Socialist Outlook

Socialist Viewpoint, International, Socialist Outlook and their supplements, 1984–2009

Gorbachev's dilemmas

· Socialist Outlook no. 1, May–June 1987 · pp 27-32 · 4,882 words

Russia and the USSR

After being postponed several times, a plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was finally held on January 27-28. Mikhail Gorbachev's marathon six-hour report marked a definite acceleration of

the course of reforms that he initiated upon

taking power, writes ERNEST MANDEL.

What was new was that the centre of gravity of

these latest reforms has shifted from the economic

and social-moral fields (for example the fight

against alcoholism and corruption) toward a

strictly political level.

THE THREE MAIN measures proposed concerned political struc- tures in the strict sense. For the first time in 35 years, a special party congress will be called at the beginning of next year. The form of selecting candidates for the elections to the local and regional soviets will be modified. (It is not clear if this reform will extend to the choice of candidates for the Supreme Soviet.)

The form of electing party leaders at several ascending leven will also be changed. (Once again, it is not clear whether the introduction of the secret ballot will apply also to the election of delegates to party congresses, as well as to the election of members of the Central Committee of the CPSU. I

A series of such reforms was in the air. These were being discussed not only within the party apparatus but also among the intelligentsia, and even with foreign guests. Some of the pro- posals discussed, on the other hand, have not been upheld (at least, not yet), such as introducing the priniple of compulsory rotation of top party positions and a limitation of terms in office, including in the Central Committee and the Political Bureau, to the life of two legislatures.

Nonetheless, it seems that Gorbachev achieved a surprise effect. While the draft report had circulated among Political Bureau members and candidates, precise details of the new modes of election had been omitted from it. It seems that have had a bomb-shell effect within the Central Committee.

1021 'he

Socialist Outlook No 1 May/June 1987

The surprise effect, the repeated adjournments of the ple- nums, the interruption of the session, the number of speeches following the general secretary's report (there were at least 34 of them) and the fact that the resolution finally adopted does not mention a number of the more radical proposals all testify to the resistance Gorbachev is running into from the top echelons of the bureaucracy. The extent of this resistance is also pointed up by. the fact that the infusion of new blood into the Political Bureau was more modest than expected. Shcherbinski remained a member; Boris Eltsin was not elected.

This resistance is simply the reflection at the top levels of the bureaucracy of the conservatism of the majority or the bureaucratic apparatus. It is afraid of any deepgoing change, of any change that is more than purely cosmetic. It is apprehensive about Gorbachev's two central slogans — 'glasnost' (openness, that is more honest, realistic and complete information) and perestroika (rebuilding, radical reform).

All this does not mean that Gorbachev represents a funda- mentally anti-bureaucratic element, a reformer in the socio- political sense of the term, in the life of the state and the party, or that he is largely isolated from the rest of the society. He represents the more lucid wing of the bureaucracy, present above all among the intelligentsia and the technocrats but also, it would seem, in the police and military apparatus, which has recognised the gravity of the crisis into which bureaucratic management has plunged the Soviet Union.

If Gorbachev speaks more and more of a veritable 'revolution' being necessary, it is to save the bureaucratic system, not because he wants to overthrow it.

The differences between Gorbachev and the so-called conser- vative faction arise from the conservatives criminal underesti- mation of the crisis, which is 'criminal precisely from the standpoint of the interests of the bureaucracy as a whole. Facing a scalpel the Brezhnevites murmur that all that is needed is an injection.

Much evidence could be cited of points from Gorbachev's report that his objective is defending the bureaucratic dictator- ship. The principle of the one-party system was stubbornly upheld, as well as the dogma that the party must always play the leading role in politics. Gorbachev sang the praises of the KGB as 26 an institution (a command performance, perhaps? .

The 'principle' of democratic centralism as it has functioned since the victory of the Stalin faction (in reality, bureaucratic centralism) was considered the touchstone of the entire political system. Its extension from the party to the mass organisations and the state structures was celebrated as the nec plus ultra [zenithi of Marxism-Leninism, with which, of course, it has nothing to do. And so on, and so on.

