tragedy ot a generatio P 4 The General Strike 1926
This month is the sixtieth anniversary of the general strike. The great strike has been recounted and argued about over decades. Here BOB PENNINGTON looks not at the detailed story of the strike, but why it occurred and why the working class went down to such a tragic defeat. Central to understanding this he argues, is the role of the TUC and the infant British Communist Party. FROM BLACK FRIDAY TO RED FRIDAY WITH THE ADVANTAGE of hindsight, the 1926 General Strike appears to have been inevitable - inevitable because the crisis of British capitalism after the First Work War, and in particular because the crisis of the coal industry immediately posed a ques. tion which all such crises pose -who is going to pay, the working class or the ruling class? In fact, immediately after the World War Britain went through a short cconomic boom. But this boom only temporarily concealed the fact that British capitalism was in decline, and had been for forty years. The coal industry was the country's largest single industry employing a million people, and exporting a third of its production betore 1914. Afterthe war was short of energy and export prices were twice as high as home prices. But then in 1921 the bubble burst, export prices fell dra matically, and the government which had controlled the minds in wartine •pulled out and left the coal owners to find a solution. The coal owners' solution was simple they called for a big cut in wages, which the miners rejected. On 31 March 1921 the miners were locked out. The Miners liederation invoked 1889 docks strike
M E N the Triple Alliance ... the alliance of engincers, miners and transport workers. The railworkers and transport workers agreed to begin sympathetic strikes on Saturday 16 April. But the day before, friday 15 April, the railworkers leader JH Thomas de manded that the miners resume negotiations with the government. The miners, knowing that the government supported the coal owners, refused. Thomas and Robert Williams of the transport workers called off the strike, and the mincrs were left out in the cold, on what has become known in labour history as 'Black Friday'. By the end of June, forced into submission by their isolation, the miners were forced to accept heavy wage cuts.
But the wage cuts did not in themselves solve the crisis of the industry. The coal owners belonged to the 'Neanderthal' faction of the capitalist class and were notoriously backward. A wartine government report had commented: ...wedonot wisely commit hundreds of thousands of workers to the charge of ill educated men. The structure of the industry itself was anarchic. In 1918 there were 1500 companies and owners, plus some t000 landowners who got rovalties from every ton of coal that ias lifted from their land The tragmented character of the industry acted as a barrier to moder
nisation, and the British coal industry had far fewer mechanical cutters than its main rivals. As the short boom was followed be another slump, the owners used the uncertainty as anoth er excuse for putting off modernis tion.
By 1924 international competition was getting ever more intense the writing was on the wall for the coal industry, indeed the wall was falling down. When Britian returned to the Gold Standard in 1925 coal took another body blow, as the effect of the move was to overprice British coal by another ten per cent. Earlier that year the owners had demanded another cut in wages; Prime Minister Baldwin said that 'the coal industry must stand on its own economic foundations' and added that there was no hope of government subsidy.
But by 1925 there was a new mood afoot in the British trade unions. 'The British Communist Party had begun to build the Minority Movement (MM), which organised left wing groups inside the miners union, the engincers and other unions. The MM
"The Minority
Movement was not just
Ta "rank and file" movement' campaigned for the unions to fight the employers offensive under the slogan 'Stop the Retreat'. It aimed to build real unity inside the unions, and to build up the organisation in the workplaces, so that control lay at the base-- stressing that this was the only way to avoid a repetition of Black Friday.
The Minority Movement was not just a rank and file' movement: it aimed to divide the unions not between leaders and led, but between left and right. Thus it numbered among its supporters miners' secretary AJ Cook, along with other left union leaders. Thepresenceof the MM inside the most powertul umons, an aware ness that the miners were only the firs in line for wage cuts, and the general growth in militancy, all put big pressure on the TUC when the miners appealed for support.
On 30 July 1925 a conference of trade union exccutives attended by over 1000 pcople endorsed a proposal from the TUC to place an embargo on all movement of coal from midnight on 31 July. It also empowered the TUC to call a strike, on any scale necessary, should the deadlock con tinue. At the cleventh hour the government capitulated and agreed to pay a subsidy to the industry until 1 May 1926. The delegates at the 'Red Friday conference had won. for the moment.
