Soviet Union's bureaucratic rulers have kept power since the days of Stalin, and it was formally abandoned by the central committee in February. What is the significance of the end of the Communist Party's "leading role"?
Of course the Communist Party's monopoly of politics has been de facto undermined by the endemic growth of political opposition over a period of years. In that sense the decision to abandon it de jure is simply a recognition of the existing situation. It was taken in the run-up to local elections in which (at the time of writing) all indications are that the Communist Party's candidates in many areas are in for a real trouncing. It was nevertheless the most dramatic yet of the reforms carried out under the rubric of glasnost.
The decision came in the context of a deepening economic crisis and the failure of perestroika to even begin to resolve it - a fact recognised by Gorbachev in February (see quote above).
It also came in the wake of the continuing rise of mass movements of the oppressed nationalities in the republics (most recently in the central Asian republic of Tajikistan) and the continuing mobilisations for change in the heart of the Russian federation itself (most dramatically expressed in the 2 - 300,000strong demonstration outside the Kremlin on the eve of February's central committee plenum).
But in order to understand it one must look SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 22, March 1990
through to a new super-presidency. since the days of Stalin.
FEATURES By David Shepherd and Patrick Baker at the further proposals for changes in the Soviet political system with which it was combined. These include increased representation for the republican communist parties at the highest level of the party. But, most importantly, the centrepiece of the proposals is the allocation of enormously increased powers
Ironically enough for the standard bearer of glasnost, President Gorbachev's latest political reforms could lead - at least in theory - to a concentration of political power in the hands of a single individual (himself) not seen
The difference of course is that whereas Stalin's accumulation of political power occured during the period of the establishment of the political rule of the bureaucracy, Gorbachev's attempts at the creation of a powerful executive presidency are occurring in the period of its collapse.
His aim is for much of the power that has been taken from the Party to go to himself. This would include powers to appoint ministers, to dissolve the Congress of People's Deputies, to impose states of emergency and so on. The refusal of the Supreme Soviet to call an early session of the Congress to elect
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the new super-president reflects doubts not only within the bureaucracy but also in society at large as to whether Gorbachev has democracy in mind or personal dictatorship.
What does Gorbachev have in mind? In a sense this is a question which has progressively been reduced in importance in recent months. He is certainly not the master of events - either in eastem Europe or in the Soviet Union itself. The current many-sided crisis has objective dynamics which Gorbachev is powerless to control.
He is forced to play a balancing act: between the exigencies of market-oriented economic reforms (which require austerity) and the working class; between the conservative wing of the bureaucracy (which is in creasingly organised and public in its activities) and the radical reformers.
It is this which explains both the "U-tum factor" (for example on the abolition of Article 6, a proposal of the radical reformers which he ruled out one day and adopted the next) and the attempts at the creation of a super-presidency: a position from which it will be easier to play a bonapartist role, balancing between contending forces and factions.
Despite pretensions to the contrary, no faction of the bureaucracy has any real altemative - and Ligachev, Gadaspov et al know it. A representative of the army union "Shield" recently wamed (on Channel 4) of the pos sibility of a coup, emanating from the upper echelons of the military; but veteran Czech oppositionist Jan Urban, now a collaborator of Vaclav Havel, expressed doubts, making the telling point that there would be little point, Page 12
FEATURES since no other force had an alternative programme.
In a general sense, what Gorbachev has in mind, first and foremost, is the interests of the bureaucratic caste of which he is the current leader. However, the question as to what course best satisfies this general criterion is not an easy one to answer. As Trotsky said long ago, in an historic sense the bureaucracy is "a caste without a future"; this statement now appears much less a long-term prognosis.
Though there are important similarities, in the Soviet Union we are not on the verge of seeing a collapse of the Stalinist regime similar to recent examples in its satellites. Quite apart from the historic role of the Communist Party - a not insignificant factor -Gorbachev retains more room for manoeuvre than a Honecker or a Jaruzelski. However, Gorbachev - and the bureaucracy in general -are faced with objective threats of truly historic proportions to their existence as a social formation. Among these are: the explosion of the powder-keg of the 'prison-house of nations*; the failure, thus far, of perestroika; and the growth of the radical opposition.
The answer to the first of these problems -the national question - has been, despite the rhetoric, traditional: brute force. Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan were clear signals to the insurgent nationalist movements: secession is beyond the pale. Yet in the context of the mass support that the Popular Fronts com mand - in the Baltic states, the Ukraine, and the Eastem republics - this poses a problem: glasnost or brute force? Gorbachev cannot have his cake and eat it. On another level, one could judge that Gorbachev's actions are an
•D irrelevance - that in Lithuania, for example, secession is now inevitable.
Second: the crisis of the Soviet economy. Glasnost has not provided the desired technological revolution; limited adjustments to the functioning of the economy have, on the whole, produced the reverse of Gorbachev's carly promises: a decline in the availability of goods (particularly foodstuffs), and increased social differentiation, particularly through the relative self-enrichment of "co-operatives" (or legal private sector). Any significant tum in the economy would require infinitely greater austerity measures, producing further poverty (as the working class in Poland is beginning to discover).
Third: the mushrooming opposition. Most significantly, this involves the Popular Fronts, now organised from one end of the Union to the other; but also the Inter-Regional group of Deputies, including figures such as Boris Yeltsin; and finally, an embryonic independent socialist opposition (in the form of the Socialist Party and the trades union federation SOTSPROF). Clearly Gorbachev believes that his best chance lies in attempting to give himself the greatest flexibility possible - hence the super-presidency. But this is no answer. Gorbachev - or indeed some other representative of the bureaucracy - may be able to cobble together a solution to the crisis.
However it is difficult to imagine how this could be anything other than a short-term, temporary postponement of the demise of the bureaucracy - either through the overthrow of the socio-economic system upon which it is based, or through a political revolution of the Soviet working class..
SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 22, March 1990