It is precisely by measuring Gorbachev's aim against the means proposed for achieving it that the dilemma he faces is most clearly highlighted

For nearly 60 years, everything in the Soviet Union has functioned on the basis of a vertical command system, from the top down, without any initiative or self-organisation by the masses. Underlying the bureaucratic dictatorship is the principle that the 'material interest' of the bureaucracy is the driving force

"a relaunching of explicit destalinisation in the style of the twentieth congress is

not excluded'

in achieving the plan and turning the wheels of the economic machine

The monopoly of power and material privileges each flow from the other. Logically, therefore, Gorbachev has started from the top in applying his reforms.

Ber. the apparatus resists, It demonstrates a ponderousness unsuspected even by its most lucid critics. It sabotages, or worse still, systematically obstructs. So, it has to be shaken up. You start by snaking up the administration administratively. Then you find more obstruction, glaring new manifestations of iner- tia, new partial setbacks, new delays and postponements.

But the ticking of the time-bomb represented by the crisis of the system goes on relentlessly. But how can some bureaucrats mobilise the masses against others and control and channel their mobilisations? The risks of such an adventure are confirmed by the examples of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, China; and the most terrifying example of all is the Poland of Solidarnösc. Give them an inch, and they'll take a mile.

urning the wheels of the economic

Socialist Outlook No 1 May/June 1987

CILI

Like the liberal empire' of Napolcon I and Napoleon III, or the 'liberal empire' of the czars, Gorbachev's liberal dictator- ship' is literally caught between two fires. Divisions within the bureaucracy widen a breach through which sooner or later the autonomous action of the masses can erupt.

While Gorbacher talks about a crisis of the system in the gravest of terms, even alarmist ones, he cannot offer an adequate explanation of how the USSR got into this predicament. Like all the ideologues and politicians of the bureaucracy, he is incapable of presenting and analysing the bureaucracy itself as a social force. For him the bureaucracy is only a psychological phenome non, a sum of defects and crrors in behaviour, at most a sum or system of inadequate ideas. The social roots of these superstruc- tural phenomena are covered over

did so in such bland ideological terms that it seemed an insult to the victims of the

did so in such bland

in the course of

duements become un•

only rummented upon.'

illion I ommunists murdered?

working class atomised, terro-

on: Ine proclamation of the

elimination

• OI suclal inequality?

and purely it clums of the

omnipotence of the managers in the factories? The elimination

of the right to strike? The enormous growth of social inequality?

All this disappears from the analysis

it is hardly condemnation of the Brezhnev era scems more radical than that of the Stalin era. In the case of the tormer, the picture is not out- lined with a few fuzzy strokes but painted in big bold colours -

surprising that the

' than that

stagnation in all areas, inertia, widespread lack of respect for the law, vast corruption, declining morality, holding back of econo- mic and social progress, blocking positive changes, blindness to social problems. The general secretary certainly did not mince any words there!

Indeed, a relaunching of explicit de-Stalinisation in the style of the twentieth and twenty-second congresses is not excluded The regular Soviet press is mentioning Lenin's last testament, especially its negative judgement about Stalin. But, for the moment, it is not publishing the full text of the document or raising the delicate question of the Moscow trials, or the composition of the Political Bureau in Lenin's time, or of the testament's generally favourable assessment of the Bolshevik leaders murdered by Stalin, in particular Trotsky and Bukharin.

Questioned by Monty Johnstone, an editor of the British Eurocommunist magazine Marxism Today, Fyodor Burlatsky, political commentator on Literaturnaya Gazeta and quite close to Gorbachev himself, still expressed himself in an evasive fashion about a rehabilitation of Lenin's companions who fell victim to Stalin:

...we must change our style of teaching the history of our party. It is now without personalities. And they must research the role of all political leaders, of leading members of the politburo, and explain what happened during Lenin's time, during Stalin's time, dealing with every figure. It is our duty. But I can't answer now about the personalities you mentioned because it is a big question, and it is a difficult question, and maybe we'll have an answer in the not too distant future.'

