Soviet troops pull out from Kabul and cross the bor- der. Intensified feuding between mujahedin factions.
Page 11
F m A U RE
Among the assessments of the Afghan events from the Trotskyist movement is this statement, issued on March 21, 1988, by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International
On February 8, Mikhail Gorbachev an- nounced that Soviet troops would withdraw from Afghanistan in the ten months following May 15, 1988.
The fact that the withdrawal of these troops was decided on when the causes that led to their presence in the country - to repeat the phrase used by Leonid Brezhnev in the wake of the Soviet intervention - have not disappeared but are more operative than ever, is in itself a stnik- ing recognition of failure. More than eight years after the start of the intervention, the balance sheet is terribly negative:
• The USSR is bogged down in an invasion, which has led to slaughter and enormous destruction.
• Its intervention has run up against deepgo- ing hostility from the great majority of the Af- chan population.
• The Afghan reactionary forces have been able to increase their influence enormously in the name of a struggle against the invader.
• The 'progressive' regime in Kabul is even more unpopular and more fragile than it was on the eve of the Soviet intervention.
• The intervention in Afghanistan by US im- perialism and its regional partners- including in particular Pakistan and Saudi Arahia, through their aid to the "Mujahadin" - is greater than ever.
• US imperialism and its European allies have gained considerable political advantage from the vast revulsion of world public opinion. including in the workers' movement, agsinst the Soviet war in Afghanistan.
It In the USSR itself, this "dirty war' has en gendered "moral gangrene" in the ranks of the army and deepgoing discontent in the populs- tion. This is especially true in the "Muslim" republics, where anti-communist Islamic propaganda has enjoyed a vigour unequalled for several decade
Why we called for
withdrawal
The Fourth International correctly judged that the massive intervention of Soviet troops, as it unfolded, was not only contrary to the right of self-determination of the people of Afghanis tan but also to the real interests of the struggle of the exploited and appressed throughout the region and to those of the Soviet workers state. The prolongation of this intervention could only aggravate the harm that it did to these in- terests. This is why the Fourth International
Page 12
Gorbachev: looking for new deals called for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.
The withdrawal decision announced by Mik- hail Gorbachev will be executed when the damage that it aims to limit has long since grown to enormous proportions.
in his February 8 statement, Gorbachev clearly refused to link the withdrawal of Soviet troopsto an agreement with Washington and Is lamabad on the formation of a new Afghan government, ax is being demanded by the Pakis tani dictatorship.
"This in a purely internal Afghan problem. Only the Afghans can settle it, even if they belong to different, or even opposing camps When it is suggested that the Soviet Union must take part in negotiations over this and still more with third states, we answer clearly: Spare us this. it is not our problem, or yours. That is what Mikhall Gorbachev has said.
This attitude is in total contradiction with the crude interference represented by the interven- tion of Soviet troops in Kabul in December
1979. just as it stands in contradiction to the very numerous occasions throughout the his tory of the Soviet burcaucracy when it has negotiated the fate of goverments in other countries with imperialism and forced its allies
to conform to the results of these negotiations.
The coming months and years will make it possible to verify whether the principle declared hy Gorhache is more than a purely circumstantial argument, especially since under Gorbachev Moscow today is advocating a worldwide course of reconciliation for the Middle East, South Africa, Kampuchea and Central America! We will oppose any attempt by the Kremlin to pressure the peoples of these
countries and regions into accepting so-called
reconciliation with their worst enemics.
The USSR's duty is to provide aid, without
strings, to the peoples struggling against im perialism and reaction. Only the leaderships of these struggles have the right to negotiate con promises with the imperialists and their partners. In this respect, since Moscow initial ly made ending US and Pakistan aid to the Mujahadin a condition for the withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan, it rapidly found itself
foun
confronted with a new condi-
tion from Washington - the en-
ding of Sovict aid to the Kabul
government following the
withdrawal of Soviet troops.
This sort of trading between
Moscow and Washington, over
the heads of their respective al.
lies, in the last analysis can only
harm the more advanced
revolutionary struggles. To get
what it wants in Afghanistan
for example, Moscow might be
led to make concessions at the
expense of Nicaragua, which is
less important for its own
security. This is why, rejecting
such deals in principle, we call
for a withdrawal of Soviet
troops from Afghanistan
without negotiations between
Moscow and Washington. The
USSR must withdraw its forces
from Afghanistan without delay, and continue to provide aid for the Af- ghan progressive forces struggling against the feudal-tribal and Islamic reactionaries, who are supported by imperialist and reactionary Mus lim states. It should conform to the an- nouncement by Moscow on March 17 that its troops will withdraw, even if no agreement is reached with Pakistan and the United States. Moscow is continuing, however, to express its desire for such an accord and to pursue that end.
Washington raises the
stakes
Even before being implemented, the Sovict
decision has already sown deepgoing dissuray
in the enemy camp. This is true at an interna-
tional level. The most reactionary currents in
the imperialist countries are disgusted by the
perspoctive of losing what has been one of their
main anti-Soviet arguments in receat years, Some have gone as far as to denounce the decision for a Soviet withdrawal, calling it "Machiavellian"! Far from making it easier for Moscow to withdraw its troops, the LiS is up- ping the ante.
The same thing is happening on the ground. After having concealed their differences and rivalrics behind a facade of unity against the Soviet invader, the various components of the Islamic Alliance based in Peshawar, on Pakis-
tani territory, are clashing more and more open- ly. Recently, the strongest of these forces, hut
strongest of these ...cex ho also the most reactionary - Hekmatyar's Hezh-
i-Islamic - has taken the leadership of the Al-
liance.. As the Soviet troops withdraw, the
Mujahadin organisations will lose their aura of
"Leedom fighters", as Reagan calls them, and appear as they are - profoundly corrupt reac-
ur - moundly corrunt reac
tionary organisations representing contending.
imreconcilable ambitions for power.
If. however, the government proves in
capable of surviving the Soviet withdrawal, its
fall would anyway be a lesser evil than the
Soviet Union getting bogged down indelinite
ly in Afghanistan. In any eveat, in the long run,
the withdrawal will bencfit the development of
a mass revolutionary movement in Afghanistan and its neighbouring countrics
TOOK no 13 March 1989
WOMEN'S LIBERATION
• Str; the oryattacks = 8
Women of the