Socialist Outlook

Socialist Viewpoint, International, Socialist Outlook and their supplements, 1984–2009

The meaning of May '68

· Socialist Outlook no. 7, May–June 1988 · pp 14-19 · 4,340 words

France Asia

Twenty years after the explosive events of May-June 1968 in France, how do marxists view their importance? Are they simply to be looked back upon as grand moments of past history, or seen as reminders of

unfinished political business that

still confronts us today? JOHN LISTER interviewed DANIEL BENSAID, a prominent leader of the student movement at Nanterre university and now a leading member of the Ligue Communiste Revolutionnaire, French section of the Fourth International.

IL: Could you speak a little on the background to the events of 1968? Everybody sare at once that the students were fighting back against attacks on their rights; but what were the issues that mobilised the working class?

DB: Much of the debate and reinterpre- tation of these events in France, especially among those who have broken with revolutionary politics, tends to ins- ist on the cultural, ideological aspects of 1968. But what gave the 1968 events real weight, at least in France, was the com- bination of the student mobilisation — which also happened in countries like Japan and the United States — with the general strike. It seems to me too much forgotten now; but it was a real general strike of between eight and ten million workers which lasted three weeks.

What did it mean? Maybe we tended to overestimate the political content of the strike. Obviously it opened up the possibility of a political crisis. But at the

same time we have to say what the limits of that general strike were. Some democratic demands were raised against the strong state of [French president] De Gaulle, a rigid archaic state with very concentrated power; and there were a series of economic, material demands to raise the standard of living; but the fact is that even given the big wave of the movement, the enormous general strike, the politicisation remained small. There was no big crisis in the reform- ist parties. For example, the communist party (CP), in spite of its line, obtained good results in the 1969 elections, and it was relatively well able to channel most of the radicalisation. There was no big crisis in the unions either: they grew a lot, especially in the middle-sized and smaller factories. There were no big breaks like we had in France in 1945-47 after the war. There was a break, but of a very limited layer of youth and workers

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 7 May/June 1988

g of May '68

which gave room for a new far left; this is significant because it still exists, but it was a very small break.

The possibilities for action changed, but not the relationship of forces. That, I think, is to do with the limits, the dyna- mics of the general strike itself. There was also a difference with Italy in terms of self-organisation. There were factory occupations, yes, but very few elected strike committees or mass meetings. The union officials maintained control and organisation throughout the strike.

Sometimes the commentaries tend to identify the birth of social movements such as the women's movement with 1968. In reality in France this came as a result, if you like, of the '68 events, but two or even three years later. The dis- tinctive demands of the women's move- ment did not appear in 1968.

I think it was a transitional general strike, which remained under the control

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 7 May/lune 1988

of the reformist leaderships, and which, in the framework of the functioning welfare state of the time, served to win more space and social gains, winning back some things that had been lost under the De Gaulle government. There had been some social security measures designed to increase the weight of the state and the employers against the trade unions, but this was one point which was not won in the so-called agreement. In fact there was no real agreement. There were negotiations but, since the results were rejected in some Renault plants, they remained only as a basis for decentralised agree- ments. There was no giobal agreement as there had been in 1936. The main points conceded were on wages, and on trade union rights, but there was no agreement on social security.

The 1968 stoppage was never actually called as

a general strike, was it?

No, that's the other point. It was a general strike, but a de facto general strike. Nobody had raised the slogan of a general strike. This is very important, and not a small point. The argument from the union bureaucracies, especially the (communist party-led) CGT, was that 'we don't need to call for a general strike because it already exists': so to call for it would be 'artificial', 'useless' and so on.

But it could have changed the mean- ing of the strike, because if they had called for a general strike, they would have been obliged to decide on what general platform they would call it, and the decision to call it off would have had to be a general decision too, with consul- tations. Secondly, if it had been declared a general strike it would have raised another question on the political precon- ditions to negotiate: whether they would negotiate with that government, or ask 13

for De Gaulle to be removed before talks began.

Despite the limitations of the strike and dynamics of the movement, there were possibilities to open up a political crisis. We don't say now, twenty years later, it would have been an immediate revolution; but it was possible to open up a political crisis in the context of the 1960s. Obviously many things have changed, and nobody knows exactly what might have been possible, but 1968 changed the situation in France and in Europe in the early 1970s. We are not discussing. whether there could have been a revolution, but the fact that the strength of the movement, in spite of its limitations, promised much more than was achieved.

Obviously the communist party line was central to this outcome?

