It is an irony that the British, upon whose empire the sun was said never to set, and in whose name bloody wars were fought, should attempt to maintain the fiction that the role of the Army in Ireland is a peace-keeping one. Even more so that this should be accepted by some sections of the British left, despite in some cases having a formal "troops out" position. Perhaps worst of all, is that this benign view of British imperialism should increasingly be held by those parties in the south of Ireland, such as Fianna Fail, whose political credentials are based on armed opposition to British rule in the 1920s.
Looking at the history of the 26 counties over the past 65 years and especially the economic crisis of the 1980s, it is hard to argue that this is the fault of the British. To leap, as the so called "historical revisionists" do, from there to the conclusion that Britain's role in Ireland over the past 500 years or more, has been one of benign neutrality, if not active good work, would probably strain even the credulity of most reasonably well-read counter-insurgency experts in the British Home Office.
The attempt to re-write history, to downplay the role of the British in Ireland has its roots however, not in the heads of the academics in Dublin or Belfast, but in the political and economic situation in the 26 counties over the past 35 or so years. The mirror image of revisionism is the failure of the economy; more specifically, the failure of the main political party Fianna Fail, once in the 1950s and again 30 years later, to carry off a strategy of economic development. To have falled once might be put down to bad luck: twice, is politically untorgivable. The most important consequence ot revisionism is not however the clamour of academic debate but the serious consequences which such failure could have for bourgeois rule in Ireland, north and south.
Above all, it is a problem for the British. Without the prospect of stable bourgeois rule on the whole island they cannot (and despite what John Hume thinks) will not leave. So the revisionists conclusion that the British are not really the problem in Ireland comes, by an ironic twist, to dovetail neatly with the realisation by the British that they must stay. The economic and political crisis in the south of Ireland now circumscribes, more clearly than almost any time in the past, British options in Ireland.
A short history of revisionism.
The earliest and probably clearest statement of the revisionist position, may have fuelled and certainly grew out of the 1969 split in Sinn Fein. Starting in the early 1970s, the "Marxists" of Official Sinn Fein (now, the Workers Party) together with a number of academics, British and Irish, began putting forward the following argument; since the influx of capital from the US, West Germany and Japan in the early 1960s - in response to the opening up of the economy by the Fianna Fail Government under Lemass - the principal economic interests in the south were no longer tied to the British and that the British had no longer an overwhelming economic interest in remaining. Official Sinn Fein were par-
ticularly virulent in their attacks on the southern bourgeoisie for their perceived failure to make an "industrial revolution" and for being dominated by bigoted nationalism. (1) Foreign investment was to be welcomed as it led to the expansion of the working class and therefore the possibility of socialism. Their criticisms of the Lemass strategy seem to have been that his interventionist approach to economic development did not go far enough. Tied to the so-called "two nations" theory, this led to the Officials denouncing the war on the British by the IRA as sectarian because it alienated the Protestant working class and was a diversion from "real" class politics.
Indeed the Officials went so far as to say that the war was a deliberate diversion devised by elements in Fianna Fail to head off the growing influence of Sinn Fein before the 1969 split (in 1970, three Fianna Fail Ministers, including Charles Haughey, were tried and acquitted by a Dublin court for the illegal importation of arms). Thus there began to appear in the mid seventies a convergence between the right (2) and some sections of the left on the teaching of history and the attitude to the British presence; one which was very different to the traditional nationalist view. The conflict in the north was to be explained by the sectarianism of the nationalists, a sectarianism which flowed from the deliberately maintained backwardness of the south and was a diversion from class politics. (3) For the right, doubts about the viability of the southern state led them to question Britain's role as portrayed in the history books and to blame the "nationalist" slant of the teaching of history in the schools in the south for fostering sectarianism.
But the process once begun could not stop with the undoubted shortcomings of an education system in the south dominated by Catholic nationalism. It carried back to a reassessment of Britain's historical role in Ireland: literally a rewriting of history. A major plank in revisionist theory is that Gladstone's policy of "killing Home Rule by kindness"
", through the Land Act of 1870 and others which followed, had drawn the sting of revolutionary nationalism. According to this argument, Gladstone's plan, partly forced on him by pressure from the Irish Party, was that once the land question had been settled by the breaking up of the large estates, the establishment of a degree of tenant right and the disestablishment of the Anglican Church in Ireland, then the pressure for Home Rule would decline or would be tamed to demands which could fairly easily be conceded by the British ruling class. The Liberals did pass a Home Rule Bill but it was shelved on the outbreak of the First World War. It is this which gives the revisionists the opportunity to argue that 1916 was a putsch, which did not have the support of the majority of the people. Also, they claimed that it wrecked the chances of a post- war settlement for the whole island, when Irish loyalty during the War would be rewarded by Home Rule. Raising the demand for national independence in 1916 was looked upon (as it is today) sas irrelevant to the needs of the working class and as divisive in practice.
