Nicaragua, given by Western diplomat in Managua Newsweek magazine, represents one of the few uncontested facts of the present struggle in Central America.
Reagan and his vicious team of cold-war advisors certainly do hate the Sandinista revolution like poison. They would dearly love to overturn the elected Nicaraguan government with its 54% majority support in the population as a whole, and replace it with a renewed right wing military dictatorship like the regimes which the USA supported upto the overthrow of Somoza in 1979. But how far are they prepared to go to secure this objective? How far can they given the scepticism of the US Congress, and the overwhelming (70%) public opposition to any US involvement in ousting the Sandinistas?
These questions are less easy to answer. Though Reagan has funnelled no less than $80 million in covert aid since 1980 to the gangs of "contra" gunmen curently fighting overthrow the Sandinistas, from certain that the administration's atest reauest for a further $14 millio n aid will be endorsed by Congress But with Reagan stepping up the cold war of rhetoric against dinistas in a desperate ploy to win over Congressional support, it would be foolish indeed to rule out any prospect that this aid forthcoming.
Reagan has demanded capitulation by the Sandinistas that they "say uncle" and negotiate with and cede a "share" of govern. mental power to the contras, central military commander Colonel Enrique Bermudez was Somoza's chief henchmen commanding the hated National Guard. He has described the mercenary gangs of CIA-organised contras, campaign of wanton murder and economic sabotage has become notorious, as the equal of our Founding Secretary of State George Schultz, too, has gone "over the top" with a hard-hitting endorsement ofthe contra "freedom fighters":
"The bottom line is this. Those who would cut off these freedom fighters from the rest democratic world are in effect consigning Nicaragua to the endless
of President a to go, to it is far the San- will be total States danger." whose its 3 million population, as a of vast arsenal and imperialist one of the some whose terrorism, by the administration to drum up "moral" Fathers". accused "redbaiting" bitrary Foreign Affairs of the ed at runway
darkness of communist tyranny. And they are leading the United - down a path of great America, The notion of tiny Nicarguagreat credibility. danger" to the United States with its armies based across most of the world's key centres is so laughable that even hard-bitten anti- communists of the US Congress have been ridiculing these latest attempts war fever. Schultz himself has been of "McCarthyism" and ar- in the House Committee. And themselves when challenged to produce proot of plausible Nicaragua's alledged aggressive or subversive intentions and actions, the administration has been hard put to offer anything tangible. A lengthen- town airfield an near Mangua, and a large number of age- Socialist Viewpoint, No. 4, March 1985. Page 24
| ing Soviet T-54 tanks have been cited
but in the absence of any serious Nicaraguan air force and in the mountainous conditions of Central
both lack any real
Conspicuously, no evidence has been produced of Sandinista arms or aid to the FMLN guerrillas fighting for the liberation of El Salvador. Indeed Reagan has been forced to abandon his original claims that the chief purpose of the "contras" was to block arms traffic from Nicaragua to the FMLN - and now admit that his sole objective is to overrun the Sandinistas. His problem in switching to this new line is that the contra forces
Ware neither united nor as an alternative government. They lack sufficient popular support within Nicaragua to enable them to capture even a token border
which they could turn into a propaganda "provisional capital" -
and they have suffered heavily under an intensified Sandinista counter-offensive.
An attempt at the beginning March to bring together the feuding contra factions at a meeting in Costa Rica and present a united front to the Sandinistas resulted in ignominious failure. One key figure in the contra forces to the south of Nicaragua, renegade Sandinista Eden Pastora, has repeatedly refused to join or collaborate with the ex-Somoza forces of the largest military gangs north, the ludicrously-titled "Nicaraguan Democratic (FDN). The Costa Rica summit also failed to enlist the support Brooklyn Rivera, leader of a guerrilla grouping of Miskito Indians on the Atlantic coast. The disarray of the contra forces and their morale has been exploited by the Sandinistas who have amnesty to those who surrender.
While Reagan has gone onto a desperate offensive to rally his support, however, the Sandinistas have made further concessions they see as a move diplomatically to isolate the USA and win back some of the international support (which had ebbed to a dangerously low level, to judge from the poor turn-out to President Ortega's inauguration January).