According to the Italian CP daily L 'Unita of 28 January 1987, a rehabilitation of Bukharin is in the works.

All these questions are not merely historical or symptomatic. They go to the heart of the problem. This is why Khruschev tripped over the same stumbling block

You cannot rehabilitate the victims of the Stalin purges without at the same time condemning en bloc their executioners, their jailers, and those who bore witness against them - that is, the bulk of the bureaucratic apparatus. You cannot point an accusing finger at this apparatus as a whole without exposing the mechanisms of political power that made it possible to commit these monstrous crimes and the reasons why the bureaucracy tolerated (or wanted) them committed

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David Aing collection

Stalin: his leadership and the isolation of the Russian revolution led to the system of bureaucratic rule

Bureaucratic privilege versus 'the communist ideal'

That takes us back to the question of the bureaucracy's material

privileges, in particular their special stores, special hospital

rooms, their vacation homes, their dachas and their state cars.

There was some talk about these things before the twenty-

seventh congress of the CPSU but a veil has been cast over them

since. Gorbachev does not seem to have mentioned these

questions in his marathon report to the Central Committee in January 1987

Here appears the second dilemma facing Gorbachev. He has exposed the veritable 'moral corrosion' that Soviet society has supposedly suffered since Brezhnev (and what about Khrus- chev's "goulash socialism'?). He has said that Western values' and 'consumer society' behaviour have asserted themselves in the USSR

*Groups have grown, including many youth, for whom the aim of existence has narrowed to the search for material well-being, for gain at any cost. The cynical position of such people has taken on the most acute forms and is poisoning the outlook of those around them.' (Summary of the report in L'Unita of 28 January 1987.)

So, Gorbachev makes a stirring eulogy to moral incentives and 'the communist ideal'. But how can you fail to recognise that all of that sounds hollow so long as enormous material privileges persist at the top echelons of the bureaucracy? Austerity for the masses, the workers, the producers, pensioners, petty functiona- ries; "material incentives' for the top bureaucrats and tech- nocrats - can anyone think for a single instant that the people are not going to notice this fraud, with or without glasnost?

How can you break out of this dilemma without striking at the bureaucracy's heart (which lies just below its wallet) and without dumping this cynical red herring of a fight against 'petty- bourgeois egalitarianism' (it would be far more correct to speak of petty-bourgeois opposition to equality) that, in the purest Stalinist tradition, still turns up in Gorbachev's report?

Underneath this second dilemma there is a third. For a year, Gorbachev has been gradually shifting the axis of economic reform from the sphere of consumption toward that of produc- tion. At the CPSU's twenty-seventh congress, a lot of space was still accorded to improving the standard of living of the masses, and in particular to the promise of modern and comfortable housing for everyone by the year 2000. But in the background, a new and mounting productivist pressure can be seen shaping up. This is what makes the workers suspicious. Burlatsky admitted this in a veiled way in his interview in Marxism Today mentioned previously.

In order for the economic reform to be accepted by the masses, for the workers to take part in it or become the active force in it, it is not enough to appeal to an "ideal', above all in a society so saturated with scepticism, hypocrisy, double talk, not to say cynicism, as Soviet society is today. The workers need guaran- tees that extra exertions will not rebound against them, above all that such additional efforts will not put in question full employ- ment, will not aggravate inequality.

But how can such guarantees be given while at the same time increasing the rights and powers of the managers and tech- nocrats in the factories and giving full play to 'material incen- tive', which remains the essential feature of the economic reform?

You can see the extent of Gorbachev's dilemma by comparing his situation with that of Deng Hsiao-ping in the People's Republic of China. The Chinese old fox held a major ace. His economic reforms could sharply increase the incomes of the peasantry, even if at the price of growing inequality among the peasants. The peasantry represents the great majority of the population of China.

However, the great majority of the population of the USSR is not made up either of peasants or bureaucrats. It is composed of simple wage earners. But to these people Gorbachev does not have a great deal to offer on the material level. Improving supply, even of food, by extending the cooperative sector, brings on a dizzying rise in prices.

