IMPERALS &THE MIDDLE EAST Gilbert Achcar's recent writings on Iraq and his debate with Alex Callinicos on the Iraqi elections were widely circulated in the British left and internationally. He was interviewed for Socialist Outlook on 24 April by Alex Cowper AC: How do you see US policy in Iraq developing after the elections? Is it true as Britain and the US say that the situation there is stabilising? GA: Obviously not. The 'violence', involving legitimate actions of the resistance as well as sectarian attacks, is increasing. political situation is blocked, mainly due to the interference of the occupying powers with the political process in the country. The January 30 elections, imposed mass demonstrations called for by Sistani a year before, were an important moment in the process of moving to a government with a minimum of legitimacy. The US was reluctant to hold these elections and not really prepared to accept their outcome if it were not in keeping with their interests: as a matter of fact, their protégé lyad Allawi got only a small vote and the majority voted for parties more friendly to Iran than to the US. Ever since, Washington has been heavily interfering, trying to prevent the majority from asserting its will. This explains the very long delay in electing the President and the Speaker of the Assembly in the first place. This was followed by a new long delay in the formation of the government. The Kurdish alliance, which has many seats in the Assembly, has been acting as a proxy for Washington, trying to impose a place for Allawi's fraction in the government disproportionate to the14 per cent of the vote it got in the elections. Donald Rumsfeld's visit to Iraq was to warn the Shia parties against pushing too hard for their own conditions. This tug of war was predicted since the election result. Hence there is an increasing sense of exasperation in the country. There have been many threats from Shia forces and from Sistani himself of 24 a return to mass mobilisations to unblock the stalemate and impose the popular will. A threat of this kind precipitated the first meeting of the Assembly after a long delay. us understand the mass demonstrations against the occupation on April 9, which were called for by Al Sadr and indirectly approved by Sistani, who did nothing to prevent them. The mainstream Shia forces actually feel that such a mass pressure could show Washington what would happen if its interference continues. Another threat that Sistani made previously was to call for a rejection of Bremer's Transitional Administrative Law - which requires impossible two-thirds majority for all key of the Assembly, thus giving If this happens, it is very difficult to predict what might follow as the Shias would be directly confronting the US occupation have a compromise whereby Allawi would stay out of the government, but this is definitely not what Washington wanted to AC: In light of the big rally of 300,000 against the occupation on April 9 that you mentioned, how do you assess the prospects GA: The demonstration has enhanced the importance of Moqtada Al-Sadr as the major representative of the most radical stand against the occupation amongst the The overwhelming majority of the Shias reject the occupation. leadership want to deal with it gradually, so as to achieve control over the state apparatus and consolidate it, and then get rid of the occupation. That's why they want to negotiate a timetable for the withdrawal of occupation troops, whereas more radical like Al-Sadr's current, are for the withdrawal of occupying forces immediately or on a very short timetable. So the absolutely massive demonstration on April 9 in Baghdad was a clear indication of the increasing exasperation of the masses with the political stalemate rightly attributed to Washington's interference in Iraq's internal affairs. On the Sunni side, the most important public political force is the Association of Muslim Scholars (AMS), which has entered an alliance with Al-Sadr and several smaller patriotic groups - Muslim or nationalist forces. They held a meeting on February 15 and adopted a common platform. When Al-Sadr called for the April 9 demonstration, the AMS joined his call and demonstrations occurred on the same day in the so-called Sunni triangle, especially in Ramadi. So this was really a day of national protest against the occupation, at least for Iraqi Arabs (not the Kurds). Joint mobilisations of this nature against the occupation are the most effective way to fight it and to overcome sectarian tensions at the same time. mainstream media response has been very telling: while they highlight immediately any atrocities, the huge demonstrations were hardly reported - just like the January 2004 demonstrations for elections Bremer's plans for appointed institutions. It is clear that such mass mobilisations are what Washington and London fear most. armed actions are at a relatively sustainable level for the occupation troops: they can live with them for a long time - although it is much more difficult for the population to bear this situation - and they can use them as a pretext to justify their own presence. Faced with mass political pressure, we have seen already that Bremer, despite his very stubborn attitude, was compelled to backtrack and accept Sistani's demand for This showed to the Shia masses that mass mobilisations can achieve results. The holding of the elections was seen by despite very difficult conditions. Thus the recent demonstrations called for by Al-Sadr were a further step in the same direction of increasing self-confidence on the part of the AC: Are there real dangers of sectarian attacks dividing the opposition to the occupation?