Using the focus of the inauguration of the new Sanguinetti, elected Uruguayan president declared a unilateral decision to send home 100 Cuban military advisors
CONTRAS "HE'S NOT HEAVY, HE'S MY BROTHER... "new military weapons MiG fighters. of leadership Castro ministration over the supply the Kremlin leaders made it painfully to the "contra" sabotage or US attacks. Force" of sinking offered an what In GUAT Engearts Ortega
and to abandon plans to acquire systems" including These concessions - plainly discussed in advance with the — successfully removed the USSR from any potential confrontation with the Reagan ad- of jet fighters: but it also absolves the USSR of any responsibility for the defence of Nicaragua. In any event May. obvious last summer that they will do It is nothing to defend Nicaragua against consistently WE SEEK NO LARGER PRESENCE IN THE AREA! Socialist Viewpoint, No. 4, March 1985. Page 25
It was quite predictable that the concessions would also fail to produce any relaxation from the US warmongers: but they do appear to have given a new lease of life to the seemingly deadlocked "Contadora" process of negotiations in search of a regional peace plan, spearheaded by Mexico, Columbia, Venezuela and Panama — which will reconvene in
untortunate in this situation that the Sandinista leadership have so
sought to answer US ANANIA
political concessions. The Contadora leading countries concerned and by the social democratic "Socialist International" as a means of procuring
within a stabilised Central America: this can only mean renouncing revolutionary struggle in Honreplacement by vague utopian hopes
liberalisation parliamentary democracy.
While Nicargua, after the defeat of Somoza and with the Sanidinistas firmly in the driving seat, has been able to organise the most democratic elections ever held on that continent,
that a negotiated settlement with the regimes of El Salvador, Guatemala or Honduras could produce comparable results duce governments that culd in any
answer the problems of their crudely-exploited workers and poor farmers — is pure self-deception. use of the Contadora process by the Sandinistas: but it does mean that each one of the Sandinistas' tactical general stance, should be clearly and tionary fighters elsewhere in Central
The failure of the Sandinistas to adopt such a clear position is only surprising if we forget their origins them. Despite the highly publicised issue of stamps bearing the head of Karl Marx, the Sandinistas are not a Marxist or even explicitly tionalists with strong popular sup-
committed to (capitalist) economy and to detence of their country against imperialism. They find themselves under ruthless imperialist attack but denied substantial military, economic or political support from the USSR or Cuba which have no wish to conflict directly with the USA in the American "sphere of influence" dinistas hae been courted instead by international social democrats eager to restrict any possible socialist developments in Nicaragua, and by American bourgeoisie desperate to confine the struggle to Nicaragua and El Salvador.
Yet the best defence of the revolution - and one of the main external factors inhibiting an even more unbridled attack by the Reagan administration is precisely its character as part of a regional struggle against imperialism. The advance of revolution in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and into Mexico, the major country of Central America, is a key both to the defence and the completion of the Nicaraguan revolution. The many supporters of the Sandinistas' struggle who downplay this vital aspect of the fight do no favours to the masses of Central America.
Cartoon from a recent issue of the Managua newspaper, Barricada. ANTES... CUANDO EL FSLN ESTABA ENMONTANADO, LA BURGUESIA YLOSPOLITICOS DECIAN QUE ERAN TERRORISTAS BEFORE .. when the Sandinistas mountains, were bourgeois and the politicians called them terrorists. ¡New! - i you thought the only astro or support Ronald Reagan, then you should read Cuba Radical Face of Stalinism. this book reasserts the need for a Trotskyist party and pro- gramme in Cuba, and presents the events firmly in their global context. Copies available now (£5.00 including postage) from Left View books, Box 3956, London WCIN 3XX. Socialist Viewpoint, No. 4, March 1985. Page 26
AHORA... PARA LOS EX-GUARDiAS NO TIENEN UNA SOLA PALABRA DE CENSUTA, Y APLAUDEN AREAGAN CUANDO LOS LLAMA "PALADINES DE LA LIBERTAD... NOW... they don't have a bad word for former National Guardsmen and they applaud Reagan when he calls "freedom fighters". CUBA Radical face of Stalinism
choices on Cuba were to support Dissecting the politics and evolution of the Cuban leadership.
