Socialist Outlook

Socialist Viewpoint, International, Socialist Outlook and their supplements, 1984–2009

Wakening the Soviet masses

· Socialist Outlook no. 15, May 1989 · pp 15-22 · 7,723 words

Russia and the USSR Trotsky Stalinism Latin America

Soviet masses branch to the racist regime in South

Africa and capitalist governments in

South America.

But by far the most historically significant and deep-going change bas been the policy of glasnost, the lifting of the chill climate of fear and repres sion cstablished in decades of dictatorial control by the Kremlin bureaucracy since the rise to power of

Josef Stalin in the mid 1920s While

Gorbachev and his co-thinkers see this as a means of strengthening their hand against stubborn elements of the bureaucratic old guard, they have taken steps which have allowed the

Soviet working class back into political life: it is a huge gamble for them to

Already, almost every political issue - from the desirability or otherwise of a multi-party state, to the ex-

Istence in the USSR of a massive layer of chronic poor, the extent of hureaucratic privileges, and even criticism of the armed forces - has been opened up for debate, at first in relatively exclusive academic and intellectual circles, hut now increasingly by sections of workers in and outside the Communist Party. It seems that the only figures exempt from criticism are Lenin and Gorbachev himself.

In January, the party Central Com mittee decreed a blankct rchabilitation of all the 'hundreds of thousands' of those unjustly executed or imprisoned under Stalin. Leon Trotsky, co-leader of the October Revolution and first leader of the Red Army, remains the only prominent victim of Stalin's terror not yet to have been rehabilitated. Much of the party bureaucracy, including Gorbachev, still use Trotsky as a convenient demon-figure whenever they wish to oppose certain lines of policy. However there have been large meetings calling for his rehahiliation as a leader of the Revolufion crocuted on Stalin's orders. Arrangements for the publication of Trotsky's major works in the Soviet union are already in hand.

The lifting of political taboos, the relaxation of censorship and restricnons on meetings, and the explicit repudiation of so many past crimer of the bureaucracy would in themselves have had dramatic enough effect: but on top of this has come the general election for the Congress of Penple's

The recent elections to the Congress of Peoples' Deputies in the USSR helped highlight the extent of the changes that have taken place. Here JOHN LISTER draws a balance sheet of four years since Mikhail Gorbachev took the helm at the Kremlin.

"Now that Soviet workers and intellectuals have scented fresh air, begun to think for themselves and to learn the real facts of history, it is hard to see how they can again be beaten down"

Page 14

S UP P L EME N

Deputies, opening up unprece- dented opportunities for unoffi- cial Communist Party and non- party candidates (provided only they obtained endorsement as candidates from at least half of a selection meeting of at least 500 people). The resultant con- lest, despite efforts of a section of the bureaucracy to rig the slates in the traditional way. produced a far from traditional response - with packed. animated election meetings and debates, and the marvellous spectacle of old guard machine bureaucrats, who had manipu- lated themselves into unop- posed candidacies, finding themselves ousted by voters crossing their names off the bal- Tot

These changes are far more fun- damental to the political development of one of the world's most powerful, most educated, but until now most repressed working classes than any of the other economic or political chan- ges carried out under Gorbachev. Now that Soviet workers and intellectuals have scented fresh air, begun to think for themselves and to learn the real facts of history, it is hard to see how they can again be beaten down. The salutary example of Poland'* Solidar- nosc - i legaused again after seven years of repression failed to destroy it

should underline the scale of irre- versible political development that is now beginning to take place in the Soviet Union.

Anathema to old

guard

Each of these democratic develop- ments has been anathema to the old guard of Brezhnevite bureaucrats. who reach instinctively for their re- volvers as soon as they hear the word dissent. And in the case of the resur- gent struggles of nationalist move- ments within the USSR with their dif ferent demands - among them the Armenians, the Baltic states, the Geor- mans and the Ukrainians: Gor- bachev faces a real dilemma. On the one hand, a resort to traditional methods of police and military repres sion to contain mass demands for na- tional rights (as recently with the tanks

d poison gax used against demonstrators in Georgia) could destroy important elements of glas

nost, strengthening precisely the worst, most conservative layers of the bureaucracy in the party and armed forces. Worse, it could further stoke up the anger and frustration in thexe republics, creating an even sharper

confrontation with Moscow, and lend- ing strength to the more extreme

nationalist elements who could press

the demand for separation from the Federation. On the other hand if Gor- bachev is seen to allow such move- ments to get out of hand, he could face serious opposition at Politburo and Central Committee level, and pay a heavy political price for opening a Pandora's box of complex demands and emotional energy which the central state machinery could find im- possible to contain.