In the 'cooperative stores' opened in Moscow you can find high-quality sausages without having to stand in line. But the price is ten times higher than in the state stores. No workers, not even skilled workers (who earn 300 rubles a month) can afford ten rubles for a kilo of sausages. (The equivalent in Britain would be £25 to £33 for two pounds of sausages).

Discussion on workers' self-management

Gorbachev's only way out, in these conditions, + tu oiter

something on an institutional level. But the contours and content of what he offers are far too vague to overcome scepticism.

An interesting discussion is going on today in the USSR on the subject of self-management of enterprises. A notable example is in the article by Lev Tolkunov, member of the Central Commit- tee of the CPSU and chair of the Council of the Union of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, in No. 10, October 1986, of Nouvelle Revue Internationale. The contradictions in the 'official' position defended by Tolkunov are glaringly obvious

'Our party...has resolutely rejected the conceptions of 'bar- racks communism' which deny the democratic forms of workers' self-management in order to give primacy to military- bureaucratic methods. At the same time, the party has declared itself, and still does, consistently and resolutely against all petty-bourgeois [sic] anarcho-syndicalist theories of "workers' self-management". The latter are unacceptable to us because they counterpose to the socialist state the self-management of workers' collectives. In reality, as experience shows [sic], the socialist state acts in common with the socialist organisations and the collectives of the workers, as the instrument for people's self-management.' (p 57.)

You can get the full flavour of this hash when you remember that since the victory of the Stalin faction, the principle of management in the enterprises has been the 'unified command' of the managements, that the right to strike or to challenge the managers' decisions has been abolished, and that, as the author himself admits, until quite recently the workers were simply informed of the content of the plans, and not even consulted about it!

Tolkunov proclaims grandiloquently. As the complete masters on their home ground in the factories, the kolkhozy, the workshops or the farms, the working people must also be masters in the country' (p 65). However, we learn in passing that in the "radical' reform that is being drafted concerning management structures in enterprises, 'workers' councils' are to be set up that will 'bring together representatives of the administration, the party organisations, the unions and the Komsomol, as well as team councils, etc... "it seems opportune to extend eligibility for election to all heads of teams, and then progressively to certain [!] other categories of leaders in the enterprises: foremen, chiefs of posts, of sectors, of workshops....of sovkhoz administrations' (p 66).

Socialist Outlook No 1 May/June 1987

US S R

The workers cannot determine what they produce, how they produce it, or to whom their product is to go. The workers who are the complete masters on their home ground in the factories' have only recently been given the right to elect the factory manager, as they do in Yugoslavia, to say nothing of the higher- ups in the trusts and groups or factories. The state, as the instrument of 'people's self-management' is supposed to repre- sent this 'people' over and above the workers' collectives. One could not give a better illustration of bureaucratic centralism.

What characterises the Gorbachev team is mistrust of the workers. What characterises the workers' attitude is mistrust of the Gorbachev team. This cannot be overcome by propaganda. On both sides, such misgivings by no means reflects any lack of clearsightedness.

This mutual mistrust clearly outlines Gorbachev's dilemmas. So far, Gorbachev has proven to be a great public relations expert, but he has remained far from expert in dialogue with the working class.

• ine ni

Women's councils Feminist consciousness recent months. The unuci- leading bodies of the party an today. The Gorbachev teann place on the subject of institu

Although this may apper question of direct represen power properly speakins. -t for a debate on the social dei an offensive againsı discrimi demands cailing tor a uta: services: improvement of In- transport tu reduce lost tinic. of the official attitude to n...... manifest.

This atter pruten lue press, instead of Deme to the 'disturbing rise in for decades.

It must. however, Dr broader sucial consuvusn been accompanied by a re even within the intelligentsia.

First of all, the leaders Johnstone asked Burlatsky uf groups of citizens who ranr Greens getting permission «.. view within the tramework... a very curt reply: "That is not us.

Secondly. the masses tu road - once bitten, u. The current sensation un Mo Committee plenun.