Government poster, 1920
Ti Misssin in ati Malert VICIO BRIA THE RULING CLASS PREPARES FOR BATTLE The ruling class had suffered a major rebutt on Red Friday, but as miners' president derbert Smith commented, it was only an armistico'. From that das on the employers, their government and their state began preparadions lot the major battle that they know was now indvitable. The tragedy wasthat their preparations were much more effective and extensive than those made by the working class leaders.
Home Sceretary Sir William Joyson Hicks, who was to play amajor part in goverment preparations, described the coming baule as this thing which has got to be fought our by the people of chis land. He assed: is Britain to be governed by parliament and the cabinet or bra handful of trade union leaders?
Meanwhile, railworkers leader Jimmy Thomas, who had sold out the miners on Blach Friday was wringing his hands and arguing that 'nothing wits more dangerous for the future of the countr than that the employers and government should be made to concede by force what they refused to concede los ronson'.
Bakiwin's concession on a subsidy pothecoal industry bad been made in the tecth of opposition from the Tory backbenches and Fleet Street. But the concession was not there to help the miners it was to give the ruling class
M A TON OF COAL COSTS 33 3AT THE PITHEAD WIRE DOES THE MONEY GO? WANES 243 MINERS S 1l Rossuitties 4 21 Toral 333 time to prepare for the coming showdown.
Immediately after Red Friday the government started making ready. By August that year The
'numerous suggestions have been made from various quarters
those citizens would he prepared to volunteer to maintain supplies and services in the event of i general strike. Such an organisation had already been set up and was at work in many London boroughs. This body, the Organisation for the Maintenance of Supplies (OMS) had been set up under the benevolent direction of the Home
The OM$ was a so-called private body including Lord Hardinge, one time Viceroy of India, Sir Rennel Rodd a former ambassador and Admiral Jellicoe, along with other retired personages from the high ranks of the military. These stout citizens who had spent their entire adult lives serving the state could be relied on to defend the national interests, which hap pened to coincide with those of the coal owners. The OMS got down to
volunteers constables, as transport drivers, messengers and so forth. When the government took over the OMS on the eve of the General Strike it had a trained army of strike breakers to
The government itself organised an emergency supply and transport service and planned a detailed network
E which covered the use of air, naval and army personnel.
Behind the government stood the Emergency Powers Act of 1922 which gave sweeping powers if a crisis was declared.
Although the government had the powers to take Over broadcasting, Baldwin knew that was not necessary. During the strike Baldwin's judgement proved correct for not only Reith, the head of the BBC, refused Kamsey MacDonald permission to broadcast but even delayed an appeal for peace from the Archbishop of Canterbury. Reith was utterly opp osed to broadcasting anything that encouraged the strike.
Nor did the government content itself with administrative measures to deleat the unions. When the Prime Minister agreed to the subsidy he also set up a Commission to inquire into the industry which was headed by Lord Samuel and included a host of ruling class personages. These gentlemen, like their colleagues who led the OMS, believed in defending the national interest and keeping Britain on a 'sound economic footing' — cven if it meant cutting wages. The task of the Commission was to satisfy the public that there had been an 'impartial' and 'fair-minded' examination of the coal industry which needed now to reduce wages and/or lengthen hours.
A powerful alliance was coalescing against organised labour. It was an alliance made up of the government, the employers, the financiers and the state, the civil servants, the judiciary, the police and the military. What united these torces was expressed by Lord Balfour who said such people agreed over 'the foundations of society' which meant they thoroughly believed in, and absolutely depended on the continued existence of the present social order. On the other side there was a notable lack of preparation by the unions concerned, although the TUC president A Swales told the 1925 Conference at Scarborough 'We must now recover lost ground to re-establish and improve wages, hours, and working conditions'. THE FAILURE OF THE TUC Yet all proposals to prepare for the impending conflict were quietly referred back to the General Council. As the months passed, the TUC did not start to prepare. Proposals for setting up an Industrial Alliance were talked about, hung hre and then dritted into oblivion. Ernest Bevin later admitted it was not until 27 April 1926 that the TUC even set up an Advisory Committee. The lassitude of the TUC was not attributable to powerlessness.
