The War Is Over: What of Peace and Socialism? If the war is over and Sinn Fein's only remaining political goal is to help govern a statelet they spent 25 years trying to destroy by military means, David Coen asks: What now are the prospects for republicanism and socialism in Ireland? "he decision was taken as long ago as T 18. Everyone has been told, apart, of course, from rank and file IRA and Sinn Fein members and they have probably guessed. All the heavy stuff has been destroyed, even if no videos of 'putting arms beyond use' were made available to lan Paisley. What is left is more for internal disciplinary purposes than a return to war. Technical consultancy on military matters was offered to organisations like FARC in Columbia until the US intervened. The Northern Bank raid was a pension plan by middle ranking leaders who realised that whatever Adams and co might say about the new phase of the struggle, the IRA was being wound down and they would have to take their chances in the growing 'conflict resolution' sector paid for by the British and the American Fund for Ireland. Who won? Clearly, not the Provisional IRA. The goal of British withdrawal and a united Ireland remains unfulfilled. To a membership schooled on the understanding that the military campaign was the 'cutting edge' of the struggle to get the British out and for a united Ireland, the prospect of junior partnership in a coalition dominated by Paisley's Democratic Unionist Party in return for the virtual repudiation of the armed struggle, must seem a very meagre reward indeed. There was no 'plan B' " Sinn Fein's defenders might argue that they have pursued a clever strategy since the 1998 Stormont Agreement. From the premise that no Unionist would want 'a Catholic about the place' and certainly not in a power sharing coalition, the strategy was to test the Unionist's commitment to power sharing to its limits and then blame them when the process collapsed. In other words, to show the undemocratic nature of the Northern State by attempting to participate in it as equals. The British would then be forced to pressure the Unionists into a deal. • this was the strategy it clearly did not work. Every concession made by Sinn Fein io placate David Trimble's Unionist Party and now lan Paisley's Democratic Unionist Party has been met with more demands, -ist notably demanding the IRA 'wear 26 sackcloth and ashes' as repentance for the 30-year war. When, in December 2004, it looked like DUP intransigence seemed about to be exposed by a deal between the British Government and Sinn Fein, DUP leader Paisley demanded video evidence of IRA decommissioning? and then the IRA were blamed for a huge bank robbery in Belfast which threw the whole deal into disarray. Sinn Fein complains, with some justification, about the role of the 'securocrats' in the repeated breakdowns of the 'peace process'. And it is undoubtedly true that these forces exist politically and within the security apparatus of the British State, that they fancy a rematch with the IRA and believe that they could militarily defeat them. They see Republicanism as an historic threat to British interests in Ireland and want to impose a historic defeat on them. In this they are supported by the main elements of the Dublin ruling class who wish, in the words of one, to 'eradicate the cancer of republicanism from the island'. Sinn Fein's naivety about the British State goes to the heart of the failed strategy. It believes the British, 'have no selfish, strategic or economic interest in Ireland'." In their view, the British are honest brokers in the conflict. While Britain's economic interest may be debatable, its other interests are clear. It could not afford to be seen to be defeated by a national liberation movement. Its strategic interest can be understood by asking: does the US have a strategic interest in Latin America or the French in North Africa? Blair is just as much a unionist as his Tory predecessors and no more likely to pressurise the Unionists than Worse still, Sinn Fein knows that for military reasons the British fostered the very sectarian divisions that they now claim to be trying to reconcile. Sectarianism was woven into the fabric of the six County State since its foundation in 1921, giving rise to the Civil Rights Movement from the mid 1960s, which turned more to armed struggle after Bloody Sunday. From very early in the war British military strategy was based on fomenting sectarian conflict. An incident from June 1972 gives a flavour of this policy. Four Catholics are shot at on the Glen Road in Belfast. The RUC chases the car and arrests the occupants who turn out to be a British Army Captain and a Sergeant - later discovered to be a member of the Military Reconnaissance Force, an undercover army unit. A Thompson sub-machine gun, which is not an army issue weapon, is recovered. The purpose of the shooting was clearly to provoke sectarian conflict." The strategy was theorised by Brigadier Frank Kitson in 'Low Intensity Operations' and many of the officers had experience of counter-insurgency in Aden, Cyprus, Kenya and Oman. The same strategy of 'divide and rule' is currently being applied in Iraq. The two British soldiers arrested in Basra in September last year, armed and dressed in Arabic clothes, were almost certainly on an assassination run to incite sectarian conflict. So widespread and deep was the collusion between the British Army and the Loyalist 1. David Coen, Socialist Outlook 2. The Republican reply to Bernadette McAlliskey's famous question about what would happen if laying down arms and pursuit of the political road brought no results. 