Gorbachev has faced bureaucratic appoxition to many aspects of his reforms, but the broad consensus of acceptance around glasnost is much more tenuous when it comes to con- fronting the Stalinist tradition of Great Russian chauvinism, especially towards the non-Slav and non-Rus- sian nationalities. Even in the newly- emerging left currents supporting glasnost and perestroika - many of which are focussed in Moscow - there are visible hints of national arrogance towards such movements. This repre- sents a political weakness of the left, since in many cases the nationalist movements have drawn in the support of a large proportion of the working class, and have focussed on legitimate grievances on language and other is sues where they suffer oppression from the centralised Moscow bureaucracy. Even if they were calling for separation, the task before marxists is to take the side of the oppresserl against the bureaucracy, and, if neces sary, to wage and win the argument against separatism. The general line defended by marxists on the national question should be to stand uncondi- tionally behind the struggle of the op pressed Soviet nationalities for their right to national self-determination - up to and, if necessarv. including thie right to independence. However this does not commit marxists in advance to uncritical support for any given nationalist movement, its progranime or its demands: in general we are in

favour of the free association of socialist repablics, and in favour of

political revolution against the Great Rusman chauvinists within the TISSR *ather than its hreak-up. We arr

socialists, not nationalists, but as socialists we are champions of the op pressed against the oppressors.

Strands of policy

How are marxists to assess the dir- ferent strands of Gorbachev's policy? Are we obliged to accept or reject them all as a job lot, or is it more ap propriate to distinguish those aspects which we can support from those which we oppose? The reality is that Gorbachev's strategy embodies profound contradictions because it is an attempt to escape from a contradic. tory situation through a process of refonns and within the present glohal halance of class forces - without making a revolutionary break from the past

Gorbachev has emerged as the leader of a reformist wing of a ruling hureaucracy whose history and un- plantation in Soviet society runs hack to the days of Stalin and the exter- mination in the late 1920x and 1930s • he and Bricheviks. This bureaucracy has become even larger. even more solidly entrenched in Soviet society than it was in the mid

1930s when the exiled Lcon Trotsky

- as a result of a detailed cconomic. political and social analysis of the HISSR argued that onlv a working

class political revolution could sweep it away and allow the workers once more to take control of what had be-

come under Stalin a horribly degenerated forn of the workers' state estahlished in the Octoher revolution: No devil ever yet voluntarily cut off his ew~ claws. The Soviet bureaucracy will not give up its posi- tions without a fight. The develop ment leads obviously to the road of revolution (Revolution Betraved.

1936)

A very different approach is repre- sented hy Mikhail Gorbachev today. Though recognising the need for deep going changes in the economy and • anciety as a whole Gorhachev's starting point is 10 reshape rather than abolish the bureaucracy, and in renegotiate a new form of accomodation with capitalism on a global scale rather than to strug

gle for a socialist solution.

International

dimension is vital

The international dimension to the problem of bureaucracy in the USSR has always been vital. It was the ini tial isolation of the October Revolu-

tion. with the failure of post-war revolutionary struggles elsewliere in

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 15 May 1989

Europe, hut expecially in Germany in 1918-23, which determined many of the early developments and limited the options of the Bolshevik leaders: "At all events, under all conceivable cir- cumstances, if the German revolution does not come, we are doomed. (Lenin, March 1919) When the Ger- man revolution did not come, the im- perialist powers were able to focus huge military resources on waging protracted and damaging wars of in- tervention in their efforts to unseat the Bolsheviks - eventually leaving the economy devastated, agriculture in chaos, and the Communist Party cadres terribly over-stretched in the tasks of running a war-tor cconomy. It was from this early isolation and dis- location that the bureaucracy first gained its foothold as the ad- ministrators and policemen regulating queues and shortages, the lechnical managers of enterprises, and the ar- bitrators between the interests and demands of peasants and workers.

In this context of deprivation, set- hacks and fatigue, Stalin emerged as the focus of political conservatism. resting on the political dilution of the Communist Party, the nationalism of the peasantry and the narrow horizons of the career administrators, and ad vocating an abandonment of any am- bition towards extending the revolu- tion, while looking instead to get on with the task of building 'socialism in one country".

This policy was soon transformed in the 1930s into a line of secking al- liances with "democratic sections of the imperialist bourgeoisic; and by 1939 this had collapsed into the notorinus Stalin-Hitler pact. All this meant oulright opposition 1o proletarian revolution which might jeopardise the diplomatic and military deals struck by the Kremlin. It served to entrench the USSR in a state of per- manent isolation, and thus permanent economic backwardness, cut off from the more advanced technologies of the capitalist countries. This isolation was barely broken in the post-war period with the extension of Soviet control over much of Eastern Europe: even Stalin's wholesale looting of in- dustrial plant from East Germany and Czechoslovakia did little to compen- sate for the fearfully primitive state of Soviet technology. To this day one of the most modern Soviet brick works- the Butovo plant near Moscow - has only just been 'modemised' to the level of western plants in the 1920s.

