Tho NamibianiNCCT.
The reign of terror in Namibia's black townships
Since 1 September, fierce conventional military SHOCK WAVES appled through winte socie ty in South Africa when on 17 November last scarithe SADE was lorced to make d tate admission of the dents unt contral a sou-
NT7S- 1304.
Sepren:
clashes — the largest in the region since 1975/6 - have taken place in south castern Angola between the Soviet-quipped, and Cuban backed, Angolan government forces, FAPLA, and the
captain and ton liestemants. and a missing pilos, as will three jets shot down in Angula: Typically, there were no reports of the SADE blink
15 wounded.
mistly Nami- Angola Such dead and
SWAPO'S armed wing. Jans.
Western-equipped, mercenary backed. South
Atrican army, the SADF. Central to the war is
der alise Na
Arıcan ar Pretoria »
th
bian and Angolan — troop casualties or of their capture m
quietly disposed of, usually in their melatives disgrace.
On 12 Novemer. the Angolan gor crn- ment admited losing 242 soldiers to the SADFs 230, and claimed to bave destrosed several SADI planes: a helicoprer and 35 armoored vehicles wer two moachs of fight ing Morenver.
PLAN, reported a successful ambush in nor- chern Namibit of a SAD! unmoured convoy
parse
between South Africa and Angola. Despite huge British involvement blocking Namibia's independence, writes LESLIE GOULD, the
independence, writes LES
Labour leadership has failed to act. civilians. who have The 'Nam syndrome
disguises tbe canve of death.
of infants
werwhelmingis
memenary units, or the 120,000 Namibians exiled and 750,000 Angolans displaced by Pretoria's war since 1975. These death rates
on 3l October, killing dozens of SAI troops and destroving 1-1 vehicles. The PLAN com butants then dowe back to Angola in twn of the SADI personnel carriers: and relrased photographs of them
"He was completely incineratod and them is no body left, unly shes mourned a hitter white father in Jo burg's Sunday papers. OF Course no thatshrs were sparce 20.000 ur so Namibians and 60,000 Ango-
SOCIALIST OUTLOOK ho.5 januaryiFetrusry 1988
are much higher if one counts death tough famine and discasc, especially
caused by the war. By rario of popalation. Namihix is the move catastrophically allected
country in the regait, not surprising given
that there are over 100,000 SADI-controlled for the toops to only 16 million people in spen
THE SADE does not now release any Annual figures on deaths or sexere munies: it meres sends individual relausts a moncoed form. sometitues months afterwurds, witch ofen
A rare study done in 1985 of the sall-s 1982 figures, however, showed how great is the SADE death toll cover up. li admiued 37
troops killed in action in the course ut 1982. mosily in Namibia. bar adaned a stagg' ering 850 killed of disease, transport and suing accidents. If only 60 percent were 29
for the 1975-83 period would show that, ax a proportion of the coul
white population in Soutli Africa and Nami-
bia, the whire South Airican death rate was thor times the number of US lives lost in Vietnam. Many of these are British citizens or have relatives in Britain
Small wonder then, the number of white war resisters (conscrips failing to bonour their call-upx) is rixing sharply — Irom 1,500 in 1981 to 7,500 in 1985, after which no further figures were relcared!
Admittedly part of this increase is attribut- able to the deployment of the SADI in the South African black townships in 1985; but there were only 35,000 troops there as up: posed to ncarly twice that number in Nami: bis and southern Angula (although the north castern Transvaal har also become heavily militarised by the SADI in a replica of Nami-
INITIALLY, THE SADY cried to pretend as usual that it was in Angola fighting SWAPO in cross-border pursuir, and was not there t protect Unita", a tribally based Angolan
However. by mid- November it changed its story to thar of trying to stop a very rcal threar to Unira: 4 claim indignantly denied by Unita Icader
Actually, Unita' is a SADE forward unit, a trojan borse for Pretoria's imperialist amhi- tions in Angula. It functions almost aden- tically to one of the growing number of the SADE's Bantustan units, but in this casc the unit is located in the most umpopulated part
white. estimates
tHa).
Angolagate unrevealed dissident muvement. Savimbi.
of Angola and protected by the largest col centration of the South African air force
anywhere. Over 80 SADE planes, not 10 mention tanks and helicopter gunships: arr based in the Namibian Caprivi Strip, the most militarised zone in the sourhern hemis phere.
