Labour's missing answers So Labour won't tell anyone precisely what its alternative to the poll tax is. Seems strange at first glance, with the Tories in chaos over "poll tax capping' of up to 110 local authorities, and certain to lose electoral support over the whole issue both in the Tory heartlands and the inner cities. Estimates predict poll tax bills of an average of £380, more than £100 above the government's target.
Berkshire County Council is mounting a legal challenge to the grant system which determines poll tax levels - the standard spending assessment (SSA) - on the basis that it doesn't take adequate account of inflation, of population or of the county's infrastructure needs.
The council estimates that its SSA is £70 million short, and that this will lead to poll tax bills of between £380-£480. It has been advised that it has a legal duty to poll tax payers to attempt to recover the missing goverment grant through the courts. Derbyshire council is discussing similar action.
In Devon, plans by the Torycontrolled county council for a budget which is £38 million above govemment-agreed levels have angered local Tory MPs. Councillors point out that the spending is necessitated by manifesto commitments and by legislation which gives new responsibilities to councils.
Few, if any of the councils likely to be capped are those that have even in the past, let alone today, been considered high spenders. And for the Tories to have to go down this road rather undercuts the initial motivation for the poll tax, which Kenneth
SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 22, March 1990
UPDATE Baker told us four years ago was a way of controlling local government through lot box than govem- legislation. was en- but as during Mur years, not one would be which aimed Tory al councils! Behind the mess lies the fact that yet again (it seems always to be the same old story with gover- ment calculations on local spending) SSAs have been set at a ridiculous- ly low level that is difficult for the most penny-pinch- ing council to at- tain. So in this situa tion of Tory disar- ray, what lies be- hind Brian Gould's unusual reticence? Is it just a case of Labour missing yet another chance of electoral suc- cess, while the Tories breathe a sigh of relief? The first Labour suggestion of two taxes was easy for the Tories to revile, and not that popular with Labour voters either. And a two tier system would require enormous ad ministration to carry through. So the current suggestion came for- ward. At first glance a property tax, based on up to date assess- ment of property value, seems
I looks like a case of "Go West young man!" If you think lim going to pay Mr Capps poll tax you're got another think Coming! "JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY fair enough. But actually, the Labour front bench are in a real trap. The real problem is that local government finance is in com- plete chaos. In order to capitalise on the Tories" disarray, Labour would have to demand back from central govemment the money leeched through cuts in central financing and by rate- capping. And to do that would require an overall economic plan which could show where the money would come from - a fea- ture which is totally absent from
Labour's economic "strategy" The only alternative is to do what both the present and previous altemative to the poll tax do - to make ordi- nary people finance the deficit. Not a popular proposal, particularly in the context of rising rents and mortgages. So Labour is yet again hoist by the petard of its inadequate polices, as the English courts begin fining people for refusal to register, and warrant sales are issued to well over 30% of Glas wegians. And as councils come up to this year's budget making. it is clear that jobs and services will become counterposed to high poll tax levels. The Poll Tax movement needs not only to or- ganise those facing harassment by the courts, to deepen the movement in the communities, but at the same time to demand of councils that they neither im- plement the poll tax, nor cut jobs and services, and of the Labour party nationally that it demands back the money that has been stolen from local govemment. Terry Conway Page 5
Behind the Wallace revelations Clearing the decks for a change of government?
The media and the par- liamentary parties are be- latedly paying attention to former army (disinforma- tion officer Colin Wallace's accounts of dirty tricks and defamation in Ireland and Britain in the 1970s. But (with the exception of Ken Foot and Paul Livingstone)this scandal hasn't surfaced due to the investiga tive zeal of either MPs or the press. Information, awaiting ex- posure, has been available for years; not just Colin Wallace's accounts, but also those of ex- intelligence officer Fred Hol royd, Kenneth Lindsay's book *The British Secret Services in Action' published in 1981 and two decades of allegations by and the civil libertarians Republican Movement. This material has included evidence of security force col- loyalist laboration with paramilitaries in the Miami Showband Massacre; the involvement of Cap- tain Robert Nairac and other SAS officers in shoot-to-kill operations in Ireland from at least 1974 onwards; bank robberies by the Lit- tlejohn brothers under Ml6 tutelage; and bombings and kidnappings South of the border by British-controlled agents. Similarly senior Labour politicians have for long been alleging destabilisation and smear campaigns against the Wilson govemment. Far from being a relentless assault from outsiders on Britain's Irish Watergate, the new interest stems from crisis and division within the system. Coming so soon after the Stalker affair, the Guildford revelations and the wrangles over Gibraltar, what has caused this and why now? Thatcher has continued and escalated the drive towards centralisation and secrecy that has been a feature of the British state since at least the First World War. Some of the more public manifestations of this have been linked to the goverment's Irish policy - the disman- tling of democratic rights and institutions, es- tablishing greater political control of the media, and the development of armed and political policing- One consequence has been that far more Page 6
FEATURES
Livingstone has long sought to bring this matter out in the open loyalty and discipline has been required from the military, civil service and intelligence officials - but in a context of declining social and political consensus. Thus, in particular, the 1989 Official Secrets Act has forced the pace on whistleblowing by threatening an imminent and absolute clampdown on the disclosure even of illegal' activities.
