centralised Soviet state this becomes much more difficult.
This is why the western powers, while belatedly supporting independence for the Baltics, areso strongly opposed to the break-up of the rest of the ormer USSR and why they are backing Gorbachev so strongly as a counterweight to separatist tendencies.
Anyone who thinks that, with the defeat of the coup and the rise of the Yeltsinites, Gorbachev no longer has any 'political base' are looking in the wrong places. He has a 'base' in Washington and Bonn, and it is one that Yeltsin ignores at his peril.
Another reason why the August events cannot be seen in any simplistic way as expediting the restoration of capitalism can be gleaned from a leading article in the Economist which said, 'The best thing about this extraordinary August has been the power on the streets The Economist's comment echoes the celebration of 'people power' by such unlikely figures as Margaret Thatcher and George Bush. This journal of liberal capitalism found it expedient to forget its own considerations earlier in the year about the possibility of a 'Pinochet' alon for theransition to capitalism in the ion for the transition to capitalism in the USSR. Leonid Kravchuk.
Moves towards new authoritarianism are inevitable. Writing in the Guardian, Zhores Medvedev, argues that 'The emerging Russian business classes...have concluded that what's needed to quickly transform the economy is a just dictatorship not democracy! The deepening and
strengthening ot democracy are incom patible with serious pro-capitalist economic retorm Is the end of the Soviet Union in a. historic sense a defeat for socialism and a victory for capitalism? In order to answer this question fully it is necessary to go beyond the scope of this article and to take a long term historical view of the role of the USSR in the world and its relationship to the struggle tor socialism.
But in order to begin to answer the question it is also necessary to examine the reasons for the collapse of the Soviet state. Various arguments have been put forward on this score.
Was the collapse due to the pressure exerted by imperialism, culminating in the massive arms build-up of the early to mid 1980s? Or was it the result of a crisisprone system imploding under the weight of its own contradictions? Might it have been caused by millions of working people refusing to go on living in the way? Clearly each of these factors was important. But which, if any, was decisive?
It would be quite wrong, and politically suicidal, for the left to prioritise the imperialist offensive as the main reason for the Soviet crisis. This argument gives ern Europe. It lets western leaders get away with arguing that the events of 1989-91 were the direct result of their 'standing, firm' agalist 'Soviet aggression' in the renewed cold war of the Reagan-Thatcher years.
Destabilising
There is no doubt that the imperialist offensive in all of its forms (from the arms race to the COCOM restrictions on the export to the Soviet bloc of high technology) provided a powerful destabilising influence on the Soviet economy. But it would be quite wrong to argue that the crisis of stalinism was reducible to this For one thing the roots of the challenge to the political legitimacy of stalinist regimes go back way beyond the 1980s, to the struggles of 1953, 1956, 1968, 1970-71, 1976 and 1980-81. You could hardly argue that the rise of Solidarity in Poland (a key development in the unravelling of the stalinist system internationally) was somehow the result of the Reagan-Thatcher arms race.
A similar argument applies in relation to those who argue that the Soviet state collapsed 'under the weight of its own contradictions'. Such an argument implies a process of decay and disintegration which needed only gentle prodding from within and without to cause the system's destruction. According to this view, for example, the coup failed not because of the relationship of social forces and mass opposition on the streets but because the army leadership was split, the coup plotters were incompetent and so on.
Like the view that it was primarily the imperialist offensive that was responsible for the end of stalinism, this position also has the effect of minimalising the active role of the working class and thomass movement in the system's col1alose In addition it begs a number of questions - such as why was the army establishment split? And why were the coupleadersincompetent? In other IN OTOC the argument rests on tautology: the reason for the Soviet crisis was the collapse of the system (i.e. the crisis)! The question becomes clearer if we look in a little more Kal car an detail into the for the failure of the coup, of which it is possible to identify at least five. i ney are not given in any order of priority.
First, the complete ideological disintegration of the bureaucracy and the lack of any coherent programme for Soviet development other than pro-capitalist marketisation. Thus the coup's plotters in the defence and security establishments and the military-industrial complex. made mention of 'communism' or 'socialism' in their public statement announcing their attempted seizure of power.
No significant section of the bureaucracy (left or right) had by this stage any even residual faith in the basic tenets of the ideology that has sustained the bureaucracy since the days of Stalin. An appeal for a return to 'MarxistLeninist' orthodoxy was impossible in circumstances where nobody any longer believes in any such thing.
Half-hearted
he second reason is related to the first: the half-hearted nature of the coup preparations and execution. The comparison with the well organised and devastating clampdown in Poland in 1981 is instructive, particularly since it vas supervised by KGB chief Kryuch‹ov, a key member of the 'Emergency Committee'.