Socialism on the back

burner

Gorbachev's modem-day response to these decades of failure of building "socialism in one country" is not to abandon the constricting and self-

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 15 May 1989

defeating nationalism of the formula. In- stead socialism as a glohal objec-

tive is no longer even given token mention, while Garbachev and his co-thinkers seck ways lo in-

troduce the laws of the market into the Soviet economy, and to open it up for ex- ternal capitalist investment.

Gorbachev's foreign policy reflects precisely this conserva- tive. counter- Gorbachev policy: continuity or a break from the past?

revolutionary history, a continuity rather than any break from Stalinism, from Khruschev's talk of peaceful coexistence and Brezhnev's efforts at "detente"; such policies have always been seen by Stalin and his successors as counterposed to support for inde- pendent revolutionary struggles. Gorbachev's recent grovelling visit to Britain, exchanging compliments with Thatcher and invitations with the Queen, is part and parcel of a well. worn Kremlin strategy of seeking col- laboration and alliances with capitalist governments, irrespective of the needs and struggles of the working class. In this respect it is no coincidence that "Eurocommunist' parties of western Europe, themselves having long ago abandoned any class struggle or socialist objectives, have embraced the "Gorbymania' so widely promoted in the media.

Indeed Gorbachev's key forign policy advisor Dr Georgy Shakhnazaroy now talks openly of a gradual coming together of the com. munist and social democratic parties: "The great split which began during the first world war and which was ex. acerbated by Stalin will be very com- plicated to overcome. Stalin's slogan was that the social democrats had betrayed us. He saw everything as treachery, and great tragedy came from that. Now, as Mr Gorbachev has

said, we must meet cach other. (The

Guardian, April 8, 1989)

Of course, it was not Stalin but Lenin who took the lead in denounc-

ing the betrayal of the social democrats after the social democratic parties of Europe had each sided with their "own" national capitalists at the start of the first world war. Lenin led the minority split in the Second Inter- national, and after the October revolu tion and formation of the Third (Com munist) International, went so far asto

draft the famous 21 Theses, designed specifically to exclude parties from af- filiation if they had not previously broken systematically from the politics of social democracy. As we know from bitter experience, the fact that Gorbachev and his team see a convergence between communism and social democracy does not indi- cate any leftward shift of the socialist parties: it confirms the continued. class collaborationist line of the Kremlin ideologists, and their shared acceptance with the social democrats of the continued indefinite existence of capitalism as the framework for fu- ture policies and developments.

Global class

collaboration

The global line of class collahora- tion predictably finds its sharpest ex- pression in areas of sharpest class con- flict. Gorbachev hastaken an even less supportive line than Brezhnev towards the Nicaraguan revolution, withholding all but the most tokenis- tic assistance and thus jeopardining the very future of the Sandinista regime whose economy has heen ravaged by an economic blockade. US-backed contru sahotage and by last year's hurricane. Desperate San- dinista leaders are now forced to plunder empty currency reserves to buy oil from Venezuela. Soviet pres sure is also clearly apposed to any es- calation of the revolutionary struggles in El Salvador or any other central American country, which would upset the USA. Instead Moscow has been courting the major capitalist powers of South America, huxily signing trade and other deals with Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina, with scant regardto the struggles of the workers' movement in these countries

There is unmistakeable evidence of the same type of policy shift in another

"it is no coincidence

that 'Euro' communist

parties of

western

Europe, themselves having long

ago abandoned

any class

struggle or

socialist

objectives,

have

embraced

the

'Gorbymania'

so widely promoted in the media."

Page 15

...pressures for concessions to the apartheid regime have clearly been

applied by

Moscow to the Namibian SWAPO liberation forces.

"Gorba- chev's internal efforts at reform are undermined by his foreign

policy."

Page 16

global "hot spor" - Souther Africa. Not only have Moscow envoys been involved in secret diplomacy with the apartheid regime, but Soviet pressure isbeing publicly applied to the African National Congress to soft-pedal their traditional line of armed strugele. The head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Africa department recently insisted that South Africa should not be talked to 'using the language of threats and banging one's fist on the table. We don't emphasise the noed to enhance the armed struggle' (The Guardian, March 18, 1989). Such a line will cer- tainly have gone down well with Mar garet Thatcher in Gorbachev's recent Downing Street talks - but leaves the black masses of South Africa high and dry in their struggle against racist op pression. Similar pressures for conces- sions to the apartheid regime have clearly been applied by Moscow to the Namibian SWAPO liberation forces. Mozambique now receives more aid from western countries than the USSR, while Angola's recent default on payments to Moscow for military support seems a factor in increased Soviet efforts to force the MPLA regime to negotiate a "compromise with imperialist-backed UNITA guer- rillas.

