In 1989 the RMT organised a series of successful one day strikes against management attempts to impose a new machinery of negotiation. British Rail management, in preparation for privatisation had decided to reorganise the industry along 'Business lines. They wanted to create a new "business culture" in order lo make the railways more competitive with other forms of transport I wouk move away from the regional structure and set up separate businesses, linked to a BR Holding Company: eg. Inter City, Network South last, Regional Railways etc.
In moving, to such a structure, however, they were faced with the problem of changing the bargaining machinery set up in 1956, which was based on the regions. They wanted new
negotiating structures based on the Businesses, and ones which would be less time consuming. Behind this, lay their need to undermine the existing conditions of service which they viewed as an obstacle to efficiency and productivity. They • were keen lo introduce such things as continental rostering (Sunday as a normal working day without the overtime rate) and 'performance pay' (dependent on the whims ot your manager, not to mention good behaviour). In short the management wanted pay and conditions subordinated to the performance and profitability of individual businesses. For the worklorce and the unions this means division and the undermining of their ability to act as a united group of workers on a national level and would have greatly weakened our ability to resist the management offensive. In the 1989 strikes the RMT membership showed its appreciation that the new machinery would do just that. Although the strikes involved the wages issue, the main motor force of the members was the issue of the bargaining machinery. It was not that they thought the 1956 set up was brilliant. The new one would simply be far worse.
The 1956 machinery gave an LDC structure (local departmental council) whereby each grade in a locality (guards, drivers, clerical staff ete) elecled 4 reps. LDC reps were not shop stewards, elected by union members, but elected by the whole workforce in elections run by the management! This sytem has encouraged a grade mentality which has long been the bane of the rail unions. However, these IDCs, the better ones at least, had the abilily 10 drag out issues through reaching a "failure to agree on negotiating items, and progressing them up the varous levels of the machinery, to the national level. What the management wanted was to remove the Sectional Councils (regional grade bodies - the second level of the machinery). They also wanted an "individual grievance procedure which would pit an individual against the local management and deny LDCs the right to take up these issues, preventing individual cases being . progressed up the machinery. Moreover they were proposing a single grade rep instead of four!
The solidarity of the six one day strikes which brought the network to a standstili, surposed the British Katlways Board. They had imagined that the failure of a dispute in the Signals & Telecomms department, not long before, showed
that the union would be unable to molise do mars NK's error of judgement meant that they received i bloody nose. They retreated, withdrawing their proposals unconditionally. However, it was clear that they would not leave it at that. They simply changed their tactics. Having, failed to defeat the RMT frontally (we shall look at the other unions later), they decided to take us on section by section. They chose the course of restructuring to be introduced department by department. They selected their targets according to their assessment of the level of union organisation. They took on the Signals & Telecomms department first.
The restructuring package for the S & T included some key things which they sought to introduce across the railway industry: 'performance pay on wide banded scales, continental rostering, a flexible day of between 6 and 12 hours, and a 47 hour contracted week (le. up lo 8 hours compulsory overtime if required). However, the worsening of conditions went hand in hand with what for many workers was a big carrot; a 25% increase on basic rates of pay. This is the only department in which they have offered such an increase which is associated with extra money available as a result of the Hidden Report on the Clapham Disaster and its recommendations on safety.
For some workers who did not work a great deal of overtime, a 25% increase was an offer they thought they could not refuse. However, for those, on the Signalling side especially, who relied on a great deal of overtime for a ! living wage (high overtime levels were also a result of staff shortages), the 25% increase did not compensate for the cut in overtime rates. For some it meant as mach as a €50 a week cut in their take home pay:
The management used intimidation to pressure people to accept the package. They were given a deadline to sign by, under threat of forfeiting the right to promotion. In the absence of a campaign by the union, under management pressure, many RMT members signed their acceptance of the new deal. A minority of our members refused to sign and continued to work under the old conditions. However, they were discriminated against, in many cases denied overtime. Pressure was continued against the refuseniks. What was the RMT going to do about this? The S& T members were ballotted, though not for industrial action,
merely a 'referendum' to determine that they wanted their union to negotiate for a better deal. This was a sign, both to the members and the management, that the union was not serious about taking action. In any case, the management refused lo return to discussions on the package. At the 1990 AGM a resolution had been passed which action ten the top basis Test auring with industrial big. Once il bad gone into negotiations on "a sectional it had effectively failed to challenge the BRB's attempt to divide the workforce.
The situation was not irretrievable, however. The BRB had in in effect broken the 1956 Machinery. RMT District Councils were told to organise open meetings on the theme of 'abrogation of the machinery of negotiation' and to prepare for a possible ballor for all grades industrial action. At these meetings we were told that this issue was liable to be linked to pay, as it had been in 1989. But the leadership bottled out of a campaign for a national strike. They did not think, as Knapp has since said, that they could 'sustain it'. At the time however, without any explanation we heard that we were to ballot on pay alone! Even then they pulled out of this ballot at the eleventh hour. The S & T members were left on their own. The degree of anger amongst the membership at this appalling misleadership was reflected in the unanimous condemnation of them at the union AGM. Management now felt encouraged to press ahead with the restructuring, in other departments. That these were blocked in the Permanentway and Traincrew sectors was largely as a result of the recognition that the packages offered would worsen pay and conditions. There was no 25% on offer. These grades had also had the opportunity to see what the S & 1 package has meant in practice. The only reason that management did not seek a confrontation with these workers was that the organisation of the Business Sectors and the end of the Regional structure, was reaching its conclusion through the erroneously named 'Organising for Quality. The management having divided the workforce could set about pressing through the changes they wanted on a Business by Business basis.
As Organising for Quality progressed, the organisational structures on which the 1956 machinery rested, were broken up. Instead of working under a
particular Area Manager, groups of workers based at the same depot or office, became the employees of one of the Businesses. The union leadership insisted to protesting members that the management had given an assurance that they would "honour" the 195h machinery until a new one was agreed. In practice, however, they were systematically breaking it up. Some LDCs who represented workers paid by able wiph as of busessen made initiad or wid the Area Manager. In some places management refused to release LDC reps to negotiate for workers employed by another business.
In the meantime, negotiations over new machinery went ahead. Threatened with a deadline after which management said they would impose the new machinery, the RMT leadership caved in and signed the new deal.