ARAO AFTER THE ELECTIONS AK: :.:evatest Iraqi elections consolidate the occupation or :a:.= *er tensions? GA: --ose who say that the election in and by itself strengthens : e accupation are misinterpreting reality. They said the same :..ng about the elections in January, which did not strengthen :-= occupation but created new problems for it. Until then the cccupation had been in full control of Iraqi institutions. But after ire elections it had to engage in bargaining and arm-twisting before a new government could be finalised. London strove to impose their own conditions and their own people and were only partially successful, failing to get their stooge lyad Allawi on board. What we have seen afterward is an uneasy cooperation riddled with conflict between the Shia forces dominant in the government and the occupation authorities. The same bargaining will happen with this election, unless the United Iraqi Alliance, the major Arab Shia list, gets a clear majority in the new parliament- and that will be difficult given the fact that this time Sunni Arabs have participated massively. So unless there is a clear majority for any single bloc, there will be even more intense bargaining and arm-twisting this time. The elections were not a 'tool' of the occupation for the very reason that they were imposed on the occupation. Of course, once they were scheduled, the United States intervened in them as a player through its allies, which are mainly the Kurdish coalition and Allawi's group. These parties will manoeuvre hard, but for the US and the occupation to be strengthened by the elections at the end of the day, they will need to get the upper hand in the new parliament. AK: Some armed groups have called for participation in the elections, although Zarqawi' has not. Is there a split? GA: The split goes back to the October 15 referendum on the constitution. It is a split in the sense that there has been a clear division of opinion between the main armed groups on the one hand, and Baathist Saddam-loyalists and Zarqawi on the other. Hard-line Baathists say the elections must be rejected because they are held under occupation, though their own political model does surely not involve any kind of free elections and majority For Zarqawi it is a principled rejection of parliamentary democracy in the name of Islamic fundamentalism. But the most important groups in the insurgency allied against that position and considered that they had made a mistake in not urging participation in the January elections, for which Arab Sunnis paid a price. Four of the main groups issued a statement in October calling for participation in the referendum and a vote against the constitution. They warned Zarqawi that they would fight anyone attempting to That is why the elections went off prevent Sunnis from voting. The armed groups imposed a kind of ceasefire. understood that the elections were not phoney but real, and that by not taking part they would lose any leverage they might have in the politics of a future Iraq. 20 Gilbert Achcar was interviewed by Andrew Kennedy on 17 December 2005, before the Iraqi election results had been announced. Interview with Gilbert Achcar This also illustrates how wrong some people in the anti-war movement were to oppose any elections under the occupation. There are many previous examples of such elections for which the occupied actually fought against the occupier. No one denounces as illegitimate the Palestinian elections nowadays although they are held under Israeli occupation. Hamas' used to, but changed radically its position. AK: A few months ago it was seen as a 'no-no' in some sections of the anti-war movement to mention the growing sectarianism between communal groups in Iraq - especially the Shia and Sunni Arabs - fuelled by the occupation. Is consideration of this factor now unavoidable? GA: Sectarian and ethnic tensions are very much part of the present Iraqi situation, unfortunately. One cannot ignore these aspects as well as the fact that the armed insurgency 1s essentially restricted to a group - the Sunni Arabs - constituting only one-fifth of the Iraqi population. legitimate liberation movement to the extent that it is fighting the occupation. But it is also in part an armed insurgency by one community that used to see itself as privileged not only under the Baathists, but also under previous regimes. Many in the Sunni Arab community resent very much not only the occupation but also majority rule when it means rule by the Arab Shia - almost two-thirds of the population. The statements of the armed insurgent groups often talk of fighting two enemies: the US occupation and what they call the 'Iranian occupation', that is the rule of Iran-friendly Shia organizations, members of the United Iraqi Alliance. dimension cannot be ignored: the majority of Iraq's population has not chosen armed struggle as a means to fight the They have preferred to rely on political and other forms of mass struggle, in the belief that a state apparatus capable of running the country should be rebuilt before asking foreign troops to get out. AK: Does that strategy amount to collaboration with the occupier? GA: This strategy is deeply wrong - wrong in the sense that the occupation has fuelled the armed insurgency and worsened relations between the communities, both by the mere fact of its presence and deliberately in order to prolong it. If Shia politicians had been firmer in their opposition to the occupation. the prospects of rebuilding a united Iraq would now be greater. They feared their community could be defeated militarily if left to face the armed apparatus of the Baathists, based in the Arab Sunnis, so they opted for the present course. They are not 'collaborationist' - a pejorative word implying that they shoulc be treated as such. They have their own agenda which does no: coincide with a protracted US occupation of Iraq. Basically the: are motivated by sectarian fears and considerations and tha: is definitely not a good inspiration. Sectarianism poisons tr= atmosphere more than anything else in Iraq today.