This peraliar colonial carving which ori ginates from the 1884 Berlin conference.
extends like a bayonce into central Africa and gives Botha and his gencrale air-strike coppe- ity net Angola, Zambia. Zimhahwe and others if need be like Malawi is Zaire, B P'retoria's puppes Banda, vE CIA stalwar: Mobutu, are threatened, since they are key plaver in Pretoria x campaign aguins the MPLt well as the Frelimo government in Mozambique
According so a recent U5 congress report, this equipment * supplied and is paris returbistied Uv sources in West European NATO couries tincluding Francel aml Is- rael, despite a supposed mandatory UN armis enbargo (a fact that Thatcher. Koll. Minter-
rand er al try to dens). Yet the Us is isos also almost directly involved in supplying the SADF In a replica of contragate", since 1982 the CiA has arranged the supply of arnis and other equiprent to Linita (ie: the SADE) via Momen by using "kickbark' funds pait by Saudi Arabia for Lie Us sale to King Falid ol AWA surveillance planes. This prompred Israc to try and ouido the Saudis in 1983 by
setting up a Unita training programme in Zaire. C Insolvement in both of these
SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 5 January/Ecoruary 1988
operations was covert until july 1985 when
bia in 1975
and hener the
However, a 1978 palace coup" in Pretoria
The 1976 Clarke unendment prohihiring Us military support to Angulan dissidents was repealed by Reagan, Why this sepped up
oper all this. PW Batha, then minister of
detence, and his generals, underscood that, if the election was remotely fair, SWAPO would win hands down, and this
**11321* would sean
is ...
The mots nt this "Bothapartin" dictaror- ship lay, on the ome hand. internal class contradiction and, specifically, through the gruwth of the power of the black working class compared to white labour and
in Pretoria's
itically
interest in Unirn?
Namibian power vacuum FROM MID 1982 until now, Reagan and Both officials bad stalled the planned doco- Jonisation of Namibia witldrawal of the SAD! and denise of Unira - by delaying the provins Angio-Arnerican diplomacy devised in 1977. Carter's officials led by Vance hoped to won the MITA gra- dually through economic dependeney, since Angolas main oxport, oil, was tu the Is and was virtually rum hy Gulf The fast step was ro secure the gradual withdrawal of the Cuban reinforcements hrought in to stems tie 1975/6 South African invasion, by imple- mentiny a Vance-Owen (that is,
another SAfF retreat and a white sell out to u
‹mall guerrilla campaign in a primarili Afri-
ter color After their previous
retreat from Angola in the face of Cuban
with the coming of age of Afrikuaner finance
capital, the irrerocable split in Alrikaaner nanonalism. On the other hand, it arose. from the growing weed to expon capital by monupoly fuance cupitulism in the 1970g. and therefore the South Alcan ruling class ambition to declop the state into a minor imperialist power in its own right in the face
region. Namibia was at the very licart of all
The 1971-2 general strike and the post 1971 upsurge of guerrilla warfare following the Portuguese collapse, had threateued the
Namibia's mmerals. fishing and agriculture in which Afrikaaner capital could enter through its pavileged
ax ir is still railed. The
retreat from Angola in the face of Cuban
roup reinforcements, the Sower revolts of 1976 had followed. A SWAPO victory wold
be an even bigger powder keg.
ver xeu. Bul
supporters managed to cust Vorster before
PENDER
mented. This signalled the start of the gone- rals take-over under the ideningy of thr
ity council resultion 335) could be imple- of growing anti-colonind struggles in the sub-
of these contradictions.
"total strategy
Bothapartism and Namibia
Labour
1987 BOTHA
African state security council as a de facto
inner cabines for hix generals and an cla- hokl on borate national security management system
to control the
mibu had created the Suuth bowen in plutidering
goverument sponsorcd-) decolonisation plan for Namibia: This would get the SADF out of Namibia, except for a temporary Namitia's only port. Walvis Bav.
stern powers in the LN — che 1'5. Britain, Franer, Went Germany and Canada (who also happened to be the largest intestors in Namibia) — because of the universally agreed UN trustership role over Namihia Jenving from its old League of Nations mandate as an ex-German colony. Vorster and the sWAPO leadership agreed 11, bur Varser naively thoughr thar his tribal pup- pets could defeal SWAPO in the propnend
Irgirinatcly in Namibia
Afrikaaner National Party South West Afrira The plan was sponsored by the five Wee apparatus A hicrarchy of secret committers
was set up at local, provincial and national
level, made up of tristed white business.