A left variant of this argument is that the leadership of the 1916 rising and indeed of the Land League of the 1870s were Catholic dominated and antisocialist reactionaries. (4) In this contorted version of history, the Land League,
which destroyed landlordism in the last part of the 19th century, was dominated by the 'strong' farmers. In addition James Connolly was forced, against his will, to participate in the 1916 rising, a pointless gesture which simply alienated the loyalist working class in the north and led in the south to the foundation of a sectarian state dominated by the Catholic Church and the conservative economics of the founder of Sinn Fein, Arthur Griffith.
The working class, which, according to some commentators, was most ripe for revolution after Russia in the 1900s, and which had been organised on a nonsectarian basis by Connolly and Larkin, were excluded from the leadership on the basis that 'Labour must wait's What the revisionists conveniently forget however is that the promise of Home Rule was only made at the beginning of World War One and that as soon as it was over, the British were in less of a hurry. Also it was not the nationalists who imposed partition against the clearly expressed wishes of the majority of people on the island.
Moreover it leaves out of account the fact that the Programme of the Ist Dail (Parliament) was a radical and democratic one, very different from the original position of Arthur Griffith. More importantly it overlooks the defeat of the Republicans in the Civil War of 1921-1923, and the foundation of a bourgeois state cemented by a particularly bigoted Catholicism (5)
Down in the free state.
Without doubt, the 26 county state provides many examples of the domination by the Catholic Church which are apparently so repellent to Unionism: de Valera's 1938 Constitution gives a special position to the Catholic Church, divorce is unlawful; contraceptives may only be purchased by those who are married, (in some areas, pharmacists refuse to stock them altogether or demand to see marriage certificates in case of doubt) and the legislature is prevented from passing a law permitting abortion by the amendment to the Constitution made in 1985 under pressure from right wing Catholics.
Similar claims are made about Sinn Fein. The general drift of such thinking is that a major reason for the split in the Republican Movement in 1969, (into the Officials and the Provisionals) was the dislike of the "atheistic Marxism" of the Officials by the Provisionals (now Sinn Fein). According to the Workers Party, the most dangerous and dispicable elements in Ireland are the reactionary ruling class in the South, who have, under the pretence of resisting the British, established and maintained their rule in the 26 counties, who have a material intertest in sectarianism and who tolerate the activities of the IRA because this fosters divisions between workers, north and south, thus helping to keep them in power.
The British have their own doubts about what they see as the ambivalence of the ruling class in the south to the IRA, or at least the tendency of Pianna Fail in particular, to resort to anti-British rhetoric at times of economic crisis. Thus there are surprising parallels between their views, those of the Workers Party and the unionists in the north, that the main problem in Ireland is not the British presence but the ruling class in the south. One solution to this problem, which
was touted during a previous economic crisis in the south - during the 1950s - was that the South should re-enter the British State. Republican rhetoric notwithstanding, the ruling class in the south share a strong desire by the British and the unionists in the north to defeat the IRA.
At the same time, to openly repudiate nationalism would undermine bourgeois rule because the whole reason for the existence of the Dublin Government is national independence, with the Treaty in 1921 seen as merely a stepping stone to a 32 County State. This sentiment is shared even by the wing of the ruling class which has historically the closest links with the British eg the "I am an Irish nationalist" speech a few years ago by Peter Barry, former Foreign Minister in the Coalition Goverment.
They are also sensitive to the almost total disregard of their sensitivities by the Thatcher Government, a disregard which is partly (and rightly) attributed to racism. Above all there is a fear that the effects of Thatcher's attempts to defeat the IRA will alienate further not just the nationalists in the north but also the south, thereby undermining their own position. For the souther bourgeoisie as a whole, the tension between its need to be seen to "stand up to the British" and its economic dependence on them has eased since entry to the EEC in 1973 and the shift of the focus of investment and trade to Europe, the US and Japan. The de-coupling from the British economy is reflected in the break with sterling in the early 1980s and, more recently, membership of the European Monetary System. Greater economic independence has given it greater room in international politics, eg Haughey's refusal to support the British in the Malvinas war stemmed not just from his "republicanism" but because he was supported by most of the ruling class.