Line-up of Mubarak, King Fahd, and New triumvirate weaves deadly web for Palestinians
Hussein with Egyptian leader Mubarak. Hussein-Arafat JACK GOLDBERG and LUCY MATTHEWS explain the Latest sucession of events since the meeting of the Palestinian National Council last November. (For further background, see the article in Socialist Viewpoint No. 2.) "POSITIVELY buoyed up by the significant development within the PLO, in Mr. Peres's Israel, in Egypt and in Iraq." This thusiastic welcome by senior US officials summed elated reaction of American imperialism to the fast moving series of peace plays in the region. of the alliance consisting of President Mubarak
Palestinian and Arab masses. that Arafat's pernicious and (PFLP DFLT, en- up the 1on were simply put into abeyance of his devotion to the Palestinian cause' name of the the new triple Socialist Viewpoint, No. 4, March 1985. Page 27
King Fahd gives his blessing to new line-up. Fand of Saudi raci and the debt Kind | Prostia lorean 1970 he Pa Kindl
Ti the hurdles to enable ing enable strategists to dictate the destinies of the
Anew Compromise and Capitulation
The
It was clear last November in Amman
shadowy "quorate" procure a Council, largely PCP, PLE, PLACCAD and PSF) was not merely an organisational coup but an event of major historical importance. With a single stroke, his supporters in the PLO took advatage of the absence of any notable opposition to bring to a close a whole historical era. Many policies that have tor decades provided the cornerstone of the Palestinian Revolu-
Instead, the old right-wing guard gave a warm welcome to butcher King Hussein, who candidly assured them of the "purity Arafat. further to be endorsed by Arafat in the
Palestinian people an outrageous insult to the thousands of
roops in Jordan in 1970. The PNC, while rejecting the Camp David agreement went a long way to meet the King's pro posals and sealed an emphatic alliance with the Jordanian monarch, signalling a
course towards compromise and terms endorsed several months earlier by FATAH Central Committee* after a long and laborious dialogue between all the organisations of the PLO and seen by many as the first step to heal the political rigt within the PLO, were simply thrown to the wind, and Arafat was able to proceed towards the logical conclusion of the new course.
Hussein-Arafat Agreement
Egypt, unsurprisingly, was the next major partner to be brought into the alliance and the feverish shuttle quickly established is now known as the "peace overtures". I'his flurry of activity finaly culminated ir he signing on February 1l of the "Ammam Agreement" between Hussein and
" tah in the largst single organisa.
within the Yassel Arafat, who is also Chair of the PLO.
The accord calls for "total withdrawal" of Israel from the "territories since the 1967 war, and for a comprehensive peace as established in United Nations and Security Council resolutions. " It also calls for "right determination" for the Palestinian people within the context of a contederation "Arab states" of Jordan and Palestine. And tinally, the agreement sees an International Conference - comprising the main rotagonists and members ot security Council including the Union - as the sole and appropriate forum to finalise the new peace process (the PLO participating within delegation joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation] ).
The agreement in itself received a mixed response from all parties. tions of the Israeli coalition government rejected it as hogwash, Peres expressed some mild interest. The Israelis' paymasters in the US felt that it did not go far enough and at this stage did not merit their involvement. But privately it was seen as "encouraging in the sense that it shows the Arab side moving toward developing a negotiating position which is realistic
The PLO Central Committee, while cursing Hussein for having blown the whistle to soon by releasing the document which had remained secret until then, took some time to swallow the bitter pill but finally bowed under pressure from Arafat, and endorsed the Agreement. gambit was soon to be another event of surpassing importance.
Peace Overtures
President Mubarak, having obtained a written document, launched a peace initiative aimed partly at Israel predominantly to involve US imperialism. In a well-timed series of trial balloons, Mubarak floated a three-phase plan: (1) a negotiating stage involving the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation; (2) an enlarged phase where Israel would be brought into the negotiations which will end in a peace settlement and (3) an international conference to endorse settlement.
Peres promptly reacted to this call saying "the plan deserves a positive study" and viewed it as a sign of progress towards a peace settlement.
Headline-grabbing shuttles were soon on the move again. Osama Mubarak's sidekick, flew to Peres's house in Jerusalem for more tangible discussions
- the first high-level meeting between the two countries since the Lebanon. The exact outcome of these intensive contacts is still shrouded in a whirl of confusion but it already seems that the Israelis have shown willingness to accept part. of the Mubarak Plan. points remain difficult but superable hurdle. While Mubarak is pro-
osing three-stage negotiations beginning with lirect talks between the US and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, Peres is still insisting open negotiations with Jordan. As for the rest, it is simply a matter of time before the vague and otten murky formulations contained in numerous statements are clarified.