At the same time there has been a certain amount of disarray within the agencies that act as core guardians of the state's interests. There has been MIS/Ml6 rivalry since the 1970s. And there have been a string of public scandals and exposures around Cathy Massiter, Clive Ponting, Spycatcher and Colin Wallace.
Underlying all this, these agencies have been undergoing an "identity" crisis, reflecting a broader debate in ruling class circles about changes in Britain's role in the world, its relations with its allies (particularly the US and Europe) and the nature of the British state. The "Irish question" is a recurrent feature in each aspect of this debate.
New factors exacerbating this disarray have emerged in the last year or so. Firstly developments in Eastem Europe have accelerated this identity crisis by depriving the state of a mythology that justified the exist-
ence of these agencies and this process towards centralisation. The ransacking of Stasi and Securitate HOs must have led at least a few British spooks to put stronger locks on their filing cabinets.
Secondly, Thatcher's popularity has dramatically declined, suggesting a new era may be underfoot possibly leading to a Labour government. Some officials may be anticipating a clean sweep as a result. As Livingstone points out, Thatcher is the chief beneficiary of the "treason" Wallace has exposed. there may therefore be reason to fear the consequences of a changing of the guard.
But such revolutions are unusual in British politics. More significantly Thatcherism effectively cemented over these long-term cracks and divisions by providing a degree of authority and continuity. With the ruling class rethinking which kind of govemment it really needs, this is bound to shake up some of the weaker props on which the secret state rests.
The key turning-point was the Euro-elections last summer - coincidentally around the same time as it is now claimed the documents exposing both the Guildford and Wallace affairs were first "discovered".
Piers Mostyn
SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 22, March 1990
The 'M' factor: South Africa with Mandela Nelson Mandela's release has injected the "M" factor into South African politics - a crisis of authority for the white govemment, where the vast majority of blacks regard Mandela, not de Klerk as the legitimate head of state. Are we seeing the beginning of the end of apartheid? What sort of society do Mandela and his allies see replacing racial capitalism?
The events of the last month have been uplifting and inspiring for all those committed to the struggle against apartheid. Mandela's presence and actions since his release have been a tremendous vindication of principled politics in the struggle against the racist regime.
Politically, Mandela's voice has been one of an intransigent reformist leader speaking for the whole nation. In his Soweto speech he held forth the prospect of jobs and homes. He has insisted on his disciplined membership of the ANC, reliance on mass action, and refusal to drop the armed struggle. He has also invoked the spectre of nationalisation of the monopolies envisaged in the Freedom Charter.
The continued commitment to the armed struggle is emblematic but vital. Even at its height Umkhonto we Sizwe's campaign was one of "propaganda actions". In 1987 there were 230 actions of this type, mainly aimed at members of the security forces and col laborators. By 1988 this had declined by 30% and in 1989, a Soviet spokesperson was able to cynically remark, in reply to accusations that the USSR was abandoning the armed struggle, "What armed struggle?".
However, the armed struggle has been a vital part of the organisation's ability to win the youth of the black townships to its banner. Its reaffirmation is both a reflection of that pressure and a commitment to that mass base.
Likewise was Mandela's insistence in his Capetown speech that apartheid will be ended by decisive mass action. These were not the words of an organisation or a leader which places primary reliance on a negotiated settlement. SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 22, March 1990
FEATURES By Gerry Nicholls Mandela's con- tinuous stress on his membership of the ANC and his ad- herence to its dis- cipline is also a pledge that he had not and would not act on a separate agenda to that of his organisa- tion. However this is a double edged sword. On the one hand, the ANC clearly wishes to benefit from the prestige associated their base. stead share prices tumbled by 7.5 per cent. pooh-poohing fears of widespread nationalisa- tion. International reaction to Mandela's release, too, has been confused and contradic- tory. press office withdrew a prepared statement, and her speechwriters worked overtime to try and square the circle of her condemnation of
with his name. On the other, the organisation may be faced with making political concessions which may be very difficult to justify to
It is perhaps for this reason that Mandela has continued to stress that clause of the Freedom Charter which commits the ANC to the expropriation of big capital. Partly for this A pall bearer gasps through tear gas during a funeral in Crossroeds, Cape Town, 1986 reason the predicted boom in the South African stock exchange did not take place. Indespite leading industrialists like Zac de Beer
the mark.