15 Their disinclination to act stemmed
U from the fact that taking national industrial action against the government, according to their own beliefs was almost certainly illegal and probably morally wrong. Furthermore it meant rupturing and possibly destroying that network of class collaboration the union bureaucracy had constructed berween itself and the establishment.
The fear of challenging the government's constitutional right to govern, and the desire of the union bureaucracy simply to be mediators between capital and labour, and not Icaders of class struggle was elequently ex. pressed by JH Thomas. Speaking for the Opposition in Parliament he said: 'For ten days WC said to the government: "You force the coal owners to give us some terms, never mind how bad they are. Let us have
'Also haunting the
trade union leaders
was their fear of
"letting in the reds"' something to go on ... I have never
that in 1 challenge to the constitution, God help us unless the expressing the convictions of most ot his colleagues on the General Council and Labour's front bench.
This is why in all those months from August 1925 right into the
the TUC clung fervently to the hope that the Samuel Commission would offer some concessions and Baldwin would intervene and soften the blow due to be inflicted on the miners. Also haunting the trade union leaders, was their fear of letting in the reds and the wildmen'. After the Strike, Charles Duke of the Municipal Workers complained every day the strike proceeded, the control and the authority of that dispute was passing executives, into the hands of men who
authority, no control, no
The government suffered from no such equivocations and doubts. knew what was involved and set its sights accordingly. The preparations it had made and the powers already in its hands were unparalleled in country not at war. For them, the issue was who was going to pay for the
- the working class or the ruling class? Because they recognised what was at stake, the ruling class remained impervious to all pleas for compromise. budge an inch. The coal owners broke off negotiations on 13 April, saying nothing less than a wage cut would satisfy them, and insisted in future they would only negotiate at district 16
P M Prime Minister Baldwin
In face of this intransigence, JH Thomas, who was on the TUC's Special Industrial Relations Committee which was in charge of negotiations, still argued against organising and mobilising, and encouraging the feeling that war was invitable ...' and suggested people "concentrate on finding a solution honourable and satisfactory to all sides'.
But nothing came to the rescue of the TUC.. The report from the Samud Commission came out on 10 March and opposed the continuation of the subsidy after 1 May. On wages and hours the Commission favoured a wage cut, but not as much as the mine owners were demanding, and thought the extension of the working week was undesirable. Then came the sting in the tail. The report suggested the miners choose between bigger wage 'the TUC were told the
Prime Minister could
not see them, he had
"gone to bed"' cuts without an increase in working hours, or an increase in working hours without wage cuts. The miners rejected this.
At first the TUC opposed it, but eventually shifted its ground einphasising its willingness to help in anyway to reach a settlement - and told Herbert Smith there was no room for negotiations'. The TUC then had two choices. The hoped-for solution from Samuel's Commision gave nothing, so now they could either start organising for a showdown or they could go back to the table, begging bowl in hand. So, back they went to beg again. Right up to the
very end the TUC did everything it could to get a settlement, but all to no avail.
When they scurried round to see Baldwin they were handed the final insult. They were told the Prime Minister could not see them, he had gone to bed'. And so the reluctant TUC, under the instructions of the union exccutives, called a national strike. As the assembled delegates sat warting for the votes to be cast they sang hymns lke 'Break of fleaven', which was undoubtedly very British of them, but showed that they had more taith in the almighty than they did in the power and unity of the labour movement!
INIERNATONAL No. 4. Marlene: 1480
THE GENERAL STRIKE General Strikes are qualitatively ditferent to other industrial disputes, and the British Gencral Strike was no exception. On one side of the divide stands the state, the government, the employers — all those who 'agree on fundamentals' • along with their allies in sections of the middle classes, and those groups of workers who falsely identify their interests with those of their rulers. On the other side is the labour movement and its allies. Both camps are confronted with momentous decisions if they are to win.