The economy (6) however represents the most critical probiem forthe ruling class in the south. More precisely, the fusion of an economic crisis since the early eighties with the political crisis in the north is its most critical problem. For Fianna Fail the problem is particularly acute. It has formed the Government for the greater part of the period since de Valera broke with Sinn Fein and entered the Dail in 1926.
The basis of its appeal to the small farmers and petty bourgeoisie was national independence (ie unity) and economic development. However, the old Sinn Fein "ourselves alone" policy which he pursued from coming to power in 1933 virtually collapsed in the late 1950s. The economic crisis of that time led some to question the viability of the 26 county state, employment and emigration soared, and the result of both, together with pressure from the international lending institutions, was the ending of the policy of protection and the opening of the economy to international capital.
The new policy, instituted by de Valera's successor Lemass, the policy of "export led growth" relied heavily on massive state subsidies to trans-national companies investing in the country. In 1964, Lemass met Captain Terence O'Neili, the Stormont leader and it appeared to some that a new accommodation could be achieved, as economic development in the south would enable it to match the social services provisions which existed in the north. The new
orientation in the south and the prospect of BEC entry also seemed to support the view that past antagonisms could be forgotten in this new, modern Ireland The Civil Rights Movement tested this vision to destruction in the late 1960s and the developing political crisis of the early 1970s fractured Fianna Fail. Grass roots pressure forced Fianna Fail to make some efforts to help the beleaguered nationalist minority in the north during the early seventies (eg Jack Lynch's "we will not stand idly by..." speech) However, Charles Haughey's efforts at sending arms led to the 1970 Arms Crisis for the Fianna Fail Government and a major split in the Party, which culminated in 1985 with the founding of the Progressive Democrats by Des O' Malley.
The foundation of the Progressive Democrats as a result of a large split from Fianna Fail made it much less likely that would form a majority goverment, but was also an indication of the breakdown of the underlying coalition which made up the Party. It is not certain that this breakdown would have occurred i hey ever ased by o Male to us northe breakestiny bode is as is with the economic crisis of the late 1970s/early 1980s which finally led to the split.
The economic boom of the late 1970s, especially in agriculture, following entry to the EEC, masked the effects of the world recession which resulted from the "oil crisis" of 1974. But the recession which began in 1979 hit the working class and small farmers particularly hard and made Fianna Fail's traditional bargain with its base-economic development and aid for the small farmer particularly difficult. It's slogan in the last election "there's got to be a better way" soon gave way to "Haughey the Hatchet"
As the second attempt at independent economic development in the history of the 26 county state runs into the sand (wits now refer to Fianna Fail as "the Fine Failures") the problems not just for Fianna Fail but for the whole bourgeoisie become more acute. Not alone was Fianna Fail the largest political party but there was considerable degree of consensus on the major problems. While Fine Gael and Labour attacked Fianna Fail on the north throughout the 1970s, especially when Haughey came to power in 1979, there was considerable agreement on economic development as a way of making the south more attractive to the unionists and on the economic strategy which appeared in the 1970s to be bringing that about.
The major expansion in government borrowing for which Haughey was blamed and was the second major reason for the split by O' Malley occurred mainly in a period before Haughey came to power. So the failure for the post 1958 strategy for economic development is likely to lead to political problems for the whole bourgeoisie and not just Fianna Fail.
Both the reason and the occasion for O'Malley's break with Fianna Fail throw an interesting light on the tensions inside the southern ruling class as expressed through its largest party. The occasion was a debate on a Bill introduced by a Labour member of the Coalition Government, Barry Desmond, which permitted the sale of contraceptives to married couples. The Bill was passed against the
opposition of Fianna Fail and three Fine Gael members. O' Malley had already been expelled from the Parliamentary Party for publicly questioning Haughey's opposition to the New Ireland Forum. He used the opportunity of the debate on the Contraception Bill to articulate a more pluralist version of the kind of republicanism espoused by Fianna Fail, invoking the non-sectarianism of its founder, Wolfe Tone, and pointing out that a Catholic dominated state would continue to be unappealing to the unionists.
The speech echoed the proposals made some years earlier by Fine Gael Leader Garret FitzGerald. The secular tone of the Progressive Democrats, while attracting some support from Fine Gael and Labour, represents the section of Fianna Fail's base which had grown up under Lemass's strategy of opening the economy to foreign capital. As such it is secularist, private-enterprise oriented, fiscally conservative and strongly anti-republican and anti-socialist. (7) Sections of the bourgeoisie look to the EEC to bail them out with regional development aid. Others like Raymond Crotty put forward a more radical version of earlier Fianna Fail strategies. Fine Gael with its large farmer and banking support combines a monetarist approach with a strong commitment to the European Monetary System and the disciplines imposed by the West German Bundesbank and the dominant deutschmark.