In the far east, the Communist Party of the Philippines can expect no Soviet moral or material support as they bat- tle on against continued repression meted out by the armed forces. Instead Moscow is offering to build power sta- rions for Aquino. In south east Asia, Soviet pressure is almost certainiy a factor in the Vietnamese decision 10 withdraw its troops from Kampuchea, leaving the unfortunate inhabitants to the none-too-tender mercies of Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge forces massed with imperialist protoction just over the border in Thailand. And while the continued Soviet occupation of Af- ghanistan was politically and militari- Iv indefensible. the urge to defuse global conflict with imperialism was clearly one of the factors in the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

Meanwhile in the middle cast. sinviet pressure on the various tactions of the Palestine Liberation Organisa- tion has played a key role in bolster- ing the position of Yasser Arafar, who has with Kremlin support now aban- doned the PLO's long-standing op pacition in LIN resolutions 242 and 338, accepted the legality of the zionist state of Israel, and dropped the demand for the right of return of over 1 million Palestinians expelled in 1948. Arafat now looks instead to some form of Palestinian 'mini-state" as a solution. Soviet efforts have also been focussed on opening diplomatic relations with the feudal Saudi Arahian regime.

It is fair to say that even if they were to result in socialist revolution, none of this list of struggles and causes pur at risk by the new Soviet policy could in itself represent the key break in the isolation of the USSR. But, as we have seen, the line is equally craven in rela- tion to workers' struggles in the ad vanced countries of western Europe. The fact is that Moscow's systematic opposition to revolutionary solutions, and consistent pursuit of class col-

sufficient to feed the population,

while factories could not turn out

enough consumer goods to satisfy

Continuing heavy defence spend- ing. the costs of the Armenian earthquake, and the loss of 16 billion roubles a year in laxes as a result of Gorbachev's restriction on alcohol sales all contributed to the burgeoning deficit, which in turn is resulting in the problem of inflation.

intlation Soviet

laborationist politics on a global scale serves to entrench its isola- tion, and to set back or restrict the options of those in struggle, Ruled out by Gorbachev's stance would be

any 'Cuban road"

any 'Cuban road" for third world revolutionaries, since Castro was from the carly days of the revolution able to lean upon cconomic and military sid from the USSR as a counterweight to the US blockade.

Since the isola- tion of the USSR is in itself part of the material basis upon which the bureaucracy has al- ways rested, Gorbachev s inter- Castro's 'Cuban road - now blocked off. nal efforts at reform are simultaneous economists auma in an inflation rate ly undermined by his foreign policy. of sto 7 percent a year, but it could be Gorbachev himself linked his foreign • migh as 10 percent - while the state policy to his domestic economic Dank pays out onlv 3 percent interest policy when he told West German on workers savings accounts Chancellor Kohl last October that Economists estimate the real value of Moscow had firmly decided to set out the rouble at around 40p compared to "along the road of active economic in- its ofticial fl exchange rate: teraction with the world outside.

Meanwhile the main symptom of this

crisis is not nang prices but a grow

Worsening economic

crisis

The harsh fact is that, despite four years of brave-sounding revolutionary rhetoric, the Soviet economic crisis is still getting worse rather than better. Last autumn's es- timales of a 36 billion ruhle (official- ly 1 rouble = EL) budget deficit proved wildly over-optimistic:currentfigures suggest it is at least 160 billion, and possibly higher. A January 1989 government report showed that while the economy grew by 4.4 percent last year (faster than before), exports fell hy two percent and imports rose by 6.5 percent, halving the trade surplus. A staggering 30 billion roubles' worth of food has been imported in the last three years as farms fail to produce

crisis is not nang prices but a grow

ing shortage of consumer goods as too many roubles chase too few com- modities: mismanagement and in-

competence have ensured that in the world's leading potato-producing na-

tion a mere 25 percent of polatnes produced ever complete the joumey from fieldto domestic kitchen: the rext arn left to rot.

Gorbachev's key cconomic ad

nbegvan. in a recent

Newsreer masazine

"The muit pressins

• the gap hetween purchas

'ry and the mupply of ennds.

NK) -ne of nenducts inday.

90 percent of them are in short supp-

then vears ago there were

some shortages - good meat. good weat sume other things Bul

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 15 May 1989

refrigerators, TV sets, washing deter- gent, cosmetics were all available. Mayhe the assortments were not very large, maybe they weren't the best quality, but when you came to a store you would see such products. Now the shops are juxt empty. Anything put on the counter is purchased at once. It's not because production has decreased, but because the amount of money that people have has increased sharply, and demand has increased. (March 13, 19891

of the main resources.

The 3 percent of farm Tand in private owner. ship produces no lenn than 30 percent of the USSR's food supply: this ix why Gorhachev (himself a former Central Committee member for agriculture) in March admitted that most state and collective farms were bankrupt nine years ago, and called for a new policy of encouraging peasants to take 50-year leases on land which they would be able to farm on their own as 'masters of the land", reaping increased prices for their produce.