3. For a sharp critique of the Good Friday Agreement, see John McAnulty, "Ireland, the December Collapse', in Emancipation and Liberation #9 Spring 2005 4. This was later inserted into the Downing Street Dec laration which laid the basis for the IRA's 1994 ceasefire and the Stormont Agreement (also called the Good Fri day Agreement) four years later. 5. Kevin Kelley, The Longest Wor, Brandon/Zed, 1982, p189. See also Roger Faligot, Britain's' Military Strategy in Iretand, Zed Press/Brandon, 1983
death squads, that many Loyalist killers saw themselves as an unofficial arm of the British Army and were fed a continuous list of Republican activists to target." In 1991 the Ulster Freedom Fighters killed more people - mainly Republicans or sympathisers than in the whole of the 1980's.' At a time when the IRA leadership were discussing its military options, a surge in killings of its supporters arguably influenced it towards a ceasefire. If, in 1979, a British Army assessment had concluded that the IRA could not be defeated militarily, by the late 1980's the IRA were realising that they could not win militarily either. Learning from the mass upsurges in political support that dated from the Hunger Strikes in 1980/81, they attempted to apply the 'armalite and ballot box' strategy to 'take power in Ireland'. But the pressure from the military campaign was partly responsible for the loss of 16 of their 59 seats in the 1989 Council elections giving a further push towards a ceasefire. The ceasefire and turn to 'politics' are not the root of the current problem. the many infiltration and the consequent weakening of Sinn Fein, their main problem is self- inflicted: the pursuit of the 'Nationalist Family' strategy. The rotten core of this is that it attempts to mobilise a cross class alliance including Dublin and Irish America as well as the middle class Social Democratic & Labour Party (SDLP) to pressure the British into being, in Adam's words, "persuaders for Irish unity'. None of these have very much interest in Irish unity and so what has happened is the reverse of Sinn Fein's goal. Instead of Irish unity and independence, they find themselves demanding that the British force the DUP to be reasonable and join with them in a coalition to govern the six County State they spent so long trying to destroy. Coalition Partners? In many ways the DUP is a mirror image of Sinn Fein. By far the largest working class party among loyalists, it is composed of a predominantly religious (in this case, fundamentalist Protestant) rural, small farmer base, allied to workers in Belfast and surrounding towns like Portadown. They are the political wing of the Loyalist Paramilitaries but when Paisley denounces he means exclusively the violence emanating from the Republican side. Loyalist violence is condoned being merely reaction to the Republicans and is justified by the fact they are the 'majority' in Northern Ireland, as if the statelet itself was a democratic one rather than the 'failed political entity' which was imposed by Britain in the partitionist settlement of 1921. The urban working class sees Irish unity not just as a cultural but also an economic threat, because of fears about British investment and British subsidies, especially in social spending. Voting DUP is a defensive move for many, both of past 'privileges' and in reaction to the perceived gains of (disloyal) nationalists since the Stormont Agreement. While sharing many of the characteristics of BNP voters, they are not fascist. Paisley's supporters are younger and much less wedded to the hierarchies and moralism of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) or the Orange Order.' It remains to be seen whether Paisley will enter a coalition with Adams. There is no pressure on him to do so as he seems content with direct rule. The British think Paisley is an unreliable partner and have for years been trying to get the UDA and the UVF to form their own political organisation similar to Sinn Fein. While there is a potential to break off the paramilitaries from the DUP the big obstacle is that, despite many years of effort, they have no political programme, being bound together only by opposition to The British however are anxious to reap the peace dividend. The job of Northern Ireland Secretary has been merged with that of Welsh Secretary. But there are still more British troops in Ireland than Iraq and Blair needs them for his adventures in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Most of all, there is the cost. New Labour would like to reduce its £6bn annual bill in Northern Ireland, which will be difficult without a devolved assembly - cuts being more easily carried out if local politicians administer them. The Stormont Agreement institutionalised entrenching Sinn Fein and