In Britain, in May 1926, the ruling INIERNAIONAI No. 4, Mayfune 1986
dass knew it it defeated the strike there would be no need to com promise with the miners, the rising tide of working class militancy would be stemmed and the burden of the crisis would be put on the backs of working people. Despite declarations that they had no intention of ever challenging the constitution, the unions had no chance of winning it they failed to do just that. The union leaders hated the situa- tion. They would never dare to, or even want to, take the steps demanded for victory. Victory would demand breaking the law. It would undermine Miners' president, Herbert Smith all the agreements, often unsand, 17
invariably unwritten, which mediated
their day-to-day relations with the employers and the state. A General
Strike destroys normality. The power and assumed prerogratives of the old ruling class are brought into question, not just by small numbers of marxists and other socialists, but by whole sections of the working class. Who decides what trains shall run; what food shall be distributed and to whom; what services operate, and who has the mandate to operate them, is decisive to victory. The strikers can only leave these decisions in the hands of the state and government at their peril. But the moment the workers' organisations step in and start taking these decisions it has challenged the right of the ruling class to run the country.
A victorious General Strike in 1926 would have had three possible outcomes. Whatever else, it would have stimulated further working class militancy as it would have strengthened the confidence of trade unionists, and almost certainly strengthened the ›osition of the left. Victory could also nave led to the resignation of the Tory government and its replacement by a Labour administration very dependent on and much influenced by the working class upsurge that had put it into office. Finally, victorious General Strike could have led to social revolution, in that the workers' organisations ejected the Tory government and took power into their own hands. In retrospect this seems a very inlikely variant, given the policies of he Communist Party in that period along with its lack of a really wide authoratative base inside the labour movement.
For the TUC leaders all these outcomes were repugnant. At best they involved an under-mining of their positions, and at the worst the nightmarish prospect that they might even lose those coveted positions. Thus from day one, the TUC entered the Strike with no desire greater than the one to get it all over with. Of course they would have liked a settlement that favoured the miners. After all it would have enhanced their own prestige and standing in the unions, and most of them were genuinely sorry about the hardship and deprivation being suttered by the miners and their tamilies. Unfortunately, the price for a victory was too high for the TUC to pay. THE STRIKE BEGINS With this encumberance around its neck, organised labour began the General Strike. The over one million miners that had been locked out were joined by another one and a half million striking workers, including all 18 types of transport workers, many
printers, sections of the building
trade, and those in the iron and steel
chemicals and power industries. Engineering and shipbuilding were onl called out after a week had gone br From the beginning the response had been magnificent. The Lightmen and Stevedores who were not then affiliated to the TUC immediately stopped work in solidarity. On the railways, less than one per cent of the engine drivers reported for work.
The Railway Clerks Union played a vital role in defeating the OMS plans to organise scabbing. Fifty one per cent of their members came out on strike, many of them senior grades like station masters who put at risk their jobs and pensions. As the National Council of Labour Colleges reported in their publication A Workers History of the Great Strike: 'It was the unexpected and heroic solidarity of the RCA responsible grades 'from day one, the TUC entered the Strike with
no greater desire than
to get it all over with which broke the spine of the Companies resistance. Any plans that they may have had for running an OMS service under skilled supervision were wrecked at once? Many individual workers not in unions joined up - the RCA recruited 3000 new members on the first day — and then walked out on strike from their workplaces. In arcas like Chorley considered then a graveyard for trade unionism, there was a complete closedown.
In all the great cities and large towns the response was magnificent cven arcas like non-industrial Colchester, reported a 'splendid' response. Altogether over 82 unions had members out on strike - the proportion differed, according cither the instructions of the TUC, or the militancy of the members, as some told not to strike did so. A TUC Bulletin reported 'Never have the workers responded with greater enthusiasm to the call of their leaders ... They. have manifested their determination and unity to the whole world. They have resolved that the attempt of the mincowners to starve three million men, women and child ren into submission shall not succeed.'
If only that determination had prevailed at higher levels! As the strike grew in strength - there were more workers out on the ninth day when it ended, than when it began — so did the bureaucracy grow ever more desperate to bring it to an end. From 6 May, Sir Herbert Samuel had been in
Troops in India Dock Road contact with JH Thomas, and the nose day i series of meetings began bet ween him and the Negotating Committee of the General Council These were held in the home of Sir Abe Bailey, a South African mining magnate who owned a string of race horses and whose house was presumably considered to be ideal incutral' ground! The talks were secret and the
were kept our of them. Meanwhile Ramscy MacDonaid was assuring everybody that he'... Was in continual touch with the government side....
