Socialist Outlook

Socialist Viewpoint, International, Socialist Outlook and their supplements, 1984–2009

Palestine: the liberation struggle will not die

· Socialist Outlook no. 1, May–June 1987 · pp 20-23 · 3,658 words

Palestine Middle East Asylum and migration

struggle

Allenby bridge, 1967.

day war

e: the liberation

which will not die

THIS JUNE marked the twentieth anni- versary of the second Arab-Israeli war. It was the war that the Arab masses, the Palestinians in particular, had been waiting for ever since the fiasco of the defeats of the Arab armies in 1948. It was the war that would avenge that defeat which had led to the establish- ment of the settler Israeli State and would regain for the Palestinians their homeland. It was the war that Presi- dent Nasser had stridently promised time and again over the air-waves of Sawt Al Arab (The Arab Voice); his promises repeated by the other Arab leaders.

But in the event, things did not quite turn out this way. With excellent planning and superior equipment, Is- rael launched lightning air-strikes on day one against the air-bases of Jor- dan, Egypt and Syria, wiping out vir- tually their entire airforces before the planes had even left their hangars. With this advantage secured, Israel then proceeded to take on and defeat all the Arab armies in a mere six days.

In purely military terms, Israel's victory was no great surprise. The Palestinians and the Arab penple however could not for

blamed

thinking otherwise. The respective Arab leaders had, after all, constantly used the 'Palestinian card' in order to draw popular support behind their re- gimes, and also to pre-empt the poten- tial threat of the emergence of an inde- pendent Palestinian organisation wi- thin their own borders. For years they

'the six day war had a

profound effect not just

on the Palestinians, but the Middle East as a whole'

had been loudly denouncing the colo- nial Israeli state and heralding the im- minent day of its defeat.

Prepared in this way for a famous victory, the Palestinians were stunned when the awful realisation dawned on them that, far from liberating their homeland, this second war had res- ulted in Israel grabbing the last rem- nants of their territory: the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The six day war, as it soon became known, was to have a profound effect not just on the Palestinians, but on the Middle East as a whole. It brought to a close the 1950s era of militant Arab

nationalism, ushering in on behalf of Syria a new period of greater concilia- tion to the West combined with local manoevering to protect its own posi- tion, and in Egypt a wholesale collapse into the arms of imperialism, with the signing of the Camp David Accords, the stationing of Western military bases on its territory, and the handing over of its economy to the tender mer- cies of the IMF.

But in a not unrelated development, the 1967 defeat also signalled the emergence of the Palestinians as a major independent political, and to a lesser extent military, force in the re- gion.

Up until 1967, though the Palesti- nian issue had been a major factor in Middle East politics, the Palestinians themselves played no independent pol- itical role. In so far as they were active at all politically, it was mainly in movements such as the pan-islamic movement (which, while adopting a reactionary religious form, nonethe- less expressed a popular feeling of ex- treme hostility to the West, and for which the regaining of Palestine 'for Islam' acted as a strong focus) and various Arab nationalist movements - principally Nasserism and Ba'athism.

Socialist Outlook No 1 May/June 1987

The Communist parties also gained a limited Palestinian following, especially in Jordan, where Arab nationalism never became a major force. The support given by the Arab Communist parties to the 1947 UN partition plan - in line with the USSR'S peaceful co-existence policy - however, basically scuppered their chances of ever gaining a mass follow- ing in the Arab world.

It was only after the decisive defeat of the Arab armies in 1967 that the Palestinians began to recognise, in any number, the crying need for them to organise independently. The six day war effectively spelt the end of the 'Arab-Israeli' conflict and the beginn- ing of the Palestinian struggle for na- tional liberation.

It may at first seem strange that it took the dispossessed Palestinian people so many years to organise themselves. After all, however much the Arab leaders wished to identify

es with the Palestinian struggle, and however much the zion- ists, and to a large extent the Western media, refused to recognise the Palestinians as anything more than 'Arabs', the Palestinian people them- selves knew that they alone had been thrown out of their homeland and denied their right to national self- determination.

That any attempt at self-

organisation met with strong repres-

sion cannot be denied, but nor is it an explanation: for when the PLO did

finally emerge, it did so under condi-

tions which were far more hostile than

was the case pre-'67.

Looking back on it some Palesti- nians point to the role of the Red

Cross, and particularly the UN. The

now familiar concrete refugee huts

built by the United Nations Works

Relief Agency (UNWRA) shortly after

the war lent an air of finality to the

situation of the refugees which, com-

bined with the marginal improve-

ments in comfort, helped them to res-

ign themselves to their fate. Also res-

ponsible for the provision of medical

aid, education, food and other necessi-

ties, UNWRA removed from the con-

fused and disoriented refugee popula-

tion the most pressing needs to or-

ganise themselves.