The industrial picture is no brighter. Last Oc- toher a two-day session of the Supreme Soviet Selling some of the potatoes that made it to market. was told bv Finance Minister Boris those sectors which fan One chu Gostev that a number of unprofitable vame in the hoast trom Mr Gostev that husinesses were 'on the brink of being the USSR woud shed a millior. eliminated' Some 24.000 state. surplus jobs un 1988. However ne did owned businesses were running up promise that in 19k4 investrand in tha huge losses, admitted Mr Gostev.

Banks would soon begin publishing

lists of hankrupt firms, which might be handed over to private cooperatives.

The state purchase of industrial production would be slashed from 86 mercent in 1988 to only 25 percent in

1989, with the remainder to be sold on the open market. However the state planning departments continue to

decide the allocation of investment resources: it is not yet cicar how managers will be able to adjust their production to meet anticipated levels of demand - or what will happen to

Agenbegyan spells out a series of policies to reduce the budget deficit in- cluding a progressive income tax, production of housing for sale, and in- creasing production of cars, videos, and audio equipment through joint ventures with foreign firms. But he also advocates a sharp increase in prices, especially of agricultural produce: "We need to reduce food sub- sidies and let prices rise in order to make agricultural products profitable. Prices on meal, dairy products and bread may have to douhle. We are ready to do that, with compensation for the people so their standard of living does not decline...' However the real prospect that rising prices would quickly reduce the living stand- ardsof workers and provoke major un- rest has already brought one postpone- ment of the deregulation of prices. Agricultural prices are now to be revised in 1990, with retail prices deregulated in 1992.

Incompetent

bureaucracy

However the problems of supply are no nearer solution now than they were in 1985. The same incompetent, distrusted bureaucracy that has failed for over half a century is still in charge

Socialist Conference

Gorbachev and the European Left

3/4 June

St Cross Bulding, Oxford University Oxford Plenary sessions on socialism and democracy, the economics of socialism, international relations, and the future of Europe. Also a large number of workshops, including the national question in Eastern europe, women's emancipation, models of planning and the Yugoslav crisis.

Speakers include Otto Latsis (deputy editor of Kommunist, Ev- geny Ambartsumov (Soviet economist), Olga Ivanova (Soviet feminist), Peter Glotz (German SPD), Steffi Engert (German Greens), Luciana Castellina (Italian Communist Party), Branko Horvat (Yuogslav economist), Ernest Mandel, Tony Benn, Wlodzimierz Brus and many others.

Registration:

E10 per day, £15 per weekend (unwaged; 45 per day) For further information contact:

Gus Fagan, 30 Bridge St, Oxford OX2 OBA Tel 0685 723207

BA Tel 0685 7

consumer sector would grow 2.3 times faster than heavy industry.

Even more musical to the cars of the wester business community were

ehv Mrunious

ther relaxation of restrictions on foreign firms' investments in the USSR. The maximum stake is to be increased from 49 percent to 80 per cent, with rumours that some holdings may be 100 percent forign-owned, effectively opening up sections of the Soviet economy to foreign sub sidiaries. Such firms will only be at tracted to the USSR if they enjoy ac- cess to relatively cheap labour and arc guaranteed rights to repatriate profits: the resultant potential for a further in- tensification of the class struggle is unntistakeable. A sign nf this was the experience of the private cooperatives which Gorhachev at first encouraged to provide various goods and services. In a short period of time 77,000 such

million workers: but when they began making large profits, the government

ins of the

coops had sprung up, employing 1.5 million workers: but when they began

was torced tad

making large profits, the government was forced to step in and impose price controis and sharply increased taxes

1 Dese

on coop revenue - up from a 5 percent maximum to a flat rate 35 percent.

Gorbachev's problem on the cconomic front is that he is socking to achieve a hybrid of a market system and a centrally-planned economy while keeping most of the central planning apparatus - the bureaucracy

- intact, and allowing little if any real decision-making to fall into the con-

ITty of the

tmi of the workers at the point of

production. The planning process has

...tirins will only be attracted to the USSR if they enjoy

access to

relatively

cheap labour and

are guaranteed

rights to

repatriate

profits."

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 15 Mav 1989

Page 17

"To put

Chinese factories on

'commercial" basis could involve up to 30 million redund- ancies!"

...the Soviet working class has endured over sixty years of relative austerity at the hands of the same bureau- cracy."

Page 18

for decades been encrusted with the routinist and incompetent practices of generations of party careerists: yet lo replace this with a free market while the present management structures remain unchanged could produce chaos.

Gorbachev's team will be further

alarmed at the evidence of shambolic failure of liberalisation measures car- ried out to much western ballyhoo by *he Chinese bureaucracy. Amid runaway growth of inflation, the money supply, consumer spending and industrial growth, while produc- tion of grain and colton and provision of transport and power have lagged behind, the Beijing bureaucrats in March unveiled a new round of austerity measures, including sharpin- creases in food prices for 200 million urban workers, to follow on waves of redundancies from the cancellation of major capital projects. There is a sharp polarisation of the Chinese masses be- tween prosperous 'haves" and a large layer of downtrodden "have nots'. In dustrial growth rates were halved in the first two months of 1989, hitting rural industries (which have expanded since 1978 to employ 80 million workers). To put Chinese factories on a "commercial" basis could involve up to 30 million redundancies! So grave is the crisis that Beijing last autumn had to postpone by two years its price reforms and reimpose centralised con- trols over the cconomy: the major growth industry of the bureaucratical- ly mismanaged mess is corruption.