Absolutely. If we re-read today the lite- rature of the big parties of 1968, mainly the communist party, we see how they were obsessed with the idea of provoca- tion and plots. They were trying to find an answer to the changes in French society, in which, for the first time, the working class was in the majority. So they had developed the idea of a new coalition of social forces, expressed at the electoral level by the 'union of the left' (yet the gaullists kept winning more and more elections). At the same time they thought the socialist party (SP) had been pushed to the side by its capitulations on the Algerian War. In a real sense the SP was very reduced in influence in 1968, so the CP thought there could be an opening for ther, like the Italian CP, to become the major party of the left and to grow step by step through elections. All this was being disturbed by the 1968 events.

They were also concerned to control the mass movement. They tried to nego- tiate a broadening of union rights which would strengthen the CP by achieving certain gains and by strengthening its control at the level of union bureaucracy because it legalised a lot of rights in the factories: delegates, hours, pay, a lot of things which the unions had wanted. In the end this was the main result of the strike.

Though it did not want to challenge the government, the CP did change its line during the strike, didn't it, raising the demand of a 'popular government'?

Yes, but that was a very short period at the end of the last week of May. It was between 22 May and 29 May — one week of open political crisis because the agreements were rejected and there was no possibility of stopping the strike just

through that kind of agreement.

The specificities of the gaullist regime left no channels to reach a consensus or negotiate: it was very centralised, and the strength of the regime was its weak- ness when it was challenged. So there was an opening of a political crisis, because De Gaulle announced on 24 May that they could not find a way out, and called for a referendum. Everybody, even reformists like Mendes-France and Mitterrand, rejected the referendum. That could mean an open political crisis. There were two answers. The SP was ready to have a 'left government with personalities'; even Mitterrand was rea- dy to propose a new government based not on parties but on personalities, wi- thout exclusions and with negotiations — which we termed inclusive bonapart- ism. The CP was afraid of being margi- nalised and out-manoeuvred, so it raised the question very abstractly of a popular government, not giving this any clear content. But this was only used to oc- cupy the space for four days. Mitterrand said afterwards in his balance sheet of 1968 that this was all a manoeuvre, to say 'we are ready to take our responsibi- lities' so De Gaulle would withdraw the referendum, then dissolve the assembly and hold elections.

At that time, our position was quite tricky. To raise a governmental slogan in the radical movement was very unpo- pular because of widespread hostility to the SP and even the CP. However, we had a general answer which was 'yes to a popular government: but no to Mitter- rand and Mendes-France!' At that time, Mitterrand was a bourgeois personality, he was not personally a member of the SP. He was in a small bourgeois radical group: only later did he join the SP.

All this lasted just a few days when De Gaulle disappeared to see the army in Germany and then came back. There was a kind of panic at that time, but it was a very short time.

Do you think now, looking back, that a more concrete governmental slogan would have been better — something like 'CP take the power"? The CP alone could not have taken power. The kind of answer we raised was not very concrete but was not so bad, and was proven in the struggle. There was a big CP-CGT demonstration on 13 May or thereabouts. They felt threa- tened from the right, and threatened on the left because the day before we had organised a rally which was a mixture between the new social democratic left and the new far left and the CP was frightened by this mixture.

They organised their own demonstra-

tion — a very big one — and we were the only current from the left to participate, and we were very small. We came with our slogan 'popular government, yes: but no Mitterrand and Mendes- France!', and it was taken up by people from the CP because it expressed the political issue and a solution and at the same time showed a mistrust of the manoeuvres of Mitterrand and Mendes- France.

The other difficulty with the general strike not having been called was that to call for it would also have raised the question of who should negotiate: who should be the leadership of the general strike — the normal union bodies, or the left? In this context we have to be con- scious of the fact that we as a current had only maybe 400 members, and in the factories we had very little - a few individuals.

Could you say something about the origins of the JOR?

We were expelled from the CP youth organisation in 1965 for two reasons. One was the kind of support we gave to Vietnam; we fought for support and active solidarity with the National Libe- ration Front (NLF), against the slogan of 'peace' which was the official CP line. The other was that we opposed the CP decision to back Mitterrand as the sole candidate in the first round of the 1965 presidential election.

We were expelled in 1965 and formed the Jeunesses Communistes Révolutionnaires (JCR) in April 1966 with 3-400 members, 90 per cent of whom were students. Our main activity was Vietnam solidarity and opposition to university reforms, which started at that time. We participated in the student movement. When the general strike started, it was obvious we had no real weight to compete: the only thing we could do was to try to organise and centralise in some way the more radical, dynamic part of the movement, through the action committees which appeared. This was not real self-organisation, since the action committees were more like gatherings of radical people. We tried to centralise these gatherings to gain a little strength to push proposals into the movement.

