VENEZUELA Results and Prospects Stuart Piper and Andrew Kennedy ask what challenges the Bolivarian revolution in Venezuela faces and pose tasks for socialists and the workers' movement in Britain.'
half adults to read and write in two and a half years, and to help to lay the basis for a far bigger and more effective solidarity There is also the land reform and urban housing programme, a sharper political content to the WSF itself, for example around The Bolivarian Revolution as Beacon nere are three main reasons why Venezuela has become i beacon for the left around the world. The first is that, on an international level, there has already been a partial break with imperialism. President Hugo Chavez has made unrelenting attacks on Washington's military and economic aggressions - which are quite unlike those of any other leader in the region except Fidel Castro. But there are also practical signs: the reassertion of national sovereignty over Venezuela's oil and gas resources; the use of these to promote regional integration in South America and the Caribbean; the firm opposition to free trade pacts and the strengthening of south-south relations; the increasingly close ties with Cuba; the support for social movements across Latin America and beyond; and an openness to discuss and collaborate with many currents on the international left, including the Fourth International. Secondly, there has been an even more substantial break with neo-liberal economic and social policies at home. The very extensive social programmes, or Missions, have used Venezuela's increased oil revenues to bring primary health care to almost every poor neighbourhood in the country, to teach a million and provide over half the population with subsidised basic foodstuffs. price and exchange controls, caps on bank interest rates and radical innovations like forcing businesses to pay their taxes and respect labour laws. Thirdly, the eighteen months has seen President Chavez explicitly declaring in favour of a transition to socialism and inviting a national and international debate on the nature of socialism in the 21st century and how to get there. This has already had an for example by making discussions impact, about socialism much more central to the World Social Forum in Caracas this January than they have been at previous Forums. To achieve all this, the revolutionary process in Venezuela has made some novel combinations of old and new features. These include: mass activity and a plethora of local forms of organisation, including occasional semi-insurrectional mobilisations, with a relative absence of structured social movements; a charismatic and dynamic central leadership around Hugo Chavez, with a crying lack of any effective, revolutionary, political party or parties; a project that now recognises the need to move beyond both capitalism and the existing state, yet which continues to rely heavily on, and be constrained by, many of the same old state institutions. International and Regional Context - positive aspects he international and regional context for the struggle il • Venezuela is unusually favourable. International oil price are likely to remain high for some time, giving the Venezuelan government a room for manoeuvre enjoyed by few previous revolutionary processes. US imperialism's problems in Irag make it more difficult for Washington to consider any direct aggression against Venezuela. The existence of an increasing number of centre-left governments in Latin America (and potentially something more than that in Bolivia) is also positive. Even if these governments have not made even a partial break with imperialism - as Venezuela has - and even if they systematically apply social-liberal policies at home, they are more vulnerable to pressures from the popular movements, from public opinion and from the more nationalist fractions of their own bourgeoisies. They therefore tend to act as a buffer against external attacks on the Bolivarian Revolution, though they may also act as brakes on its radicalisation. In this context the US government is finding it difficult to develop a coherent strategy against the process in Venezuela and the wider cracks in its hegemony across the region. Its failure to isolate Venezuela in the Organisation of American States (OAS); the collapse (at least temporarily) of its plans for a Free Trade Area of the Americas in the face of opposition from Venezuela, Brazil and Argentina; the cool response to a series of regional visits by Condoleezza Rice and Donald Rumsfeld; the removal of Roger Noriega as Under-Secretary of State - all point to a certain loss of direction, if not a crisis, in US policy towards its 'back At the same time the popular and workers' movements, in Latin America and across the world, are increasingly looking towards the Bolivarian Revolution as a source of hope and inspiration. The Chavez government, often in tandem with the Cuban government, has deliberately sought to position itself near the centre of the global justice movement, or at least that part of it that gravitates around the World Social Forums, as demonstrated at the decentralised Vith WSF just held in Caracas. This could movement. And it has already been partly responsible for giving the theme of a 'socialism of the 21st century'. US imperialism's However it is also important to ensure that this move by the Chavez leadership is not problems in Iraq allowed to undermine the autonomy of the WSF and the social movements. make it more A bit of perspective difficult for balance of forces Yet the underlying Washington to remains firmly in favour of imperialism. Venezuela's partial break with imperialism consider any direct has been political and ideological, but scarcely at all economic. The fact is that aggression against Venezuela continues to provide some 10 to 14 percent of US oil imports. Almost half of Venezuela Venezuela's 3.1 million barrels a day is still produced in association with a variety of transnational oil companies. The only measures taken in this area have been mainly of symbolic importance - like forcing all transnational companies to pay the taxes they already owe, or making the foreign oil companies pay higher royalties and engage in joint ventures that are fairer to Venezuela. The other 