Socialist Outlook

Socialist Viewpoint, International, Socialist Outlook and their supplements, 1984–2009

Crisis in Dublin

· Socialist Outlook no. 11, December–January 1989 · pp 30-31 · 2,394 words

Ireland Europe Economy

Queuing 1o°

TU R E S in Dublin

The political and economic crisis facing the Dublin government has deeped considerably. Here, DAVID COEN. looks at the history of the twenty-six county statelet and its economy, and questions whether the British strategy of encouraging stable bourgeois rule, north and south, has any hope of succeeding.

JAVIl british

SOEN. trategy

The Economist's Ireland survey earlier this year was quite clear: 'No Cuts Charlie* has become 'Haughey the Hatchet". This was a reference to the prime minister's about turn on economic policy in the twenty-six coun- fies since coming back to power in March 1987.

In addition, Haughey's willingness to give in to British demands on security and extradi- lion, raises again the question nf whether or not the bourgeoisie in the south is capable of pur- suing its own political interests independently of Bntain. This is by no means just an academic prolem because the development of the politi- cil situation in the 26 counties has serious im- plications for the ability of the British to defeat republicans and impose a stable bourgcois rule in the whole country. Recognising this and their relative weakness in the south, Sinn Fein have over the past few years begun to tackle that

to tackle that problem. But the discussion of the class charue- ter of the 26 county statelet and the method of

assembling the forces on the island to bring assembling the fomar about a 32 county socialist republic are at a very early stage.

Much of the debate so far has centred on economic questions, often in a very crude way as if the dominant capitalist interests in the south of Ireland could simply he read off from the different levels of investment. On the basis of changing trade and investment patters the Workere Party denics thar the Britich are Aler longer the main problem in Ireland such is the level of US, Japanese and West German invest- ment. The southern bourgcoisic are denounced as historic failures for the lack of industrial development and as backwand reactionaries.

mr. are At a very

south of Ireland could simply he read off from

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The Socialist Workers Party (SWP) point to the recent export of capital from the south as evidence of the independence of the capitalist clase. For both, the struggle over the 'national question' is a blind alley away from the strug- gle for socialism, though the SWP at least takes the side of those fighting British imperialism.

The errors of both flow, however, from an economistic approach: the dominant capitalist interests in Ireland are understood mainly by the levels of investment, whereas for the British the main problem in Ireland is a political one namely the dangerous instability of hourgcois rule north and south. Therefore the arguments ahout whether the level of British investmeat in Ireland is the reason fur the continuing British presence are side issues, What is crucial, and something for which the British have been will- ing over the past twenty years to pay an ever in- creasing price, is the level of political stability - whether a political solution is possible which will ensure a stable bourgeois rule in the long tem and not threaten any of the political, military or economic interests of imperialism in that region.

Nohody can doubt that there is an economic crisis in the south of Ireland. Unemployment is approaching 20 per cent: emigration is rising towards the levels of the 1950s when the depth of the crisis began to put the very existence of the state into question, and the foreign debt per head of the population is ligher than that of Brazil. Of all the indicators of the crisis, the debt is the most significant, not simply because of its size, but for what it represents for the mling class, and especially for Fianna Fail, the largest political party and one which has considerahle electoral support from irish workers. Put crade

of F

all's appeal

to the working class in the 26 counties wax

economic development: the promise of state in-

tervention to create employment.

In the 1950s following the failure of the de

Valera policy of industrialisation behind high tariff walls and the resultant high emigration. the viahility of the "Free State" itself came into question, with some people questioning the value of the relative independence. won from Britain after 1921. The response of Sean Lemass, de Valera's successor as leader of Fianna Fail was to open up the economy to cx- lemal capital and go for a strategy of exported growth. The debt crisis marks the failure of that policy. No section of the bourgeoisic has an al- lemative, so the political crisis is particularly acule.

In 1986, the national deht, ar IRC25 hillion.

nic dev.

mal

•ne nasonal deht. at IRE25 billion. was the highest as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Europc. The ratio of debt to GDP was estimated at 145 per cent

compared with an EEC average of 60 percent. Nearly half of the debt was foreign and interest payments were cating up around one third of tax revenue. The present situation is not much changed other than the fact that the debt is not growing quite as quickly as it did in the period

after 1981. At this level of borrowing the

foreign bankers become increasingly nervous

and the usual procedure is that no further loans

are sanctioned until an International Monetary

Fund (IMF) package is implemented

Though out of government since 1982. Haughey was blamed for the deht spiral. Before the 1987 election he assured the voters there was a 'better way" than the massive cuts proposed by the Fine Gael/Labour Coalition

ava 2k 15

ail Dut

O0k no 11 December 1988/January 1989

government. No sooner had he become leader of a minority Fianna Fail govemment than Haughey was implementing cuts on a scale which made the opposition gasp. In money serts (hefore adiusting tor inflations. spending in 1988 will be three per cent down on 1987. In what are being described as the biggest cuts for 30 years, nurses are heing sacked, hospitals closed, teachers and civil servants pushed into carly retirement and wages frozen. Further cuts are planned in social security and it appears now that there will be no need for an IMP delegation to visit Dublin.

Though Haughey is blamed for the "extravagance" of the borrowing and spending of the early 1980s, it is clear that the main tar- get of the monetarist right is not just the actions of Haughey but the whole policy of public spending and state intervention into the economy which had heen accepted by all governing parties at least since the 1940s. That it was such a comerstone of Fianna Fail policy. and the speed with which Haughey has about tumed on the issue, is a recognition hoth of the complete failure of past policy and a massive political problem for Fianna Fail. In the sense that this policy was accepted in the main by all sections of the ruling class in the south, the debt crisis is an index of the depth of the political crisis.