Sectarianism only existed at a very low level prior to the occupation. It was a very deliberate policy by Washington and London to foster sectarian divisions, to address Iraqis as Shias and Sunnis, as well as Kurds and other groups, trying to separate the communities from each other. A climate has been created in which Sunni sectarian forces, including forces such as Zarqawi's Al-Qaeda branch, have been able to win recruits. Until now the Shias have not retaliated, on the advice of their leadership. But they cannot keep getting attacked and slaughtered indefinitely without reacting. This could create a very dangerous situation. A rise in sectarian and ethnic conflicts would be used as a pretext by washington to stay in Iraq as an arbiter. This is again the very old imperial recipe: divide and rule. AC: Does the US really see Iran as enough of a threat that it will take military action against it? GA: Washington is playing a game of 'good cop, bad cop' with regard to Iran. The EU is the good cop, assigned a role by the US in getting concessions from Tehran, while Washington plays the bad cop with its military threats. However, the US won't open a new military front while it is stuck in the Iraqi quagmire and faces problems with the mobilisation of troops in the US. Moreover, Iran is a powerful challenger, a much tougher nut to crack than Iraq, so there is no real incentive for Washington to pursue the military option as long as there is no imminent danger of For Tehran going nuclear. the moment European pressure seems effective. Bush won't try to topple the Iranian regime by force: he has repeatedly stated that regime change in Iran would come through action by the population. But if the US gets suspicious that Iran is actually progressing with its nuclear programme, there is no doubt that they will strike militarily - whether directly or through Israel, acting by proxy. iran's nuclear programme is a much more serious worry for Washington than the false cretext of WMD that was cited in relation to aq. No one disputes the fact that Iran has = nuclear programme. Of course they say it is civilian, but trying to get nuclear weapons makes sense from their point of view: they are threatened and they want an effective deterrent when they see how Washington deals with non-nuclear states. Neighbouring countries - Israel, Pakistan, India - have nuclear weapons. Washington however cannot contemplate the possibility that Iran would use such weapons as a deterrent in the Gulf, threatening to turn a major oil supply area into a radioactive zone and thus disrupting the world capitalist economy. The Israelis are also very alarmed at the prospect of losing their monopoly of nuclear threat in the area. AC: What's behind the planned Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in the summer? Will it be a full withdrawal? GA: It won't be a full withdrawal - Israel will remain in control of all access to Gaza, including from the south, but there is a plan for quite a substantial withdrawal, because, firstly, Gaza was never a major issue for the Zionists - that's why it has a very small population of settlers - and, secondly, because the Gaza strip is a real problem for Israel, a big powder keg in the form of a very dense concentration of Palestinians. The Israelis actually, especially Sharon, are ready to give up most of Gaza in order to keep a major part of the West Bank - as indicated by his building of the Wall. AC: Does Sharon want to expel all Palestinians from the West Bank eventually? GA: Definitely, if he could. But the Palestinians would resist fiercely and it would be very difficult and bloody. He has tried to achieve the same result gradually by suffocating the Palestinians and making life unbearable for them, but they have resisted heroically. It proved very difficult if not impossible to expel them and Sharon is trying therefore to achieve what has been the basic Zionist plan since 1967 - to keep control of major chunks and strategic parts of the West Bank and withdraw from the areas densely populated by Palestinians. The actual issue for the Zionists since the Oslo agreement is the extent of the bantustan they would allow the Palestinians to set up. AC: Syria is now pulling out the last of its troops from Lebanon. How much of a success is this for the US and Israel? GA: It is a success, in the sense that they have been demanding it recently, but it is doubtful whether it changes the strategic conditions in the area. Damascus has withdrawn its troops after the assassination of Al-Hariri and the demonstrations it provoked, but even before that Damascus was under pressure from Washington and Paris through UN resolution 1559. Before that the pressure was building up against Syria over the disarming of the Hizbollah. When Damascus refused to comply, as it is allied with Hizbollah and with its sponsor Iran, Washington and Israel asked Syria to withdraw its troops. The UN resolution demands both the withdrawal of Syrian troops and the disarming of Hizbollah and of Palestinian camps in Lebanon. The Syrians understood they could not remain in Lebanon and resist all these pressures, given the balance of forces. Since they were not prepared to disarm Hizbollah, they chose to withdraw - even more quickly than the UN had requested. But Lebanon could become a problem again for the US and Israel. On the one hand, Hizbollah proved by their massive counter-demonstration that they are a very important force. On the other hand, although a majority of Lebanese were unified in their opposition to the Syrian presence, they are divided on all other issues - so the broad front that was created against Syrian domination is doomed to disperse. In other words, Washington will not be able to take full advantage of the new Lebanese situation. Gilbert Achcar will be speaking at Socialist Resistance meetings in London (17 May, ULU) Birmingham (18 May) Oxford (19 May) All meetings start at 7.30; for more details see www.socialistresistance.net 25