'left-leaning' governments of the region (again with the possible exception of Bolivia) pose even less of a challenge to imperial economic interests. And the overall rate of extraction of surplus value across Latin America continues to evolve very much to the benefit of imperialist capital. The Venezuelan-Cuban proposal for a Bolivarian alternative to Washington's Free Trade Area of the Americas (known by the initials ALBA, meaning "dawn" in Spanish) finds an echo from these other governments only in so far as it coincides with the view of regional capitalist integration favoured by sections of their own business classes and state apparatuses. It is true that there have been a variety of important social struggles against neo-liberalism in different parts of Latin America over the last few years. But, again with the exception of Bolivia, it is difficult to see any country where big social struggles might coincide with a real political alternative in the short term. And in the key countries of Argentina and Brazil, the 'social liberal' policies of centre-left governments have divided and disoriented both the social movements and the left. 21
that is where we are heading, but a new kind of socialism, a the latifundio' in January 2005, the progress of land reform socialism of the 21st century' (throughout the rest of 2005); remains painfully slow. In this situation, the emergence of a Domestic Developments one demoralisation and tragmentation of the domestic politica • opposition to Chavez since the August 2004 referendum ha continued. Their last-minute withdrawal from the December National Assembly elections was partly a recognition of this weakness. But it also fits with what seems to be emerging as the preferred strategy of the US embassy for dealing with this weakness. At the massive 4th February demonstration which launched his own campaign for 10 million votes in next December's presidential elections, Chavez described this opposition strategy to a crowd of around half a million, 'they will invent a phantom candidate, invent a series of phantom irregularities in the course of the campaign, and then at the last minute they will pull out, claiming the elections are a farce and that Venezuela is a dictatorship'. If this is the US plan, though is not clear that the Venezuelan opposition is up to carrying it off, the international solidarity movement needs to be ready to do everything possible to counter it. But there are some signs the opposition is recovering. It was able to hold a march of its own on the 4th February which, though far, far smaller than the 'chavista' one, and far smaller than the ones it could mobilise before the 2004 Referendum, was probably five to ten thousand strong. That is significantly larger than anything it could mount in 2005. With the opposition in retreat, the central political debates in Venezuela increasingly take place within the Bolivarian camp. One side of this has been marked by the continuing ideological radicalisation of Chavez himself and some of those closest to him. In successive phases Chavez has raised the political content of his speeches and weekly TV shows, opening up a debate on the need for a Socialism of the 21st Century. A few examples illustrate this evolution, 'the only way to combat poverty is to give power to the poor (September 2004); 'we must learn from the debates between Stalin vs Trotsky... personally | do not think there are any national solutions' (December 2004); 'I used to think there was a third way between capitalism and socialism, but now | am convinced there is not. ...! am a socialist' (January 2005); 'socialism is the only solution, with various new sub-themes - 'the need for workers to manage their own enterprises' (May Day 2005), 'the need for millions to be trained in workplace and community militias', to expropriate disused factories', etc. This radicalisation in discourse has been accompanied by some uneven but important practical experiences. Co-management and recovered factories _ollowing the symbolic expropriations of two small, bankrup factories at the beginning of the year - Venepal and Valvula - and the appointment of a new, radical management team at ALCASA, a very large state aluminium plant, and in MIBAM, the mining ministry, 2005 saw some of the most radical experiences so far in 'Revolutionary Co-management'. The ALCASA example has many aspects of workers' control or even workers' self- management. However, in other places like the state electricity company, CADAFE, attempts at such co-management have been blocked by Chavista managers. And in PDVSA, the state oil company, there is no serious proposal for co-management at all. Indeed this is a version that is purely consultative. the CMR. 3 There is active resistance from many 'chavista' mayors and governors, who see a threat to their own political power, not to mention their pockets encouraging development. development of the process. one of the main criticisms of the most radical trade unionists in the oil industry, who point out that it was the workers who successfully kept the industry running during the bosses lockout of 2002/2003. Some government circles have explicitly argued against co-management in strategic industries or have promoted An absolutely central part had been played in the best examples of co-management both by the new National Union of Workers (UNT), and by organised revolutionary militants within that - particularly those of the Party of Revolution and Socialism (PRS) and Proyecto Nuestro America (PNA) in ALCASA/ CVG' but also by This experience contains some important lessons. It demonstrates the need for autonomous trade unions and other social movements. It shows what an impact politically organised revolutionaries can have. And it indicates the real possibilities of convergence between the UNT, organised revolutionaries and sections of the Bolivarian administration (such as the Carlos Lanz adminstration at ALCASA) around specific revolutionary tasks.