Repentanie, which is a violent

a. anced by leaps allu vuunas in

represcmauon uf women in ine id the state is creating a real oe adai has reacted. Discussiono nave e Itionalising women S councus

a wav Or ver

ne s nanc

. Ul wumen in me orval me tinie it creates a puasi • yeuli w women

.. mat alsu and al

ension ul cullectr-

1ot aistribunon anu

• mulaton of the p ldlu.r. whose rec.

The reason for this is two-fold: hemselves discourage this vhether he envisaged the p Lo nacitione cimilan to thr

Iole

xa Du

view within the framework of a more populist society. He got a

very curt reply: "That is not usual for our society. Secondly, the masses themselves hesitate to set out on that

showing of Abuladze tue of the Stalin terror

Socialist Uutook N. 1 ..

nout the dead dictator peing named.

ident; nor is it any accident that the in reatures that recall those of Beria more

than those of Stalin.)

As the crowds leave the movie theatres, groups form discuss-

ing the film's message and the balance sheet of the Stalin era

vigorously, if not passionately. These discussions seem entirely

spontaneous and free. But, at least so far, they have been limited

to the past. They have not at all touched on current questions,

either on the political structures presently in place or Gorba-

chev's reforms.

110n

The Observer also points out in its 8 ne tnat during a pop concert in a suburb of

*cr alluded in his song to the absurdity of

an and to the human losses incurred (there is

in a recent film by Yuris Podnieks). The

•Dided him frenetically. But there was no

Inly the deaths of Soviet youths were

fur

es, political discussion, political criticism

" political awareness can arise only out of

portical apprenticeship at the base. Marx

nu thought that under the enlightened

tney could teach swimming without letting

water He ridiculed the jumping teacher'

• I vaulting a precipice with a tape measure. Gorbachev's enlightened paternalism is running up

sustacle. Likewise, science cannot progress

..un. Fur their political apprenticeship, the wuvirv. Such political freedom is not provided

• corms.

Elimination of censorship needed That means that the masses - above all the workers and the youth — are waiting for a whole series of tests in order to judge the real portent of these reforms. These can be summed up in the point which are given by way of examples

(supplementary points could easily be added):

• Elimination of censorship. The right for any given group of

citizens (not just writers and journalists!) to freely publish. • Repeal of the articles in the penal code that restrict freedom of

expression, in particular those that prohibit 'anti-Soviet agita- tion' and 'slandering Soviet power.'

• Release of all the political prisoners.

• Establishment of habeas corpus. Any persons arrested must

be presented with a precise charge within 24 hours of their arrest,

and have the right to a freely chosen lawyer to defend them. And

these lawyers must have the right to see the evidence on which the charge is based

Elin That • JI

•wardens

'Workers" Councils'

st police arbitrariness, anyone arrested

appeal to the local soviets. The local

wht to do their own questioning of any

...mc pulice present. The soviets have to ngate police operations.

"up of citizens, above a certain minimum ..... candidates for election to the soviets • soviet in nominating assemblies — that in Gorbachev's report to the Central un candidates in the elections themselves.

-ndidates to publish their platforms and

"e voters, with no political restrictions, •t Irom those of the CPSU. rade-union delegates, members of the ana the Women's Councils' in the en- ignt to put forward several candidates, .... For a transitional period, for the reasons ... himself. the freedom of such elections ..... a secret ballot.

ery clected trade-union members of the

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'Workers' Councils' in the enterprises to contact each other, to consult and organise 'vertically' within an industry, and above all horizontally in the neighbourhoods (in the great urban centres), in the smaller cities, in districts, regions and republics.

Elimination of the principle of democrauc centransm' within

the unions, enterprise groups, 'workers' councils' and all mass organisations.

