on South Africa
Thatcher's visit to Southern Africa at the beginning of April marks a new stage in Britain's drive to establish a Zimbabwe-style, Lancaster House agreement in South Africa. The British government's new ally in this project is the Soviet Union, in a further expression of Gorbachev's 'new thinking'. The British left has a special responsibility to understand these new developments and to act accordingly.
Elections in Namibia
ment on Namibia. Cuban troops have withdrawn from Angola, and United Nations forces are superintending the withdrawal of South African troops from Namibia The South West African Peoples Organisation (SWAPO) have to win Tect of the yote in the forthcoming elections to be recognised as the legitimate goverment of Namibia.
Not only has this constitutional barrier been placed in front of SWAPO, but the conditions under which the elections are being held are stacked against the liberation forces. Under the termx of the agreement South Africa announced that the notorious Koevoet counter-insurgency unit was being disbanded. In fact all that has happened is that the unit have been told to remove their badges and to continue their
The new international developments follow the Cuhan, South African and Angolan agree
Namibian working class are not yet in a situation to ex- propriate and expel the multinationals.
One of the heritages of colonialism is that they lack the ad- ministrators, tech- nicians, and skilled workers vital to the success of a post inde- pendence economy.
However they have started to develop strong independent worker organisation through the National Union of Namibian Workers and its
COSATU: a force to be reckoned with
Soviet thinking on Southern
Africa
tinks with COSATU unions in South Africa. The basis for workers" control of the economy and a drive for the expropriation of the monop- olies can be developed from these beginnings. But this is dependent on the continued inde- pendence of the unions. In Zimbabwe, one of the first casualties of of the Mugabe gover- ment was the unions and govemment suppres sion of workers' activity.
But in turn the possibility of a progressive development within Namibia rests centrally on regional developments as a whole.
The role of the Soviet Union in the develop- ments has now become crucial. While not directly involved in the Angola-Namibia agree- ment Soviet diplomacy endorsed both the reduction of the UN peace-keeping force, a
Soviet thinking on the question of South
Africa has also evolved. Following Oliver I Tambo's March visit to Moscow, a statement issued by Tass, the govemment press agency.
called for a tightening of sanctions against
South Africa and reaffirmed its support for the
ANC. Less publicly, the Soviet defence minis-
try will continue its supply of military aid to
unkhonto we Sizwe.
But at a press conference where Oliver I Tambo called for an intensification of the
armed struggle, he was directly contradicted by
Yuri Yukalov, the head of the Soviet Foreign
Ministry's South Africa department, who said:
"We would prefer a political settlement and
want apartheid to be dealt with by political
means. Any solution through military means
operations against SWAPO.
It is precisely for this type of reason that
move bitterly fought by SWAPO, and the removal of ANC bascs from Angola.
SWAPO protested against the virtual halv- ing of the size of the UN peace-keeping force. The reduction in size of the unit
means that the UN can claim it is unaware of such operations.
South Africa is also illegally maintain- ing its control over Walvis Bay, the chief outlet for Namibian uranium and other im- portant mineral products. SWAPO will clearly he faced with continuing breache of the Namibian people's sovereignty and de stabilisation, whatever the results of the clections.
There are other problems facing a post independence Namibia, which are not reducible to extemal interference. Muiti- nationals such as Rio Tinto Zinc and De Beers are keen to see a xmonth transition without challenge to their interests. To this
- 111......
•ix Bay. the chier arum and rayer....
«WArN win
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end they nave pursuc tions with SWAPO.
Lessons of Zimbabwe independence are important here. The SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 14 April 1989
Zimbabi The lessons of Zimbabwe stransitionte
Botha deposed, but little will change
will be short-lived, We do not want in em- phasize the need to enlarge the armed struggle.
South Africa should not he destroyed. There are other means such as trade and economic sanctions. These are very usefal
tools. It doesn't mean that the South African regime should be talked to using the language of threats and by banging one's fist on the table.
This statement was backed up hy Anatoly Gromyko, the head of the Africa Institute in Moscow. Gromyko has heen participating in talks between Soviet and South African representatives in London. chaired by Sir John Killick, a former British envoy to Moscow.
'There would have to be a programme of reforms submitted to nationwide dis cussion at which all sections of society would he represented. This will mean sit-
ting down at negotiations for two, three or however many years.
The day before, in a rather more cyni-
cal vein, official Soviet Foreign minister,
Gennady Gerasimov, was asked about
Soviet support for the armed struggle in South Africa 'What armed struggle?', he
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FEATURES
retorted, 'How can you support an armed strug gle which doesn't exist?"
In truth the removal of the ANC bases from Angola now means that any military capacity the ANC has is now some hundreds of miles from the borders of South Africa.
