improved economy? BEFOREITS ABOLITION, the Greater London Council published a weighty volume entitled The London Industrial Strategy (LIS) made up of strategies for twenty sectors of the London economy. The book describes policies for the GL.C's own intervention, including for its investment arm the Greater London Enterprise Board. But this intervention was intended to be an experiment, developing and proving a left alternative to the industrial policies of the Labour and TUC leaderships. In the New Statesman, Mavism Today and elsewhere on the left it has been hailed as a new, pathfinding approach to cconomic policy.
The LIS contains useful proposals on many economic issues, including on the public sector and domestic work. Bur INIERNAIKINAL No S July Amput 1986,
London's docklands up for grabs. Many 'flex spec' firms are relocating there The GLC has put forward a rival industrial strategy to Kinnock's. JAMIE GOUGH examines just how different it really is, and suggests an alternative. the most distinctive contribution concerns policies for strengthening the power of workers within the private sector There are in fact several contradictory lines on this issue in the LIS, reflecting the different political currents that were present in the GI.C. It is these strategies 1 look at in this article. Modernising Britain, from the left In order to see what kind of alternative The London Industrial Strategy provides, we need to compare it with the traditional policies of the labour movement on industrial intervention. The central aim of these policies has been to improve the competitiveness of British manufacturing against its interna- 21 tional rivals. The Labour and trade union leaderships have put
themselves forward as the champions of 'cfficienes' and "modernisation. British capital is presented as backward and unpatriotic, centering its activities on overseas investments and speculation. Accordingly, the role of the labour movement is to orce industry to do its job proper!! like German or Japanese capital, for instance. Kinnock's current presentation of the Labour Party as the party of production' is the latese version of this old theme.
The labour movement at all lores has largels tollowed this line. Since the second world war hundreds of billions of pounds of grants have been given by the state to private manufacturing firms, as regional grants, through industry-specific schemes, as funds for spocific firms, and through investments. The labour movement has very seldom questioned these hand-outs or attempted to harness them to its particular ends. After all, if grants equal greater productivity «quals more jobs and higher wages, what is there to question. The typical approach of the labour union movement bas
'the rate of profit is so low that productivity increases just displace jobs' therefore been to get together with the emplovers to lobly the government for more.
The first problem with this approach is that it is completely insufficient for the task it supposedly sets itself 'modernising' British industry. The overseas, speculative orientation of British capital is dved in the wool. To change this orientation would require such massive direction over the City and the British multinationals as to amount to expropriation in reality it not in name. Investment grants hardly scratch the surface.
But there is a more fundamental problem: on a world scale, increased investment and productivity now does not mean more jobs. During the 1950s and 1960%, increased productivity did help to feed the international capitalist boom, through cheapening consumer and capital goods and raw materials and thus sustaining profit rates. Good protits encouraged more investment and higher output, more than cnough to oftso the job displacing effects of increased productivity. Now, however, the rate of profit is so low that productivity increases do not encourage a new wave of sustained investment: ther just displace jobs.
What is more, one effece of most increases in investment es to make capital's profit situation worse, through increasing capital intensity. Extracting the same prot requires more capital and so the rate of profit declines. This was happening also in the '50s and '60s; but with the current already low rate of profit increased investment helps to deepen the crisis of profitability, and thus the crisis of jobs.
Governmen grants that increase investment may well improve the competitiveness of a particular firm, or stop it becoming more uncompetitive. They may therefore provide some often temporary respite for workers in that firm. But they do not create jobs overall, and therefore are not a ins strategy for the working class movemen. Fortis, the tire seep is rather the kind ot policies proposed in the Campaign Group's pamphlet A Million Jobs a Year relation and increased government borrowing made effective by nationalisation of the City.
The LIS, however, does claim that industrial intervention can create jobs. Vigorous and detailed state policies for production - in contrast to tinkering with the money supply ('monetarism') or with demand ('Keynesianism'! are said to be able to revive the cconomy. The DIS argues that, through using advanced technology and good organisation, an enter prisecan gain a 'strategic place in the economy. Thismight well enable the enterprise to reap higher than average protits at the expense of other forms. But this does nothing for the overall rate ol profitor for economic revival. The job creation' strategy of the LIS is just a more sophisticated presenation of the 22 traditional policy of improved competitiveness.
