abyss?
IN DEPTH Ті лиЯ REFORMINE Stalinist rule in Eastern Europe is on the verge of total collapse. The Soviet Union is facing a desperate economic and political crisis, and maybe even disintegration. What will come out of the crisis? Can anything be salvaged for socialism? Phil Hearse talked to OLIVER MACDONALD, founding editor of Labour Focus on Fastern Europe, and a member of the New Left Review editorial board.
* After what we now know about the living standards of the masses in Eastern Europe, and even the decay of their social welfare system, why would the restoration of capitalism be such a big defeat? What is there in these states to defend?
* Socialised property. It is a fundamental position for socialists that the economic resources of society should be under democratic political control and organised to break down class divisions and promote egalitarianism. In the market economies of the West the entire cconomic resources of society are taken out of the hands of the political control of the masses, and fundamental decisions are taken outside of any political control by private capital. In the Easter bloc of course there was not democracy, or direct control of economic resources by the working class.
But those people who say there is nothing progressive in the socioeconomic character of these states presumably say it doesn't make any difference if Siemans and ICI and Fords take over or not. We say, we want that basic ownership structure to be maintained and be under democratic control - that is a possibility and a tremendous opportunity.
Kohl and the other German leaders are driven not just by a desire for German reunification but by a great fear of the Easter economies coming under democratic control - with all the consequences that it would have, especially in West Germany. SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 22, March 1990
REISFE Es seni ERIX ЯЗОН NEUES SM itbüt FORUM AUF!
* Perestroika isn't working. Can Gorbachev overcome the economic crisis? *The Soviet economy has not simply been in stagnation but in decay - we can talk about the decay of the productive forces. At every level there has been a complete loss of confidence in the old system. But the only alternative been posed to replace it, by the Communist intelligensia, is thorough marketisation. This "Hayek-type" marketisation has made enormous inroads into the living standards of the working masses, who were heavily subsidised under the old system. This led to an enormous battle, which the marketisers lost inside the CPSU leadership. Far from going forward it has produced a sort of economic "dual power' or "dual chaos' situation.
On the political side, the attempt by the bureaucracy to maintain single-party rule, and the suppression of genuine federalism in the Union, has resulted in only one strong political challenge coming forward - that of nationalism in the republics. This has created enormous problems for Gorbachev, and become inter-twined with the economic crisis. For example one of the consequences is that the CP leaderships in the republics have tried to keep hold of power, and utilised the market system to comer as many economic resources as possible, leading to a complete breakdown of what division of labour between the republics there was. It's an enormous crisis.
* Is a return to Brezhnevism possible? What would be the consequences of attempting?
* No - if you mean the re-establishment of unity in the bureaucracy at an all-union level and the squeezing back of the masses into the corset of monopoly Communist Party rule.
What we are seeing could have three possible outcomes. There could be an eventual consolidation of the Gorbachev regime: but that supposes a relatively rapid turaround in the economic situation which
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things go from bad to worse, and integrity of the Soviet state, they will stick with
is unlikely. It supposes also that there is an agreed formula on the na- tional question, and that the Gorbachevites maintain a dominant base inside Russia. most certainly by the rise to dominance of an authoritarian chauvinist- nationalist populist trend in Russia. This would be a "wild beast' in the region. This could be a Jaruzelski-type regime prepared to do business with anyone, and engaged in the same type of operations as the Polish govemment. least in the short and medium term. The forces are not there. It could only happen after this whole phase is over. nationalities? Could he be overthrown, either by a section of the bureaucracy or by a mass movement? * In the next 18 months, I would say that it doesn't look as if a Rus- sian nationalist force would have sufficient strength to topple Gor- bachev. As far as the military and the KGB are concerned it appears that so long as Gorbachev maintains the real integrity of the Soviet state, they will stick with him. By that I mean that if, for example, one of the Baltic states won de jure independence, but de facto stayed within the whole Soviet military and diplomatic setup, then I think. the military and the KGB would accept it. Of course, de jure independence for one or more Baltic republics would fuel Russian nationalist move- ments, but that's another matter. But of course the crunch issue is the economic one. While the figures for last year are not appalling, the experience of the masses is that there's no prospect of any short term turround. Gorbachev desperately needs, if not economic success, then at least a strong signal to the masses that the economy has turned the comer. And there's no sign of that yet. CPSU? tally, the rule of the bureaucratic caste relies on the exclusion of the masses from active politics and, over time, that cannot survive any form of democracy. On the other hand the bureaucrats, or some of them, can survive. Look at what's happening in Poland: the army is as- king to be 'de-politicised". That is in preparation for surviving the political transition, so that the officer corps survives. The same is true for other sections of the bureaucratic apparatus. In all countries you have a bureaucracy, who take key administrative decisions, but they don't necessarily rule in the social sense. countries you have a bureaucracy running the country, which is not fundamentally linked into or controlled by any social class: they are free-floating. So that means we are still in a transitional phase, and its not at all clear how its going to work itself out. Page 22
N The second variant is a break-up of the Soviet Union, followed alThe third variant would be a regime of order, of the military type. A fourth variant, a victory of the socialist left, is not on the cards, at * Can Gorbachev survive the secession of any of the OVENOTWALLS How popular is Gorbachev in Armenia? look as if a Russian nationalist force would have sufficient strength to topple Gorbachev. As far as that so long as Gorbachev maintains the real him" *Could bureaucratic rule survive the end of the monopoly of the * Well it depends what you mean by bureaucratic rule. FundamenNow in Faster Europe we have a paradoxical situation. In many In Romania, with the destruction of Causescuism, you have a
DEPTH not for socialism at all. rule ... "In the next 18 months, I would say that it doesn't the military and the KGB are concerned it appears as if the GDR is not going to survive as a separate state. Leipzig and Dresden are now calling for? ster Christa Luft. of Europe ....
