troops, not through any affection for the wretched al-Sabah ruling family, but because the invasion gave US imperialism the pretext it wanted to dispatch vast armies to the Gulf: it now endangers the defence of irag itsell.
Saddam remains the biggest liability in the defence of Iraq, clearty prepared to take his own country and its people up to and over the brink of ruin to fulfil his own ambitions.
There is no disagreement over whether Saddam is a despicable torturer and tyrant: the difference is over who should remove him, and who should decide the fate of Iraq, the Gulf region, the Middle East and the Arab world as a whole. It is here that socialists have nothing in common with those in the imperialist camp. We believe that the overthrow of Saddam is a task for the Iraqi people themselves, and that the security of the Middle East can only be guaranteed by the Arab masses, and not by wester generals and bankers. For us the right of national self-determination is a principle to be defended, not just a useful card to play when it embarrasses the Kremlin bureaucracy.
History shows that every involvement of imperialism in carving up Middle East 'security' leads to further misery, exploitation and repres sion for the workers and peasants. The latest military adventure, using weapons more powerful and deadly than ever before, is already in danger of destroying the economy and the environment of the Gulf for many years to come.
That's why we make no apology for calling at one and the same time for the immediate withdrawal of British and US/UN troops from the Gulf, and for the defence of Iraq against the imperialist offensive, while we support struggles by Iraqi workers and peasants for the removal of Saddam Hussein, as part of the struggle for the revolutionary overthrow of pro-imperialist regimes and the establishment of a socialist federation of states in the Middle East.
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Who will win the war?
Only a week after the start of the Gulf war did it become possible to cut through the barrage of US propaganda and begin to make an assessment of the military course of the war and the possible political implications. ALAN DA VIES weighs up the events so far. It is clear that initial estimates by the US alliance - that the war would be over in a few weeks - were wildy off the mark. Estimates of the duration of the air war ranged from one to five days for gaining air supremacy. One report even said three hours. These estimates were a crucial part of the US military strategy since for Bush a quick war (and a clear victory) is both a political and a military necessity.
Not only has the air war not been won in the first week, but the damage inflicted on Irag, particularly on military targets, has been much exaggerated. Some allied planes have been attacking cardboard cutouts of missile launchers, and it is now accepted that the destruction of all Tragi airfields is impossible because of their size, number, camouflage and 1.5 metres-thick concrete covers for the aircraft - which were build by the British. Even the alliance now claims to have destroyed only 30 of Iraq's 700 aircraft.
Damage has clearly been sustained in the infrastructure of the economy, (electricity, water and communications); but the extent of this seems well short of disaster level as we go to press. Water pressure is reduced in Baghdad but it is still flowing in the taps, electricity has been restricted but may still be available. The telephone system is working in some areas and BaghPage 2
UPDATE dad radio continues to broadcast. Iraqi reports of casual- ties are also low, still under 300 - 41 of these civilians, though for some tactical reason they appear to be deliberately mini- mising the civilian death toll, which according to refugees interviewed in Jordan must be much higher than the govem- ment admits. It is easy to see why military casual- ties should be concealed, but there is little reason for Saddam to withhold details of civilian casual- ties which have world- wide propaganda value, least the reported not bombing of schools and hospitals, If there were very big civilian casualties, Iraq would surely want to use this to refute unsupported and doubtful US claims of "clinical" bombing restriction to and accuracy military targets. If the reports of relatively low casualties are true, this points to a highly developed system of har- dened shelters available to the population and adequate wam- ings of attacks. These probably date from the Iran/Irag war and have been extended in the last six months. The most important military reality which has now been recognised by the USA is that they failed quickly to destroy the Iraqi air force, and that their air power is ineffective against deep- ly dug-in troops. These factors alter the course of the war, since the US strategy for a land assault has been to ensure that it is un- dertaken under conditions of air supremacy, after the defending forces have been seriously damaged by air attack. In some ways they mean that the real war has not yet begun. The prospect of a land assault against defensive positions which are largely intact - and the pos sibility of Iraqi air attacks against US and coalition forces advanc-
US: worried about land war ing in the open -is the worst pos sible option. It would involve the biggest tank battle in history. with combined armies of over a million on the Kuwaiti front alone. Alliance forces are clearly not prepared for such battles, as shown by reports that some British armour is already bogged down and lost in the desert before the war has even started.
Massive casualties in tank engagements are absolutely inevitable under those conditions, and there is no certainty that the US could win. Generally accepted military strategy sees a three to one advantage as necessary for a ground attack against defensive positions. The US does not have this advantage. Ultimately they could win, of course, in a military sense. But the crucial question is whether they could win before political opposition became unstoppable? And if they were to win after such mass slaughter, what would be the new shape of the Middle East, and what would be the level of opposition to a US presence?
The start of the war, and the claimed victories, has increased support for the war in the main combat countries - US, Britain and to a lesser extent France, where there are clear divisions in
the ruling class. But elsewhere opinion is already moving in the other direction - such as in Italy where opposition to the war is 80%.
