SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 25, June 1990
Paqe 29
REVIEWS
American car workers queue for jobs
A Bright Shining Lie - John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam by Neil Sheehan
Reviewed by Steve
Taylor
Explaining the American defeat in Vietnam has become a growth industry in the States. Unlike most of the reecent accounts, Neil Sheehan's book is neither an attempt at retrospective jus- tification nor a study in dumb ig- norance.
Bright Shining Lie is a detailed and throughly researched ex- ploration of the war, written by a Vietnam correspondent who had access to hard information and high ranking informants.
Sheehan is primarily con- cemed with the practical conse- quences of the political and military strategy adopted by the United States. The book gives full and vivid expression to the sheer vanity of the enterprise un- dertaken by the Americans. Lie deserves to be read purely for Sheehan's account of Khe Sanh and the Tet offensive.
However, the main focus of the book is the life and times of Lieutenant Colonel John Paul Vann. Through Sheehan's ex- ploration of the Bright Shining Lie, Vann becomes a partial metaphor of the American role in Vietnam.
Vann understood that victory was dependent on mobilising the Southem Vietnamese and he un- derstood that the war was being lost by this failure.
He spent most of his time, from his arrival in 1961 until his departure in 1972, attempting to convince his superiors to adopt a
more sophisticated approach than the carpet bombing and wanton destruction which charac- terised their military strategy. Neil Sheehan was part of the lobby which Vann utilised to promote his ideas about the con- duct of the war. They met and became friends.
Vann never ceased to believe that America could win the war.
Sheehan charts the Lieutenant Colonel's rise
through the competing hierachies but is never seduced by Vann, and this is a major strength of the book.
Vann was finally given the command and co-ordination of military and social resources in the Central Highlands of Viet- nam. By 1971 he was one of the few remaining commanders who still believed in America's ability to turn the war around. Vann became the first civilian General of the conflict. He was killed in a helicopter crash after momentarily halting the North Vietnamese advance at Kontum.
The personal and protracted failure of Vann is perceived by Sheehan as the historic failure of the United States.
Vann's main achievement was to prolong a war that had al- ready been lost. It is this ultimate delusion which compounds and electrifies Sheehan's moral in- dictment of the American cam- paign.
Hovever while Sheehan's in- dictment is powerful, moving and just, the strategy advocated by Vann has survived: it has be- come quietly incorporated into America's subsequent geo-politi- cal conduct.
A integrated command struc- ture; the use of locally recruited soldiers; American hardware under American direction; the selective recruitment and train- ing of both civilian and military personel; the careful targetted use of both terror and large scale terrorism; the deployment of American advisors and tech- nicians rather than ground for- ces; the de-Americanisation of completed military objectives, and the development of social programmes aimed at subverting unrest: each of these methods, advocated by Vann amidst the cacophony of the Vietnam war, have become basic elements of current US policy.
The political and miltary leadership which lost the war in Vietnam have survived and learned from their mistakes. John Paul Vann can take a good deal of posthumous credit for this.
SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 25, June 1990