This principle, even in its original Leninist (that is, genuinely democratic) form makes sense only when applied to persons freely associated on the basis of shared conviction, and not to class or state bodies. At this level, to assure that the masses will genuinely exercise the real power, the guiding principle must be that of delegated authority based on a mandate that can be taken back at any time by the electors who gave it. • Re-establishment and guarantee of the right of the workers to strike or carry out any other kind of action pursuant to their demands. • Generalised workers control over all econornic activities, at all levels of the plan and management, such as over stocks and movements (shipments out and in, transport) of raw materials; use of, and demands for, equipment; calculation of current production costs; the establishment of production and wage norms; the targets of the plan within the enterprise and in other enterprises; the general priorities in plans governing employ- ment; right of veto over layoffs and other forms of reducing employment, etc.

This is a key measure for increasing real, and not merely formal, "public relations' participation by the workers in mana- gement. This is a decisive step toward the economic democracy that Gorbachev talks so much about, and which is supposed to be the 'updated' version of the 'democracy of the producers' that was talked about in the wake of the October revolution. • Elimination of the special stores and reserved wards in the hospitals, vacation homes, special restaurants, and so on. Workers' control (and citizens' committees) to assure that these measures are applied. • Introduction of the principle that no state functionary, including at the highest levels, can get greater remuneration

(including non-monetary benefits) than a skilled worker.

In view of the tight interlocking of the state and the CPSU in the USSR, the extension of a series of demands about "openness' to the structures of the CPSU does not represent illusions about the nature of this party but rather elementary democratic demands.

'Really revolutionary changes'?

Since for the moment the only real political debates that are going on in the USSR are taking place within the Central Committee of the CPSU, it is logical for critical Soviet citizens to demand that these debates be published. Since Gorbachev proposed that there be election by secret ballot of the members of the cPsu's committees, it is logical for the citizens to demand that these elections not be mere shows, but there be a choice of candidates representing real unpusing plattorins.

All this, obviously, in no way detracts from the importance of demanding a multiparty system, that is, the right of Soviet workers and peasants freely to form political parties of their choice.

Is advocating such demands in the USSR 'too much', 'too soon'? Does this strengthen the position of the conservatives opposed to Gorbachev's reforms? That is one of the most moth-eaten of arguments. Already on the eve of the revolution of 1848, the liberals accused the communists (the revolutionary socialists) of the time of 'playing the reactionaries' game' by putting forward their 'excessive' demands. The real problem lies elsewhere. It lies in the class nature of political activity, in the different social interests that are to be expressed and linked up.

Thinking that you can make 'really revolutionary changes' (Gorbachev's phrase) in the Soviet Union as it is today without the working class moving is believing in Santa Claus. Thinking that you can get the working class to move without appealing to its interests is falling into the most sterile sort of voluntarist and idealist utopianism.

The main roads of both material and moral incentvies for the workers follow the markers of solidarity, justice, equality and real decision-making powers and have been well known for more than 30 years.

To those who say that you cannot go too quickly without running into more and more obstacles we should reply - along with Gorbachev - that up until now the movement has been much too slow. According to the London Sunday Times of 14 December, a report drawn up by dozens of academicians stressed that the gravity of the crisis ('a terrible mess') calls for faster reforms

To the Gorbachevites who say that the people can only adjust to democracy step by step, we should point out that their paternalism is leading them into a blind alley. Nothing better than their own slogans could reveal the depth of their contradic- tion, which borders on the ridiculous: 'Don't be afraid [!] to advance in a brave [!] and resolute way'

In the real world, the brave are characterised precisely by the fact that they are not afraid, that no one can frighten them. That quality is something that the masses will acquire by their own experience anr! on their own initiative, as they did during the revolution of 1917, and not by command or according to rules established and strictly limited at the top

Speaking on 19 June 1986 to a group of writers, Gorbachev came up with a very apt formula. "The enemy [it would have been better to say the international bourgeoisie] does not fear Soviet nuclear missiles. But they do fear the extension of democracy in the USSR.' (New York Times, 22 December 1986.)

Unquestionably, a Soviet Union in which a real socialist democracy prevailed, which would have a power of attraction for the masses of the entire planet, would change the whole world situation at one stroke. That is, it would, if this socialist democracy were real and not fictional, if it gave the workers not only more economic rights and powers but more political rights and powers than in the most developed capitalist countries.

Socialist Outlook No 1 May/June 1987

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