The aftermath of the
Gideon Mendel Retex:
Although there was a general tendency on the left and in liberation circles to dismiss the May elections in South Africa as "irrelevant" (Tambo) — because it was an all-white election, excluding the vast majority of the people of South Africa - its results and consequences cannot be lightly dismissed, argues CHARLIE VAN GELDEREN
THE WHELE ELECTION was of course not so much an election as a referendum. Even the tame Uncle Toms of the "coloured and indian legislative chambers were excluded The white voters were being asked if they would continue to place their future in the hands of Botha and the dominant National Parry (NP).
The election was launched in a period of grave cconomic and political crisis and in the midst of a state of emergency. There is a 16.8 per cent inflation rate and almost standstill growth. The rand has collapsed and unemployment has reached rocord levels: among whires as well as blacks — estimated conservatively ar six million (25 per cent of blacks are unemployed). The average white was better off after tax in 1970 than today, despire a 13-lold increase in the price of gold which accounts for more than half South Africa's foreign curreney earnings. bloated bureaucrucy necessary to process the mass of apartheid legislature (pass laws, infux contrul, censorship and so on) has led to a four-fold increase in personal taxation in Jess than a decade.
In few other countries would a government with such a dismal economic record voluntarily pur as populanty to the test ar the ballot box (elections were not due copstitutionally for another two vears) Bar this "election' was not being lought on such bread-and-burrer issucs: The scare of the coonomy scarcely figurd on the hustings As the financel Times por it for tany whires "security? and the maintenance of white pavilege is more umportant than prosperity For tany ut COLTSE. thr is : the çourantee of the other.
What was at issue was the most effective way muncing whire-dommated capitalism. Among the white clertorate there Were three of thoughr The mainstream, represented by the ruling Nanonal Party: believed that severely limited! "reforms" — the three chamber parliament; trade union rights for black workers i certainIs the major reform): tinkering with some of the more arritating aspecte of Verwoerdian apartheid such as the mised marriages act and similar cosmteric measures, would contain the sicuation.
PERHAPS WHITE
IS A WRONG THING
HOU SKOLE
WIT
BY WIT
le white elections
To the left" of the governing party were the "verligtes". - those Nationalists like Wynand Malan, Esther Lategan and Denis Worral and the Progressive Reform Party (PRP) who aligned themselves with sections of big business and wanted the "relorms' ro go a littie fasteriand a little further. None of these "progressives was in favour of a unilary state: with state with one-person-one-vote. They all campaigned for the continuance of what is euphemistically known as 'free enterprise but which in reality, means the continued domination of the economy by the monopolics, headed by Anglo-American. To the right of the National Party was rhe Conservative Party (CI9. thr Herstigre National Party (HNP) and in the background the openly fascist Afrikaner Weerstand Beweging (AWB). These want to turn the clock back to the days when Ver woerd was king and the kaffic knew his plare, to a rigid apartheid in which blacks would exercise political rights" only in the so-called tribal homelands' and coloureds" and indians only in racially demarcated areas. For them Rocha's reforms were the
SOUTHAFRICA thin edge of the wedge, opening the road to racial equality and, inevitably, black rule.
Botha perceived that the main threat to his base came for the right" rather than the 'left despire the media ballyhoo which sur rounded the dramatic jnurney of Dr Worral from the South African embassy in London to the bustings of Helderberg. The dection resalt has more than vindicated his judgement. The ruline National Party increased its parliamentary representation from 116 seats to 123. Its gains were largely at the expense of the PFP. The rise of the ultra-right. as a threatening force in South Africa resulted in a ner gain by thr. Cr of four seats at the expense of the NP and replacing the PFP as the official parliamentary opposition. Had the CP and the HSt not split the rightwing vote, they would have won six more
A feature of the election result is that the english-speaking whites who have hitherto managed to present a 'liberal' veneer and who formed the hase of PFP support moved over to the NP in droves. English-speaking which were considered unassailable were captured by the NP and others transformed into marginals. In the words of Basinen Das, a Johannesburg financial daily, english voters sacrificing ar last the rale of keepers of a liberal flame, chose to liquidate themselves as identifiable political force'
By playing the racist card, Botha succeeded in uniting the whites.