You referred to the student agitation on Viet- nam, and it is obvious that international events had a big impact on the French events of 1968. Weren't there also important developments in Germany with the student movement? It is interesting to compare the situation today. In France there is a tendency to exaggerate the extent of the radicalisa- tion and politicisation of the youth and

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 7 May/June 1988

student movement before 1968. The real growth came only in 1968, and after- wards. Before, the communist students were the milieu of the maturing of the radicalisation, and they never reached five thousand members; nor were there such massive demonstrations before 1968. The radicalisation started with the US bombing of Hanoi in 1966-67, but the demos were not so big.

I was at Nanterre university, and we called what we considered a big gath- ering of people one Sunday — it was 500 people out of 10,000 students at the university. It was a significant minority of very active people — no more than that. What is interesting is to compare that with the situation now: then there was a kind of happy, spontaneous inter- nationalism, a strong identification not only with Vietnam. Vietnam obviously was centralised, summarised as an issue, imperialism versus black people, a clear- cut confrontation, everything clear, politics, morals, ethics, everything lin- ing people on the same side, no problem. But at Nanterre the movement also took on anti-bureaucratic struggles; there were some involving students in War- saw, and other Polish issues.

The Nanterre movement was open to everybody. It had three main axes: it was against bourgeois education re- forms; anti-imperialist, and anti- bureaucratic. The only limitation on becoming involved - there were no tests, no programme like a party or anything — was opposition to US inter- vention in Vietnam, that was the only real criterion that was used. That's very different from today and was very clear and simple if you compare with now, when we find problems like Afghanistan on the one hand, Kampuchea on the other. Then it was all very clear, a unified view of the world was a real characteristic of those movements.

The German events had a big impact for various reasons. First, we had establ- ished some direct links with the SDS movement of Rudi Dutschke, at the beginning of 1967, with common confe- rences, meetings and so on. We co- organised with the SDS a big Berlin demonstration in February 1968 before the attempted killing of Rudi Dutschke. Quite a big German delegation had also been here, so there were fairly strong direct links. When Rudi Dutschke was shot we were in a national conference of the JCR, and we started at once mobilis- ing street demonstrations which radica- lised very quickly.

Gould you say something about the other movements of that time, for instance the 22 March movement of students?

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 7. May/June 1988

The 22 March movement began first at Nanterre university, and changed com- position as it spread. It was a confused political movement. At the beginning there were mainly two currents: us and the anarchists. The CP youth always opposed it, and there were some Lam- bertists (members of the Organisation Communiste Internationaliste, OCI) who were very concerned with student unionism. They considered the 22 March movement was an 'anti-union' movement to destroy the student union. We didn't consider it was opposed to student unions. So the really dynamic forces in the 22 March movement were the anarchists and the JCR. Among the youth, the CP was very marginalised at that time, so there was us and the Lambertists — very sectarian - and the main current was the maoists who were growing as a result of the cultural revolution in China in 1966-67. At the beginning of the 1968 events they were stronger than we were, but we won out in comparison to them through 1968.

Did the JCR grow fast in 1968?

Yes, we had enormous prestige because we were identified from the beginning with the radical wing of the movement, with the 22 March. For example on the night of 10 May, the 'night of the barri- cades', sticks in everyone's imagination because of the pictures of it, we were the only national political current fully par- ticipating. The growth of the JCR and later of the Ligue came from the combi- nation of two things: our participation in the movement when the maoists were a bit discredited, and the campaign of our comrade Alain Krivine in the 1969 pres- idential elections, when most of the groups, showing their left infantilism, had no idea of utilising those elections. It • was not obvious, and it was particularly difficult to do it, but it was a good idea, and it was this which within a year gave us a big space to expand.

The Lambert organisation — then the OCI, but today's Parti Communiste Internationaliste (PCI) — opposed involvement in the 'night of ihe barricades' didn't they?

They were against it, and so were the maoists. It is a tricky question, because now, being more mature politically, I don't know if seen from the point of view of the global relationship of forces, building barricades in the centre of Paris to defeat the government without the workers, the unions, without the move- ment, offered any chance of winning. So was it irresponsible?

At that time the leadership of the JCR

was young, Krivine was only 25, many were 20-21, and maybe for that reason we didn't hesitate so much; it was more a question of feeling the sense of a big mass movement — because it was a mass movement - thousands and thousands of people. So we thought let's go ahead, and we shall see. Political decisions in such situations depend on feelings.

That decision clearly strengthened your links with the student movement. The Lambertists argued that their orientation was rather towards the factories and the working class.

No, I don't believe that was the real difference. I think the difference was on their characterisation of the political situation. They had more workers at that time than we did, that is true, but not so many, and only in certain specific areas, such as the public services, which in such a situation are not so explosively combative. They had some good workers — for example in Nantes, where they started the strike — that is true, but that was an exception.