A new formula produced by Sam uel, which again did not rule out wage cuts, was rejected by the mincis. Undeterred the TUC pressed on. On I May they told the miners thes must accept the Samue proposals which had noteven been endorsed by the government. The miners exccutive refused, insisting they were not prepared to accept any cuts. They also knew it the Strike stopped tor nev negotiations it would be more or less impossible to restart it if the negotia tions broke down. unannous decision of the TUC then decided the Strike could no longer be carricd on. Their representatives then trooped off to Downing Street and without mentioning the Samuel proposals, offered
what Ralph Miliband in his book Parliamentary Socialism aptly descri bes as unconditional surrender'.
The outbreak of 'proletcrian distemper was over, business could now get back to normal for the trade union bureaucracy. The miners were now alone and isolated. Every single lett
'meetings were held in
the home of Sir Abe Bailey, a mining
magnate who owned a
string of racehorses' winger on the TUC voted for the ending of the strike and doomed the miners to an eventual crushing defeat. In their capitulation to the policies of the right wing, the left had behaved no differently then they had done on the rest of the nine days, or for that matter in the period between Red Friday and midnight of 3 May 1926.
In his book The General Strike, Julian Symons writes: "The left trade union leaders played what seems in retrospect i strikingly timid part.' He explains that while they were in a minority on the General Council '.. HERNATONA
they occupicd important positions. One ofthem Purcell, was chairman of the Strike Organising Committee: George Hicks, Ben Tiller, John Bromely and AB Swales were all leading figures on various TUC committees.' Swales who had been president of the TUC: the previous year must bear a heavy responsibility for not resisting and fighting against the downright failure of the TUC: to make any preparations for the incitable showdown due for May 1926. Symons reports there is no suggestion that opinion in the Ciencral Council was severely divided at any
The apparent unanimity of the General Council with the left raising no criticisms of the traditional leaders, helped to stifle any criticisms that might have emanated from the ranks. Worse still, the Communist Party who had done so much to build a left inside the unions with its launching of the MM, not only failed to criticise the complicity of the left leaders, it actually encouraged the idea that they were the ones who would represent and campaign tor the interests of the rank and file. In 1925 the Sundar Worker, the paper of the Communist led Left Wing Movement in the Labour Party, was enthusing about
Sivales, describing him as a person
with the simple and rugged strength of a far-secing and couragcous leader.
On 7 August 1925 the Communist Party paper, Workers Weekly said:
'The leadership (of the events of Red friday) passed into the hands of good proletarians like Swales, Hicks, Cook and Purcell. And this proletarian leadership and the proletarian solidarity it was capable of organising and demonstrating was the real big thing that came out of the struggle! The Communist Party theretore encouraged the idea that a left alternative existed in the TUC; and that the workers should put their confidence in these "proletarian leaders'.
CP leader Harry Pollitt spelt out the implications of this line when he wrote:'... the now General Council will simple have to pursue
more vigorously the fight on behalf of the
'Every single left winger on the TUC
voted for the ending of
the strike workers. Reliance on the TUC lett meant that the Communist Part through the M.M urged the workersto subordinate everything to the TUC and in practice their slogan of 'All power to the TUC" meane exactl that. Cicorge Hards who was at the time acting secretart of the MM wrote in his book Those Storme Years... we sent out from the MM headquar ters instructions tor our mombers to work for the establishment of Coun cils of Action in wat ed. however. that the Councilsof Action under no circumstances were to lake over the work of the trade were to ser that the decisions of the General Council and the union exec utives were carried our ...