^ But it also shows that the state apparatus as a whole remains the number one obstacle to advancing and deepening the revolutionary process in Venezuela. Moreover, there are bureaucratic currents within the UNT itself that form a major continued obstacle to its political radicalisation. And the revolutionary organisations are small and organisationally weak. Activists in the PRS understandably spend most of their time building the UNT and have little time for developing their party's profile and structures. It could also be argued that some on the socialist left in Venezuela neglect the vital question of developing initiatives for participatory democracy, an issue which could develop support for revolutionary ideas among the vast mass of the unorganised workers, peasantry and urban poor. The struggle for land A parallel situation exists in the countryside laround the struggle for land reform. In spite of Chavez' re-launch of the 'war on more structured and militant peasant movement around the Frente Campesino Ezequiel Zamora (FCEZ) represents a very An alliance has been formed between this force and sections of the Agriculture Ministry. The outgoing Minister, Antonio Albarran, joined them on their march in Caracas last year to protest at the slow progress and the complicity of sections of the army with the landowners and even their hired killers. But much of the Land Institute - not to mention local mayors and governors - are sabotaging the agrarian reform by doing deals with the landowners. This is made possible both by the commitment to work within the existing legal framework, and by the way that legislation is framed. This shows how, in the absence of real organs of popular democracy, the 2000 Bolivarian Constitution and its 2001 Enabling Laws are becoming a brake on the The urban movement and participatory democracy he movement of the urban poor remains the core social bas • of the Bolivarian revolution. There are continuing impressiv
Huge demonstrations show a continued commitment to Chavez and the Bolivarian process levels of local organisation around the Missions, the urban land committees, water boards, etc. There is also a high level of continuing commitment to Chavez and to the Bolivarian process, as demonstrated by the huge demonstration on 4th February. But there is a lack of nationally co-ordinated structures with power to shape the direction of the Missions or social and urban policy, and there are worrying reports of corruption and clientelism developing in some areas of Mercal. Moreover, there has been very slow progress in implementing Chavez' call for participatory budgets and other forms of participatory or direct democracy. Again there is active resistance from many 'chavista' mayors and governors, who see a threat to their own political power, not to mention their pockets. The building of 'a social economy' Endaghors orself sustaizgovernent. overment ministries exist to encourage and resource the setting up of urban and rural co-operatives. These are often valuable tools to develop self- activity and political consciousness among the masses. these developments are presented,. as they often appear to be, as a means of painlessly 'bypassing' capitalism, they will miseducate the popular base. The fact remains that there will have to be a confrontation with the state and expropriation of the key sectors, including banking. Capitalism will not wither away of its own accord. Co-operatives and a 'social economy' cannot in the long run substitute for democratic planning and control over the economy's central direction. Meanwhile, inflation and unemployment continue to pose a threat to the living standards of the urban and rural workers and poor, and indeed of sections of the middle class who might otherwise be won over the Bolivarian project. It is vital that the issue of co-operatives does not become a distraction from the need to tackle the problem of the economy's central direction. The role of revolutionary democracy should give less place in their rued thda fevol call fe d, it could be argued that revolutionarie immediate expropriation of the capitalists - Venezuelan private capital has always been weak, dependent and parasitic upon the state sector. Instead, they could focus on developing mass revolutionary consciousness and organisation through demands which radically extend people's control over their daily lives. The rhythms of what, when and how expropriations take place need to be set by the people themselves in the course of their struggle. And to do that means building up precisely the structures whose absence is the weakest link in the Venezuelan revolutionary process: the mass social movements, the political organisations, and the structures of direct democracy, in the workplaces and in the communities that can give them the autonomous power to do just that. In other words, the key priority is to build revolutionary democracy independent of and in opposition to the (still capitalist) state apparatus, as a pre- condition for an expropriation that is permanent and deeply- Solidarity It is of course up to the Venezuelan people themselves to decide the path they must take. But we have a duty to do everything possible to assist them in that process, and at the same time to learn the lessons of their experience. Socialists internationally must take the lead in developing trade union links; community, municipal and regional twinning; links between workers and activists in the health sector; links between universities and schools; links between those fighting racism, sexism and homophobia. In Britain, local solidarity groups need to be developed as the basis of a national movement with a capacity for significant mobilisations. It is in this context that we will be able to develop a real dialogue with Venezuelan revolutionaries, as opposed to merely 'teaching' from the sidelines. Hands Off Venezuela: www.handsoffvenezuela.org Venezuela Solidarity Campaign: www.venezuelasolidarity.org.uk 1. This article forms the basis of a document to be voted on at the April conference of the International Socialist Group, British section of the Fourth International. 2. CVG is the state enterprise engaged aluminium and iron ore production; ALCASA is an affiliate. 3. Revolutionary Marxist Current, part of the international currentaround Socialist Appeal in Britain. 4. Carlos Lanz is a historic figure on the Venezuelan revolutionary left who was appointed President of ALCASA by Chavez and who has been one of the main promoters of revolutionary co-management'. 5. The network of subsidised government food stores. 23