Far more than in more rural, less in- dustrialised China, Soviet Communist Party chiefs are seriously reluctant to be seen as reducing the living stand- ards of key sectors of industrial workers, who comprise a large section of the party's rank and file: the last thing they want is to create conditions for a direct confrontation with a Solidarosc-style radicalised, inde- pendent trade union movement

Modernisation - under

workers' control

Ofcourse marxists are not opposed to any modernisation or restructuring of the Soviet economy: on the con trary, this is essential if the needs of the working class are to be met. The model we would put forward however

is neither the present bureaucratic

centralised planning, nor the free market with its disregard of social

need and uscfulness and exclusive

focus on cash-flow and profitability: we argue for a system of democratic

airstres manning hased on workers' control and management of

the production process, of the

enterprises and of whole industries

through factory councils, and local

and national soviets.

Sparse display on the meat counter.

To accept perestroika in the way it is proposed means to accept that the same bureaucracy which reduced the Soviet economy to its present parlous state should now be trusted to manage the introduction of a potentially devas fating series of changes, continuing to take decisions on behalf of the workers. The old argument is being trotted out that a period of austerity is necessary for the workers before economic growth can provide a guaranteed right to a job, and adequate supplies of reasonably priced neces sities including housing and consumer goods: these arguments are grimly familiar to workers in western Europe But the Soviet working class has en- dured over sixty years of relative austerity at the hands of the same bureaucracy, which now asks formore concessions. They have no reason in trust the same failed figures: Soviet workers must organise to take the power in their own hands if they are to solve their problems.

Trotsky's classic analysis of the forces driving towards political revolution placed great emphasis on the issues of the warkplace and the working class. He stressed that: The revolution which the bureaucracy is preparing against itself will not be so- cial, like the October revnlution of 1917. It is not a question this time of changing the economic foundations of society, of replacing certain forms of property with other forms...

"It is not a question of substituting one ruling clique for another, but of changing the very methods of ad. ministering the economy and guiding the culture of th Burcaucratic autocracy must give place to Soviet democracy: A restora- tion of the right of criticism, and genuine freedom of elections, are necessary conditions for the further development of the country. This as

sumes a revival of freedom of Soviet parties, beginning with the party of the Bolsheviks, and a resur rection of trade unions. The bringing of democracy into industry means a radical revision ot plans in the inter exts of the toilers. Free discussion of cconomic problems will decrease the overhead expense of bureaucratic mistakre and zigzagr Expensive playthings - palaces of the Soviets, new theatres, show-off subways- will be crowded out in favour of workers"

dwellings. "Bourgcois norms of dis- tribution" will be confined within the limits of strict necessity, and in step with the growth of social wealth, will Rive way to socialist cquality.

And finally, foreign policy will retum to the traditions of revolution- ary internatinnalism.

(Revolution Betrayed. pp 288 290)

It is in this context, the restoration of the right of criticism, the first (rela-

tively) free elections xince 1917, and the opening of a political didogue reaching increasingly into layers of the working class that Gorbachev's contribution can he seen as most un- ambiguously positive.

New political

awakening

Like the kiss of Prince Charming for Sleeping Beauty and her transfixed

corbacher spoucy of plasnost.

the relaxation of decades of rigid press

censorship and political repression

has produced a rapid transformation of the froven and stagnant sociely of the Brezhnev years. Political debates

and differentiations have opened

puhlicly within the Communist Party.

socialist discussion clubs and circles

have sprung into life, and national

minorities have gained the courage to

minorities have gained the courage to

voice and act on their pent-up

demands for quality and a greater

degree of independence from the

aler tha

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 15 May 1989

S UPPLEM E

deadening, centralised hand of Great Russian bureaucracy, Most recently. the general election for the Congress of People's Deputies gave 150 million Soviet voter their first ever chance to participate in such a process, and produced a number of dramatic upsets.

The spectacle of dozens of career party bureaucrats tumbling to embar- rassing defeat in the election will have given new confidence to millions of Sovict workers. A Politburo member and some 34 regional party secretaries bit the dust, as well as the mayors of Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev. The opportunity for voters to voice their disapproval of unpopular candidates by crossing out their names on the bal- Iot form produced humiliating defeats for bureaucrats in Leningrad, Kiev and Tomsk in Siberia, who had all ar- ranged to run unopposed but still failed to secure 50 percent of votes cast. Among the red faced military figures rebuffed by voters (sometimes their own other ranks) were the com manders of Soviet forces in Bast Ger- many, the Far East and the Moscow region, and admirals of the Northern and Pacific Fleets: siso rejected was the head of the Estonian KGB.