But they had a strange view of the situation: their main worry was the danger of the gaullist regime evolving towards fascism, a kind of corporatist state, tending to incorporate trade unions through wages policies and so on. They reacted in accordance with that, fearing that to provoke a confrontation could lead to a populist-fascist state, risk the smashing of the workers' movement and big repression; that was their main reason for opposing the 'night of the barricades', for example.

Our attitude was very different. It was partly an attitude of improvisation rather than a planned approach, but we felt that there had been a rise in workers' struggles and strikes. There had been a real, but not a big increase in strikes, each time bringing confrontations with the police. There was a feeling that not all that much divided the student radica- lisation from the general mood of the country. We analysed the attacks by the gaullists on social security and so on; and in the earlier strikes we had fought for student solidarity, collecting money Ours was not a lunatic line, given the general mood in the country — though obviously we did not foresee we could provoke a general strike!

And after the strike was over, the JCR was made illegal.

We were made illegal, yes, and again in 1973, but it was advantageous in some ways because if you don't have the crazy line of the maoists and if you have some real links with the workers' movement, illegality is a formality and gives a cer- tain prestige. We had to reorganise for

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four months, and 20 people were jailed until September or October, but it was not a big problem for us.

How do you explain the rise in votes for the CP after their role in the 1968 events?

The CP came out of 1968 as the main workers' party, before the SP started to win back some ground. They were the main reformist party and won some support after 1968 — but not so much. I think it would be good to study the statistics some more. After they signed the 'common programme' in 1972, there was a growth of real reformist currents, of which the CP was one. But as a reformist party it was less efficient than social democracy, and suffered from its links to the Soviet Union, which are strong in France. Many of the people who are breaking with the CP now are from this generation of 1968.

You mentioned the question of women's libera- tion in the context of 1968: what was the level of women's involvement in the events? Obviously they played a role: there were women students and women workers — but their role was as workers or students, without raising specific feminist or wo- men's demands. If you read the plat- forms and statements, they hardly ap- pear anywhere. The same was true of participation in leading bodies of strikes. It is interesting to compare for example the weight women had in the 1986 stu- dent movement with the photographs and documents of 1968, with only mar- ginal involvement. That is a big change. It's now 20 years on: do you think things could have been done better? Do you think that the potential of 1968 led some people to artificially high expectations?

Obviously it was a high point, with potentialities which were not used, but we should remember with what strengths we entered 1968. We were formed in 1966, defending the very idea that the working class still existed, when all kinds of people were arguing that everyone was bourgeois now. Suddenly within two years we had a real, live general strike. It is very good for you!

There were obviously other potentia- lities even for a small organisation if we had only had more experience and more maturity.

The real question you are raising is firstly one of an estimation of 1968. This is not an academic question. Should we say was it a mountain or just a small hill? The truth may be between the two. But what it represents depends on what we do now: if nothing more happens, then it 16 was just a big peak followed by a general

decline. Now is the moment we must start from.

Some say it was the last big strike of the nineteenth century working class. But perhaps it was the first big strike of the twenty-first century. We don't know, and it depends on what we do now.

A more balanced view of 1968 is not that it was a revolutionary strike though sometimes we insist on stressing the political potentialities. A colder assessment shows that the consciousness of the working class had been formed by the years of prosperity and expansion, the welfare state, democratic rights. 1968 was not a revolutionary crisis like those of the 1920s or 1930s: that is true, and sometimes in polemics with the CP we insist too much on the revolutionary character of the situation.

Perhaps we have been more objective in our polemics with the Lambertists, though at first we did not know how to express why we felt that the situation was

revolutionary but pre- revolutionary. Yes, there was a deep move- ment of the working class that was shak- ing the bourgeoisie: but there was no subjective factor, no leadership rooted strongly in the working class. The strength of the bureaucracy has some- thing to do with the level of conscious- ness of broader layers of the working class. We can now see that better.

It is true that there were also many more illusions in maoist currents, partly because of the view that the working class was finished. They expected revol- tuion now, immediately. They went rapidly into decline. Their very illusions coupled with the frustrations of what happened in Europe and then in China do not justify but explain why so many right wing intellectuals have come from maoist currents.

Social democrats tend to interpret 1968 in cultural and sociological terms: some say 1968 was a success because of what the SP was able to do in govern- ment - realising democratic aspira- tions, legalised abortion, and so on. Of course this is absurd: in many countries all this and more has been achieved without 1968. It doesn't explain any- thing about the peculiarities of such a movement, why a general strike involv- ing millions of people took place, and so on.

There is a general move to depoliticise the interpretation of 1968. We have to defend the real political content and the dynamics of 1968, not just to celebrate but to give some present political mean- ing to it •

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 7 May/lune 1988

The morning after the night of the barricades

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 7 May/june 1988

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