaltion with their trident new opponents, the CPRF. The latter were of course more than willing.
However Yeltsin's vote in June was better than some expected. Seizing the moment ne made anotner snarp turn. Within 48 hours he moved to co-opt his second main opponent, the ultra-nationast ane nen nera ener eger Lebed immediately secured the demotion of all those ministers opposed to him, most notably defence minister General Pavel Gratchev and several other generals.
It was a typical Yeltsin manoeuvre to use the size of Lebed's vote to his own advantage by bringing him into the govemment. However Yeltsin was more interested in his rival's link with the armed forces: this was the real basis for Russian troops in Baku his move. This new alliance has strengthened the President's hand.
Yeltsin's twist reflects the precariousness or te present situation.
The precise deal struck is not at all clear. It may signal a renewed 'neo-liberal', i.e. capitalist, drive combined with strong government.
On July 17 Lebed got his way. Yeltsin was persuaded to appoint Lebed's side-kick General Igor Rodionov as his new defence minister. This both underlines the policy of strong government and greatly strengthens Lebed's position as potential heir to Yeltsin.
General Lebed is noted for his military service in Afghanistan and his admiration for Chile's General Pinochet. Rodionov is remembered for brutally disnersing pro-indenendence demonstrations in Georgia in 1989 with the loss of 19 lives.
Lebed will undoubtedly use his brief to "crack down on crime" to strengthen and professionalise sections of the police and military apparatus.
This will go hand in hand with Rodiano's brief to streamiine and professionalise the iwo million strong conscript army.
Western governments will watching develonments anxiousiv. "his is not be. cüuse the men in power lack a commitment to capitalist restoration: but their exireme nationalism raises concern in terms of how open their hoped for markets would be to the West. The Western governments are opposed to the CPRF for similar reasons.
The top layers of the national bureaucracy spawned Gorbachev, Yeltsin and the most openly pro-capitalist, so-called "democratic" and liberal parties.
Ine muit-milloned middle and tactory managerial sectors of the bureaucracy found their most reliable champion in Zyuganov's CPRF, which has strong links to the military-industrial complex.
Their corporate interests are not at all secured by the untrammelled rule of the markel proposed by the ultra-liberal wing of the bureaucracy.
They want a controlled and planned markel, more selective privatisation. cheap raw materials, some protectionism, order, and the 'restoration' of the Great Russian state wolld not bode well for Chechnya or other nationalities. workers to fight but also to build a new independent workers-party through extending the struggles in defence of socialised property, a defence of all democratic and national rights and for internationa solidarity.
In the increasingly bitter power struggle all wings of the bureaucracy fear the full entry of the working class into the political arena.
Against this potential danger, like a ruling class, they unite in terror. At the same time their fear of working-class resistance highlights their inability to restore capitalism without violence or even civil war against the workers.
Without a military regime that will physically crush the resistance of the working class a full restoration of capitalism is beyond their reach.