Labour, as in Britain, longs for the return of a caring society and so opposes cuts imposed by anyone other than itself, and the Workers Party operates with a stalinist "forced development" model.The major fear for the southern bourgeoisie is that republican radicals will ignite the social discontent resulting from the austerity measures which have been implemented by Fianna Fail, with the support of Fine Gael and the Progressive Democrats, over the past couple of years. Hence the attacks on Sinn Fein involvement with the campaign against heroin pushers in Dublin.
The ruling class also fear that as austerity puts further pressure on Haughey's base among the working class, he will be tempted to reach once again for republican rhetoric and exhibit his "flawed pedigree" in the words of Garret FitzGerald. The potence of this was shown during the recent Ryan affair when Haughey's standing in the opinion polls rose after his Government was perceived to be standing up to the British.
To sum up, the attitude of the ruling class in the south is that it wants the British to make war on the IRA but not in such as way as to alienate nationalist opinion. It recognises the need for nationalist rhetoric in order to deal with the problems thrown up by its own economic policy, but is fearful that British errors, combined with nationalist posturing from the likes of Haughey, will fan the flames of republicanism.
It does not believe, nor do the British, that an "internal" all-Ireland settlement is possible; the IRA are now more of an obstacle to that than the unionists were when it was tried earlier in the 1974 Sunningdale Agreement. What it would prefer would be an "internal" settlement guaranteed by the British, allowing it to repair its relation with the unionists and laying the foundation for stable bourgeois rule in the 32 counties.
The State of the Unionists.
It is a sobering thought, especially for those one sided denouncers of republican violence, that we are marking in 1989 not 20, but nearly 70 years of war, since the foundation of the six-county state in 1921. In every decade since then there has been military action of one kind or another, which is hardly surprising given that the state itself was founded in sectarian violence and the threat of "immediate and terrible war" by the British. It is hard to understand how most of the British ruling class, the Labour Party and even large sections of the Labour left are still attached to the view that, were it not for the danger of a "bloodbath" the British would long have left.
The tensions between a predominantly industrial north and a mainly agricultural south would anyway have been great, even without the injection of conflicts within the British ruling class in the period up to 1921. The strength of the unionist bourgeoisie in the north derived partly from their ability to draw in large reservoirs of Catholic workers to the rapidly expanding industries of 19th. century Belfast and other towns, growing fat on shipbuilding and engineering contracts from the British Empire. (8) Not unnaturally, the interests of the northern bourgeoisie lay in maintaining the link with Britain, while at the same time maintaining the divide between Catholic and Protestant workers through blatant sectarianism.
Thus, the loyalist workers, fearful for their jobs and conditions because of the influx of Catholics from rural areas, and having a material stake in imperialism, became ever more tightly tied to the Unionist ruling class. This was in sharp contrast to 100 years earlier, when they had revolted against the British in the rebellion of the United Irishmen in 1798. The Orange Order, which had been revived in the mid-19th century was behind pogrom atter pogrom unleashed on Catholic workers in the late 19th century, and functioned also as a kind of "private labour exchange" which excluded Catholics from the jobs. In 1911, though Catholics represented 30% of the population of Belfast, they held only 5% of the skilled jobs.
The uneven development of Ireland, the religious bigotry fanned by the Orange Order and encouraged by the bourgeoisie in the North and the intervention at crucial periods of the English Tory Party: Lord Randolph Churchill's statement, " if Gladstone goes for Home Rule, the Orange Card is the one to play" led, (9) almost inevitably to partition in 1921. The border was drawn in such a way as to maximise the area which the Protestants could hold: only in counties Antrim, Armagh, Derry and Down did they constitute more than 50% of the population. It clearly was, in the words of Carson, "a Protestant state for a Protestant people.
The six county state was established in violence and war. The notorious B specials,a part time police force recruited from the ranks of the loyalists and armed and trained by the British, wreaked sectarian havoc on the nationalits before, during and after the electionsof 1921, the first under the partition settlement. A truce arranged between northern Prime Minister Craig and IRA leader
Micheal Collins around the time of the anglo-Irish treaty broke down largely because of the actions of the B specials and full scale war broke out between the loyalists and the IRA.
Refugees from the pogroms streamed south. Another truce was attempted, but failed again because, according to Micheal Farrell, though the Govemment, representing the business classes in the south, and Craig, both wanted peace, Craig found that the rank and file loyalists, long fed on a diet of protestant supremacism and sectarianism, were having none of it. Craig's Protestant state was soon buttressed by the Special Powers Act, a piece of legislation even more draconian than anything introduced by the British during the War of Independence. Internment without trial and gerrymandering of local government (Derry being simply the worst example were also required, as was virulent sectarianism.