UN Resolution 242
Mubarak for his part, has already started putting flesh on his proposals. In a press conference on February 27, he went a long way to allay Israel's reticence on the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation by claimi noticial repoesentatives of the PLO that it would not necessarily inand emphasized that they would represent the "moderates". As for the absence of an
occupied of self- the UN Soviet joint While sec- Prime Minister exchange for territories. This diplomatic overtaken by in full stream and that has turned into a dialogue situation". whole imbroglio is slowly 1l as an important litmus test. but US an‹ distance, hardly conceal an elated optimism. the started have careful and by offering emergency Israel on top of the This assistance. El-Baz, ibility trom Israel. invasion ing a significant role in the Arab world. The sticky would remain sle Arafat, and within not in- 'Arab dynamics" US are leaving to direct themselves. and it may be sometime soon." Even the involvement of the not perceived as a American between
Habash and Hawatmeh: leaders of the Democratic Alliance explicit reference to UN resolution 242 in | change of views has already achieved one the Amman Agreement, Mubarak explain- ed that the sole fact that such an accord has been reached implies categoric acep vigorously tance by Arafat of this resolution, which calls for recognition of the state of Israel in It remains to be seen whether Mubarak is saying in public what Arafat is still concealing in flights of rhetoric. What is certain is that the play is account "the icy situation Heights. The taking some shape but all parties will be looking to the visit by Mubarak to Washington on March tion of Elated Optimism US imperialism has kept a calculated waiting for the outcome of this diplomatic gallop. With the ball firmly in their camp, their caveats and cautions The The situation is rapidly moving to their advan- tage: firstly their efforts in bolstering Peres useful to proceed pyaing some dividends. In fact they are in the process of strengthening their political positions economic aid to $1.2 billion regular sowing would put them in observers stronger position to demand more flex- Secondly the emergence of Mubarak as a force for peace is also a major trump card. Not only a dependable and pliable servant, he is already emerging form his period of isolation and will soon start play- Finally the US realise that the major tus- between Hussein and controversies Palestinian the organisations. For them the question of the cleared be needs to before negotiations can begin, and this the concentrated the Arabs do to Secretary of State Shultz has Agreement. already indicated their readiness for an in- creasingly active role "we are prepared to work in a helpful and direct way whenever we see the timing of it as appropriate... that that would occur Positive Dialogue Soviet still amendemnts Union in the International Conference is The threat any more. ilateral talks on February 19 in Vienn Committee. and Soviet officials seem to have opened "a positive dialogue" on the issues involved. This tentative ex- Socialist Viewpoint, No. 4, March 1985. Page 28
tangible result: relations between the US and Syria took a turn for the better. While
condemning the Amman agreement as a "US conspiracy", Syria, which a year ago was on the verge of a military confrontation with the US, warmly welcome 1 the US statement that "no peace treaty will take place without taking into
Syria's rights on the Golan "
Reagan did not waste such an opportunity and promptly telephoned President Assas to congratulate him for his reelection as Head of State. The combina-
Othe ongoing thaw between Nashington and Damascus and the US Soviet dialogue will undoubtedly sap and disorientate any Palestinian opposition to Arafat that may take shape.
Contradictions quickly developing dipiomatic moves are not without problems. In Israel, Peres is walking a tightrope. He decided
with the consultations with Egypt while Shamir, the current foreign minister, in a tour of EEC capitals, unequivocally rejected the peace proposals
contusion to he point where remarked on "the two diplomacies of Israel"
It is quite possible that as a result the stress on the coalition may end up in its rupture. Peres, with US help and mirroring the prospects of a peaceful settlement with Israel's neighbours, will be in a strong position to call an election
As for the Arab side, the quick pace imposed by Mubarak seems to have crated
within the PLO Central Committee itself. In a bid to avoid a political earthquake, the Central Committee without condemning the proposals
Sits fire on refining and amending the details of the Hussein-Arafat
Two representatives, Abu Iyad and Abu Mazen, flew to Amman to negotiate two important amendements: (1) that the Palestinians would exercise their right to self-determination "after the withdrawal of the Israelis from the cupied territories" and (2) that the PLO would be part of an "Arab delegation" with equal status to other participants. It is
uncertain to what extent these have been agreed and if agreed, whether they would be sufficient to quell any opposition within the Central
In fact, while the emissaries sounded confident and satisfied that all is in order, King Hussein referred to the
amendments as "minor details with bearing on the substance documents".
The rift between the Central Committee and Hussein on the precise interpretation of the accord is further complicated by a fundamental difference over the Mubarak Plan. While Mubarak propounds the International Conference as the ultimate stage in the peace Jordanians Palestinians see the conference as the only forum where the Palestinian problem may be resolved.
