Which model of sor
OLIVER MACDONALD
Aber Aganbegyan. ine economics o/ perestroika Hutchunson. Ex.N9.
THIS IS BY far the best guide yet available in English to the economic dimension of the current Soviet leadership's drive for perestroika.
Aganbegyan writes cleariy. vigorously and, within the limits of what is a manifesto, very frankly. His book can form the basis for serious discussion among socialists here attempting to make sense of and evaluate economic perestroika.
It is important to bear in mind that within what might be called the Gorbachev coalition „there is not one single
conception of the desired economic strategy and ultimate aim; and the variety of views is even wider in the leid of tar. and tempo of economic reform.
But for the last three years, the views of Aganbegyan and his Novosibirsk schori of ecoupm have been the dominant influence spon Gorbachev himself and bus immediate of advisers.
Too much of the dine 1e*»
the left here over these issues either assumes that the most extreme marketisers i caller "monetarists' in the Soviet Union) represent the 'real" programme of Gorbachev or that once market indicators are introduced, an iron logic of the market leads "inevitably to the conclusions of the monetarists.
The very extensive east European experience of degrees of marketisation shows that this is far from being the case.
What is true is that the
introduction of market indicators decentralises decisions about economic allocations and leads to increased social differentiation within the working population
by comparison with the formal-legal (as opposed to parallel-market and corrupt network realite- gat. of centralised command
planning
Aganbegyan's platform is a wholesale. axe
traditional stalimst svstem of market. economic management, which
Furthermore, the measure of he describes as administrative, and a call for "coonomic" methods of management, by which he means the use of market indicators of performance by state enterprises. along with the development of
co-operatives and individual enterprises.
how advanced the soviet economy is in this debate must be a relative one: the strength of the Soviet economy vis-a-vis the world capitalist market. And here it remains pitiably weak, and consequently subject to enormously strong material
pressure.
We should be quite frank in
acknowledging that when we face a choice between these two
systems, commandist centralised
planning of exchanges between producers and consumers is not
in principle in any way superior to the use of market indicators.
Neither Lenin nor Trotsky ever gave the slightest indication
after 1921 that they would have supported Stalin's administrative regimentation of connomic relations as being in any way superior to NEP. Those in the Soviet Union who ard currently claiming that Stalin followed Trotsky in 1929 over cconomic policy are either
ignorant fools as far as Soviet
history is concerned, or liars.
Some on the left here, on the other hand, argue that today. unlike in the 1920s, the USSR has a highly advanced cconomy, has freed itself from the
contradictions of backwardness
that made NEP necessary in the
1920s and consequently an
adoption of market indicators is a retreat from advanced, more
socialist positions.
This is simply not the case. The fact is that the commandist
system has for decades operated not only alongside, but to a
arke
в ноли 111303
paralle
As Trotsky argued, the
Bukhanın-Sann tantas»
overtaking the west and
advanced socialism in isolated. autarkie development would
lead to an impasse. And as he
also argued, the more advanced
such an isolater more acute its gilliculties wi be.
None of this means that planning has failed. With an open public life and democratic accountability the Soviet commandist planning system would indeed have worked very much better. And no socialist cconomic policy of any sort can ahandon strategic planning. Trotsky's argument in the 1920s was precisely to combine plan and market with the voluntary development of co-operative
forms of ownership alongside the state and individual-family
opcrative ralonesi
sector.
In the current deep crisis of the Soviet economy, there is no
viable alternative to a policy of this kind. On the other hand,
just as the commandist plan has
great costs attached to it, so does the market. These costs of marketisation are not adequately faced by Aganbegyan.
They include the inevitable growth of social inequalities, threats of poverty for sections of
growth
the population, the domination of tie consumer by producer carteis, speed-up and crosion of
rights at work, the dangers of
powerful centrifugal pressure
thanks to the accompanying opening up to western capital,
new forms of corruption as a
result of this, the emergence of a
new "red bourgenisie' as workers in Poland called those who made a killing in the increasingly marketised Poland of the 1970s.
Ther effeete of thin kind of
marketisation and opening to western capital in Poland in the
1970s led to ferment and revolt
among the working class in the
big lactories, especially the
workers in the Polish communist
valt that event
an believes that willi
workers' self-management and
greater political freedoms.
with a large strenething
of the levels of provision in social
services, that kind of egalitarian
revolt can be avoided. Yet the
se sciection of
• the
show that mic vorkere haue not vol
swung into action in a decisive way to destroy the hold of the
Ligachey wing of the party leadership on the big plants. They haven't moved because they remain suspicious of perestroika.
The answer to this crisis of the Soviet reform movement is for
the reformers to genuinely take the Soviet working class into their confidence: to open the
books to the workers, explain to
them the scope of the crisis, the
need for austerity, the way that austerity will involve the
destruction of the privileges of
the burraucracy, as Yeltsin has demanded, and then put the package of measures to the
id-TJ0M 10 a
THUM SOMSUR
mannie aroue for
-mecrane way
not a defence of
rommandist plannı the introduction of
co-operatives and market indicators •