difficult SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 11 December 1988/January 1989 struggle ahead Chile After General Pinochet's brutal *Popular Unity' government of military coup ended the Salvador Allende in September 1973, over 2000 refugees were welcomed into Britain and a serious solidarity campaign was created. Political discussion took place among a wide layer Before and after the coup, debate about Chile brought up a lot of the key questions of revolutionary tactics and strategy - how to build political al- fiances: the nature of the state and the role of the army (especially after Al- lende brought military chiels into his government): and how to prepare the masses for the bourgeoisie's violent reaction. It seemed to crystallise many of the debates going in Europe at the Today the situation after the between reformists NO PHOTO: Julio Etchard Reflex
Obviously within such a defensive. front in the upcoming clections based on independent working class parties - which in practice would mean argu- ing against a CD presidential can- united front the left could raise slogans (as the MiR currently does) for revoking the 1980 Constitution. sembly, for frecing all political prisoners and the return of exiles, for dismantling the secret police and of course anti-austerity demands, Strengthening and broadening the for- ces around the MDP and rebuilding the CUT (Chilean TUC) is also inpur- for a froely elected Constituent As- didate in favour of an SP refonnist couraged by the Church, the CD, the SP and the media. "Marxist" parties are still illegal, and it is difficult for tive ideas. The regime has tolerated the public activity of personalities after all the referendum excitement referendum mobilisations do not A pacifist ideology is being en- new activists to find out about altema- identified with the banned CP so they are involved in discussions with Con- vergence parbies; but the regime in- vokes the CP's illegality as soon as it Reports from Chile suggest that remember the Allende years. M enthusiasm of the masses for striking repression against its militants, and then the Nicaraguan experience, it referendum in the face of the obvious During the Allende govemment the CP was politically to the right of ing the trauma of the coup, the bloody tions, transforming its armed cadres into a sort of armed liberation front - the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front - in December 1983. The Front has been able to carry out limited armed any sort of blow against the dictator- the SP and otber left forces. Follow- made a shift to more hand line posi- P P ship. is not on the "Pinochet's regime was its October defeat, but collapse... shaken by verge of
Democrat, then the tactical problems processes. An extreme position of 'icformist" alliance or 'fronts for democracy could allow the CD and SP all the space they need in the mass The dilemma for the Chilean lelt is: sition and yet not isolate oneself from Tant. If at the end of the day the only opposition candidate were a Christian for the left would be more compli- It is not clear how the revolution- ary forces supporting the armed strug- gic fronts would intervene in such refusing any participation in any how lo maintain a clear revolutionary armed capability) opposed to a smooth trati- movement lo lead il into a dead end. (including option phere, Pinochet is firmly sticking to sititution - under which he stays in charge until presidential and congress Pinochet will remain head of the Rumours are rife that his wife might On the other hand the Convergence ment is respecting the timetable. For tion is promising - the transition can be calmly organised while Pinochet there is a relatively passive atmos the schedule laid down in the con- elections in 15 months time. Meanwhile he is reorganising the armed forces, and the military will ap point 40 per cent of the congress. is paralyned in discussions about ac- ceptable candidates, and for the mo- the U.S. State Department the silua- military to consolidate his power. stand for president! tion is promising tion provoked further debate inside the CP and an overwhelming majority to participate in any of the limited openings for mass work, the correct policy for political alliances, and the actions against the repressive forces. Since the referendum, two of its militants have been reported killed while bombing electrical installations (Guardian 7.11.88) Its most spec- of its cadres in the Frost (particularly role of armed struggle. The official Communist Party leadership around Corvalan has drawn back from its people's rebellion" line and istalking tacular action was the abortive assas sination of Pinochet in 1986. This ac- The debate was basically over how again of dialogue with the military. the youth) split from the party,
the masses. The experiences of both pines after Marcos show it is all too derestinate imperialism's room for manoeuvre (declaring the so-called transstions") and to fail to understand In the Chilean struggle today. sion has to be denounced - 3 people have already been killed in demonstrations since the referendum. Not all the political prisoners have been released. Eight thousand people have been sacked from goverment workschemes as a punishment for a Spain after Franco, and the Philip- easy for revolutionary currents to un- the masses current conscicusness. solidarity is still important. impossibilily munique since the referendum, does could be conveniently dumped if there were to be an upsurge of the For the left in Chile it is not casy. ing under continuing repression remain. The left has to relate to the masses' desire for democracy while challenging the CD's right to lead such a movement. While not clearly differentiate itself from the Conver- *The enemy is the dictatorship and not other sectors of the opposition. We propose unity to all other sectors. Our call for a programme of meetings All the practical problems of organis- challenging the CD and moderate sec- fors, the Communist Party. in a com- grouping called MAPU-LAUTARO. Although the CP has regained a pendent of it, and the Front acts the MIR, which also led to a split last year. Pascal Allende's current, which current around Nelson Guitterez, more on using all the semi-legal open- good part of its cadres in the Front, similar debate has developed inside: favoured a line of armed struggle and working with the Front, expelled a which wanted an approach based ings and moderating" their political There is anther armed struggle which is much smaller but engages in Robin Hood-type appropriation and there is still a large grouping inde- autonomously from the party. A which wanted people, after sights... has way working referendum, "One of the remarkable been the the