political system without a centre. But its clear that in the National Sal- vation Front has strong tendencies to try to re-establish a bureaucratic order. That's not to say of course that we could in any way support the National Peasants Party, which seems to be the main opposition. But that takes us to a wider question, a rather painful one for the left, that we had always assumed that political revolutions would be led by the Left. But in fact political revolutions have been led by forces that are * That depends what you mean by political revolution. If you take it to be the destruction of bureaucratic rule, then the move- ment towards that, in general, hasn't been led by socialists. But then political revolution telescopes two concepts - the overthrow of bureaucratic rule, and the establishment of direct working class * Yes it telescopes the destruction of bureaucratic rule and the es tablishment of socialist democracy. But political revolution as a con- cept developed by Marxism was developed not in the east, but in bourgeois society, and it has a general applicability - to mean changes in the political form of the state bringing the masses into politics. In France in 1848 there was a in Spain political revolution; there was something which amounted to a political revolution - with the overthrow of the monarchy and establishment of the republic at the beginning of the thirties. You could say there was a political revolution in Spain in the mid-1970s with the transition from Francoism to bourgeois democracy - a political revolution which didn't, in the methods used, take a revolution- ary fom. The one exception to what we've been saying is the GDR, where the left played an extreme- ly important role. But whether that can be consolidated into socialist democracy looks ex- tremely unlikely, because it looks * Is a capitalist reunification of Germany on the cards in the short or medium term? Isn't that what the masses on the streets of * Socialists are in favour of the people of the GDR deciding for themselves. That's quite different from socialists advocating reunifica- tion of Germany on a capitalist basis; and it's obvious that in the present conjuncture that's the only kind of reunification we would get. The movement in East Germany was in the first place largely led by the left. Those people were fighting against the Honecker regime, but for the maintenance of the GDR. And they are still for the maintenance of the GDR. It's interesting to note that many of the oppositionists in the "round table' are much more for the maintenance of the GDR than the Communist Party itself, not to mention people like the economics mini- It would have been perfectly possible for Bonn to stabilise the GDR. Why didn't they do it? This is vital for understanding the future SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 22, March 1990
IN * Yes because the other imperialist states seemed in favour of an ordered tran- sitions. For example US secretary of state Baker's visit to Modrow seemed to give blessing to the Modrow project. * Absolutely, people from the foreign ministries of the USA, Britain and France have been in and out of Berlin frequently, hardly giving Modrow time to think. But the reason that Bonn had to destabilise the GDR was because of the appalling prospect for them if there had been a successful socialist and democratic resolution of the crisis in the GDR. That would have created ferment in the SPD and in the West German trade unions. The leader of the German BDI, (the ANDERSMAN equivalent of the CBI, said the other day that the problem was destabilise the SED without destabilising the GDR. But that is less than the truth, because the BDI has found it can do business with the SED, especially with its economics minister, Frau Luft. Bonn has chosen to destabilise, while pretending to do the opposite - and pretending that the thing which most concerns them is the mass emigration from the GDR. There is another question which is driving the West German Chris- tian Democrats; they know perfectly well that if they were to prop up the GDR, with the objective of going for reunification in the longer term, the British, French and Americans would try to turn it into a per- manent stabilisation. So Kohl has tried to keep it on the boil, and they've done it very well. Now the working population of the GDR faces a choice. Do they go for a quantitative improvement in their living standards, which they know would be the result of reunification, or fight for a qualitatively better, in social and cultural terms, state in the GDR? How do they make that choice? They make it on the basis of whether they think the GDR is going to survive. If they feel it's not, then to hell with it. That seems to be the mood now very strongly, and once it takes hold it be- comes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Once you lose faith in that state you cease to work for its survival. So I think that the de facto reunification of Germany will take place very quickly, but the de jure reunification will probably come some time after. Whoever is elected will be totally under the thumb of West Germany in terms of all major public decision making. But formal reunification will take longer, because Bonn will not want to provoke the spasm of