It is no doubt true that agencies such

as UNWRA were a factor in determin-

ing the level of organisation among the

Palestinians. Imperialism has, after

all, a long record of giving generous

humanitarian aid where such was

deemed necessary in order to dissipate

struggles or avoid certain upsurges.

And there is no doubt that the West

clearly recognised the human time-

bomb constituted by so many refu-

gees, homeless, stateless and with no-

thing to lose, camped in their thou

sands just outside Israel's borders.

Socialist Outlook No 1 May/June 1987

Indeed, on top of this aid 'carrot' they launched, at the same time, a massive propaganda campaign de- signed to force the Arab regimes to assimilate the refugees, into their own countries precisely in order to avoid the otherwise inevitable emergence of a Palestinian movement which could challenge Israel's right to usurp their country. In fact the whole refugee problem' was presented in the We- stern media not as a problem created by Israel for making them homeless, but as a problem created by the Arab states which, in refusing to 'assimilate' the refugees, were 'heartlessly using them as pawns in their conflict with Israel'.

The overriding factor explaining the lack of organisation among the Palesti- nians before 1967 however, must be found in their widespread belief in the determination and ability of the forces of Arab nationalism - to carry out their promises and liberate Palestine. The extent of this belief was signified by the pictures of President Gammal Abdel Nasser which adorned the con-

Yasser Arafat at the last conference of the non-aligned

movement

The market in Jerusalem

crete walls of literally thousands of refugee huts. Of course, they were soon to find out just how wrong they were. But measured against their own apparent impotence, and looking back at the history of Arab nationalism it is, nonetheless, easy to see why they had hope.

Arab nationalism started emerging as a force in 1917 when the French and British, reneging on an earlier agree- ment, proceeded i. arve up thr Middle East between them. Bt the end of the second world war, while most of the Arab world excluding north Africa) had finally gained its indepen- dence, the old feudal regimes that had operated under previous colonial ad- ministrations remained more or less intact. A rising class of urban petty- bourgeoisie and a peasantry sinking ever deeper into impoverishment com- bined to produce an explosive situa- tion. The feudal rulers acted not only as landlords to a largely landless pea- santry, but also provided their sole

access to credit — a powerful position which they exploited ruthlessly. At the same time the growing numbers of

becoming increasingly angered at the

special commercial agreements which

the feudal rulers guarded for their

ar hai

which finally led to a series of national-

istic revolutions in Egypt, Syria and

That three Arab armies

not well equipped Zionist

Piers Carendish/ Reflex

19

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masses to be a demonstration of the total corruption and rotteness of the "old regimes'.

Avenging the 1948

regaining Palestine was thus seen as a very central task of the eme nationalist regimes. And while it is true that the likes of Nasser constantly promised the goods on Palestine that he could not possibly deliver, 1 Is certainly not the case - as it was

as it was constantly presented by the western media - that Nasser was nothing but bluster and hot air whose popularity could be explained only through the extreme gullibility of the Arab people.

The fact is that the records of Egypt and Syria in standing up to the West at that time were impressive. And with no authoritative leadership capable of pointing out the limitations uf the nationalist regimes, the Palestinian and Arab masses could hardlv br blamed for believing their inflated pro- mises on Palestine.

The 1950s was the era of the cold war. The USA was desperately trying to stitch up the newly-liberated third world countries into regional pro-West alliances. In Asia this meant SEATO; in the Middle East it was the Baghdad Pact. It was Egypt's refusal to get involved with any such alliance that precipitated the series of events which led to the Suez crisis, ana e quently to Nasser becoming a hero throughout the third world.

Having refused to join a western alliance, Nasser round ine arms markets closed for him and was consequently forced to turn to the eastern bloc for alternative supplies In a predictable retaliatory move, the US reacted by unilaterally withdraw- ing the very considerable funding it had promised for the building of the Aswan dam — a popularand prestigious gious project planned at improving dramatically Egypt's ability to feed herself.

It was in response to this that Nasser announced the nationalisation of the British-French owned Suez canal - a small corridor between the Mediterra- nean and Red Sea, vital to the military and commercial interests of the West.

The move took the West by surprise and won the admiration of the deve- loping world. Here at last was a leader refusing to buckle under the threats of the West. Here was a leader prepared to stand four-square and confront im- perialism. The subsequent invasion of Egypt - never backed by the US left Britain politically isolated, Nasser, covered in glory, emerging as a leading figure in the non-aligned movement.