In Britain, although public support for the war is strong at the present time this could evaporate quite quickly. The antiwar movement is developing fast, and even the craven support for the war shown by the Labour leadership could soon be challenged. 34 Labour MPs are op posing the war, and there have been four front bench resignations on the issue.
There is no serious pos sibility, at this stage, that the bombing campaign will tum the Iraqi population against Saddam. At the present time support for him and the war effort is clearly increasing, as usually happens with air bombing. The population is being rapidly politicised into a wider understanding of the implications of the war for the region. The attacks on Israeli cities are highly popular and seen as direct support for the Palestinians. These factors may change if the US bombing caused a complete breakdown of Iraqi society, but this is not the case at the present time.
The prospect of a protracted SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 30, February 1991
US troops: massive casualities inevitable war holds other major problems for the US alliance. They have picked the best climatic conditions for what they saw as a short war. From now on, conditions can only get worse, with rain at the moment, sand storms in February and March and then the temperature rising to intolerable levels. A tank war in such conditions would be something of unimaginable brutality. The medical authorities are already predicting that they will be overwhelmed by casualties, and are preparing mass graves for the dead.
At the same time Iraqi trench defences are being recognised as more effective than previously thought. They are very deep and some are hardened - particularly command posts, amunition dumps and tank emplacements. US surveillance is less effective, and possibilities of camouflage are more effective, than previously thought.
Munitions are being expended in the Gulf at a level which may not be sustainable. With up to 3,000 sorties a day, likely to increase if cloud cover lifts, shortages may arise quite quickly. High-tech missiles in particular can only be produced at a fraction of the rate they are being used up. even with the factories on maximum overtime (leaving aside the economic effects of their cost). The first four days of the war cost Britain £100 million and Major is now forced to admit that the £500 million they put forward for the war is totally inadequate. The five Tomados lost to date cost £16 SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 30, February 1991
UPDATE million each. Already it is clear that this will have a major impact on the budget.
Iraq's medium-tech army is easier to maintain and supply. Iraq has its own huge arms industry, built up during the war with Iran, which can supply most of its needs, and an engineering industry closely integrated into it.
The economic effects of the war are clearly massive. It could push the world into massive new recession: the US is already talking about putting up taxes to pay for the war which is now costing them S1 billion a day. The cost of the hardware being expended is absolutely enormous. It costs £500,000 to launch a Patriot missile, and 40 were launched in one attack. A top US strike aircraft costs S72 million and an MI tank $4.4 million.
The Scud attacks on Israel and Saudi Arabia are clearly of political more than military sig nificance. But the Scuds have taken the war outside of Iraq. forced the deployment of expensive defences, and created a political problem though deploying Patriot missiles in Israel which in a sense draws them into the war.
Syria has already objected, saying that the deployment alters the military balance in the region, and that the Patriots will eventually be used against Arabs. At the same time the US has prevented Israel from striking back with air power by denying them the identification codes used by alliance aircraft.
The alarm of Arab govern-
ments which are a part of the alliance has also been increased by the intervention of Turkey, through the use of its bases to attack northern Iraq. Iran and Syria have raised the possibility that Turkey may attempt to take over part of Iraq in the event of its defeat. The Iranian Foreign Minister has said that this could lead to an Iranian declaration of war against Turkey. They suspect that Turkey wants to take over Mosul and Kirkuk, two oil-rich provinces from Turkey which were incorporated into Iraq by Britain in 1926.
The Iranian govemment, under pressure from fundamentalists for its connivance in the war, has made proposals to try to end it via an Islamic solution, and has called for a conference of Islamic leaders.
Most governments of Islamic countries or countries with Islamic minorites, are now under pressure from their populations who are increasingly supporting Iraq against the US. Egypt's Mubarak and Assad have hinted at a conference of Middle East governments to call for a cease fire.
The govemment of Pakistan, which has 10,000 troops in the Gulf, is under massive pressure from the population and faces imminent collapse over the issue if the contingent is not withdrawn. There have been massive demonstrations and strikes -notably in Islamabad and Lahore - against the war, some organised by the youth wing of the ruling party. Tens of thousands have
volunteered to fight for Iraq, and are demanding to be allowed to go to the front.
There have also been demonstrations in Bangladesh, where 1,000 have signed up to go to the front. Anti-war demonstrations have broken out in India, which has a Muslim minority of 100 million. In Malaysia, where demonstrations are banned, thousands are signing up to fight for Iraq. In South Africa, Muslims are asking to be allowed to
Iraq's strategy is clearly to fight a protracted war of attrition. Saddam Hussein made it clear before the war started that Iraqi troops would be dug in deep, that there would be nothing above ground, that the air strikes would be ineffective and that when the land war started the Iraqi army would be intact and ready to fight. So far this is emerging as essentially correct.
All this says is that a US victory is no longer guaranteed. Indeed, the possibility exists for a political and military catastrophe for the USA, where Bush hinged his whole appeal on the pledge the war would not become another Vietnam', Yet a land war with tens of thousands of casual ties now looks certain, and political support for this in the US may well be impossible to sustain.
Failure to defeat Iraq would put the US back where it was after Vietnam - facing a massive loss of credibility, and its imperialist foreign policy crippled by a population not prepared to go to war.
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Police-state racism