The response of the South African Com- munist Party to Soviet "new thinking" has been unsympathetic. African Communist has carried extracts from speeches by Castro attacking the Sovict leadership's new line and has stayed un-
ayed un-
characteristically silent in its own editorial
naractentiallu spanew comment on "perestroika"
Manoeuvres by apartheid
I SWAPUL
WITH
NUI
But the ANC does not only face a weaken- ing on the military front. Politically too there is a challenge tn be faced from the apartheid regime. The constitutional crisis over Botha's refusal to relinquish the presidency, has only temporarily interrupted the political manoeuv. res being prepared by the National Party.
De Klerk has alrcady conducted discussions with various collaborationist leaders like. the Rev. Allan Hendrickse, leader of the Labour Party, and Chief Buthelezi, the Zulu leader.
The negotiations with Buthelezi are of par- ticular importance. The KwaZulu leader wants to see the introduction of the power-sharing elections in Natal, leading to the dramatic ex- tension of his electoral base in the country. De Klerk's price for this is the incorporation of Buthelezi into the govemmental National Council, which until now he has boycotted until Mandela and other political prisoners have been released and the ANC legalised.
The legitimisation of the Natal proposal with London and Washington are vital to both the govemment and Buthelezi, and are part of Thatcher's evidence that her approach is better than that of sanctions.
ANC discusses problems
The problems flowing from the Namibia ac- cords were the subject of an important meeting of the ANC held in Norway at the end of March. The urgunisation faces a crisis of perspective.
From the uprising of 1984-85 the ANC developed a strategy of "ungovernability, ac- cording to which the ANC would develop a dual power based on the townships. The regime would be forced to the negotiating table and elections held which would lead to the for- mation of an ANC govemment within the decade.
This strategy underestimated the formidable
political and repressive reserves still enjoyed by
Solidarity with Namibian struggle requires higher priority from the Brilish left
Botha's goverment. The weight of repression meant that the broad front formed tn execute this strategy, the United Democratic Front, has collapsed.
Trade union unity
The only nationally based organs of resis-
tance still intact are those of the trade unions. The ANC, which was initially hostile to the moves which led to the formation of COSATU, has tried to impose its hegemony on the new trade union confederation. Until the last con- gress of COSATU this appeared to be success ful. Little or no response was forthcoming from the ranks of unions like NUMSA to the chal- lenge of those who wished to impose the programmalic framework of the ANC on the movement
However the decision of that congress to hold a broad conference of all those against the apartheid regime, as against the position of the 'Charterist" forces which was that the gathering should be limited to those who supported the ANC's Freedom Charter, marked a reversal of the trend.
The conference itself was banned by the regime. But since then the terrain of the debate has shifted onto that of trade union unity and in particular the unity of COSATU with NACTU, the other independent trade union federation.
The unity of the two federations would great
Defend the Alexandra Five
Khola Mayekiso, NUMSA activist and partner of South African trade union leader. Moses Mayekiso, has just finished touring Britain on a TUC sponsored speaking tour to raise support for the Alexandra Five.
The five were recently released on bail after spending 2 years in detention as a result of
massive international campaigns in the labour
movement, but still face possible life senten- ces if they are found guilty at the end of their trial which has already been going on for over a year. They face charges of treason, sedition
and subversion for supposedly being part of an "unlawful attempt to coerce, usurp or en- danger the authority of the state.
Khola was accompanied by Bongani Bkhuno, NUMSA member and chair of the national shop stewards council of the BTR Dunlop Group. Bongani was recently unfair- ly dismissed and his union prohibited by the courts form taking strike action in his support.
It is vital that we redouble all efforts to sup- port these comrades.
ly strengthen the development of the workers movement in South Africa. Such unity would have to be a genuine recomposition, rather than
'the warkerr
unity would
have to be a genuine recomposition, rather than
the simple ultimatum in which such a move has been posed by COSA TU leaders up until now. Moves towards unity have already developed apace between individual unions and trough rank and file initiatives.
Hunger strike victory
However even if such unity is established the prospect facing the liberation movement at the present time is one of setback. In this context the victory won by the hunger strikers in forc- ing the promise of release from the government marks a signficant victory in an otherwise bleak
landscape.
Triais such as the Upington 25 and that of Moses Mayekisn (sce box) still consign scores of militants to the gallows or massive jail sen- tences.
In addition the disgracing of Winnic Man- dela through the activities of her bodyguard. has given the regime a breathing space in rela- tion to the massive intemational campaign for the release of her husband. Ironically the Botha crisis probablv blocked the release of Mandela when the government saw an opportunity to release him with the minimum political impact thanks to the Stompic Mokhetsi murder.
The period of change in Souther Africa of fers the opportunity for the left to start to put forward a constructive altemative within the anti-apartheid movement in Britain. Mectings of left activists in AA have already started 10 estahlish a provisional agenda for such an alter- native based on: support for all those fighting
•pport for all those fichting against the apartheid regime; labour movement action to block collaboration with apartheid; linking up with the black community and fight- ing for a democratic anti-apartheid movement.
Building such a solidarity movement in this
country should he the left's response to the
project of our own imperialists in imposing a
solution on the people of South Africa.
nraject • aution
Steve Roberts
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SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 14 April 1989