Nor was Syria's record any less convincing. By 1957 she found herself the subject of a massive western propa- ganda campaign at least on a par with that faced by Gaddafi at its height last

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year. This was because of her links with the USSR, her support for African and Asian countries still fighting for their liberation and her outspoken

condemnation of the Eisenhower doc- trine - which offered US financial and military aid to any country 'threa- tened by communism'. Labelling it as 'communist controlled', the USA tried to destabilise Syria from within,

cient grounds for hope that they would went grounds carry through their oft-stated commit- ment to uperating Palestinr When these hopes were finally dashed by the six day war. tue Palestinians Wrrr forced to start looking elsewhere.

Many looked to the example of the Algerian FLN which 5 years earlier had succeeded in liberating their country from the French after a protracted

Ein-él-Hilwé, Palestinian refugee camp in south Lebanon

isolate her from without, and threaten her militarily, with Turkish and Iraqi (Baghdad Pact) troops massed on her respective borders.

Needless to say there was never any truth in the US allegation of commun- ist control. Both Egypt and Syria were, in fact, very hostile to commun- ism within their own borders. Indeed Communist Party activists were liable to imprisonment throughout Nasser's rule in Egypt. Their relations with the Soviet Union were aimed simply at balancing East against West in an effort to maintain their own national independence. Nor was the US una- ware of this fact. But they were also aware that the bourgeois nationalist regimes were, in the final analysis, more scared of the threat of their own working classes than of western domi- nation which enabled the USA to use the 'communist scare tactic time and

yain › it the 'non-alignment balance in its favour. The tragedy was that the Palestinian and Arab people nad no leadership capable of un- derstanding the situation with com- parable clarity.

Without such a leadership, and cer- rainly with rowing cynisism and doubts, the Palestinians believed the

records of Syria and Egypt gave suffi-

guerilla war. Throughout 1968, gue- rilla organisations sprouted like mush- rooms in the fertile soil of the refugee camps which were soon transformed from hopeless, humiliated and depen dent communities into proud hot-beds of Palestinian resistance. Most of these organisations grouped themselves under the umbrella of the Palestine Liberation Organisation.

But the PLO did not just emerge phoenix-like from the ashes of the 1967 defeat. It had its origins in many diverse sectors of the pre-'67 political scene, all of which were forced to develop in certain ways under the impact of the defeat and were drawn together into a unified Palestinian or- ganisation.

The organisation itself was first set up in 1964 under the sponsorship of Egypt, in what was actually an attempt to contain the growing rauicalistation of the Palestinian refugees. Only after 1967 was it transformed into an inde- pendent Palestinian body seeking ef- fectively to organise and give voice to that radicalism. And it was not ac- tually until 1969 that the largest guer- illa group, Fattah, led by Yasser Ara- fat, gained a controlling majority in the PLO.

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Fattah had its political roots in the pan-islamic movement, but following 1967 it developed rapidly towards bourgeois nationalist politics — a tran- sition which was marked by its adop- tion in 1968 of the call for a 'democra- tic secular state' of Palestine.

The most right wing of the groups within the PLO, Fattah has always distanced itself from the struggles of the oppressed within the Arab world, seeking instead to build opportunist alliances with the Arab regimes.

Nasserism found its echo within the PLO in the form of the Habbash-led Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine PFLP. A former leading member of the Nasserite Arab Na- tional Movement, Habbash moved leftward under the impact of the '67 defeat to reject Nasser's bourgeois Arab nationalism in favour of building alliances with movements of the op- pressed throughout the Arab world With the slogan "The road to Palestine leads through Jordan" , the PFLP identified the overthrow of the Jordanian monarchy as a primary task confronting the Palestinians.

Perhaps the most advanced conclu- sions to be drawn from the period culminating in the SIX day war however, were represented for a short time by the DFLP - a small group that splintered from the PFLP shortly after its formation. The DFLP distinguished itself by being the first Palestinian group seriously to attempt to build a principled support for the Palestinian cause among Jewish Israelis.

The Syrian Ba'ath movement also found representation within the PLO in the form of As-Sa'iga. It close links with the Syrian Ba'ath Party meant, however, that its post-'67 develop- ment owed more to the rightward shift in the Syrian regime than to the grow- ing militancy of the Palestinians.

The emergence of the PLO marked a great leap forward for the Palestinians. For the first time they now had an independent voice which alone had the authority to speak on its behalf. For the first time they had an independent democratic organisation to give lea- dership and structure to their struggle.