Most publicised of the victorious oppositional candidates was Boris Yeltsin's landslide 9-1 win over the official Communist Party candidate, the boss of the prestige Zil limousine works. Yeltsin, though ousted as party boss in Moscow, is stall a member of the Central Committee; a vote for his populist denunciations of special shops and other hureaucrats. privileges is not a vore against the CP hut against the establishment, not least the notorious Moscow party "mafia" with whom Yeltsin had clashed while in charge of the city. However Yeltsin has built his reputation as an oppost- tional figure, and spoken of grouping together up to 30 percent of the deputies in the Congress to vote on a common line on key issues: if this hap- pens, a substantial number of such op- positionists should secure places in the more influential Supreme Soviet. which will he given increased powers under Gorbachevs reforms.

Legalise factions and

parties

Yeltin's proposal for a political caucus of deputies is not a long way different from forming an organised faction or tendency within the party - though it is probable that on many is sues his stand would also be supported by some of the non-party candidates who managed to win election to the Congress. This repe-tents a senour challenge to the ban on factions which was imposed as a temporary measure under Lenin's 'nadershi during the tense, nervous situation in

Yeltsin's proposal of a Congress caucus could potentially become a Party faction. 1921, and which was then shameless pared to 41 percent who said that they ly exploited by Stalin to suppress all would still vote Communist. (The forms of dissent, and has remained in Guardian, March 27 1989) force ever since. In similar fashion the

One pertinent question that could emergence of the socialist clubs and of also be asked would be the extent of -andidacies of non-party members. potential support for a Trotskyist ten represent the embronic stirrings of al- dency or puty in the USSR. based on terative politics to those of the CP. a revolutionary platform of genuine which call either tor recognition as soviet power, of free trade unions. of distinct tendencies within the party or freedom of soviet parties, of an end to for the night to form alternative, legal all bureaucratic privileges, and an ir parties. The rival parties to the Bol- temationalist foreign policy. It is like- sheviks were originally only repressed ly that initial support would be small because they took the field in opposi-

not least because so few Sovict tion to the revolution in the vexed workers or intellectuals know any period of the Civil War - not because thing but bureaucratic lies and distor-

Lenin argued any virtue in a single- party state.

Trotsky, in fighting the Stalinist degeneration of the revolution, was al- ways insistent in his call for the legalisation of soviet parties as a key component of any political mobilisa- tion of the working class:

•Democratisation of the soviets is impossible without the legalisation of soviet parlies. The workers and peasants themselves by their own free vote will indicate what parties they recognise as soviet parties'. (The Transitional Programme, 1938)

Interesting confirmation that the Soviet working class is not falling head over heels to vote for pro

capitalist, restorationist parties came in an opinion poll held during the recent elections. While 46 percent said they thought there should be political pluralism and only ten percent against, only 16 percent were in favour of there being a bourgeois democratic party to vote for (with 59 percent against), and only three percent said they would vote for such a party. While 74 percent thought there should be a green party. only 16 percent said they would vote for it, and only nine percent said they would vote for a socialist party. com-

tions about Trotsky and the struggle of the Left Opposition against Stalin. However the existing level of support doesnot define the potential that could be tapped in the right conditions.

The path of Trotskyist revolution is by no means the most obvious, cary path: Tariq Ali in his recent bonk Revolution From Above argues that there is a strong popular revulsion in the USSR against military spending. and a leaning not towards revolution- ary internationalism hut increased isolationism. This would not be entire- ly surprising, given the extent to which Jomestic problems have multiplied and the working class have been ex- cluded from any voice in the vanious

global policies of the Kremlin, while forced to shoulder the cconomic costs of the military effort, and while con- script soldiers and their families have borne the brunt of the painful ex- perience an Afghanistan. Tariq Ali correctly argues that this shows the need to revive

a "popular intemationalism within the Soviet working class: but what he does not admit is that this will not happen spon- taneously. A committed inter. nationalist, marxist current is needed that will challenge both the present

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 15 Mav 1989

...a vote for Yeltsin's

populist

denunci-

ations of

special

shops and

other

bureau-

cratic privileges is

not a vote against the

CP but against the

establish-

ment, not

least the

notorious

Moscow

party

'mafia'.

Page 19

The Soviet masses have discovered new ways to express themselves politically.

...the bureaucracy is a social layer of some 15 million men and women with a privileged lifestyle to defend, all of which depends upon them keeping their hands on the levers of power at every level of Soviet society."

popular mood and the Gorbachev line

of intensified class collahoration, and spell out the necessity to break the isolation of the USSR and the other bureaucratised workers" states.