But a history of the successive failures of ef- forts at economic development also reveals something more fundamental about the class structure of the 26 counties and its relationship to imperialism. Despite the current Fashion for historical revisionism and the downplaying of the role of imperialism in the underdevelop- ment of the economy, it is clear that the hold of the pro-imperialist/anti development clements in the "Free State" was much too strong for the populist republicanism of any Fianna Fail goverment since 1933. Furthermore, it is precisely these elements in agriculture and finance, politically organised hy the Fine Gael party, which constitute the main hope for British initiatives at the moment and which rep resent the greatest obstacle to a 32 county socialist republic. If the debt crisis represents the historical failure of state intervention to promote development in the 26 counties, it ix also the failure of more progressive sections of capital to overcome the obstacles placed in the path of development by a well-entrenched sec- tor which derived most of its strength from the relationship with Britain and whose free- market, non-interventionist stance was just ax virulent when it ruled briefly after inde- pendence as it is today. In some ways it can claim to have been vindicated by events, since the failure of state intervention to promote development lends credence to the free marketeers of today.

In summary, the debt crisis represents the failure of efforts at economic development, hut the reasons for this failure must be sought in the balance of forces within the capitalist class in the Free State' following the civil war of 1921- 23. The dominant sector of thatclass, which had fed for decades on the relationship with Britain,

successfully resisted all efforts at development which threatened their interests.

It might be argued that whatever the relevance of this class formation up to acces sion to the EEC in 1973, the 'modemising" im- pulse from Europe would be too strong to resist and thai a fundamentally changed scenario now existed. This is not correct. A recent article in the most progressively oriented bourgenis paper in the south, The Sunday Tribune, shows that GDP per head compared to the EEC average is about the same (63 per cent) as it was in 1972 or 196J.

One of the main advantages of EEC entry ac- cording to its advocates in Ircland before 1973 was that because of its natural advantages in grassland, Irish agriculture could compete suc- cessfully against others in the EEC and the resultant cconomic boom would lead to economic development in other soctors, par- licularly agriculture-related. There undoubted

...the EEC boom actually reinforced the

dominance within the

economy of those

very forces which

historically had been the major obstacles to

development: the large landed interests

and the banks...

ly was an économic boom in the 26 counties

following entry to the EEC in 1973, which masked the post-oil crisis depression in the world economy after 1974, and there was a sig- nificant effect on sgriculture.

But the EEC boom actually reinforced the dominance within the economy of those very forces which historically had been the major obstacles lo development: the large landed in- terests and the banks.

The landed interests because the long tem effect of EEC subsidies is the very reverse of that which was used to win small farmers to vote for EEC entry, namely to protect small farmers and to redistribute income; the banks, because many small farmers, carricd away by the hype during the boom years of the mid- 1970s borrowed heavily from the hanks and found themseives being driven off the land when the boom ran out of steam in the late 1970s. At the same time the goverment became reliant on borrowing as a way of staving off harsh decisions on taxation and spending. but now that too is no longer and option. The politi- cal crisis may well lag behind the economic, but its effects on the political map of the whole is land are likely to he huge.

The problem for the southem bourgeoisie,

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 11 December 1988/January 1989

especially the wing of it which has dominated the 26 counties politically, is that its basis of support within the working class is eroding. When the previous efforts at industrialisation failed in the 1950s, the very existence of the

*fe the very sistence of the state was called into question. If high tariff bar-

rierscould not 'grow" native industry then Fiun- na Fail under Lemass were pragmatic enough to make a U-tum and poxitively encourage foreign investment. The contract was renewed: Fianna Fail support in urban areas was con- solidated on the basis of job creation and high state spending.

Now, however, the post 1958 strategy has run into the sands and neither foreign capital in vested nor borrowed can provide the impetus for development. The crisis of the 1950s relums with renewed force, Though, at the moment, the bourgeoisie has a massive political majority for its austerity policy, a big shake-up in the politi- cal situation is likely. The beneficiaries of this crsis could he the left in Ireland.

But it is the split in the bourgeoisie itself which is the most striking. Historically this has

been between the large landed and banking in- terests represented by Fine tiael and the small

farmers and small town businesses represented hy Fianna Fail. A combination of the failure of the Fianna Fail strategy for economic develop- ment with the BEC induced boom in agricul rue, the benefits of which went mainly to the larger farmers, has strengthened the landed sec- tor both within the economy and politically. An

"agribusiness" sector is emerging which looks to the free market economics of the British Con- servative Party and to the intensive agriculture of the American mid west. It is virulently anti working class and, having nothing to offer along the lines of the Fianna Fail development" policy, is likely to rely more and more an out- right repression.

The Fianna Fail wing of the sourthern bour- geouse snares a comnion history with Sinn Fein at least until 1926 and a common social base: small famers, rural workers and the small town pelly bourgeoisie, who have relied on the economic intervention of De Valera, Lemass, and earlier, Humphrey Guts, It attracts more support than all than all the other parties pur together.

British strategy requires this unstable coali- tion to hold together and to bring it into the mainstream of pro-imperialist politics. But the strains inside this multi-class party are such that it scems likely to fragment as Haughey's austerity programme begins to bite. This is both Sinn Fein's opportunity and its weakness: op- portunity, because of the possibility of winning a significant section of the southem working class away from its allegiance to Fianna Fail: weakness, because it is only recently that Sinn Fein have taken seriously the question of or- ganising in the south. A socialist leadership which grasps the opportunity offered by the crisis of bourgoois rule in the south, will not only frustrate British strategy on the island, but significantly advance the prospect of a 32 country socialist republic.

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