To understand why Saddam Hussein risked this war, it is necessary to grasp the nature of his regime.
Saddam's power goes back to the 1960s when the Ba'ath party took power. After a brief spell in the government in 1963, the Ba'ath came back to power, in collaboration with the military in 1968.
Ba'athism originated after the Second World War in Syria. Its founder, Michel Afleq, outlined a creed based on 'nationalism, socialism and freedom'. But the Ba'ath was really an Arab nationalist party. Its main opponents were always the communists; in 1963 the Ba'ath collaborated with the military in massacring the Communist Party.
In 1968 Saddam Hussein was no 2 in the regime. By 1971 he was the central leader. He has ruthlessly shaped a regime based on three main pillars – the army, the massive secret police and the Ba'ath party itself. All three are the eyes and ears of Saddam.
The Ba'ath party has gradually degenerated into a simple tool of the regime. Any independence of Saddam and his security apparatus has gone.
Iraq is ruled by a tiny class rich entrepreneurs who all rely on the nationalised oil industry to do their deals. This so-called 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' is deeply dependent on the regime and the huge state apparatus for patronage and power. Iraqi society is a strictly controlled pyramid with Saddam at its apex.
After the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1978 Saddam saw the opportunity for the Iraqi rulers to become the masters of the Gulf. That was behind the decision to invade Iran in 1980. The United States and the European capitalist countries were prepared to give qualified support to Saddam against Iran. Behind the scenes they backed him in the Iran-Iraq war. When Iraqi planes attacked the American warship Stork in 1987 the US did not respond.
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were, ironically, the main financial backers of Iraq in its war with Iran. Between them they gave him $30 billion. But when the war was over Saddam came into conflict with them over oil prices. Low oil prices suited the Saudis and the Emir, but not Iraq, struggling to make good its war losses.
Saddam saw the opportunity to simultaneously deal a blow at Kuwaiti intransigence and extend his power in the Gulf by carrying out the invasion. The US appeared to signal beforehand that it would not intervene. What went wrong in Iraqi calculations?
Two factors weighed with Bush. First Saddam was becoming troublesome by threatening Israel, and starting to develop a nuclear capacity. The United States will side with any right wing gangster in the Gulf – except one who is seen as a real or potential threat to Israel. The US became convinced that Saddam was changing from 'our son-of-a-bitch' to just another s.o.b.
Second, the Kuwait issue gave the United States a golden opportunity to lead a mighty Western crusade, to show its superiority in a world were Japan and, especially, Germany were becoming stronger. The military weapon in inter-imperialist conflicts was wheeled out.
Why did Saddam Hussein go all the way to war. Would it not have been better for Iraq's rulers to make a tactical retreat? The answer is that it would surely have been better for the super-rich Iraqi rulers to back down temporarily; but not necessarily for Saddam Hussein himself. In any dictatorial regime where one individual gradually assumes absolute powers, irrational calculations can have a decisive role. Maybe Saddam made the rational calculation that war was more likely to preserve his personal position than a face-losing climbdown, bringing closer his nightmare of a military coup against him.
Probably his personal calculations will never be known. The Shah of Iran never made the mistake of assuming that being the main power in the Gulf gave him the right to make any fundamental challenge to the United States.
Saddam's decisions have now put in question all the gains of the Iraqi ruling class since 1968. If the war ends with Iraq utterly defeated, Turkey, Iran and Syria may try to dismember the Iraqi state. Saddam is learning a harsh lesson: if you are the rotweiler of imperialism it is better not to bite its hand. The patrons and financiers of today can become the assassins of tomorrow.
US and Britain – Out of the Gulf!