BESIDE. DROEF PATM Can the LIS solve youth unemployment? Signing on in Piml A new flavour — 'flexible specialisation The Ci.C's publicity made much of the imaginary jobs it was arcating through its investments. But the emphasis of the LIS is non on job crcation but on strengthening workers' position through changing technology, organisation of production and organisation of industries 'restructuring of labour' is the slogan. Contral to this theme is a now form of industrial organisation called "Hexible specialisation'.
Hexible specialisation in its ideal form turns on its head most people's idea of 'modern' industrial production. Rather than miss production' make large quantities of a standardised product, it sets out to make a large variety of products in short runs. Instead of plywood cupboards, we have the entomised firted kitchen, spanish, inder' on high rech' to taste. Instead of icans we have designer jeans, instead of M&S
'instead of jeans we have designer
jeans, instead of M & S we have Next' we have Next. And rather than repetitive production line work De workers most of whom are trained only for the specific, simple job, in the flexible specialisation model workers need to have the skill to handle constandly changing products, to reser machines frequenly and solve problems as they arise.
This now organisation inside the factory can alter the organisation of the industry. The advocates of flexible specialisation agrue that the new type of production can be carried out of most efficiently not in the large factories and firms typical of mass producton but in small or medium factories and firms. The necessary inventiveness and fast footwork is best achieved when factories and firms have extremely detailed knowledge and skill in a narrow area of production: hence
flexible specialisation. So instead of the large integraed decl works producing basic steel, you have small works producing steels for special markets.
The LIS sces flexible specialisation becoming the dommont industrial model in the world economy for along period. in the way that mass production has been from the 1920: 10 the
"flexible specialisation is only one of
capital's response to the crisis' present. Computer controlled production equipment con be programmed for new tasks much more quickly than the old electro-mechanical machines could be set, thus cheapening the production of varied goods. The new telecoms and date processing can easily handle stock control and rapid ordering fora massive variety of designs and sizes. Andthe DISarguethat there is a decline in demand for standardised produces and increasing demand tor varied consumer goods and customised capital equipment. The LIS then bases its strategies on thos flexible specialisation future.
It is true that the flexible specialisation streger is bring adopted by groups of firms in many different industries. But it is only one of capital's responses to the crisis. Mass production of standard products will remain important: in raw material and energy production; in transport, distribution, communicions and other 'infrastructures'. In other industries standardised production is becoming more important: office work, mans consumer services, and production of standardised machines with the flexibility to do many different tasks. In consume goods, fragmentation of taste has a lot to do with increing differences between income groups, ages and the sess produced by the crisis — it is not a permanene lame. A INTERNAINAL. No. S July:/August 1986
sarategy boseston flesible spocialisation can therefore affect only part of the working class. The new craft worker? But the LIs has reasons for cottoning on to flexible specialisation: it appears to offer the possibility tor a gradual inerose in working class power based on skill. There are (at love ano lines on this in the LIS
The tire line, devoloped for example in the strategies for damniture and the media, is straightiorwardly class-collaboradionist. barguesthat flexible specialisation gives workers strong bangaining power against their employers. The employers cannot casite sack them, because their skills are needed; nor can production casily be speeded up or. reorganised without workers consent because workers' collaboration and initiative is needed for this type ot production. The employers are willing
through their specialisation and products. Compouton on the basis of quality, not cost, means caplorers need not resort to nasty cost cutting methods. In short, Hevible specialisation is a step forward for the working « lass. I can restore the control over work and the dignity of labour that the crade worker had before this was smashed by mass production.
Far from providing a radical alternative to the labour deadership, this line gives their policy a sophisticated underpinning. The fans of flexibie specialisation argue that (especially in backind Britain) state intervention will be necessary to support small, innorative firms: in providing funds, training services, common marketing and rescarch services, and in
'the overseas, speculative orientation
of British capital is dyed in the wool' camping down on employers who indulge in unfair cost cutting through super-exploitation or illegal practices. But state amrolled enterprises would be 'bureaucratic' and
lon tooled tor this tope of production. We are back at the National tavestment Bank and local Enterprise Boards to give Kinnock-Hattersley line: no to nationalisation,
But, even for the production of varied and fast-changing goods, this return to the good old days of the craft workshop is an illusion. First, the degree of skill and autonomy of workers even within flexible specialist firms will often be limited. New production cechnology cnables many quite complex design and production tasks to be substantially automated. And new information technology cnables management to continuously monitor and measure and so control - the labour of workers, even those doing quite varied tasks.