AK: Is it merely a myth of the occupation that Iran is supplying weapons to the resistance? GA: I wouldn't be surprised if Iran was supporting armed actions against occupation troops in one way or another. It is in the interests of Iran to see the occupation bogged down. activity would be rather marginal. Iran is playing it politically above all, betting on SCIRI, 3 the force closest to them, to achieve a major influence in the country, if not at the level of central government then at least in the southern half of the country where the Shia are the majority and where the most important This does not mean that SCIRI are Iranian 'agents'. They have their own agenda but look to Iran as an ally that backed and trained them when they were in exile under Saddam. AK: What does the new Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, represent? Is Iran dead set on confrontation with the US? GA: Ahmadinejad's election is an expression of some hardening of the regime, resting on a hardening of the mood of its popular constituency. This was in reaction to intensifying US threats, which started when the US put Iran in the 'axis of evil' after 9/11 even though a 'reformer', Khatami, was then in power. Bush torpedoed the very forces the West was betting on in Iran. AK: So Zarqawi won't be pleased? Ahmadinejad is thus the expression of an emboldened confrontationist mood. What happened in Iraq tremendously increased Iranian self- confidence and contributed to breaking Iran's regional isolation. The Iranian regime is very keen on furthering this by strengthening its appeal to Arab public opinion as a whole. That is the real significance of Ahmadinejad's recent grotesque statements against Israel. They were mainly aimed at the Arab and Muslim street. Hamas came out in support, proclaiming that it is in alliance with Iran. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood also came out in support. Iran is thus strengthening its clout in the area. Ahmadinejad is not dumb as the Western media says, but is resorting to a clever manoeuvre. He made one of his statements in Mecca at an Islamic summit. It was a way of pushing forward the image of Iran as the most radical expression of Islamic opposition to Israel and to Western domination. GA: One could think that Osama Bin Laden represents the most extreme form of Islamic fundamentalism, but Zarqawi is more fanatical still. One of the differences is that Bin Laden and his mentor Zawahiri never attacked or made sectarian statements against the Shias in the way Zargawi did. They looked at Iran as a potential ally although they had conflicting interests - for example Tehran was pleased about the fall of the Taliban, because this opened up a space for pro-Iranian forces in Afghanistan. Some Al Qaeda members are in Iranian custody so Bin Laden had to be cautious. In contrast, Zarqawi is appealing to the crudest sectarian Sunni fundamentalist ideology. But this is self-defeating - he has no real popularity even among Iraqi Arab Sunnis and Iranian statements against Israel weaken Zarqawi's point, of course. AK: Some Gulf states have expressed alarm that any US attack on Iran could lead to Iranian retaliation against them. Could the US attack Iran in the near future? GA: The most likely source of an attack on Iran would be Israel. Some information leaking out indicates that Sharon is preparing an attack This could be disastrous on Iran next spring. because the Iranians could retaliate and Israel is within reach of Iranian missiles. I don't think Iran would retaliate against an Arab country, but against the sources of attack whether US or Israeli. Any attack on Iran would only enhance its prestige among Muslims internationally. AK: Does Israel hope the US would wipe out the Iranian regime in any ensuing conflict? GA: Israel wants the US to be very vigilant about the Iranian nuclear programme because at the moment Israel is the only state in the area with nuclear weapons. If Iran developed nuclear weapons this would create a balance of terror and would neutralize Israel's deterrence Beyond that they know that the US is capacity. not in a position to launch a full-fledged invasion Iran is a much harder nut to crack than of iran. Iraq was in 2003. The Iranian regime has a much larger and more committed social constituency than Saddam ever had. Also Iran is a much larger country with many more inhabitants than Iraq. 1. Leader of a sectarian fanatical Sunni armed group, the Iraqi branch of Al-Qaeda (but see below). It has been generally blamed for many of the bomb attacks on Shia civilians. 2. An Islamic fundamentalist party enjoying mass support among Palestinians. 3. Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. 2