RADOVAN KARADZIC has been forced to give up all his political posts in a deal struck between Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke.
This move is not about rebuilding a unified Bosnia-it continues the de facto division of Bosnia into two states embodied in the Dayton peace accords. Karadzic's replacement as President of Republika Srpska, his former deputy Biljana Plavsic, is an even more hard-line Serb nationalist and a central figure in the Bosnian Serb leadership in Pale.
Karadzic's removal is designed to allow elections scheduled for September to go ahead —whether or not it will lead to his arrest for war crimes remains to be seen. These elections will tend to confirm ethnic divisions within Bosnia, reinforcing those in favour of partition. Ms Plavsic's stated opposition to the Dayton accords may strengthen her hand as a supporter of partition, but she will also be faced with opposition from forces loyal to Milosevic.
For Milosevic the most important issue is encina canctions against Serbia without which his chances of re-election are slim. For two years he has been organising branches of his own Socialist Party in Banja Luka, the largest city in Republika Srpska, and encouraged tivities of the United Yugoslav Left (JUL) associated with Mirjana Markovic, his wife.
JUL has attempted to portray itself as an anti-nationalist party committed to peace. Mirjana Markovic's hatred of the Pale clique is undoubtedly real-she once compared Biljana Plavsic to Dr. Mengele!
September's elections will show how far Milosevic's strategy has worked.
To strengthen his position in Serbia Milosevic has been forced to try to keep the Bosnian Serbs outside of political affairs in Serbia itself. An alliance of the Serbian opposition and the Bosnian Serbs would provide a threat. Hence his decision to act 'on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs at Dayton, his support for the dumping of Karadzic and his willingness to use the issue of the Broko corridor as a bargaining counter both to improve his own position and to threaten the Pale leadership. Without the corridor the viability of Republika Srpska is called into question.
Croat President Franjo Tudiman's strategy is the exact opposite. His ability to maintain power depends upon maximum involvement of nationalist Bosnian Croats in the internal affairs of Croatia - so long as his HDZ party remains unchallenged by the majority of Bosnian Croats.
Tudjman's strategy is revealed at its most brutal in the city of Mostar. The HDZ has resisted all attempts to reunify the two halves of the city, divided between Croats (west) and mainly Muslims (east).
Thousands of non-Croats are still living in cellars and sheds in east Mostar even though thousands of flats remain empty in the west of the city.
There is no doubt that the refusal of the HDZ in Mostar to allow the reunification of the city is orchestrated by Tudjman. Mijo Brajkovic, mayor of west Mostar, openly admits he acts under orders from Zagreb.
The continued division of Mostarwhich takes place under the noses of EU monitors-is a central aspect of a continued attempt to create a viable, ethnically pure Croat Herceg-Bosna. Despite the supposed Muslim-Croat Federation the real nature of Tudjman's intentions is demonstrated at Mostar.