Socialist Outlook

Socialist Viewpoint, International, Socialist Outlook and their supplements, 1984–2009

Vietnam: twenty years since Tet

· Socialist Outlook no. 7, May–June 1988 · pp 26-27 · 1,800 words

Asia Russia and the USSR

THE TET OFFENSIVE was an authentic revolutionary insurrection with the ur- ban population rising up to combine with the armed forces of the NLF and the North Vietnamese regular forces.

But its nature was widely misunder- stood at the time. It was certainly not, as the US government claimed, the culmi- nation of a long external offensive by North Vietnamese forces on the inde- pendent state of South Vietnam. No such state existed.

The Geneva conference had been held the month after the smashing defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954. While the conference agreed to divide Vietnam into iwo parts along the 17° north latitude, it also provided for the holding of elections two years later for the purpose of reunifying the two Vietnams.

However South Vietnam, supported by the USA, refused to hold the elections, in its concern that the immense popular- ity of Ho would result in the reunifica- tion of the country under his leadership.

The political heritage of the aborted agreement was a vast network of Viet Minh cadres in the south of the country, 24 • which in December 1960 fused with

liberation forces into the renamer STEVE ROBERTS writes.

radical buddhist groupings to form the NLF.

However, Tet was not simply a popu- lar uprising against an unrepresentative and unpopular government in the south, as some liberal critics of the US govern- ment claimed.

In 1959 the Hanoi leadership decided to back armed struggle in the south. At the third national congress of the Viet- nam Workers Party a number of sou- thern cadres were elected to leading positions, including Le Duan who was elected to the key position of general secretary of the party. Le Duan had been associated with the fight for an armed struggle line in the south since the col- lapse of the Geneva accord. Under his influence the number of regular North Vietnamese troops in the south in- creased in the 1960s to over 50,000.

However, this must be set against the awesome build up of us military power. In 1961 South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem asked President Ken- nedy for assistance against the growing offensive against his regime. American aid was at first limited to military equip- ment, supplies and military advisers (al- though it should be noted that in two

In February 1968 stunned Americans watched the tv spectacle of American marines battling with National Liberation Front (NLF) forces in the garden of the US embassy in Saigon. By May, Lyndon Johnson had ordered a partial cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam and sat down to the first serious peace talks. Although another seven long years of war were to follow, the basis had been laid for the triumphant entrance of the Ho Chi Minh City.

years the number of 'advisers' had grown to 17,000).

The first air raids began carly in 1965 under the direction of Lyndon Johnson. By 1968 the tonnage of bombs dropped on Vietnam was eighty times in excess of that dropped on Britain during the se- cond world war. The build-up of troops proceeded at a similar astronomical rate. By 1968 there were half a million US troops in Vietnam, supported by 50,000 South Korean, Australian and New Zea- land troops, plus 600,000 South Viet- namese forces and hundreds of thou- sands of local levies and militias.

It was this vast military machine that gave General Westmoreland, its commander-in-chief, the confidence to say that 'the light was at the end of the tunnel'.

The phrase was particularly inappropriate. North Vietnamese sappers were putting the finishing touches to the vast network of subterra- nean passages that would take thousands of NLF and North Vietnamese troops to within 200 metres of the outskirts of Saigon and other major cities without detection

The offensive began on 2 February.

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 7 May/June 1988

Artillery barrages began against US military posts, and hand to hand fight- ing began in the streets, as NLF troops, aided by hundreds of thousands of their urban supporters, began the insurrec- tion. The US embassy in Saigon was occupied. By the end of the month over 70 major towns and cities had fallen to the NLF, including Hué, the capital of the central region.

The effect on American public opi- nion was electric, spurring on, and add- ing weight to the rapidly growing public opposition to the war. Millions of Amer- icans, including hundreds of thousands of students, participated in rallies and demonstrations against the continuation of the war. Burning of draft cards and the raiding of conscription records were becoming widespread.

In March, Johnson ordered an end to the bombing of approximately 90 per cent of North Vietnamese territory, rejecting Westmoreland's request for 200,000 further combat troops. In May negotiations began in Paris about the possibilities of a peaceful resolution to the war.

Since that time, right wing historians have argued that Johnson made a fatal mistake. The Tet offensive was admit- tedly spectacular, they argue, but in reality it had been a massive failure for the liberation forces.