Farrell reports how one W L. Allen, Town Clerk of Barrow-in-Furness, was appointed Town Clerk of Belfast in 1942 until it was discovered that his wife was a Catholic, whereupon the Ministry refused to sanction his appointment and he didn't get the job. In 1929, northern Prime Minister Craig abolished proportional representation (PR) in order to ensure that future election were fought on a straight unionist/nationalist basis and to eliminate Labour and the Independent Unionists.
Of the 48 single-seater constituencies the Unionists won 38 instead of 32 under the previous system, reducing the opposition from 20 to 14. 11 Nationalists, two Independent Unionists and one member for the National League, a right-wing nationalist, who defeated the Labour candidate in West Belfast. As intended, PR drove a wedge between the Nationalist and Labour Parties. The Nationalists had anyway become the representative of the Catholic middle classes and PR cemented that process.
At the same time, Craig managed to tie in the majority of Protestants to support for the official Unionists. In spite of the long-standing opposition to Sinn Fein by the Nationalists and their openly expressed desire to work within the structures of the northern state, it soon became clear that nothing could be achieved in the face of the intransigence of the unionists and so, from 1935 onwards, what Farrell calls, " a creeping abstentionism sets in" so that by 1938 there were no Nationalist representatives at Stormont.
A farsighted unionism might have recognised the dangers in this and attempted to integrate the Catholic middle class, but it was not until 1965 that, with the decline of unionist economic power as the empire gave way to decolonisation, that an attempt was made by the unionist bourgeoisie to foster friendly relations with the south and thereby make overtures to the Catholic middle class in the North.
By then however it was too late, and the would-be peace- makers were still dogged by the bigoted loyalism which they had fostered in the north, in the person of lan Kyle Paisley. In 1945, following the Labour victory in the British General Election, the northern Nationalist MP's decided to end their boycott of both Westminster and Stormont and shortly afterwards, the Anti-Partition
League (APL) was formed. The IRA's wartime campaign had just ended and there was the hope that the Labour Party would be sympathetic to the anti-partitionist cause. It was again dominated by the Catholic middle class, had mostly rural support and was conservative on social issues. Despite the formation of the Labour Friends of Ireland group among British Labour MP's in 1945, the APL was no more successful than the Nationalist Party before the War. (10) When the Labour Government brought in "one man (sic) one vote" in local elections in Britain the Unionists further restricted the vote in the north despite the direct appeal to Attlee by the APL • Though they were opposed 1o the Welfare State, the Unionists did eventually introduce the same welfare measures as operated in Britain, aided of course, by a subsidy from the British State. When Clann na Poblachta, a republican party, (taking seats from de Valera's Fianna Fail and removing them from government in the general election of 1948, formed the Inter-Party Government of 1948-1951 with Fine Gael and Labour, one of the first and perhaps unlikely acts of the new government, given the dominance within it of the conservative Fine Gael Party, was to declare a republic and so take the south out of the Commonwealth. Northern Prime Minister Brook called a general election in the north in response to the perceived threat to end partition. The Unionist victory had its intended effect in London and in May, 1949 the Labour Government introduced the Goverument of Ireland Act, which declared that Northern Ireland would remain part of the UK until the 'Northern Ireland' Parliament decided otherwise. Partition was, for the first time, explicitly written into law. A major reason for the collapse of the 6 county state was its long tern economic decline. While, during the war, it had benefited from the demand forengineering products-shipbuilding, aircraft and munitions- the trend was for economic decline in tandem with the British economy.
As in the south there was serious economic crisis in the 1950s, unemployment grew rapidly, (the response of the Unionists was that registers of unemployed loyalists should be used to fill any vacancies) and there was a housing crisis. Under pressure from electoral losses to the loyal Northern Irish Labour Party, the Unionists replaced their leader Lord Brookeborough with Captain Terence O'Neill (Eton, the Guards,) as Prime Minister. He began to implement broadly the same kind of policies as Lemass in the south and met with him in 1965. Here, as in the south 20 years later, the economic crisis entwined with the political crisis of unionism. O'Neill needed to portray the six counties as an attractive area for foreign investors and to take some joint initiatives with the south. However the tradition of bigotry and sectarianism combined with economic decline meant there was no mood for compromise among loyalists.