This would tend to indicate that the obvious dithering and incompetence with which the coup was carried out (and which enabled opposition to be organised in the crucial first few hours) are not explicable by any supposed innate ineptitude on the part of the plotters. Rather they were the result of the depth of the political crisis of stalinist rule and the overall relationship of forces in socery.
The third reason for the failure of the coup was the existence of an organised centre of opposition, in the form of Boris which, basing itself on the masses, defied the authority of the new regime and called for mass defiance and a The fourth reason was the defection to the Yeltsim camp of a number of key figures within the bureaucracy and security establishment (especially Kobets of the Soviet general staff and air force commander Shaposhnikov). In this way the preconditions for Yeltsin's counter-coup were assembled.
While basing himself on the mass resistance to the coup, Yeltsin simulwhat emerged from the defeat of the coup was a political regime able to impose an 'orderly' transition to a poststalinist system in which the neo-liberal sections of the bureaucracy can flourish. For many sections of the political and military establishment the Yeltsin option looked like a better bet than throwing in their lot with the hapless coup The final, but by no means least important, reason for the defeat of the coup was the active resistance of important sections of the masses, especially in Moscow and Leningrad, but also in the industrial regions of Siberia and Vorkuta The response to Yeltsin's strike call wasuneven and the mobilisations which took place during the coup attempt were smaller than the demonstrations which took place earlier in the year.
However, the mass response to the calls for resistance was sufficiently strong to discourage the coup leaders and to encourage other sections of the bureaucracy to remain neutral (the wait and see approach) or to go over to the ment was therefore crucial.
In the light of the coup's defeat, the demonstrations became much bigger as the masses were emboldened to demand a once and for all end to the hated sysRevolutions don't happen in societies ruled by self-confident, politically united and powerful classes or strata in favourable international circumstances.
They happen in societies whose ruling strata are deeply riven, relatively socially weak in exceptionally unfavourable Yesterday's man clings on as President of a disintegrating Sovlet Union international circumstances. This does not make them any less revolutions.
First phase August in the Soviet Union witnessed the emergence of the masses onto the political stage in the first phase of a revolutionary struggle to overthrow the political rule of the stalinist bureaucracy.
The struggle to complete this revolution is at the same time a fight against the neo-liberal project of the Yeltsin wing of the post-stalinist bureaucracy, that is a fight against capitalist restoration and authoritarian populism. The outcome of this fight is not predetermined: everything is left to play for.
In this context the most urgent task for socialists is the development of an independent working class politics based on the greatest possible working class self-organisation - through independent trade unions, workplace committees and Such forms of organisation are re democratisation of society of a kind which cannot be achieved by Yeltsin's populist presidential decrees. The destruction of the Communist Party's links to the state apparatus - an essential democratic task - should be achieved through the creation of mass, ticipatory democratic structures to The fact that the leaderships of some republics leave the Communist Party and declare for independence does not mean they cease to be bureaucrats. There should be no confidence in any section of the bureaucracy to act in the interests of the workers The task of really finishing off the old ganisation is vital from the point of view of preparing for the pro-capitalist offensive. But it is also necessary if inter-ethnic strife - of the kind currently gripping Yugoslavia - is to be avoided.
It is certainly possible that an authoritarian-populism in Russia and in the other republics might seek to whip up ethnic antagonisms and border disputes as a means of hanging on to power in conditions of economic catastrophe and political instability Support should be given to the demands for independence of the op pressed nations of the former USSR - but that is not the same thing as supporting he current political leaderships of the republics. Democratic rights of self determination should be extended eyond the existing fifteen republics to nationalities and national minoritie: within these republics.
The central democratic principle here that the limit on the right of self-dete mination is reached where such self-determination impinges on the rights of •thornanona Macornationa minoritac The resolution of border disputes, inter-ethnic conflicts and so on is only possible in the context of the fullest pos sible democratic self-determination for the various groups involved. Only genuine mass participatory democratic structures can provide the institutional and political context in which real negotiation and compromise on the myriad issues of national-democratic rights can be reached.
The only way terrible inter-republican and inter-ethnic strife can be avoided is through finishing off the democratic revolution against bureaucratic rule. It is of course only on the basis of complete respect for the national-democratic rights of all the nations and national minorities that any deep and lasting working class unity can be built. "the most urgent task is the development of an independent working class politics, based on independent trade unions, workplace committees and so on"
No. 7 Sept. 14, 1991 Page 9
THE BREAK UP OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM has accelerated since the beginning of the 1990s with the discrediting of perestroika as a project for the modernisation and humanisation of the bureaucratic system.
The deterioration of the economy implied 'radical' remedies and there were already rumours of a coup d'etat, during a polarisation in which Gorbachev had lost his popular base.