outrage which would come from the US, USSR, France and Britain if Germany was formally reunified quickly. All of them are afraid of the enormous increase in power that would result for the West Germans, which to some extent has already taken place. It's not simply German reunification that's increased the power of the Federal Republic, but the collapse and power vacuum in the east. • But won't reunification be a mixed blessing to the West Ger- man ruling class? It would bring in masses of people who are, to a greater or lesser extent, imbued with some sort of socialist and col- lectivist values. * I don't think this would be a major problem for Bonn. If the GDR is destroyed you will get an enormous effort to restabilise economic life in the area of the GDR, and a more powerful SPD. In the transition period there will be very great problems, that's true; for example, the issues of unemployment and social security policy. The other problem will be that it will be under very suspicious surveillance from its allies in the West; and not only from the West, because as long as the CDU - not to speak of the CSU and the Republicans - refuse to underwrite the SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 22, March 1990
DEPTH THE CONGRESS SEEMED VERY INSPIRED BY MY CALL FOR MORE MONEY TO POLAND!.
POLANDR!.... THEY THOUGHT YOU WERE TALKING ABOUT THEIR PAY INCREASE! D1900 WALT HAN TIMES PICAYUNE 1945 borders with Poland, this will provoke tremendous hostility in Poland and USSR.
What has been going on is a very devious game with Thatcher and others insisting that a reunified Germany has to be totally within NATO. West German foreign minister Genscher points out that by saying that she is really saying there should be no German reunification at all - because for a united Germany to remain in NATO would be totally unacceptable to the USSR.
* Are you saying that the West German ruling class would be prepared to come out of NATO to achieve a united Germany?
* This is an issue which very much divides the West German political elite. But it's not a question just of totally in or totally out; it's also a question of whether the area of the GDR comes under NATO command. Genscher's position has been to stabilise the GDR; he's not been in favour of Kohl's policy of destabilisation, and this came to a head in the cabinet two weeks ago. Genscher believes that there must be '1992' and the Delors plan, and the Franco-German axis; and there must be the Bonn-Washington axis in NATO. His line is that they can increase their influence in the East on the basis of these things.
Then you have the line of the CSU: German national unity first, totally opposed to monetary union in the EC, a robust stand on NATO and so on.
Now Kohl and Staldtenberg and the leadership of the CDU are offering a formula which is not exactly 'out of NATO', but offering to agree certain special rules on the territory of the GDR, and other rules which will modify their relationship with NATO. So you have the paradoxical situation of an enormous increase in West German power, but the possibility of a massive backlash from the USA, USSR and so оп.
* After the East European elections this year - in Czechos lovakia, GDR, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria - it may well be that basically liberal democratic governments come to power. Can socialised economies survive that for any period of time? In the absence of socialist democracy, isn't capitalist restoration the inevitable long-term consequence?
* I think it is dangerous to discuss these questions abstractly: it will be decided by socio-political forces on the ground. You need to look each country in tum, they have very different dynamics. Look at Poland; this country is much more advanced in terms of the drive towards marketisation, change in form of political rule, and so on.
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IN
Now in Poland there is very deep working class hos tility to the austerity plan - the Balcerowicz plan - a classic project for austenty and privatisation. The other side of the situation is that the West has not come up with the goods! This is a fundamental aspect of the equation. Will the West put its money where its mouth has been for forty years? The West is not underwriting the Maziowiecki government.
The USA would love to underwrite this govemment. but it hasn't got the money. Senator Dole suggested cutting 5 per cent from the money that goes to the Israelis, to provide a few dollars for Eastem Europe, and that's caused the most God-almighty storm. The Americans are broke; they don't have the cash. So when we talk about what's going to happen in Czechoslovakia and Hungary we have to bear these things in mind.
Now Czechoslovakia is very different. It is a real juicy prize for intemational capitalism. It is far from bankrupt, it has some advanced industry, some high quality managers, an educated workforce - but cheap labour, in Wester terms. And in geographical terms it's near the "golden triangle' - the dynamic heart of European capitalism which goes from the Benelux countries to West Germany and norther Italy. So it's no accident that Vaclav Havel (who I've discussed with several times and is, no doubt about it, a real right-winger) chose to make his first trip to Munich!