the Unionists as representatives for their respective sides and cementing divisions among the working class accordingly. But this is an unstable arrangement, because of its potential for stoking further conflict - for example, the Loyalist anger at the perceived gains of the Nationalists since 1998; and, as importantly, as Northern Ireland begins to feel the reduction in government spending required by the neoliberals around Blair and Brown. Both Adams and Paisley are canny enough to see that devolution and a coalition government is a poisoned chalice. Some commentators have already begun to wonder if, despite all the moving and shaking by Blair and Taoiseach (Prime Minster) Ahern and the regular calls by Sinn Fein to reconvene the Assembly and set up government, there is little desire on their part for this to happen."° The End of the National Road Almost uniquely on the British left, the Marxist Group (IMG), forerunner of the International Socialist Group, opposed sending troops on to the streets of Northern Ireland and demanded the abolition of the sectarian state and Irish unity. They were active in the Irish Solidarity Movement, which mobilised tens of thousands of mainly Irish workers against internment, and in protest at Bloody Sunday. Having initially called for 'Victory to the IRA' - which would now be an offence under current terror legislation - they concluded in 1972, that it was not possible to build a solidarity movement on that basis and replaced it with demands for 'Troops Out' and 'Self Determination for the Irish People ', while maintaining 'critical but unconditional support' for the IRA in the war against the British State. While the slogans were a tactical question, the attitude revolutionaries should take to Sinn Fein (and indeed national liberation movements as a whole) was crucial to both the understanding of imperialism and to revolutionary strategy at a global level. In the classic Marxist understanding, the nationalist capitalist class (the national bourgeoisie) had three historic tasks: national independence, solving the land problem by breaking up the large estates, development, which usually involved trade protection policies. Lenin and Trotsky's formulation 'permanent revolution' where the national bourgeoisie emerged relatively late - after say, the establishment of Germany and Italy in the late nineteenth century - this bourgeoisie was so compromised by its connections with imperialism, that it was unable to carry out its historic tasks and therefore they could only be achieved by the workers' Therefore this struggle for national liberation had an anti-imperialist character and would, at some point, necessarily tip over into a struggle for socialism. While 6. See the various reports by John Stevens. 7. Steve Bruce, The Edge of the Union, Oxford Paper backs, 1994 8. Danny Morrison's speech to the 1981 Sinn Fein Ard Fheis (Conference) 9. Eric Kaufmann, Prospect, November 2005 10. http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/northern ireland/ 4687382.stm 27
Marxists might have reservations about the character of the forces involved especially the 'progressive bourgeoisie' it was a duty to support the struggle while maintaining political differences. Hence, support for Sinn Fein and the IRA, while criticising some of their positions on women's rights or their subordination to reactionary Catholicism, similar debates to those which rage around the Iraqi resistance. A discussion of the political effects of the neoliberal offensive around globalisation and the changed nature of imperialism is not possible here. What we can say is that the message of 'free trade' is that the US will not tolerate independent economic development nor its protagonists, the progressive or petered out in the late 1950s and with it went any pretensions to a 'national road'. So when Sinn Fein embraced the Southern establishment as part of the 'nationalist family' they surrendered any realistic hope of national independence as traditionally understood. Their other allies in the attempt to the British to grant independence - Irish America - were rabid exponents of US global interests in the form of free trade and shared the same reactionary Catholicism. Sinn Fein capitulated not because of infiltration or betrayal, " or even because of the threat from British sponsored death squads, but because their programme for national independence could not be sustained in an era when most national states are subordinated to a few global The British Left and the Irish Struggle Marx's phrase that a 'nation that oppresses another shall never itself be free' is as valid today as it was when he and Engels defended the Fenians in the 1860s. War consequences of it and the repressive came 'home' to Britain a long time before Blair's recent attempt to introduce 90- day internment - think of the Prevention elements operate in Iraq, and Blair, no doubt confident of the lessons learned in Ireland, and without a trace of irony, sent ex-RUC chief Ronnie Flanagan to Basra to investigate collusion between the British installed leaders and local militias. Who would know more about collusion than Flanagan? MI5 is virtually a retirement pensioned-off insurgency' experts