We should be Irying to develop. The Chile Solidarity Campaign recentiy sent an all-women delegalion composed of 1. Ruddock, M. Prosser and others to meet popular organisa- tions in Chile. Such initiatives need our support, particularly when the mass media now tend to mention Pinochet as an avuncular type who has brought an economic boom and within a general solidarity effort, what support we can for groups in Chile Who have a clear, socialist perspective SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 11 December 1988/January 1989 organises democratic votes! against the dictatorship- the popular majority and not from a didate cannot he ruled out. Corvalan, CP general secretary, is on record as being in lavour of dialogue and a Another approach is to fight for a and marches to support the demand for Pinochet's resignation made by the United Command of Shantytown residents... such a Ipresidential can- didate] would have to emerge from Despite such criticism, eventual CP support for a moderate CD can- "consensus govemment" that they would support from the outside (see (from New Worker Nov.RR). International Viewpoint, 105) group of parties." But a whole generation of has been the way working people after One of the remarkable sights com- the referendum were going up to shaking hands. Memories seem so young people most involved in the distribution. The immediate social base of all these more radical sectors of the movement is to a great extent among the youth, unemployed and the shantytown dwellers. The traditional CP base in the trade unions has been devastated by unemployment and mented on by Chilean revolutionaries members of the repressive forces and militants were lost and many of the short. members of were going forces and repressive Memories short..." seem so shaking hands. up to Page 22 the
former bourgeois allies who would However this is not to say Castro's marxism: his uncompromising line towards the largely impotent national bourgeoisie was not matched by any coherent development of working class organs of power, Capitalism was overturned from above in Cuba rather than by workers mans action: Lhe Cuhan workers have still never held It was 18 months from the Rebel policies were those of revolutionary Army's sizure of power in January state power directly in their hands, 4 not stay the pace. E P un
anniversary of the victory of dictatorship of Radical Face of analysis of failure of political subsequent January 1989 marks the 30th Fidel Castro's over the Cuban Batista. Since then many guerrilla and movements so-called controversial book 'Cuba: Rebel Army left wing Here follow the Fulgencio and have attempted to follow the 'Cuban Road". JOHN LISTER, author of a Stalinism offers an Castro's strengths and weaknesses that helps explain the revolutions which tried to Cuban example. Page 23 1959 to the sweeping measures of nationalisation which finally broke Cuba's links, with imperialism, ex- propriated most remaining Cuhan capital, and established a deformed workers" state. During this time the developed from initially quite limited democratio reforms to embrace a wholesale overtum of the previous ecodomic system as the only way to combat the pressure of US im- This development was also as- wisted by Castro's ability to retain and mobilise the enthusiasm of the Cuban masses, utilising the anti-imperialist sentiments of a nation breaking the yoke of dependence on US capital. Conversely, had Castro utilised his energics and talents to arguing for concessions to imperialism rather than defiance, he could certainly have divided if not totally derailed the However the undoubted subjective meant that options were on offer to The first major advantage was the extent to which the old Cuban state machinery under Balista simply and armed forces and police, riddled with corruption, saw the mass desertion of thinking of the Fidelistas had strengths of the Castro leadership were not enough in themselves: they were able to develop in a uniquely favourable historic situation which Castro that had not heen open before and have not been open to liberation abruptly collapsed in 1958-9. The the senior officers and conceded defcat to a Rebel Army of not more than 1.500 guerrillas (albeit with widespread popular support, as evidenced by the weck-long general strike in Havana which brought Castro to power with hardly a shot The nearest comparison to the January 1959 situation was the col- lapse and mass exodus of the Yugos- lavian bourgeoisic which had thrown in its lot with the occupying Nazi for- ces prior to the victory of Tito's com- munist-led partisans in 1944. In Cuba, too the collapse of the old state machine was followed by the deser- revolutionary movement. fired in the capital). struggles since. leaders, or discussing the problems of parison with equivalent leaderships of USA, hut also (in the carly days) from tionary or even radical policies rather tionz of the capitalist class, Castro was ing the rule of the Tory and TUC the Nicaraguan revolution withoutex- amining the role of US imperialism Nobody would dispute that in com- post war revolutionary struggles, the Castro team was quite extraordinary in its tenacity and its attempts to assert its independence not only from the Moscow. Where other leaders buckled under and abandoned revolu- than brenk their alliances with sec- From the start prepared to split from