This means that, unlike in Poland, you can be sure that there will be investment in Czechoslovakia from West Germany - particularly from the private sector, but I suspect from the West German state as well. After the GDR, it's their number one priority. On the other hand, the working class in Czechoslovakia has not experienced economic collapse and desperation that has been experienced in Poland, especially the working class in Bohemia - whose living standards rival those in Britain. So the question is, are they prepared to accept the unemployment and attacks on all family-consumption subsidies (rents, public transport, food) which will come with capitalism? It is true that the Czech intelligentsia is utterly hostile to socialism because of all the repression it has suffered - and longing for the life of Westem professionals. But the real question comes down to a political struggle on the ground, the outcome of which is far from determined in advance.
Overall, Wester capital is in general very ill-prepared for opening up ties with the East, particularly because of the existence of the European Community. From an historical point of view, you would have thought it was ABC to say to a country like Czechoslovakia 'in you come' to the EC. But they can't do that because of the whole EC system of balances and trade-offs which involve powerful capitalist interests.
If you allow Czechoslovakia in, then you have to allow the rest in. too. And then, where is your Common Agricultural Policy? Where is your 19927 Your social fund and your regional fund? And you can say goodbye to the Delors plan for monetary union. And then you have the problem of the whole political system organised around NATO. It's not so easy to change all these things in one fell swoop.
* A 'united socialist Europe' is a nice slogan. But what steps can we take to bring it about?
* Before we talk about European unity, it's very important to talk about European socialism. We have to get to grips with not only the Page 24
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collapse of the eastem bloc, but the collapse of Communist Parties. This is a major historical tuming point. Communism, by which I mean 'official' communism with a capital 'C" has dominated the imaginations of millions upon millions of Europeans - let us not forget that - it's a reality sometimes obscured to us by the relative weakness of the British Communist party. For hundreds of millions of people in Europe, this is not simply a defeat for comThe true face of Lech Walesa? munism with a capital 'C. let alone a defeat for Stalinism, but a defeat for communism with a capital "M" - for Marxism itself. Serious Marxists will not just brush all this aside and say 'this is not our defeat, we are advancing" and all that. This is a serious practical and theoretical problem for us.
One solution is to say that the 1917 Revolution should never have taken place, and we should have gone with the berts and Schiedemanns and McDonalds and so forth. And that communism had nothing to do with socialism at all - this is the good old Labourite, social democratic response. In this view, what has happened in eastern Europe is not a defeat for the Left but a victory for the Left - what you might call the 'Common Market" Left.
A second position, more serious, is that of Martov-type Menshevism. Martov, of course, was not a counter-revolutionary but the leader of the internationalist minority of the Mensheviks. This says that there should have been the Russian February revolution, and maybe even the October revolution, but what should have followed was "double New Economic Policy" - a sustained capitalist development with a powerful state sector. This a serious argument and I don't think we should just brush it aside.
But the argument which is not being seriously discussed is that put forward by Trotsky. Namely, that while what existed in the Soviet Union was not socialism, and the only way forward for the workers" states was their participation in the international division of labour - via their political strength on a world scale, including crucially their bases of support in the world labour movement, which the Stalinist leaders have of course woefully neglected. Let nobody believe that Trotsky was in favour of what Stalin did with his crash programme of industrialisation and collectivisation in 1929. Trotsky wanted to move beyond the New Economic Policy, but was not in favour of moving beyond market relations at that time. Neither was he in favour of using military-bureaucratic force for collectivisation.
The whole way that Stalinism moved, right through to the Brezhnev period, through autarky, was a massive struggle for a pre-capitalist economic existence, together with the terrible drain of resources to build up military forces to put them in a position to have an historic reconciliation with Washington. This was coupled with an utter disregard for ideological support in the world labour movement, which was the only place you could get the support for undermining cold war ideology and the economic embargo.
Let's not kid ourselves; the events in Eastern Europe don't automatically bring socialism across the continent closer. Why not? Because the forces which led the political revolutions in Eastern Europe were not led by socialists, but by people who saw the only viable alternative as being Wester capitalism. Having said that, of course, we are very much in favour of the establishment of democratic liberties, because without freedom of expression for the working class you've got nothing, it's all built on sand.
