Socialist Outlook

Socialist Viewpoint, International, Socialist Outlook and their supplements, 1984–2009

No Soviet deals with imperialism

Socialist Outlook no. 13, March 1989 · pp 13-15 · 1,235 words

Russia and the USSR Afghanistan United States

Soviet troops pull out from Kabul and cross the bor- der. Intensified feuding between mujahedin factions.

Page 11

F m A U RE

Among the assessments of the Afghan events from the Trotskyist movement is this statement, issued on March 21, 1988, by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International

On February 8, Mikhail Gorbachev an- nounced that Soviet troops would withdraw from Afghanistan in the ten months following May 15, 1988.

The fact that the withdrawal of these troops was decided on when the causes that led to their presence in the country - to repeat the phrase used by Leonid Brezhnev in the wake of the Soviet intervention - have not disappeared but are more operative than ever, is in itself a stnik- ing recognition of failure. More than eight years after the start of the intervention, the balance sheet is terribly negative:

• The USSR is bogged down in an invasion, which has led to slaughter and enormous destruction.

• Its intervention has run up against deepgo- ing hostility from the great majority of the Af- chan population.

• The Afghan reactionary forces have been able to increase their influence enormously in the name of a struggle against the invader.

• The 'progressive' regime in Kabul is even more unpopular and more fragile than it was on the eve of the Soviet intervention.

• The intervention in Afghanistan by US im- perialism and its regional partners- including in particular Pakistan and Saudi Arahia, through their aid to the "Mujahadin" - is greater than ever.

• US imperialism and its European allies have gained considerable political advantage from the vast revulsion of world public opinion. including in the workers' movement, agsinst the Soviet war in Afghanistan.

It In the USSR itself, this "dirty war' has en gendered "moral gangrene" in the ranks of the army and deepgoing discontent in the populs- tion. This is especially true in the "Muslim" republics, where anti-communist Islamic propaganda has enjoyed a vigour unequalled for several decade

Why we called for

withdrawal

The Fourth International correctly judged that the massive intervention of Soviet troops, as it unfolded, was not only contrary to the right of self-determination of the people of Afghanis tan but also to the real interests of the struggle of the exploited and appressed throughout the region and to those of the Soviet workers state. The prolongation of this intervention could only aggravate the harm that it did to these in- terests. This is why the Fourth International

Page 12

Gorbachev: looking for new deals called for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

The withdrawal decision announced by Mik- hail Gorbachev will be executed when the damage that it aims to limit has long since grown to enormous proportions.

in his February 8 statement, Gorbachev clearly refused to link the withdrawal of Soviet troopsto an agreement with Washington and Is lamabad on the formation of a new Afghan government, ax is being demanded by the Pakis tani dictatorship.

"This in a purely internal Afghan problem. Only the Afghans can settle it, even if they belong to different, or even opposing camps When it is suggested that the Soviet Union must take part in negotiations over this and still more with third states, we answer clearly: Spare us this. it is not our problem, or yours. That is what Mikhall Gorbachev has said.

This attitude is in total contradiction with the crude interference represented by the interven- tion of Soviet troops in Kabul in December

1979. just as it stands in contradiction to the very numerous occasions throughout the his tory of the Soviet burcaucracy when it has negotiated the fate of goverments in other countries with imperialism and forced its allies

to conform to the results of these negotiations.

The coming months and years will make it possible to verify whether the principle declared hy Gorhache is more than a purely circumstantial argument, especially since under Gorbachev Moscow today is advocating a worldwide course of reconciliation for the Middle East, South Africa, Kampuchea and Central America! We will oppose any attempt by the Kremlin to pressure the peoples of these

countries and regions into accepting so-called

reconciliation with their worst enemics.

The USSR's duty is to provide aid, without

strings, to the peoples struggling against im perialism and reaction. Only the leaderships of these struggles have the right to negotiate con promises with the imperialists and their partners. In this respect, since Moscow initial ly made ending US and Pakistan aid to the Mujahadin a condition for the withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan, it rapidly found itself

foun

confronted with a new condi-

tion from Washington - the en-

ding of Sovict aid to the Kabul

government following the

withdrawal of Soviet troops.

This sort of trading between

Moscow and Washington, over

the heads of their respective al.

lies, in the last analysis can only

harm the more advanced

revolutionary struggles. To get

what it wants in Afghanistan

for example, Moscow might be

led to make concessions at the

expense of Nicaragua, which is

less important for its own

security. This is why, rejecting

such deals in principle, we call

for a withdrawal of Soviet

troops from Afghanistan

without negotiations between

Moscow and Washington. The

USSR must withdraw its forces

from Afghanistan without delay, and continue to provide aid for the Af- ghan progressive forces struggling against the feudal-tribal and Islamic reactionaries, who are supported by imperialist and reactionary Mus lim states. It should conform to the an- nouncement by Moscow on March 17 that its troops will withdraw, even if no agreement is reached with Pakistan and the United States. Moscow is continuing, however, to express its desire for such an accord and to pursue that end.

Washington raises the

stakes

Even before being implemented, the Sovict

decision has already sown deepgoing dissuray

in the enemy camp. This is true at an interna-

tional level. The most reactionary currents in

the imperialist countries are disgusted by the

perspoctive of losing what has been one of their

main anti-Soviet arguments in receat years, Some have gone as far as to denounce the decision for a Soviet withdrawal, calling it "Machiavellian"! Far from making it easier for Moscow to withdraw its troops, the LiS is up- ping the ante.

The same thing is happening on the ground. After having concealed their differences and rivalrics behind a facade of unity against the Soviet invader, the various components of the Islamic Alliance based in Peshawar, on Pakis-

tani territory, are clashing more and more open- ly. Recently, the strongest of these forces, hut

strongest of these ...cex ho also the most reactionary - Hekmatyar's Hezh-

i-Islamic - has taken the leadership of the Al-

liance.. As the Soviet troops withdraw, the

Mujahadin organisations will lose their aura of

"Leedom fighters", as Reagan calls them, and appear as they are - profoundly corrupt reac-

ur - moundly corrunt reac

tionary organisations representing contending.

imreconcilable ambitions for power.

If. however, the government proves in

capable of surviving the Soviet withdrawal, its

fall would anyway be a lesser evil than the

Soviet Union getting bogged down indelinite

ly in Afghanistan. In any eveat, in the long run,

the withdrawal will bencfit the development of

a mass revolutionary movement in Afghanistan and its neighbouring countrics

TOOK no 13 March 1989

WOMEN'S LIBERATION

• Str; the oryattacks = 8

Women of the

← Ten years of crisis · Women of the world unite! →

Something wrong on this page?