Gorbachev's programme of
While hacking the general perestroika, Ligachey warned of the dangers of too much marketisation, too many concessions to imperialism and too much freedom for non-party, informal, political associations like the Socialist Clubs. It was a declara tion which was sure to get a good reception in lower levels of the bureaucracy, which see themsel ves as threatened by Gorbachev.
Gorbachev's response was swift. Following a melodramatic visit to Siberia, where many people complained about the slow. ness of the reforis, Gorbachev summoned a special Central Committee plenum which rcmoved Ligachev as politburo number 2. and shunted him into the agricul-
Three new Gorbachev cronies were brought onto the politburo, and a decision taken to end the function of regional Communist organisations as economic managers — a sort of parallel state apparatus. This Latter decision will threaten the role of thousands of lower party officials. Finally, President Gromyko was asked to renign 'for health reasons', to be replaced by Mikhail Gorbachev
Gorbachev's coup against the Ligacheviles was carried out in a manner totally al variance with the methods espoused by the official
UP glasnost propaganda.
There was no dehule on
Gorbachev's report, and, apart from Gromyko's pathetic speech asking to bo relieved of his duties, there were no other speakers. The whole meeting was over in less than 2 hours.
CC
The plenum revealed that progness on perestroika reformsis painfully slow because tens of thousands of lower level buzeaucrats nationwide, who are expected to put it into effect, are extremely reluctant to change their old privileged ways.
Second, the CC plenun showed Gorbachev's penchant for accruing per sonal power in a ratber vul gar and open way, which has nothing whatever to do with glasnost! But there are otber straws in the wind indicating that glasnost may be under threat.
There were persistent rumours over the summer that the politburo had taken a decision to clamp down on non-party organisations and events.
In August a demonstration in Pushkin Square commemorating the invasion of
Czechoslovakia in 1968 was brurally broken up by an array of security forces, including a new not squad not seen in public
The party leadership has bad no choice but to accept the legitimate continued functioning of the
"popular front" in Estonia, which
Includes the Estonian party leadership. The front has held demonstrations for Estonian self- determination which have mobilised over a million people a huge percentage of the adult Fetonian population.
But an attempt in Novemher to emulate the Estonian example in
Byelorussia was crushed by the violent dispersal of demonstralions in Minsk. Unofficial clubs in
Byclorussia, including the socialist clubs, reported that they were no longer able to book public
A Do great minds still think alike? The old Politburo halls which had previously been used for mectings.
On the domestic level therefore Gorbachevism seems to be in a period of uneasy equilibrium, with few real advances in the cconomy working their way through, or new initiatives in freedom or openness being apparent. But it should not be thought that by sidelining Ligacher, Gorbachev has inflicted a final defeat on cither the man or the very large forces that he repre
Iniemationally however Gorbachey has undouhtedly scored a major new successs with the Oetober visit of Federal German Chancellor Helmut Kohl to Mos: cow. Kohl took an entourge of 500 with him, many of them top German busincemen, hungrily cycing the 240 million-strong Soviet market. Dozens of new trade and aid deals were done.
Thatcher, in evident pique al this success, has launched a 'don't pay for perestroika" crusade, probably in cahoots with the United States, aimed at discouraging precisely those economic links being built by Kohl's Moscow
Moscow's policy in Afghanis tan has. however, come under renewed pressure as the US and Pakistan have Increased their military aid to the Mojahedin guerrillas, taking advantage of the Sovier withdrawal. The Soviets have replied by halting their troop withdrawal and supplying the Af ghan govemment with long range
There is no doubt that the LISSR is prepared to sce the present Afghan government replaced, but wants a political solution which prevents a hard line anti-Soviet group coming to power. Thus the Soviet Union wants desperately to bolster the Afghan government's forces to prevent a complete roul when the military pull out is com-
Stil, it seems only the most catastrophic tum of events would reverse Gorbachev's determination to complete the Red Army's withdrawal by the end of next