Significant divisions appeared in the state apparatuses, in the first place the army and the party. They reflected the movements from below which have shaken the system to its roots. It also reflected the weakening of the powers of the centre in relation to the republics summed up in the new union treaty.
In addition, the loss of power by the break up was announced before the coup by the political regroupment of liberals and Communist reformers led by Shevardnaze and Yakovlev.
This explains the extreme fragility of the putschists. But what was the political logic of the coup?
The press has generally characterised the coup as 'conservative' or 'right wing', led against a left supposedly incarnated by Yeltsin. But there are several varieties of 'conservative and several right wings.
The putschists made no appeal for mobilisation. Evidently they were counting on the passivity of a population profoundly discontented by the degradation of everyday life. They appealed to this sentiment by announcing lower prices and referring to the dangers of famine linked to the reforms.
International Policy Their main stated aim was the maintenance of a Union, with a powerful centre, and a strong law and order policy. But they did not disassociate themselves from the liberal market projects.
heonly international 'policy' put forward by the putschists was a contempt Kriskor head die ket, wise al for western 'aid' and a 'patriotic view.
denounced the plot by foreign secret services 'seeking to destabilise the Soviet Union' last winter, supports this view.
The coup did not represent an 'antiimperialist' turn; nor was it conservative in the sense of a return to the old system.
The putschists seem to be mutants between the old svstem of non-capitalist dictatorship, of which the administrative machinery has collapsed, and the new pro-capitalist dictatorship that is emergin This underlines the real ambiguities of Sept. 14, 1991 No.7 _ Features LIBERTY GUIDING THE PEOPLE (or Boris the Big Russian Takes Over) the coup, linked to the cleavages running across the bureaucracy, with those who have opted for reconversion in the market economy strengthened.
All the bureaucrats are pragmatically guided by the defence of their material nterests. The putschists represented firstly those attached to a strong central state apparatus on the internal and internationa 1 level.
Second, they represented those who saw the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact and the new sovereignty of the republics, plus the drastic reduction in the central budget and arms expendias a threat to their jobs and ture. privileges.
This 'conservatism' of a part of the state apparatus could find a resonance with a part of the neo-Stalinist apparatus of the Communist Party (CPSU) and the trade These layers feel threatened by the economic and political reforms such as Yeltsin's decree against the Party organisations in the workplaces.
Conservatives
The Russian Communist Party, created by the conservatives, the United Front of Toilers of Leningrad, and the Interfronts based mainly in the non-Russian republics were, in this respect, potential allies of the putschists.
They could support them, with their rhetoric of pseudo 'defence of the interests of the workers' and of the USSR. But they were not the obvious initiators of the coup and do not seem to have been mobilised to defend it either.
have nonetheless been held responsible and are suffering in full from the effects of the coup's defeat.
The ambiguities of the of the putschists reflected the common ground between 'market stalinism' and state capitalism in the current period. The state apparatus is one of the essential tools for the capitalist restoration underway.
The fact that Yeltsin and the liberals in power in Moscow and Leningrad were not arrested could express the uncertain orientation of the putschists. Or perhaps it was because they wanted to leavé a door open to negotiations with supporters of the liberal market, rather than a reflection of amateurishness.
The coup leaders were favourable to market reforms, but at the level of the Union and controlled by the strong state, without counting too much on foreign capital. There is probably no difference on goals, but simply on strategy, be tween Rykov and Silaev or Pavlov and Shatalin.
The tide of capitalist restoration does not have the political, social or economic strength to be completed, except in Germany. Everywhere else, it is stagnating There are different currents, some ad vocating a national capitalism protected from foreign investments, others the most open insertion into the world capital market:
Some call for a rapid privatisation at matter what cost and whoever no matter benefits, others a slow privatisation controlled by the state. But who will control the state?
One of the difficulties of capitalist res toration is the lack of new personnel. Although state capitalism appears the logical 'solution' from the point of view of the restorationist projects faced with the lack of private capital, any reinforce ment of the state based on the same ap paratuses will be seen as 'conservative'.
Liberal market offensive Those who are most able to advance a restorationist project are those who originate from a break or a struggle against the old system. Thus in Poland Hungary and Czechoslovakia it is those who were explicit opponents of the Communist Party (even if they are a product of it) and new layers of the technocratic intelligentsia who are in power.
Thanks to his previous break with the CPSU and his role in opposing the coup, Yeltsin has prepared the way for a liberal market offensive, but not the conditions of its success. This offensive will no doubt benefit, as in Poland, from a brief honeymoon period and increased foreign aid.
But crisis and political uncertainty mean that foreign capital (and US economic support) is still reticent. And the honeymoon will be shorter than in Poland and made more problematic by the breadth of the national questions.