WHILE THE white electorate rallied to the tattered blood-stamed banner of apartheid
Blacks registered their protest ar their exclusion from the decision-making machinery in the most effective way open to them. More than half-a-million stayed away from work on polling day and nearly double that number the next day to demonstrate whar COSATU described as the opposition of the vast majority of South Africa's people to the mad, repressive, racist course this government is bent on' • Thousands of students stayed away from schools. colleges and universities in solidarity with the striking workers:
One immediate effect of the triumph of the so and the emergence in strength of the ultra right — who won more than 26 per cent of the pvcrall popular white vote, almost double the PFP's share — is to diminish the influence of big business on future government policy. Despite their domination of the South African coonomy, Botha will now be even less inclined to listen to the blandishments of 'enlighrened' capitalists, like de Beer of Anglo-American or to bow to pressure from the multi-nationals. They pinned their post-election hopes on the success of Dr Worral and his fellow independents
*even the quisling
Buthelezi is hesitant about participating in a national council which, according to a statement de Beer made in London on 4 May would increasc pressure on the government to make conces-
Pressure from that quarter is off the agenda for the time being.
In the immediate future, Botha will have to ward off the threat from the die-hards on parliamentary opposition benches by showing that his reformist" velvet glove conceals the iron fist which he would not now hesitate to use. He has received a mandate which he dare not ignore if the NP is to maintain its hegemony over the Afrikaners. This was neatly summed up by LTDF leader Allan Bocsak: *white voters have made their position clear. They support the state of emergency; they support detention of thousands of children; they support the actions of the security forces"
Opening Opening the newly-elected parliament, Botha made it clear that apartheid was here to stay and warned of an impending crackdown against the extra-parliamentary opposition. If there were still any sections of South Africa's voteless blacks who thought that any real reform, let alone a change of
SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 2 July/Augus 1987 NS wen intimal itali
government could be brought abour through the white parliamentary process, these hopes have now been effectively dashed.
Bocha has not wasted much time in arlempring to put his chreats against the opposition - the real opposition - into effect. One of his major targets would appear to be the trade umions, Even before the elections, the police laid siege to Cusatu House, the headquarters of the Confederation ol South African Trade Unions: This was followed by raids on other union offices and the harass: ment of trade union Icaders.
Two days after the clections, the striking railworkers" six-person negotiating leant was picked up in a Johannesburg raid. On the same day. Themba Numalo: general secretary of the Municipal and Allied Workers of South Africa, was stopped at a road block. This was followed by more raids on union officer and arrests in Pietershung m the Northern Transvaal and Germiston near Johannesburg COSATU offices in East Tondon were burnt down.
Botha has also made it clear that the group areas act and segregated education - two of the corner stones of apartheid would be rigilly enforced. The so-called grey areas. where white and black have been living peacefully together these past lew years, would no longer be tolerated This was signalled by a raid on a largely blacknocupied flat in the central Johannesburg suburb, Hillbrow and the alleged detention of a Hillbrow caretaker who has been prominenr in the prolonged campaign against the erictinn of black residents in Hillbrow.
Verwoerd's policy of 'independent' black 'homelands" would also be pursuod. Botba has given the go-ahrad for impoverished KwaNdebele to become the fifth 'blank naLion', , brily nine monthe sfer the territory's Jegislative assembly vored against the independence proposals: KwaNdebele is 0/ wholly artificial creation with no traditinnal tribal ties. It consists of a few thousand acres of desolate farmland, 100 miles north-cast of Pretoria: The land was formerly owned by 19 white farmers who were, undoubtedly. Handsomely compensated. Now it in home' to 250.000 blacks, mosly of the Ndebele trbe who have been forcibly removed there,
There can be min doube that all sections of the liberation movement face a difficult furure in the immediate period ahead during which the stare of emergency will become a permanent feature. The single, bleak gesturr which Borha has made toward the majority, is the offer of black participation in a natinnal cuncil. Even the quisling Buthelezi is hesitant about participating in this farce. He has stipulared the release of Nelson Mandela as a condition for lalks, bur this is virtually impossible in the present climate
Botha was rebuffed even by the uncle Coms. On a visa to the Vaal's Lekon township in lunc, where he was offered the freedom" of six townships including Sharpeville, he invited the Mayor Fsat Mahalarsi and other councillors to sit on his nacional council Muhalasi and his colleagues bave been living behind barbed wirr in a specially-constructed and heavily guard-
SOUTH AFRICA ed compound since they increased local repts in Seprember, 1984. This was the beginning of the narion wide rent bovcotts and the wave of orrest which has continued unabared despite two states of emergency.