Such a political tradition already exists, and has a record of consistent struggle against Stalinist politics from the very outset: that is the tradition of the Trotskyist Fourth International, whinee i adrew were ruthlessly arminaed by Stalin « mass repres-

sion, but which has never given up on

the principled defence of the USSR

against imperialism and the perspec-

live of a cleansing political revolution has would hreak the power of the bureaucracy and restore the power of "e working -.ne- The liftine of tepression through glasnost means that building of a distinct political cur- rent on these lines is now a real pos- sibility in the USSR. It is not a matter of principle that such a current must immediately proclaim itself a fully- fledged and organisationally distinct "party" in competition with the Com- munist Party: it is possible to imagine different tactical ways in which forces could initially be grouped around an independent political banner, possibly as a de facto tendency within the CP. possibly as a wider "socialist club. But the seeds of a Trotskyist party must be carefully planted in the fertile soil of today's historic debates.

Already the March election has raised the political level of debate in- side and outside the Communist Party. while focussing most attention on the possibilities of refonn achieved within and through the party machinery itself. In this respect the Yeltsin victory - as an expression of radical currents emerging within the CP - actually helps Gorbachev in his objective of reshaping and restructuring the party machine, using pressure from below as a means to discredit and dislodge some of the more obstructive and powerfully-placed elements.

Do the elections now mean that the

Soviet working class can now simply vote its way to political revolution - busting the "bad" burcaucrats one by one until only the good guys are left? Certainly this is the illusion that will be created among some more refor- mist-minded clements on the left in Europe and (more understandably) among sections of Soviet workers. However we should rememberthat the bureaucracy is a social layer of some 15 million men and women with = privileged lifestyle to defend, all of which depends upon them keeping their hands on the levers of power al every level of soviet society. To im- agine that by effecting comparatively small - if dramatic - changes in a par- liamentary election (100-200 'unofficial' andidates alanind nr "official" candidates rejected out of 1,500 deputies, while 750 more places were allocated without public elec tions, 425 of them directly controlled by the CP hierarchy) Soviet workers are really achieving control of the state, is the most crass electoral il lusion.

The most significant aspect of the clection is that it has helped develop a political process of awakening of the Soviet masses, who have discovered new ways of expressing their hostility to the burcaucracy, and are unlikely to be satisfied for long with the prospect of occasional parliamentary elections. Trotsky pointed our the contrast be- tween universal suffrage and the es- sence of soviet democracy:

*The bureaucracy replaced the soviets as class organs with the fiction of universal electoral rights - in the style of Hitler-Goebbels. It is neces- sary to retur to the soviets not only their free democratic form but also their class content. As once the bour- geoisic and kulaks (rich peasants) were not permitted to enter the soviets. so now it is necessary to drive the hureaucracy and the new aristocracy nut of the soviets. In the soviets there is room only for representatives of the

fictior. - in thr

workers, rank and file collective farmers, peasants and Red Army per. sonnel.

(The Transitional Programme)

Ar we have scen before several times in post-war castern Enrope, 30 long as one 'reform" wing of the bureaucracy is seen as offering the solution, and the workersremain at the passive level of casting occasional in- dividual votes in mass ballots, the workers will at best be offered choices on which bureaucrat should take of fice and how far the USSR should move towards 'market' solutions. Be- cause the working class is a property- less class that must make its revolu- tions consciously, and defend them actively, there is no such thing as a real proietarian "revolution from above Though Napoleon could successfully "export the property relations of the French bourgoois revolution through use of bayonets and invasions, the sorry post-war events in castem Europe showed that even the huge his toric step of expropriating capitalist property across vast tracts of the con- tinent could be carried out under Stalin's control in such a way as to weaken and alienate rather than strengthen and mobilise the working

clans. Likewise there is no shortcut to political revolution: it must be a real revolution, in which Sovict workers must mobilise to take power in their

own hands, wresting it forcibly from

wn nands the bureaucracy.

The task before the Sovict workers is not to replicate the bankrupt par- lamentary structures of bourgeois democracy - scen from decades of ex- perience to be largely irclevantto the day to day running of the cconomy and state machinery. It is to regenerate and re-assert the long-defunct powers of the soviets, the workers" councils which were the key to the 1917 revolution and which should now offer a constant challenge to tie deadening, centralised power of the bureaucay.

It is through collective class action, through the fight for workers. control in the factories, through pressing for the full opening of the books of the "bankrupt' enterprises and drawing up a workers plan that the fight for genuine workers" management of in- dustry and of the economy asa whole must take shape. The Soviet working

class must fight as a class to win back the power that was so systematically taken from it as Stalin consolidated the power of the bureaucracy. Socialist discussion clubs and intel- lectuals have begun again to popularise the historic slogan All power to the soviets!': the workers must make it their own, and give it a concrete expression.

Page 20

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 15 May 1989

← Apartheid's murderous role in Namibia · The changing face of capitalist Europe →

Something wrong on this page?