Sccondly, big capital need not let itself be so casily andermined by these jumped-up smaller firms. Big capital, too, may be "burcaucratic, but it is quite capable of organising to produce varicd goods. It can casily expand and diversity its dongn departments, and it can divide its production up into specialise shops, factories and subsidiaries. And big capital can still maintain control over the crucial distribution networks, and probably increase it, as recent mega-mergers in retailing and the media costity. A new craft trades unionism There is, though, an important kerned of truth in the pro-flex spec line. As in all previous capitalist cries, there are firms and sectors ouche cconomy which are able to reap good rates of profit on the basis of advanced technology and efficient organisation. Within these firms, some of the workers have skilled jobs which put them in a strong bargaining position. These workers are not necessarily conservative because of this, whaterer Eric Hammond and left-talking curocommunists would have us believe. Their strong cconomic position can be used tolight capital. In fact, in the end they always have to fight capital, as we now see in Fleet Street. Capital's never-ending 23
reorganisations always require or cnable it sooner or later 1o undermine cach particular grou But the pro-flex spec line takes us in the opposite direction: to collaborate with position, supposedly for all workers, but in fact for a small capital in making a strong minority. This line deepens divisions inside the working class.
For fles spec promoters, wages and conditions depend directly on good profits. So these must be set at the tim or shop level; if you're in a weak firm, hard luck. In this way, solidarity across an industry becomes very hard to build especially if the firms are as small as the flex spec fans would like.
Moreover, for these strategists the strength of the skilled workers depends heavily on their short supply. So it must be underpinned by restricting entry: and what more natural than for men to exclude women, white to exclude black, older to exclude the young? And it not all jobs can be in successful, flex spec firms, if mass production remains, where are the good jobs to be located? Naturally, in the imperialist countries, which
sophisticated production, and are closer to the discriminating buyer. And so the flex spec promoters argue that their strategy can keep the imperialist countries ahcad of the Third Workd. and bannish lou skill, low paid jobs to where they belong. Craft workers are nee
reactionary. But a strategy which centres on bunkng vorking class strength through skill certainlv is. The class struggle ...to enlighten capital AsT have mentioned, there are rival strategies in the LIS. A more
Ton flexible specialisation is to be tound in the Introduction to the LIS, writen by the head of the Gil.C"s economic department, Robin Murray. Murray agrues that, while something called flesible specialisation is the future, this can include deskilling of work and continued domination by large capital, somewhat in the way I have discussed above. Like the tans of flex spec, Murray's contral political amm is mereasms the skill content and varicty of work, and thus the worker's immediate control over the work process. But in Murry's perspective this requires opposing capital's attempes to deskill. The labour movement, backed by a Labour government, necds to compel firms to adopt skilled work processes, and the government needs provide resources participate in designing appropriate production equipmen.
Promoting better jobs in this kind of ".!! valuable, and more discussion is needed in the labour morement of how it could be done. But at this point Murray backtracks. He insists that these better jobs are alwayus just as profitable for capital as low skill, tightly supervised ones. The emplovers deskill jobs out of a short sighted belief that super-esploitation and use of unskilled labour is in their interest. If this were truc, then any strong control by the state or the labour movement over capital would be unnecessary to achieve better jobs capital just needs more progressive advice. Weare back with the hands-off policy of the Labour leadership.
But the employers are not short sighed. The have an
interest in exercismg as tight as possible control over the work
process. And capital always aspires to be as mobile as possible,
to freeitselt from dependence on particular workers and toleave
itself able to use the reserve army of labour. The needs of
specialised production sometimes confer with this, but don't
Increasing skill and variety of jobs, then, cannot generally be An alternative
done in collaboration with capital. And relying on skilled, high
work to strengthen labour is inevitably devisive
Industrial policy necds to go in the opposite direction: to break
down divisions between groups of workers, and to help 1o
strengthen collective organisation.
This is a more lundamental am than attempoing to create
better jobs, valid though that is. It is only on the basis of strong
organisation that any positive measures can be imposed on
capital, whether it be more jobs or beter jobs. he is also an aim
that helps to unity the working class, tarher than secking
through directly econonne means to badd workmg class 24 strength which is, at best, estremely uncron and unstable.
Grant Retics Welder in new small docklands firm.