professional, political and other "experts"
UN-supervised clections to a consritaent 1s- sembly and that the sAD could then remain
who were consalted by military and police chiefs on all political decisions — a star
within a state. Copying the Salt's expe- rence in ruling Namibia, where the whine
National Party had split and beime ineffres ive. this white "secunty umbrella" could then hem place to en-opt select black collaburators ar the formal parliamentary and mumcipal level with a view to crearing black puppet armed forces such as those started in Nami-
LITES
political position in the colonial state
threat to Buer hegemons- powcred by swA- PO's escalating struggle, case in the form uf die Vance-Owen plan. itself a response to wider imperialist consideration.
In response. Buttia tirst delaced the LIN plan — Owca and co. obliged by dirhering over whetber to lake sanctions mrasites. Botha planned to build up the client parties in Namibia and severely crackdown on SWAPO and its merging union wise — the National Union ol Namiliar Workers, Thaucher's election in 1979 was a filip. She was persuaded that the Cubane would be invited in to Namibia by SWAPD because.
(DAF
32
SOUTHERN AFRICA
Nainibia, and sw stu's stony worker and European and Japanese nuclear industries—
peasant base; were unabic to consolidare as well as so claim war reparations and
their multi parry conference" and interim conomic compousation against some of the
government prujects. Moreover, of more
critical importance. Bolla's new lucal arus
and police force, as well as other state struc
tures, were utterly dependent on the SAf
ince die SADE let there would be a power
Unlike In Kbodesia which had a local army, police force, judiciary, central hank auki so forth, Namibia did nor prosess the trappinge of a local state un which the natin malist movement leaders could be grafted Butha pleaded for time to stare: build. The Namibia plan was pur on ice as artention focnesed on Zimbabwe. With the South Afri can economy in serious recession (including) a gold price slump) and the overthrow of the Shal meaning more espensive oil supplies. Botha cooperated with Carrington in a deal allowing the Lancaster House plan in retur for British oppostion to any sanctions. Hop ing for a Muzorewa win, the Mugabe elec tion victory merely confirmed Botha's suspi- cion abour Namibia.
vaccuum
largesr manopoly corporations which plunder the territory. For example, the last
Labour government could have impounded
the huge yea diamond stocks of the de Beers cartel in London but this was never dis- cussed. Opportunities also esist for diver
workers blockades of Namibian produce —
wurkers sanctious - which the NINW and Most SWAPU hase called for. Currentiv. fur
instance. the dockers in liverpool have
stupped cargoes of suspected Namihian ura-
The dialectic between struggles on te South African prriphery and the heartlands
makes Namibia's independenre a porcorial
achilles leel for the Botha regime and the new imperialist right Ilias solidarity work
in this drea is urgent.
Another 1976 coming?
IN THE RECENT fighring in south castern
Angola and north Namibia the sAit has received soone severe sethacks: When in.com- * to mecung PAPLA brad un the SADE appears to push is black troops to lie front. This recently provoked a dramate mutiny in
Angola by over 100 black Namibians in 101 Battalion in Noveruber, 360 hring seat from the front to Walvis Bay military prison in Namibia as well as another protest in 102
Barralion. A sAt poor adanted to the London Sondes Trigrops that Two yous
1 3 go. de Angolit world try to avoid me in a
Now dey 're spoiling lor a heht and coen las ing ambusties dor our pilors.