Mayor Mahalatsi, aware that he was elected by a derison mieroscopic vote and that he was not one of the real black leaders as described by Borha, gracefully declined the state president's invitation: we would have arcat reluctance in participating in the national council We seriously urge you to abandon the idea... the reform you (are pursuing) will be an act offutility. it does not (lead to) the ultimate participaTion of blacks in parliament on a par with: whites'
In anncipanion of strong action against the liberation forces, Botha is cleuring the decks. His deportation of media representatives Iron Britain, USA, Australia and other countries is no simple act of revenge for past activities by these reporters. With state control of radio and tv in South Africa and press reporting severely curtailed by emergency regulations, the regime can conceal the tie state of affairs from people in South Africa. It now hopes to bring down the curtain between South Africa and the rest of the world For President Botha, no news from the dark recesses of the townships is good news.
the banning of the mass organisations must be in the mind of the regime
Undoubtedly, the increased authority which the clection result has given Botha will be used ruthlessly, While he will keep the trade unions within his sights, he will first train his guns on the political wings of ibe liberation movement and, in the first instance, on the UDF, the main mass extra-parliamentary movement, and AZAHO. Preparing legistatoo lo ban these organisations which will escape nullification in the Supreme Court may tke time. As an immediate step. Botha proposes to use the Fund-Raising Act of 1978 to stop these and other organisations rerciving financial aid from overseas. This may not be as effective as the government appear to behove The liberation organisations such widespread support that it can get by without overseas aid though, undoubtedly. this will increase their difficulties
The banning of the mass organisations. however, must be very much in the mind of the regime. It hopes banning them would have the same effect as the outlawing of the ANG and PAC after the Sharpeville massaure of 1960 — a period of relative political cal and apathy. But there is no possibility of this scenario being repcated The people in the townships and, specially the youth have been highly politicised in the last rwo years of struggle. Living in a perpenual state of emergency they have become inured to miprisment and death, It has become so much part of their daily lives thar no reprissium, however severe, will be able to put a brake on the movement of revoit:
There is a danger, of course, thar without organised political leadership this will take the forin of mindless violence and anarchy. While this will increase the ungovernability of the townships, it will not create the bestconditions to give birth to an alternative goveroment and social system The problem of political leadership would still have to be solved. THIS 15 ONE variant nf the vears ahcad. Bur there is another aspect which was not present in the 1960c — the independent trade union movement. Undoubtedly, the government will try to curb the influence and militancy of the unions - as it has shown by its vicious action against thie striking railway workers. But they won't find this easy Even the representatives of big business are aware of the power and strength of the organised trade unions: In the pre-clection interview in the Independent (5 May), the Anglo-American director, Dr Zach de Beer said thar in the long term the most effective anti-government urganisation in South Africa was the trade won movement *Wherever vog are now you are dealing with unions in South Africa What I have said many times to the government is that if you give people trade untion power it is certain they will use it for political purposes. What is remarkable is the restraint: the unions used in the first six years but this is changing
Another prominent member of the big business establishment, the chair of the majur multinational Shell SA, John R Wilson has also warned the regime of the consequences of raking on the unions Srare: pressure on COSATU, be said could only bode ill for the Tuture'. 'The raiding of of fices, the banning of meetings and the in discriminare arrest of hundreds of workers is not likely to crush the unions" he said. Rather It will strengthen their resistance and suppurt and will have adverse raniticamans for stable industrial relations, the effrets of which will be felt thoughout industry. violencc will not abare under the present repressive conditions.
He went on to say: Sadly: though, as viuletice, high-handed and strong-arm tactics are employed in what is transparently an attempr to crush an increasingly powerful government opponent, ones behef in a negotiated future berames coen more fragile." (Workly Mail, 22-30 May):
Botha Having been rebuffed oven by the quislings of KwaZult and Lekoa seems 10, have realison that he has to conl the sitta-
After the attempted vicious repression of the rail strike. the employing authority suddenly caved in. All 10.000 sacked railway workers got their jobs back and unino recognition Despire its victory at the allwhite polis, the regime does not feel inself = enough to rake on the organised strength the workers in the open conilrontation.
=
While the trade anton movement, as sucb. is not the idical vehirle for political leadership - Invalved as in of necewity is, with the day* ro-day struggles fur better working condi-
SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 2 Jely/Auguir 1987
nons and wager — its organised strength and close ties with the liberation movement can act as a slueld for the political wing if in ls:
driven underground The close bond which has been cerablished between the unions and thie community organisations the
(ownslups and between the unions and che students will also: prove important disciplining the spreading revolt and guiding
It into more fruitful channek.
The birth of an independent working class party would. undoubredly, be a big step forward but the emergence of such a party with a muss base is not likely in the immediate future COSATUs proclaimed polirical plat form, with its firm comminment to socialism, provides the framework within which such a party can take shape. It is toward this end that revolutionary socialists must work, in side the unions and inside the mass organisarinns. There are no short cuts. Parties which can give effective leadership to the working class cannor be creased by proclamation.
While the trade unions cannot be substitute for the political party of the working class, neither can this role be fulfilled by the populist mars organisations. the LIS. tie AZAPO or, for thar marter, the ANC.