In dercloping this policy, the first issues must be how a Labour government would invest in private industry. Given that these investments typically do far more for the emplover than the working class, the most minimal requirement should be that the workers in the firm or industry concerned should be able to use the money as a bargaining counter against the employers, by having a veto over the making of the grant. To improve the chances that the grand was used for its intended purpose, workers should also be given access to all information relevant to the investment which would usually amount to a complete opening of the books.
These are minimal retorms. But they would be a big change from past practice, including from the "participatory' National Enterprise Board of the 197+ 79 Labour government and from most of the investments of the Greater London Enterprise Board. They would help to strengthen trade union organisation, and begin to make goverument investment in the private sector an issue of debate in the worker's movement. But a policy is also needed on what the investments are used tor. The crucial need is to oppose the way in which the crisis and capitalist strategies are crcating deeper divisions within the working class. The crisis tends to accentuate the differences in profitability between firms and increase wage diftcrentials between workers. Capitalises de consciously promoting this by setting up "separate' profit centres and subsidiaries, by fragmenting and decentralisig production sites, and sometimes by increased sub contracting. The Tories" monetary policies and trade union laws are designed to back up these processes. In confronting these attacks, there are important lessons from the light agamst privatisation in the pubhe sector. This has sought to prevent the fragmentation of emplovment, the introduction of different wages and conditions of employe. ment,and the transfer of production to more weakly organised Workers. Policy fortho private sector should start from a similar
A minimal move would be to withhold grants from firms which are fragmenting and decentralising production. More positively, grants could be died to reorganisation that brought workers together under the same employment contract, and that reduced or eliminated sub-contracting. In industries where fragmented ownership is a barrier to trade union organisation (and there are many), investment could be used to merge ditterent firms and production sites to produce larger units.
A policy along these lines could and should be started industrics still in private ownership. But it follows from what has already been said tat in many cases this type of reorganisation would be vigorously resisted by management. Fragmentation of workers is impor can for capital. Firms which did carry through reorgamsaton
which bencfited labour would often be at a considerable competitive disadvantage and therefore vulnerable.
therefore require nationalisation of the whole industry with a Consistent oppostion to anti worker strategies would
workers veteover managemon decisions — workers control.
And consisten reorganisation which positively strengthened
the collective organisation of workers can only be carried
through when workers actually run the industry.
An industrial polies which sets this aim, though, can help
to resist capital's divisive strategies now. And it can shon how
a strategy of nationalisation under workers' controlas a step to
management is necessary to consistently build the
workers
unity of the working class.
meaning of pornography and how to respond to it has been given a now focus with the introduction of Claire Short's bill. In America, some of the points at issue for the women's movement and the left in her introduction to an American feminist argument putting the
Claire Short MP
SHouLDTHE women's movement campaign
for censorship of pornography in order to
oppose its sexist and degrading images of
women? In America the anti-pornography
lobby, supported by a number of prominen
tominists, is campaigning for legistation. In
Britain the Churchill Bill, from the right,
and Claire Shore's Bill, from the left, have
both, in their different mars, called for
censorshp. In both countries fominists are
divided on how to deal with pornography,
and whether censorship is the answer. Belon
we reprint excerpts from an artice in
Againse che Current, published in the US,
which argues the case against censorship.
The debate centres on whether pornography is the cause of male violence against women, or whether it should rather be scen as one end of a continuum of the sexist representation of women, from TV soap operas and adverts to "muti" movies
Those who argue that pornographs is the thcory - rape is the practice and porno graphy is volened agamst women', cham a direct causal relationship between the depicton of women as passive victims of sexual violence and actual acts of violence against women assault, rape and ultimatel murder. The logic of this analysis is that the banning of pornography would lead to a decrease in the number of atacks. In evaluating this argument, the theorics underlying it must be critically examined.
For Andrea Dworkin' and Susan Brown. miller? the origin of the oppression of women lies in our biological function, in reproduction. This makes women an op pressed class. Men, all men, are the enemy. The revolution to liberate women, then, will bearevolution in which women will take the power away from men. The approach that blames men for secking domination over women in a power-hungry way, also blames men, all men, for violence against women. and pornography for encouraging it.
Marxists, however, have argued that this approach is based on false premises. While many would not reject Engels' claim that the oppression of women arose at the same time as class socicty, this does not necessarily entail the conclusion that biological reproduction itself was the basis of women's oppression. Rather, it is necessary to INTERNATIONAL No. 31uy Aig.st 1986
The debate within the women's movement in Britain on the the lobbies for and against state censorship have developed relatively well defined positions. Below, JANE KELLY outlines case against censorship.