from Northern Ireland and their influence on British policy there and here is obvious - that is not to say there was much the Met (or its Special Irish Branch, founded 1883) had to learn about repression and shoot to kill. The experience of Irish solidarity, however, 28 is very mixed. Critics of the IMG's change of slogan from 'Victory to the IRA' to 'Troops Out' and 'Self Determination' argued that the Troops Out Movement still remained relatively small and mostly confined to the far left. One of the reasons 'Troops Out' did not mobilise mass support in the British working class was undoubtedly the effect of the 1975 Prevention of Terrorism followed the Birmingham pub bombings. Serious as this was in demobilising (particularly Irish) worker's it does not explain why the solidarity movement failed to grow. The implication of the IMG's critics was that had they patiently explained the importance Ireland to British workers, would have eventually given their support to the Irish struggle. But that is far too simple an analysis of the politics of the British working class. For one thing, the big unions, particularly the skilled engineering unions such as the AUEW (now| part of Amicus) had members in Northern Ireland and blocked discussion both in the unions and in the Labour Party. Thousands of their members worked in war-related industries such as armaments and aerospace and were unlikely to criticise their employer, the British Ministry of Defence. If you add the workers in the finance sector, heavily dependent on the City of London and therefore on the stability of British investments overseas, a huge chunk of the working class, unionised or not, is, at the very least, neutral on the activities of the British State. While it is true that the Miners, Steelworkers and Print unions some hard lessons about the repressive apparatus of the state during era, these forces were never mobilised effectively around Irish independence. There is further the "cultural' question that has emerged again with the debate on Iraq. This is the presumption derived from imperialism that other societies or economies are in some sense backward, expressed most clearly in Huntingdon's 'clash of civilisations' argument in favour of the US war on terror. So that although the effects of the US invasion may be wrong and catastrophic for the colonised peoples, in the long run they will become progressive 'democracies' just like us. Following the same line of argument, British workers buy into the argument that while occupation of Ireland might be wrong, it could have the long term benefit of turning what they saw as a socially and economically backward by the Catholic country, dominated Church, into a modern one. Some of the left is imbued with the same attitude. Every discussion about the north of Ireland sooner or later gets round to the question of when 'normal' politics Will break out, when nationalist and loyalists will stop fighting about obscure theologies and organise together against the capitalists. By 'normal' of course they mean British. That is not going to happen for all the reasons outlined but it lies at the centre of the thinking of organisations like the Socialist Party and the CPGB. Of course every socialist favours working class unity but it does not have to be unity within the British State.' An Unstable Coalition In a recent issue of Socialist Worker, Kevin Ovenden explained it thus: '[The "Peace"] process is about reaching an accommodation representing Catholic and Protestant communities. It can reproduce the sectarian division that is built into the Northern Ireland State. But it does provide a space for working class people, Catholic and Protestant, to fight for their interests against sectarianism'. It does not. Unfortunately, there is now even less that nationalists can put aside sectarian differences and unite around 'bread and butter issues'13 - 'normal' class politics as understood in Britain. So, while we should encourage working class unity in defence of their interests, there is no way round the question of the six County State. The way ahead looks difficult. Having failed politically and militarily, Sinn Fein is likely to slip back into cultural anti- imperialism - identity politics - alongside the defence of nationalist/Catholic interests if the Stormont Assembly is restored. ' This is very likely to be seen as even more of a threat to the identity economic competition (over declining British subsidy) with cultural competition between the two sides. It could entrench reactionary leaderships on both sides: for example, in the South ??? have moved rightwards in their economic policy as they orient to Fianna Fail. Even so, the contradictions at the heart of the settlement will throw up lots of opportunities for the left to make headway, especially now that the nationalist road is no longer an option and the loyalists face the dead end of loyalism. History of the IRA, who more or less suggests that a section of the SF leadership was being run by the capitulation to reactionary unionism under the guise of 13. See my The Bread and Butter of Revolutionary 14. The evolution of Fianna Fall in the South after defeat in the Civil War is a useful template for the way