These last convulsions are predictable. What the US calls the "Arab dynamics" is a necessary process of claritication anc ine tuning. But more important will be the fightback by Arafat's opponents in PLO. The Democratic Alliance, (PFLP, DFLP, PCF and PLF), having placed their faith in the Aden-Algiers agreement as the right panacea to unite the PLO, to control Arafat and to retrieve the historical positions of the PLO, found themselves overtaken by events as Arafat gave them the cold shoulder and took the lead in calling for a PNC. The resultant PNC has been declared non-legitimate, by the Democratic Alliance, on the grounds that it was boycotted by the majority of
organisations in the PLO. In its wake no of the George Habash, General Secretary of the PFLP stated that "the de facto which the Central Committee of Fatah is trying to force the on rest organisations will not last long" (!) and he announced yet another plan of action "to strengthen the Deomcratic Alliance, continue the dialogue with the Nationalist and Alliance (Fatah dissidents, General Command, prepare for a unifying PNC. and too late. Arafat confidently proceeded with his plans and outflanked them once again, agreement and the launch of the Mubarak plan. The left reated to this with a rallying the call for a united front of all forces to beat back the agreement, and while it is likely that most organisations will respond, it is almsot certain that such a move - essence correct and necessary traditional already become a cry in the wilderness. The too far too fast, to be reversed simply by forging tactical alliances. Only a powerful mobilisation of the Palestinian masses can now stop Arafat in his tracks and gut all moves towards and it is the Left which must be the
Palestinian of the it sO 1S Alliance, Sai and and to These measures again proved too little doing with the signing of the Amman cept this in - has course toward liquidation has gone to initiate grave-diggers compromise with Israel, revolution. Socialist Viewpoint, No. 4, March 1985. Page 29
spearhead of such a mobilisation.
Turn to the Masses
If holding a unifying PNC on the basis of the policies contained within the Aden-Algiers agreement was once a possibility,
Ano longer. The Democratic which has always remained determinedly against the establishment of a parallel organisation to the PLO, now finds itself politically marginalised inside an organisation which is on the verge of
Ideal with imperialism and recognising the state of Israel. It is certain that the Palestinian masses will never ac-
Ta pro-imperialisi settlement and vould look up to the Left for leadership were it to provide a credible alternative;
leadership would the more authoritative if it came from the principled elements regrouped in a commanding powertul organisation. With the future of the Palestinian revolution now seriously it question it is the responsibility of the Lef
Othe building of such an organisation. If the Left fails to take up this responsiblity, it will leave the future of the Palestinian people in the hands of the
Cof the Palestinian
Prise out the facts to strengthen the fight!
SUE OWEN explains why an end to business secrets is vital in the fight for jobs and for workers' control. THE NCB's claims about "uneconomic" pits have now been attacked three times by specialists: by a group of accountants, by a report by Andrew Glyn commissioned by the NUM, and now by the "Aberystwyth report". Each time the Coal Board's response has been the same: "You've missed the point; the arguments you attack aren't the basis on which we decide which pits are uneconomic.
The reason is clear enough: the NCB and the Tory government are not concerned with the short-term economic costs of pit closures - far less the long term social costs for the mining communities. They have shown themselves ready to invest upwards of £3.5 billion to achieve the twin objectives of defeating the NUM and restructuring the coal industry to suit the long-term needs of capitalism. This type of "balance book" approach — like that of Edwardes In his period in British Leyland — can appear at any given moment to be economic nonsense: only by assessing their long-term plans can we understand why they are prepared to shoulder such heavy short-term costs.
But the answer from the workers' movement - as embodied in the miners' challenge to the argument for keeping open only, "profitable", ke mist be to tight for policies of fits employment and decent living standards, regardless of the requirements of capitalism. As the early Communist International declared, in uncompromising terms in 1921:
"The Communist Parties should be concerned not with the viability and competitive capacity of capitalist industry or the stability of the capitalist economy, but with proletarian poverty, which cannot and must not be Longer. is the demands put forward endured by the Communists correspond to the immediate needs of the broad proletarian masses, if the masses are convinced that they cannot go on living unless their demands are met, then the struggle around these issues becomes the starting point of the struggle for power. In place of the minimum programme of the centrists and reformists, the Communist International offers a struggle for the concrete demands of the proletariat which, in their totality. challenge the power of bourgeoisie, organize the proletariat and mark out the diiterent
OPEN THE