gory movements as diverse as the Central American revolutionary movements, the PIO, the ANC and Sinn Fein conceals important differences between them. The PLO is a bourgeois nationalist movement whose radical sectors have declined over 20 years. It has no goal of socialism, but simply that of a Palestinian homeland. The Salvadorean FMLN and the Sandinistas were very different, posing revolution and socialism as goals as well as 'national liberation' from imperialism. Sectors of the FMLN and FSLN made explicit reference to Marxism and even Leninism in a way that the leadership of the dominant Fateh wing of the PLO would never consider.
But for all these movements the question of a solution to democratic and national ques tions was posed centre-stage. In every country dominated by imperialism, national and demo cratic questions come to the fore. These include questions such as the creation of genuine national unity and inde pendence, the solution of the land question, the dismantling of the old reactionary oligarchy I part of the ongoing struggle. and so on.
When posed in that way, the all round solution of national and democratic tasks requires a break from imperialism and lo cal reaction. It is a revolutionary task. How could you solve the land question in El Salvador without crushing the local oligarchy which dominates the latifundia? And. obviously, crushing the oligarchy requires revolution - whatever term is used to describe it. How can there be a real, lasting solution to the Palestinian national question without the defeat of imperialism's local agency - the Zionist state? And that requires a revolutionary mobilisation not only of the Palestinians, but of Arab and Jewish workers in the whole region. There is no artificial dividing line between national and democratic questions and the 'social' question - the question of power. That is why Marxists reject the old Menshevik-Stalinist idea of two strictly divided 'stages of the revolution in oppressed countries. But this should not be interpreted as implying the impossibility of national or democratic gains as For example, the post-second world war upsurge of the colonial revo lution created a rash of newly independent states as the imperialist occupying powers withdrew. No one could deny that these were real gains for the national struggle. Marxists argued, however, that this process created semi-colonies countries still dominated by im perialism. Moreover, while arguing that the democratic tasks remained unsolved, it would be foolish to deny that in some dependent countries, Brazil is an example, that there are demo cratic gains for the masses - ie real steps towards formal political democracy, however partial or fragile.
The inter-twining of demo cratic and revolutionary tasks was at the heart of Trotsky's theory of 'permanent revolution'. The essence of that theory is notthe idea that without social ist revolution real gains for the masses are impossible. It is the idea that securing and extending these gains requires a construggle, otherwise they will go backwards. It is moreover the idea that partial gains in the national liberation struggle, for example the establishing of a formally independent state, crystallises a new relationship of class forces which itself in volves exploitation of the masses and subordination to imperialism. Take India. Who could deny that the driving out of the British was a victory? But then who could deny that this victory incarnated the rule of the domes tic Indian bourgeoisie which cruelly exploits its own masses? Or that India was still dominated by imperialism? Thus while rejecting the idea that there is an inseparable divide between 'democratic and 'socialist' stages of anti-imperialist struggles, or that the solution of the democratic and national tasks can separated tinuation of revolutionary | from the solution of the 'social question, the question of working class Marxists should not fall into the trap of denying the possibility of partial democratic and national gains. These gains however re-cast the struggle in a different way: they do not conclude it.
Moreover, insofar as such partial victories are secured by negotiations and peace deals, there is an overwhelming criterion by which Marxists judge: what is the effect on the dynamic of the mass movement? Is it mobilising or de-mobilising? Does it enable the revolutionary or national liberation forces to regroup their strength for a new stage of the struggle, while securing partial gains? Or does it amount to calling off the strug gle and conceding victory to reaction? It is by these criteria that the current rash of peace negotiations has to be judged.