One of O'Neill's fiercest opponents was lan Paisley and in June of the following year, the revived Ulster Volunteer Force shot 3 Catholic barmen, killing Peter Ward. The suspension of the Stormont Government and the introduction of direct rule from Westminster marked the effective end of the unionist state: attempts to revive it with the Sunningdale Agreement which brought the
Social Democratic and Labour Party into government and provided for a Council of Ireland involving Dublin, foundered on loyalist opposition, and, it emerged during the Wright affair, hostility if not sabotage, among the higher echelons of the British establishment. Other attempts at "devolved government" have come and gone with Secretaries of State.
The swings between constitutional methods and armed struggle in the nationalist population have often been noted, less so the dual strategy approach of the British. Every "political initiative" from Westminster has followed or been accompanied by vicious repression.
The Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1988, which for the first time attempted to bring Dublin into an internal settlement in the North, has, despite repeated British claims that the IRA cannot be defeated militarily, been accompanied by a more or less open policy of assassination of IRA volunteers. It is clear nevertheless that in spite of the repression the Nationalists are no more inclined to accept this solution from Westminster, sweetened by the involvement of Dublin, than they were in the past. In fact the very opposite is the case. Despite heavy pressure form sections of the Irish American lobby, especially through funding for Humes's SDLP, the nationalist people have shown no desire to politically return to Stormont Government, even if they are allowed to fly the tricolour.
They have taken everything that British can throw but remain undefeated. Perhaps as big a problem for the British has been the fragmentation of the unionists since 1972. Deprived of governmental power after 50 years, they have little to offer the loyalist working class. Their economic base has long since eroded and, but for British aid to the engineering and shipbuilding industries, the decline would have been steeper. Her Majesty's Government's plans for privatisation of the Harland & Wolff shipyards may be thought poor reward for her loyal subjects.
Not surprisingly, the loyalist working class has begun to take its distance from traditional unionism and it remains sceptical about the bluster of those like Paisley, who seeks to threaten militant action and then retreat from the frontline. The more farsighted realise that, as far as the British are concerned, they are expendable; and are therefore playing for the strongest possible position in a settlement.
At the same time they have a strong desire for the British to remain, either because they want British subsidies to continue, especially if a settlement were to be reached, or, because in the face of declining employment, "security" is a major employer. In a situation where the British Govemment is cutting spending on health and social services while increasing spending on the "security services", there is a serious danger of the war becoming "insitutionalised" making it much more difficult for the government which follows from British withdrawal.
The British in Ireland.
In financial terms alone, the war costs the British about five billion pounds a year. It can hardly be seriously suggested that such a tenacious and costly presence is due mainly to a desire to keep the peace or out of loyalty to the unionists. whatever the more sentimental members of the Tory right may say. Neither is the British presence to be explained by the usefulness of the military bases in protecting NATO's western flank, important as they may be and whose importance is dealt with in Geoff Bells contribution. The real reason for the British presence is a political problem which has grown more acute even as they seemed to be on the point of resolving it.
At its centre is the crisis of bourgeois rule north and south. The ruling class is divided and weak, partly because of the different forms of economic development since about the middle of the 19th century, but partly because of the actions of the British ruling class. Partition led, in the words of Connolly, to a "carnival of reaction on both sides" because of the division among the working class, but also to a split in the bourgeoisie on the whole island. One of the most important features of the relations between Britain and Ireland since the Act of Union in 1800 has been the extent to which differences over Ireland have divided the British ruling class and re-shaped British politics. Of these, Home Rule was one of the most difficult and divisive.
In 1886, Liberal leader Gladstone, having reaped the political benefits of the dis establishment of the Anglican Church in Ireland and of having introduced some degree of security of tenure for tenant farmers in Ireland, introduced a Home Rule Bill. Apart from the pressure of the Fenians and the Irish Party under Parnell, Gladstones's thinking may have been influenced by the attitude of conservative opinion in Ireland.
Isaac Butt, a Protestant lawyer and founder of the Home Rule Association (later the Irish Party) proposed Home Rule as a guarantee against a Fenian revolution or, should England "be broken up by an outbreak of the infidelity and socialism that are spreading throughout her own land" the time might come "when every Irishman would wish that we had in Ireland a parliament and government which an English revolution could not touch" (11)
The form of Home Rule proposed by Gladstone was extremely mild but it was enough to provoke the Conservatives and some sections of the Liberals into outright opposition. Gladstone's 1886 Bill was defeated in Parliament as a result of a large number of Liberal defections. In the general election which followed, fought on the question of Home Rule, the Tories and the anti-Home Rule Liberals had a large majority. The Tories effectively used English opposition to Home Rule to sustain them in power for the best part of the following 20 years.