While it is true that NLF losses were heavy (some 30,000 by conservative estimate) these opinions are contra- dicted by expert testimony. For example, Nguyen Van Loc, the South Vietnamese prime minister in 1967-68, judges that, 'We lost the battle for the south in 1968... By 1975 the communists only had to push in a few chosen areas to gain total victory'

The prospect of overwhelming milit- ary power smashing the communists and leading to a quick victory had been shattered forever. Now the Americans began seriously to negotiate an end to the war, while trying to determine the terms of the settlement through the po- licy of 'Vietnamisation'. However, the new policy had already been compro- mised by the huge intervention that had preceded it.

In January 1973 a cease-fire in the whole of Vietnam came into effect. It provided for the withdrawal of all Amer- ican troops within 60 days and the hold- ing of new elections in the south. The Paris peace accords were characterised by Saigon as treason, by Washington as an honourable settlement, and by many on the left who should have known better as a sell-out. But within a year the fighting had resumed throughout the whole country. In March 1975, a partial

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no7 May/June 1988

retreat of South Vietnamese troops turn- ed into a total rout.

On April 30, North Vietnamese troops and NLF fighters entered Saigon, promptly renaming it Ho Chi Minh City. Thus more than a century of imperialist domination, first by the French and then by the Americans, was over.

What of developments since? Accord- ing to western writers, the newly unified Vietnam then began to set out on a course of expansionism aiming to do- minate neighbouring Laos, Cambodia and perhaps the whole of south-east Asia.

Superficially there seems to be evi- dence for such a charge. In 1977 a treaty was signed with the Lao peoples republic which has been characterised by many, including some on the left, as a neo- colonial imposition on the part of Viet- nam. And in January 1979 after two years of border skirmishes, the Viet- namese army overthrew Pol Pot's re- gime and captured Phnom Penh.

China 'the main enemy' of the Viet- namese revolution.

National security again became the main concern of the Vietnamese and relations with its near neighbours be- came entwined in big power diplomacy. The vision of a socialist federation of Indochina became tragically trans- formed into its parody: a war-exhausted country maintaining 200,000 occupying troops in its Kampuchean 'ally's' terri- tory.

Retribution was swift. The month following the overthrow of Pol Pot, the Chinese leadership decided to 'teach Vietnam a lesson' and launched a powerful military thrust 60 miles across the Sino-Vietnamese border.

While the Chinese offensive was largely unsuccesful in its objective of inflicting heavy damage on Vietnam, the combination of military pressures on the country has exacerbated the pattern of economic disasters which have af- flicted the country since 1975.

In part these disasters have been due to climactic factors, failure of harvests and so on. But more importantly, the bureaucratic deformations which alrea- dy existed in the North Vietnamese state have become grossly amplified in the wake of the revolutionary victory.

The sixth congress of the VOP meeting at the end of 1986 discussed some of these problems. Politbureau member Vo Chi Chong declared, 'our manage- ment is neither centralist in character nor democratic, but a conservatism that consists of prolonging bureaucratic cen- tralism'.

The cure proposed was of the Gor- bachev variety. The congress shook up the leadership, retiring the three most central figures: Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong and Le Duc Tho. The press was given greater freedom, not only to go through officially sanctioned 'criti cisms', but to initiate disucssion.

The Soviet Union has urged along the process with less than subtle warnings about the 'waste of aid' granted to Viet- nam.

Despite this interlinking of the process of economic reform in the USSR and Vietnam, it would obviously be a mi- stake to adopt a facile comparison of the two. It is still not clear what economic course Vietnam will adopt to try and overcome its problems.

For our part while clearly recognising these gross bureaucratic deformations of the Vietnamese state, we should also understand the horrendous pressures that transformed the bright new future opened by the Tet offensive into a maels- trom of fratricidal warfare and economic devastation •

25

'the effect on American public

opinion was electric'

However, the thinking of the Hanoi leadership points in an opposite direc- tion to some "neo-imperialist' grand plan.

After the victories of 1975, the Viet- namese leadership had assumed that there would be a peaceful international context for the development of the coun- try. They also assumed, perhaps na- ively, that a combination of Watergate, war guilt and international pressure would force heavy reparations from a US government. Under these conditions Vietnam could enjoy a respite from the horrors of war and devote itself to the tasks of internal construction and modernisation.

The reality was very different. Not only was the US not prepared to pay damages, it brought pressure on its we- stern allies to block all aid to the bomb- ravaged country. The only way forward for modernisation and industrialisation was a closer alliance with the Soviet Union.

Until that time Hanoi had walked a tightrope, balancing between Peking and Moscow. But China could offer little in terms of the technology and economic aid of its rival. Unable to compete with Moscow on this level, China resorted to military coercion: cutting off aid and increasing military pressure on Viet- nam's borders. By 1978, the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) had declared

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