The neis Mig-23%. superior to the SADIs Mirages and updated Irari-designed Cher- National tude. and die Angolans" more sophisticared colar mad ground to surlace missle systems supplicd bv lie Suviets, have made deep cross border rade be contational sADE tomes increasingly risky. The only coumer u this new weaponry is the supply of die C$ Stinger anti aircraft and Tonundiawk aur tank missilcs reccally delivered by the CTA 2o Units But there b so evidense that this epipment has lipped the balance against FAPIA, alhangh it should be resenbernd how many more resmines the South Africans have at their disginal — copecially if the gold prue concue upwards
The aim of the SADF meursion was. in the words of Sourh African soneral Malan. 10 tallet a once and for all defiar on tAMA, homever so lar this has tailed. Bur be 16 December - despite a manimous bet Token, UN Security Cuuncil call for ile SADI To withdraw from Angula by 10 December - Malan fores had crcused an numbers. spread wiseward along the Curio Catanuo province and into Cunene pronce and were attacking 12 towns, Angolan president dos Santos, wax threatening to again resort to maternativalst aid from our Cuban friends and allies' in a renewal id the 1976 cam- paign. Cuhan troops were srads in tove south of the Mocamodes railway line and op to 17 ( uhan generals: many veterans of the 1975/6 war, were reponedly arriving from Havana •
SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no. Jaswary/February 1988
departents in Pretoria and local white
During this period of salemate in impe- rialist strategy, SWARO was further extenu- ing its support inside the country. dramațic has been the creation during 1986 of numerus workplace committees under the banner nf the National Union of Nami- bian Warkers: (NIXT) and then the consoli- dation of these in four militant industrial unions in late 1980 and 1987 amider a wave
sctilers. ca.
of strikes and worker demonstrations across the country. Obviously, thus was not unre- le to similar developments in South Afri
Enter Reagan BY THEN, HOWEVER, Lupe was on the huri- zon in the farm of a Reagan election win and Pretoria ser about to exploir to the maximum the new right's post-Vietnam return to the cold war. Even belore the inaugeration. Reagan was calling South Africa 'a friendly country and wax hinting that Angola nerder 4 апсанет House seulement that would include Savimir. By salling Namibian deco lonisarion with a hogus demilitarised zone proposal to the IN in 1980, Botha was ahle to
local army and police force,
Treed be.
Class hase
scupper any hopes of early implementarion of the UN election plan at a last-dirch 1901 conference and hegin arrash programme of state building in Namibia srarting with a
With the Reaganite Chester Crocker lead lug a scrice of secret Li-South Africa talks on Namibia, ir wis made clear thar, first, a constimation guaranteeing large private prop- cry and minority right would have to be
VO 3
imen food workers in the
Union of Namibian Workers
nr and a hall years Silent socialists
835
agreed (chus pre-empting the proposed UN constituent assembly) and secondly. the Cu- bans would have to start pulling out before the ON pian conle he activated.
Crocker was able to force the MPLA intu talks on the possibility of a Cutan withe drawal and force su A/O to agree to stue constitutional principles guaranteeme pre- vate property, bar nor minority rights, änd an agrrement that the Namibian constitien: assembly would have to make derisons in a tenthirds majority bass Thin latter deal was to cater for Breha's renewed efforts to build up an anti swaho hlor of client par- ries. Thus transtorming the original UN plan Into a virtual Lancaster House deal, vet with Pretoria still able to bold on to Walvis Bay tol choke a SWO governmear inro submission
THE RUNDING blocks for the new Crocker- Borha plan woukl not take shape, however First, stong populat anti-colonial support in Angola, especially for EAPLA, and a high Caban and Soviet military commitment, was able to hukl off scrious military destabilisa cion, despite the chormous human costs in Lic south Secondly. Borha's black puppet politiciane in Namibia, because of an ex- tremely lose development of an indignons petty bourgenis and middle" class strata in
By the ond of 1987, de unions had over 40,000 members in the Mireworkers Union
ol Namibia, the Numibian Food and Allied
Lion, tie Meal and Allind Namibian Worker Umun and the Namibian Public Workers Lmon Coanny the other workers committers, AwARO had organised about 20 percent of the waged worktome in jer over
INCINFASINGIN THATCHERITE and Rea gamine politirians, and now followers of Kahl. harr been sucket in to the anti SWAPO crusade prototed be Pretoria's lavishly funded front organisations in Washington, London, Ronn and Paris In Britain, for cxample, over 100 Tory stis have regularly signed motions supporting Pretoria's une lerzed chear "government" in Namibia. By contrast, social democratic and lahour move ment leaders remain vintually inactive in campaigning for Namibian independence.
Borause of Namibia's unique status in hourgris international law (the only terri- tory directly under 1.% sovercign jurisdic- ton). paricular opportonites an: open 10 tan the trade in Namibia's natural respanes — of wich its uranium is the most strategie. but not absolately essential. for Us, West