These exist both between the Union republics and within the Russian federation itself. The USSR as a 'prison house of nations' is no more and cannot be revived.
The defeat of the coup and the offensives led against the CPSU and its instruments of repression make declarations of independence, but also new forms of union, more likely.
The consolidation of a powerful Russia with a powerful leader and the declarations by Yeltsin threatening the frontiers of the separatist republics, and the large numbers of Russians nominated to governmental posts, have alarmed the other republics At the same time, Yeltsin's power in Russia facilitates the bypassing or weakening of the centre. Several factors Photomontage: John Harris (with apologies to Delacroix)
mitigate against the simple disap pearance of the central state, in spite of the growth of direct relations between the republics.
These include fear of the dispersion of nuclear weapons, the search by certain nationalities for federal protection, and the need for common management of a currency and infrastructures.
This is compatible with the sovereignty of the republics in several domains. which, in the USSR as in Yugoslavia, will be at the heart of the negotiations and conflicts to come. In international policy, the republics want to have their own representatives in world bodies alongside the Union (as is formally the case with the Ukraine, and as is envisaged with Yugoslavia).
Effects of 500 day reform As for the armed forces, each republic wants to be able to protect itself and the right of its conscripts to serve where they wish. Finally, there is the question of the what degree of inde pendence each republic has, and what monetary space it operates in.
The defeat of the coup accelerates the change and break up of the USSR on three levels - the Union, the Party/State and the economy. It was essential to fight alongside Yeltsin against the coup immediately. But it is also necessary to point out what the effects of the 500 day reform that he supports would be.
The development of political pluralism and freedom of speech are the only guarantees of democracy. They are the real defence against future coups, wherever they come from.
Such self-organisation and such liberties should workplace and the localities. This is why we are against the decree forbidding the workplace cells of the CP, but for the generalisation of the right of organisation and political debate.
We are for the nationalisation of the property of the CP and the official trade unions. But we are for their redistribution under the democratic control of the ing the Political organisations, includIn the same way, we do not accept the banning of the CP, because we reject the confusion between the necessary struggle against the Party/state and its monopoly, and the forbidding of the expression of ideas or limits on the right of organisation of those who still adhere to Communism.
It is no accident that Yeltsin is seen by the socialist and pro-self-management left in the Soviet Union as a potential
Isloated and vulnerable: common ground between Gorbachev and Yeltsin Is a pledge to cut ald to Castro's Cuba Features complemented pre viously by parallel state markets which supplied goods unavailable else where and, up to 1986, by free peasant markets. These were relatively expensive, but provided a wider variety foodstuffs, particularly fruit and vegetables.
Nowadays neither exists. The latter were shut downby the Communist Party because they made it easier for private peasants to enrich themselves. And the middlemen who transported the goods from to the cities found it easy to use state transport for their own ends. This was made worse by the lack of social control.
So there has been an increase in inequality and corruption, as well as the enrichment of some small tarmers. There were protests, and finally, free markets were banned by Fidel Castro. This is strongly questioned nowadays, because while speculators have been abolished, the markets have been replaced by markets. Now everything is rationed - only four eggs per week, meat is only available irregularly, and the bread ration has just been set at 80 grams a day. Q: What are the real causes of this terrible situation?
JH: I will outline five. First, you can't understand what's happening has some resonance. However, even if the state sector can't replace small private production, it is they who will have to solve the shortages.
The same is true of most small businesses - getting a lock mended, a pipe installed, or your shoe mended, can be a real nightmare. Experience proves - at least until there is new society - that state centralisation can't solve this kind of Fourth, tourism. In the short term, it is a very important source of hard currency. But tourists need to eat - even to eat well. This leads to the diversion of produceto the tourist hard currency secwhich Cubans are barred from, though this is a less important factor. The Cubans have been organising these ' for a long time, putting massive investments into infrastructure, building Fidel Castro said recently that in the current situation, Cuba would never have hosted the games, but now it is too late to pull out.
For a month or two, there will be a big influx of money - but also problems in feeding the tourists. It will certainly bring in hard currency, but the building Q: Is the imperialist threat as present as ever?
JH: Since Soviet-American relations improved, Washington has changed tactics and put more emphasis on economic and political pressure to destabilise the For the moment, military intervention is unlikely. The most reactionary layers of Cuban emigrants in Miami -participated in attempts at overthrowing the regime over the last 30 years -The threats of military intervention have in fact had the opposite effect from that intended - popular mobilisation has been strengthened. This explains the current tactics, which involve trying to aggravate internal tensions, to weaken the popular base of the regime.
They have tried to create a bridgehead
the could be Yeltsin
party/state, and the loss of control of the economy, contributed to its downfall. Its