This obviously strengthened the hands of the Unionists who had good reason to fear any breach with Britain. From Lord Randolph Churchill's "Ulster will fight; Ulster will be right." speech in Belfast in 1886 to the founding of the Ulster Volunteers in 1912, the most important factor in Irish politics was the needs of British politics. When, in 1912, the Liberals under Asquith introduced
an even more limited Home Rule Bill, again under pressure from the irish Party led by Redmond, Tory leader Bonar Law threatened civil war if the measure went ahead. Part of the reason for the vehemence of the opposition (the Conservatives had briefly supported Home Rule before it was taken up by Gladstone in the 1880's) was that the Conservatives themselves were divided over tariff reform while Home Rule was an issue on which all factions could agree. In the 1921 settlement partition of Ireland was the price to be paid for unity in the British ruling class.
However the settlement left the Irish bourgeoisie even more divided and the British committed to the unionist cause. More recently, there have been other Ireland.
cases of British divisions with a bearing on From the controversy over former MI5 Officer, Peter Wright's book, "Spycatcher" and others, such as Colin Wallace and Fred Holroyd, who worked for the British Intelligence in the six counties, it is clear that one of the reasons why the Wilson Government were unable to move against the Ulster Worker's Council strike in 1974, which brought down the Sunningdale Agreement, was a vicious battle going on inside the British ruling class.
The Heath Government, which had negotiated the deal only a year before, had been brought down by the Miner's strike, and the ruling class feared that the working class having re- discovered its power, would push the Labour Government to the left. There were rumours of plots and coups. To make matters worse, Heath was seen as a weak leader and incapable of solving the crisis. In these circumstances Ireland, as in the 19th and early 20th centuries, was a useful tool both to unite the Tories and a useful weapon against Heath and WilSOn.
Thatcher's patron in the Tory Party was Airey Neave who had close connections with the Secret Services. Wright's allegations of attempts to de-stabilise the Labour Government and that the source of some of these activities were the north of Ireland will surprise only those unaware of the fact that during the upheavals in British politics in the period between 1906 and 1914, the Tones openly threatened civil war it the Liberals went ahead with Home Rule for Ireland, both because they were opposed to it in principle, and because it served as a useful stick to beat the Liberals.
A considerable degree of Tory support among the British working class has been on the basis of their anti-Irish stance, especially since the huge influx of Irish workers which began with the Famine in the late 1840's. This is the basis for the strong pockets of Orangeism which persist even today in cities like Liverpool and Glasgow. In summary we can say that the Conservatives have used the question of Ireland to mobilise and consolidate their political base. The British interest in Ireland is too deeply etched into the political structure for them to be easily persuaded to leave. Lofty phrases about "peace" or their responsibilities should not be allowed to conceal their political interest in continued occupation.
Apart altogether from the problems which withdrawal would cause within the Tory Party or in the ruling class as a whole, is the danger of being seen to
be in any sense defeated by a revolutionary movement. Portuguese withdrawal from Mozambique and Angola led to a revolution at home and nearly the end of bourgeois rule there. Given the closeness of Ireland the upheaval would be at least as great. The only "safe" circumstances would be one where a massive defeat had been inflicted on the working class and socialist movements in Ireland and Britain.
Given the impossibility (at least in the medium term) of safe withdrawal, the British continue with attempts at internal settlements, pressing Dublin for more "security co-operation" in order to keep the IRA at bay, while prodding the unionists towards an accommodation with both the nationalists and, more importantly, with Dublin.
In this they have been generally supported by the Labour Party leadership, who despite the Party's commitment to Irish Unity since 1981, operate within the constraint of the unionist veto. Thus the Party is in favour of "unity by consent" and to gain that consent is apparently willing to give guarantees to the unionists that they will not be forced into a united Ireland against their will, while at the same time seeking to harmonise the legal and economic situations north and south, apparently to facilitate unity.
Not surprisingly, the unionists see them speaking with forked tongues. Since the Anglo Irish Agreement seems to provide opportunities for harmonisation it is supported by the majority of Labour MP's including some of those who favour British withdrawal. For most Labour MP's this is not inconsistent since they are not anti-imperialist, only opposed to the worst excesses of British rule, such as the so called "shoot-to-kill" policy.
The long-term plan appears to be that with a series of reforms such as ending strip-searching of women prisoners or a ban on the use of plastic bullets, together with a series of measures to develop both economies on the island, the "alienation" of the nationalists will be reduced, and in the long run, the unionists may be persuaded that their long-term interests really do lie in a united Ireland, their position guaranteed by a benign British Govemment.