After his Capetown speech, Thatcher's
Table.
the ANC as a "typical terrorist organisation", Mandela's reaffirmation of the armed struggle, and her invitation for him to visit Downing Street on his release. Thatcher is determined to use Mandela's release as a pretext to relax sanctions (which she never supported). But she also wishes to continue her govemment's role as go-between for de Klerk, Buthelezei and Mandela. George Bush too has his problems. The President is at odds with legislation of his Congress. He remains com mitted to sanctions much more wide-ranging than Britain's. Legally, however, he cannot relax those sanctions unless de Klerk repeals the state of emer- gency, the Group Area Act and the Population Registration Act, and allows people of all races to participate in the political process. It is fear that de Klerk will do just that which is fuelling the mass mobilisation of the far right. They have considerable parliamentary support, and their contention that they would win an election of the white electorate today may not be wide of More sinister, particularly in the long term, is their base of support within the police and the army. De Klerk's strategy is supposed to command the support of the army leadership. but how far that has filtered down is debate- It has been estimated that at least 70 per Paqe 7
cent of the police belong to the Conservative Party or the neo-Nazis. However the Conservatives* problem remains lack of the credibility of their political programme of separation of the races, in particular white where the "homeland' should be. such Without a "solution" in practice, their amounts to main- policy of aparthied tenance through repression. Their means for achieving power is 'extra-parliamentary" ac- tion from their supporters inside and out of the state However de apparatus. Klerk is confident that he speaks for big capital in South Africa, and that, changing the given economic structure of the be this will country, decisive in the long run. It is this change in the social base of the National Party which accounts for its "liberalisation". The change from the party representing primarily Afrikaner capital has not been an overnight phenomenon, of course. It is merely that in de Klerk they have found a spokesperson capable of articulating those in- terests. P.W. Botha, his predecessor, was too closely linked with the Party's past. This is why de Klerk's reforms reflect a real change in the South African political situation and not a mere cosmetic ploy to lift sanctions. This is not to say that the reforms themselves are radical. As Jesse Jackson pointed out, Mandela is free, but he still does his have the cannot sec not vole, grandchildren go to the school of their choice, and is not free to reside where he wishes. As such the reforms fall far short even of the Page 8
FEATURES The extreme right wing feels threatened by De Klerk's limited steps modest requirements of the international diplomatic community, let alone the aspirations of the black masses.
It is evidently the unleashing of these aspirations which has all along been the fear holding back Mandela's release. It is not merely the goverment that has been fearful. Mandela and the ANC leadership have consistently stressed that the political process that will now ensue would be a protracted one. This is in part due to the remaining divisions with the black camp, demonstrated by the camage in Natal where over 2000 people have died as a result of clashes between supporters of the ANC and local warlords who claim affiliation to Buthelezi.
Mandela's tremendous moral authority may permit a temporary resolution to the crisis, but the root of the problem lies in the mass base which Buthelezi commands, parCrossroeds, linoleum rellef print, Sydney Holo, 1986
ticularly among uprooted Zulu rural workers.
Buthelezi has long been regarded by Thatcher as a trump card to play in the unfolding political process. Representatives from the St John's Wood offices of his Inkatha movement have always been in close contact with Conservative Central Office, and Buthelezi has been a frequent and welcome visitor to Downing Street.
Divisions exist too within the ANC, There is a world of differenc between the multi-millionaire Richard Maponya in whose BMW Mandela was escorted to his homecoming rally, and the youths who waited to greet the released leader. Maponya is one of the five richest men in South Africa, white or black.
These social divisions are reflected in the interplay between factions and tendencies within the ANC, divisions that will become more pronounced as the political process deepens. Mandela's role in holding together this coalition will be crucial. Probably his greatest allies in this will be the South African Communist Party.
Its vision of a future South Africa corresponds to the schema of the national democratic stage, followed by socialist transformation. The ANC both organisationally and politically represents the vehicle for the introduction of the national democratic stage. Ironically while Mandela has been stressing the question of nationalisation, SACP leader Joe Slovo has been playing the reassuring theme of a "mixed economy" in which national capital would be respected and foreign investment welcomed.
This poses no problem for the SACP. which is able to emphasise the maximum or minimum parts of its programme to suit the occasion and the audience. What is more intractable however has been the party's attempts to come to grips with perestroika and
SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 22, March 1990
Now that the Embryology and Fertilisation Bill has reached the closing stages of discussion in the House of Lords, campaigners are preparing for its entrance to the Commons. Socialist Outlook asked