Now in some of the countries of eastem Europe there are democratic
SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 22, March 1990
Appeal for material and financial assistance for SOTSPROF A new, independent socialist trade union movement in the USSR At this time of fast moving revolutionary upheaval throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, socialists in the West face a paradox. On the one hand, we delight in seeing the collapse of oppressive bureaucratic regimes. On the other hand, however, it is 'socialism' rather than Stalinism that is loudly pronounced dead by politicians, pundits and media alike - while they constantly seek to inject free market' rhetoric with a new lease of life, despite the savage crisis of capitalism raging throughout the world. This is why the emergence of an independent socialist and trade union movement in the Soviet Union is such an encouraging development. SOTSPROF has now been legally recognised, and is a growing organisation, yet it does not have the basic means to function effectively in terms of office and printing We, the undersigned have been authorised by Boris Kagarlitsky and SOTSPROF to publicise this new movement in Britain, and, perhaps more urgently to raise funds for it. We are hoping to arrange public meetings in most major towns throughout Britain with guest speakers from SOTSPROF. We are appealing for Tony Benn MP: Oliver McDonald; Hilary Wainwright: Branka Magas; Eric Heffer MP; Tamara Deutscher; Quentin Hoare; Paul Foot; Alice Mahon, (Treasurer); endorsed by the Camapign Group of Labour MPs For further information about the SOTSPROF TOUR contact John Rose on 01 538 5821 Send contributions to Alice Mahon, Treasurer, PO BOX 2988, London WC1 N3XX Cheques
liberties plus socialised economies. But the West is trying to deny the people of caster Europe the right to democratically decide the future of these societies, how they want economic resources to be managed. They are using the usual mechanisms that they often use with third world countries - look at the IMF deal with Poland - a scandal and an outrage. Here are millions of people who would like to determine their own future. And if you were to get significant numbers of people in eastern Europe choosing democratically their social system, this would open up untold pos- sibilities. I think we have to campaign for that, against things like the IMF Poland deal. These countries must be able to sell their products in Western Europe to advance economically. And what is the barrier to this? Something called "Europe'; the Common Market with all its quotas and tariffs against east European goods. We have to campaign against that. On top of this all the institutions of Europe are in crisis or decay - East and West - because they are all premised on the cold war. What we should argue for is a democratic decision on the future of Europe - and autarky for the 35 nations of Europe is not the answer, it has to be a pan-European solution. I think we should argue for a democratic congress of the peoples of Europe to decide the future, from the At- lantic to the Urals. The future should be decided by the peoples, not by secret diplomacy. A democratic assembly should be tackling the issues of militarism, social rights, economic co-operation, ecology. * A European Constituent Assembly? * Absolutely. Why not? We should aim for a platform of the left, which is not calling for a united socialist Burope immediately, but for the democratic organisation of the peoples - towards a Europe-wide congress of the peoples. * Finally, just to take you up on your observation that the "political revolutions' have not been led by democratic socialist for- ces, revolutionary marxist forces if you like. This was not, after all, what Trotsky expected. Why do you think it turned out like this? Is SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 22, March 1990
FEATURES tendencies. A worried Kohl? us to this pass, then communism is worthless. do not survive. is. equipment. donations, and labour movement sponsors of the tour. payable to Alice Mahon, SOTSPROF
this primarily a function of objective factors, how the historical process unfolded, or was it primarily a function of subjective fac- tors. I suppose I mean sectarianism by the main historical marxist * Very much a matter of objective factors. Sectarianism is not simp- ly a subjective factor: it is the product of a whole array of objective fac- tors historically. We should remember that certain his- torical turning points went against us. which could have gone the other way. One of the crucial ones was the Prague Spring and the invasion of Czechoslovakia. That invasion was not a foregone conclusion: the Soviet lendership was deeply divided over that, as we now know. If that experiment had been allowed to proceed, things could have tumed out very differently. There is a tendency on the part of Trotskyists to pre- destine those events after the event. Objec- tive factors, after all, clash with each other and produce unexpected results. Where I do think Marxists can be criticised, especially in the 1960s and after, is in not realising sufficiently that we are part of the mass labour movement and can- not put ourselves above it. You can see that in easter Europe, because a left alternative has not emerged to official communism, the judgement of the masses is completely ruthless: because communism has brought Having said that, it is not unimportant that with the exception of Romania the communist parties have ceded power, belatedly. They may get only 2 per cent in elections, but they will be able to operate politi- cally, and that is important for the future, because many of their rank and file will be part of the left in the years to come, even if those parties So we have to go back to the 1848 Communist Manifesto: the com- munists have no interests separate from the working class movement it- self. Is there a real working class movement in Western and Eastern Europe? If not, then what has happened is disaster for us. Happily there Page 25
Salman Rushdie one year on: Much more than