There are many problems with this position, not the least of which is that it refuses the right of self-determination to Ireland, a basic socialist demand. Secondly, it is depressing to think that after all the efforts made by successive goverments, including Labour, to reform the six county state, and when, after 20 years or more of such efforts have so obviously failed, the Labour Party should pop up brightly offering, not so much a new list of proposals but a rehash of previous failures.
Thirdly, how, in view of the failure of the Thatcher Government to reverse the decline of the British economy, and the almost total opposition of the greater part of the British ruling class to consider increased spending on anything other than "security", the Labour Party considers it is going to be in a position to pour soothing financial balm onto the "Irish" problem. This is especially problematic since, even in the heady days of the pre-Thatcher consensus, the same Labour Party either did not or could not do so. Like much of the new thinking within the Labour Party over the past few years, the policy does not stand up either on
socialist grounds or any other. We have nonetheless come some way since policy was in the hands of such as Roy Mason and Don Concannon. The commitment to unity by consent is a step forward. A number of Labour MPs, notably Ken Livingstone, courageously spoken out against British repression and in favour of withdrawal, and there is a significant degree of support among CLPs and among some trade unions, enough to worry the Tories into banning Sinn Fein from television and radio.
There is evidence of some doubt in the ruling class about government policy. These are not going to be supporters of self-determination but the left should still use the opportunity to open up the debate on Ireland, while not overestimating their political significance, which at the moment is negligible. One of the "benefits" of the economic crisis in the south of Ireland is the influx of mainly young Irish people. As in the past they can play a major role in winning self determination for Ireland and the victory of socialism in Britain which must surely follow it closely.
Notes.
1. See THE IRISH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION Repsol Publications 1977. 2. See Joseph Lee, THE MODERNISATION OF IRISH SOCIETY 1848 - 1918, and John A. Murphy, IRELAND IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, published by Gill & Macmillan (1973 and 1975) A recent and even clearer statement of the revisionist position is contained in D.G. Boyce, THE REVOLUTION IN IRELAND 1879-1923.[Gill & Macmillan 1988] In one essay, a after 1905 "if anyBritish academic Charles Townsend, declares that British policy in Ireland thing suffered from an excess of moderation" as a result of the "commitment to reasonableness which was at the heart of British political cuiture.....
3. See THE IRISH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 4. Left revisionism is probably best seen in the work of Paul Bew: see for example, LAND & THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN IRELAND 1858-1882 [Gill & Macmillan 1978] Also, Austen Morgan and Bob Purdie (Eds.) IRELAND: DIVIDED NATION DIVIDED CLASS [Ink Links 5. Despite the much peddled view that the political divide in the 26 counties does not fall along class lines, the main support for the pro-Treaty forces which formed the government after the Civil War, came from the large farming and banking interests, which had been dominant economically under the British, while support for the the republicans and later, Fianna Fail, came from small farmers, the small-town petit- bourgeoisie and the working class. On the social basis of politics in the South see: R.K. Carty, ELECTORAL POLITICS IN IRELAND [Brandon Books 1983] or Laver, Mair and Sinnott: HOW IRELAND VOTED [Poolbeg 1987jror a more general and histoncal survey see Kumpf & Hepbum: NATIONALISM AND SOCIALISM IN TWENTIETH CENTURY IRELAND [Liverpool University Press 1971. 6. Books on the political economy of the 26 Counties are scarce. See Paul Bew and Henry Patterson: SEAN LEMASS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN IRELAND 1945 - 1966 [Gill & Macmillan 1982], Ray Crotty: IRELAND IN CRISIS [BRANDON BOOKS 1986]. On the North, sce Bob Rowthorn and Naomi Wayne, NORTHERN IRELAND, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CONFLICT [Polity Press 1988] 7. On the foundation of the Progressive Democrats, see Dick Walsh, DES O'MALLEY [Brandon Books 1986] 8. See Michael Farrell, NORTHERN IRELAND THE ORANGE STATE [Pluto Press 1976] and Geoff Bell, THE PROTESTANTS OF ULSTER [PLUTO 1976] 9. See George Dangerfield THE STRANGE DEATH OF LIBERAL ENGLAND [Paladin 1983] and THE DAMNABLE QUESTION [QUARTET 1979], J.C. Beckett THE MAKING OF [Faber & Faber 1969] MODERN IRELAND 1603-1923 10. See THE ORANGE STATE. Also, Geoff Bell, TROUBLESOME BUSINESS |Pluto Press 1982] 11. THE MAKING OF MODERN IRELAND P. 377