But twenty years on, the question must be asked: what did the Palesti- nians really gain? Emerging into an Arab world of regimes moving rapidly to the right and anxious above all not to be dragged into further conflict with Israel, the Palestinians have been un- welcome wherever they organised. For the last twenty years they have been led from disaster to crisis, from suff- ering to suffering.

First came Black September in 1970. Having reached a state of virtual dual power with King Hussein in Jor- dan and having won the support of large sections of the Jordanian people, the PLO leadership caved in to the

Socialist Outlook No 1 May/June 1987

monarch's ultimatum to disarm the Palestinian forces. In the massacre that followed, thousanas of refugees were killed and wounded and thou- sands more exiled from the country.

Regrouping in south Lebanon, the PLO forces joined with the forces of the Lebanese National Movement to over- throw the Maronite minority rule which the French had left behind when they departed in 1953. This time it was Lebanon's powerful neighbour, Syria, which turned its guns on the Palesti- nians. Seeing its interests in weaken- ing the strong Maronite hegemony on its northern border, Syria initially backed the PLO and LNM, but swapped sides when these, in turn, became too strong. The Syrian siege of Tel al- Za'atar in 1976 bore much res- emblance to the similar sieges of the Beirut camps over the last seven months.

The next disaster came with the Israeli invasion of the Lebanon in 1982. Waging a war of attrition against the Lebanese and Palestinian population, Israel relentlessly

pounded Beirut day in and day out with phosphorus and cluster bombs, eventually forcing the PLO fighters to leave as a condition for halting the carnage.

Perhaps an even greater disaster followed in the wake of this. Shortly after the evacuation from Beirut, Ara- fat staged a reunion with Egypt - a regime officially boycotted even by such cravenly pro-Western states as Saudi Arabia following Sadat's rec- ognition of Israel in 1979. Arafat then proceeded to the court of King Hus- sein. It was here that Arafat signed the Amman accords, which, by conceding to the butcher King joint right to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians, and by accepting effective Jordanian control over any part of the occupied territories that Israel might care to give up, gave away at a stroke every- thing the Palestinians had been strugg- ling and suffering for for the last fifteen vears.

With the PLO split down the middle at this treacherous move, and with the Palestinian military presence seriously weakened in the Lebanon, the stage was set for the latest crisis: the siege of the Beirut camps. Syria, which has always seen controlling the PLO as an important potential boost to its powers

(expecially with regard to regaining the Golan Heights) saw its chance to make a bid for the 'alternative leader- ship'. While backing the forces of Amal in their attempt to wipe out the last vestiges of PLO power bases in Lebanon, President Assad of Syria planned to step in like a fairy God- mother 'just as the last rat was eaten' to present himself to the beaten and divided Palestinians as their only fu- ture

Assad got his answer with the reuni- fication Palestine National Congress (PNC) that has just taken place in Algiers, when all factions of the PLO supported a resolution reaffirming the PLO's sole right to represent the Palestinians. In answer to King Hussein's bid for power, the PNC formally abrogated the Amman ac- cords, and so clearly re-established their aspirations towards national self- determination. But most importantly, the PNC was one in the eye for Israel, which over the last twenty years has used every trick in the book to try to establish a local 'alternative leader- ship' prepared to negotiate and imple- ment some form of 'autonomy' (Ban- tustan) in the occupied territories. Having failed for so long — despite fierce repression that has left no Palestinian family untouched - to break the occupied Palestinians from their total allegiance to the PLO, Israel saw in the Amman accords, the reu- nion with Egypt, the divided PLO and the Amal attacks in Lebanon, a light in the end of the tunnel. With the latest PNC these hopes have yet again been dashed.

After twenty years of struggle and suffering, the Palestinians have not liberated one inch of their territory. Their victory, however, lies in this: subject to the most incredible pressu- res from all quarters, they have managed to survive - not just phy- sically, (though under the cir- cumstances this in itself must be seen as something of an achievement) but politically. They have not conceded their right to chose their own represen- tatives and they have not conceded their right TO national self- determination in their own homeland

The incredible militancy and na- tional consciousness that twenty years of struggle have forged in every section of the Palestinian population will not easily be eradicated. Without correct leadership, however, militancy and self-sacrifice can only lead to further suffering. The task of the Palestinians in the coming years must surely be to fight for such a leadership within the framework of the PLO, and rooted firmly in their most oppressed layers, and with a developing understanding of the politics of bourgeois nationalism and its acute limitations, to carry them forward to victory •

Many of the photographs in this supplement are from the excellent book After the last sky by Edward Said and Jean Mohr (Faber, £6.95)

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