The shows very well, that the USA Clinton, a very clear strategy based on economic competition against Japan, cast and south ast si However, he goes on to imply a claim that the the Asian crisis of 1997, both by driving up the value of the dollar against the yen from 1993 onwards, and by stimulating flows of "hot moncy region, which ?
then withdrawn by hedge He writes that "the question, of 3 course, arises as to whether the sciously using the DWSR as an instrument of cconomic statecraft Asian economics. What is certain is that the dollar-yen exchange rate is in the policy gift of the US Treasury and Federal Reserve. Summers [the US Treasury Under Secretary, now Treasury Secretary] was deliberately organising a strong dollar against the yen and was fully committed to it (p.93), that this ( could hardly have been because the US wanted encourage tion of a yen-zone in which the Japanese had shown no real interest. Consequently, "we are thus left with a mystery over the source of interested squeezing Japan's 9880589 in the region. Everything that we know about the Clinton administration's obsession of the region also points in this direction" (p.93).
are a number of T 198511 this argument. Firstly, it is not clear, given Japan's USA and its role America's largest creditor, that the dollar-yen exchange rate is as much within US control as Gowan suggests.
Secondly, with Japan's economy slumping and the consequent risk of the renatriation of Japanese canital back home from the US, there were good reasons for the US to yen down despite the problems involved in an increase of Japanese cant anti-inflationary benefits for the USA domestically.
Thirdly, it could be argued that the significance Gowan gives to the rise in tnc dourar in causins tae Asian crisis is too great. The far against a number of other currencies, such as sterling, Consequently, there was not such a great global loss of compersia as might appear from concer in 1993-97 the yen remained at a high level in historical terms.
Fourthly, the impact of the high doliar was problematic both for US companies located at home and in Asta, While wowan mimsci points out the severe problems caused by the Asian crisis for the big US investment banks (p.115).
None of this means imposso e o sy that the usA deliberately tried to undermine the Asian cconomies. However, while proven that such a strategy was folowed, he does write "there is, as Clinton administration acted strategically from 1995 to use the dollar price rise, pressure to dismantle controls on the capital account, introws of not moncy and financial warfare by the US hedge funds to bring countries in East and South-East Asia to their knces. There is much dence to suggest strateBur the question remains open (p.128).
This carries a very strong impli• sure, the was consciously planned, In my view this overstates the degree of control exercised by the US and consequently overlooks emerged as a result of US weakness rather than strength - in particular the legacy of rockless investment in Asia by Western productive and financial capital as a result of weak acumulation and scarce profit opportunities at home. about Gowan's analysis, that of its relation to than inter-state competition. This can be posed more specifically in terms of the links between Gowan's work and other Marxist analyses of One of the attractive features of Gowan's book is the very clear oundation given to his account by his demystification of ortodox accounts of financial markets and a Marxist understanding of the role of finance within capitalism (chapthere is a possible tension here in that. until the final section of the first half of his book, which deals with alternatives, Gowan preductive sector to parallel his study of financial relationships. This has a number of COIS quences for the hape of his argument. dency to downplay the and Caraucons problems those economics subject PECSSUTe from the US, particuthe Asian 48T) (conomics, the implication that prob. lems there result almost entirely i from factors rather than from internal contradictions. Gowan the valid point that China, Taiwan were protected from the financial crises n Asia through retaining a struccontrols. He alsc argues correctly American commentators are unjusunico in cialmink lost the asian crisis proves the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon model of cafitalism Yet these points do not mean either that capital controls can indefinitely avert cconomic crises, or that the East Asian model is criChina and Vietnam, for example, continue to face very severe economic problems despite high headOutlook
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