The MM was not therefore seeing the Councils of Action as a means of extending the Strike, and as potential alternative means of carrying on the struggle in the event ot a betraval trom the TUC: instead they were given the jod according to Hardy, of the workers on behalt of the TUC:. THE ROLE OF MOSCOW The subordination of the Communist Party and the MM to an alliance with Purcell et al, may have been a policy applied by the British Communist Party, but it wasa policy that had been claborate in Moscon. In 1925 the British and Russian TUC; Gencral Councils formed the Anglo-Russian Committee whose aim was to promote world trade union unity and 19
All photographs
Tin the
supplement
courtesy of Judy Groves
AJ Cook bring about closer relations berween British and Soviet trade unions. Pur cell, Hicks and Swales were members ofthis committee and got a reputation as being lefts, more on less because of their alleged friendship for the USSK. Left or not, unlike Cook the miners' leader, these worthies were not mem bers of the MM. But that-mattered little to the Stalinist clique that was beginning to establish its ascenden! over the Russian Communist Party and the Soviet state. Ther saw the Anglo-Russian Commitice as a bridge to establishing better Anglo Soviet relations. Zinovier even boasted it's one of the surest guarantees against intervention'
Most likely the leaders of the British Communist Party were less personally enthusiastic about Parcell and company afterall nonc of these lefts had lifted i finger when the Labour Party conference of 1925 lad decided to ban from membership members of the Communist Party. Nevertheless, the British Communist Party was beginning to grasp that under Stalin their first task was work for co-existence betwcen their own country and the USSR, and they assumed that the Anglo Russian Committee could help in that respect.
So in the interests of Sover diplo macy, the Communise Party endorsed the Anglo Russian Commitree letts, awarding them credentials as proletarian fighters, an accolade concocted up in the party editorial offices, but certainly never carned in the class struggle! The blank cheque handed to the TUC: lefts was eventually cashed by the right wing TUC leaders, and the people who madethe ultimate gain
was of course the British ruling class.
When the General Strike did take
place the policies of the Communist
Party made sure that it could never use
the Councils of Action as an alter-
native to stop the TUC sell out. You
just cannot say, month in and month out - as the Communist Party had
been doing give 'All power to the
TUC' then at the last minute confess
you were wrong and argue you need a
new leadership. Although the Com
munist Party did not want to end the
Strike, its previous policies made sure that it could do nothing to stop the TUC's instructions lor a return to work being carried our.
This does not mean that if the Communise Party in the period prior to the Strike and during the nine days of the Strike, had had correct policies victory would have been assured. But their uncritical attitude to the TUX: letts i lett, whose past history gove an almost certain indication of where they would stand in a class conflict of such a dimension as a Ciencral Strike
precluded any hope of perory.
The task of the Communist Pars and the MM, in the does from Mos 1925 to May 1926 was to demand, and demand again, of the lefts that the TUd organise. I should have insised that the Tue: lots report to the unions what preparations had bern made and once it was clear that the right were not preparing then ir should have called o the left 10 themselves take steps lor preparation. This would bare divided the TUand doubless there are those who wouki have claimed it would disrupt trade union unity.
The Communist Party could have answered that by pointing out that the unity which existed in those vital 12 months was unity of corpor and inactivy i unity the labour movement could nod afford.
It is more or less certain, that aren given correct policies, the still rela uveh weak base of the Communist P'arty aniong the ranks of organisco labour, would have ruled out iheir sopping the TUC sell out. That, however, is not a justitation for nor advocating what had to bedone Their
failure to do that made sure their con members were miseducted in the greatest class struggle in Britain during the 20c centurv. Ie also made sure that all those new people brought around the Communist Party because of the individual work of its militants - the Communise Party rank and file were invariably the most dedicated and hardworking members of the local strike committees were also miseducated.
The role of a Marxist party is to be the historie memors of the workers morement and it has to examine objectives, and it need be ruthlessly, its mistakes. At ever big tum and change in its existence it needs to draw a balance shert of its past work. This is themiay it learns from its mistakes and prepares for the luture. The Communise Party could never draw up a true balance short of its work and
immediates pror to, and during, the General Strike because to do so would have shown that it put its lovaler the Soviet bureaucracy above the waging of the class struggle.
The trade union barcarac had pur is lobales do the constion, and all the paraphernalin of British bourgenis democracy abore the interests of the working people. Al great cost to the miners in particular, the labour movemen " goncral, and to all the working class for many rearsto come, the Strike had demonstrated the need lor the Workers movement. along with its allies, to build organisations and parties that pur the interests of the anti capitals struggle above all other considerations. Without that bappen ing, we shall have repents of 1926 over and over agon.
Women hold up
half the sky The ideas of feminism have entered the consciousness of the mass of women, yet the pattern of women's employment shows increasingly discriminatory gender segregation. VALERIE COULTAS argues that the Labour left should make a priority of a fighting strategy for women's rights. THEWORkING@LAsshas always included women working both in the home and outside. But, i present trends continue by 1990 the number of