Although all these organisations never umit to genuflect in the direction of the "eading rule of the working class?, they are very vague about the specific meaning of this. It makes good reading in articles and manifestos: In actual practice this has rocant culling bn the workers to bear the bruns of any. struggie sipinsated by the miss orgarusations
This has led, in the past, to friction between: the tiade unions and the populist organisations. Tie most glaring example of this was the stav-away in Porr Flizabeth and East London in March, 1985, an action which was decided upon by community. youth and political organisations, without first cunsulting the trade unions. It was the workers who suffered loss of pay: it was the workers who provided the picker lines. But this is not what we mean when we talk about the leading rule of the working class"
A workers' party, even if initiard and launched by the trade unions — which is the most likely variant — would nor be an exclusively trade unionist party contining itself to trade union poliries. There is no comparison between the situation in South
UTHAFRICA
Atrica today and the founding of the British
Labour Party at the curn of the century. The trade union Icaders in Britain took the initiative to lor a political party mainly as a defensive response to legislation which chrcatened the very cxistence of the unions, especially the T'all Vale judgement.
Ir was not till 1918, in the wake of the
Russian revplution, that the word 'socialism' milde its appearance in the platform of the
British Labour Party. The British Labour
Party was burn in a period of relative conomic growthe and political stability when it was srill possible.to wrest relorms and concessions fron the ruling class, Its purpose was to strengthen che fight for reforms by adding political activity to the industrial muscle of the working class At no time did it threaten the power and structure of the state, ur the social order.
The scenarin in South Alrica is vastly difTerent. There the unions have come into ex-
Islence and grown strong in an era of unprecedented turbulence, COSATU'S very ex-
Istence and the close links it has cstablished with community.: youh: women s organisations, make it qualitatively different to the minion wich formed the British Labour Party, Its programme is uncompromisingly political and recognises that the struggle for immediate economic demands is not enough. The declared aim Of COSATI, is an end to racist capitalism. Te sees the battle to cod apartheid and the overthrow of the social order as a single srruggle. Whar it has nct yet done is to forge the political instrument which can effectively lead this struggle - an independent party of the working class. A WORKERS PARTY, by itself. no matter how well led, cannot achieve victory It needs to ally itself with all sections of the people fighting the racist regime But, in these necessary alliances, the working class does not subordinate its own programme to accommodule that of another The defeats of the popular and people's fronts in Franer and Spain in the 1930s are tragic reminders of the result of such compromises. The Jeading role of the working class" micans that, within the alliance, while fighrine resolutely lor the united objective ro defeat the main enemy- the workers' representatives fight for the domination of their own programme — socialisa - con scious of the fact that this programme is the only guarantor of victory. Ir is hy striving to win the others in the alliance to this programme that the working class exercises us leadership. All orher interpretations of Lie
'leading role of the working class are com pletely meaningless.
It is significant that ar is founding conference at the end of May, the new giant
COSATU affiliare, the National Union of
Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA), clearly spelled out its commitment to a socialist society where workers' control of government and industry was enforced
While ir adopted the Freedom Charter as 'containing the minimum political demands that reflect the view of the majority of metal workers" vision of a free and democratic non- discriminatory South Africa it underlined that the demands of the Freedom Charter could only be realised in the lives of the wurking-class masses "through the practical leadership of the industrial working class... and it recognised the limirations of the Freedom: Charter by demanding that it should be supplemented with a "workers" charter' a demand originally raised by die imprisoned Moses: Mavekiso,: who was unanimously clected as general sccretary of the new union.
In South Africa, the conditions are par ricularly favourable to the emergence of a working class party with a policy which will safeguard the interests of all sections of the oppressed while remaining firmly committed to socialism. This is because the overwhelming majority of black people in South Africa, that is, the overwhelming majority of the population, are bound with indisoluble links to the working class.
The middle classes form only a small The middle minority of the black people. Inderd, it can he said, that by far the biggest section of the cconomically active men and women in South Africa are urban or rural workers. The students, who have often been in the forefront of the barries in the townships, are the sons and daughtors of workers. In this situation, • thoroughly working class political programme, which has for its objective the overthrow of the capitalist-apartheid state, is also the programme which embraces all the demands of the people as a whole — an end to racial discrimination, equality in law. education and civil civil socicty: the redistribution of the wealth of the coutry, induding access to land; a government of the working class with the same Inbuilt democratic control from below which has been such a distinguishing feature of the black trade unions in South Africa:
For socialists world-wide the task is to intensify the mobilisation of solidarity with the black peuple of South Africa. The heady days of student risings in the townships may be temporarily over as a consequence of intensified state repression. Suppression of news may keep South Africa our of the media headlines and off the tv screens. Rut the straggie is going on, inevitably. remorselessly. It cannor be balted. Victory 1s certain! 11
SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 2 July/August 1987 38192