Socialist Outlook

Socialist Viewpoint, International, Socialist Outlook and their supplements, 1984–2009

The crunch for the workers movement

· Socialist Outlook no. 28, November 1990 · pp 27-30 · 3,207 words

Economy Britain Asia Germany

IN DEPTH

Western economies in crisis

The speculative bubble of the 1980s world capitalist economy is bursting. In Britain, the entry into the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System will further tighten the squeeze. A severe recession is com- ing. The workers' movement needs to politically prepare itself to resist the coming onslaught, argues JAMIE GOUGH.

A world recession is now a certainty; the only ques- tion is how severe it will

OU be. The most obvious

capital's forms of

HATE problems are not in

HONE

production as such but in

IF YOU

that mystifying thing, money. This is not surpris-

•HATE

ing: the 'boom' of the

TAX

1980s was built on a

HIKES

pyramid of fictitious money (debt), and the 'boom' itself encouraged the creation of more fic- titious values in the in flated values of stocks, bonds and property.

During the 1980s the world rate of productive in- vestment, though very vari-

Bush reneges on his promise and loses popularity able by country, was low by historical standards, due above all to histori- firmed by the collapse of the Tokyo stock ex- cally low rates of profit. In consequence, there change since the beginning of 1990; it fell was a great excess of money capital which 35% before the Gulf crisis started (and has fal- could not find profitable, productive invest- len a further 25% since then). These falls were ment outlets. These were loaned for a variety i due to a recognition that the performance of of purposes: to corporations to tide them over the productive economy was not living up to

low profits; to individuals to spend; to | the value of stocks and shares, which are

speculators for 'leveraged buyouts' of corpora- based on the speculative estimate of future tions; to property developers for their ap productive profits.

1987 crash parently 'safe as houses' operations; to the US

The first reaction of the imperialist govern- economy to finance its enormous balance of

payments deficit with the rest of the world; | ments to the 1987 crash was to cushion it: they

and to the US government to finance its great- eased monetary policy, in effect allowing more ly expanded military spending and huge • debt creation, in order to prevent a big impact budget deficit. The ratio of world debt to on the productive economy. In Britain this was world annual production is now probably the move which, in his recent confession, larger than it has ever been. This was respon- Nigel Lawson said that he regretted. But since sible for the 'successes' of the capitalist 1988 monetary policy has been progressively

tightened, interest rates have increased, and economy, such as they were, in the 1980s.

This growth mechanism is now grinding to the debt-propelled economy has ground to a

a halt. Worse, there may be a major financial collapse. The basic reason for this is that the 1980s 'boom' failed to radically raise the rate of profit and stimulate productive investment. The average rate of profit of industry and com- merce in the US is now lower than at any time since the Second World War - lower than at the start of the period of stagnation in the late 1960s, and lower than when the Reagan boom began.

This failure was first signalled in the 1987 stock market collapse, and by the sharp downturn in autumn 1989. It has been con-

TAX

HIKES.

HATE

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 28, November 1990

halt. There have been two reasons for this.

Firstly, inflation has been increasing worldwide, reflecting the fact that debt- propelled demand has exceeded stagnating productive capacity. This inflation is all the more remarkable when you realise that the prices of most raw materials have decline, in many cases by large amounts, during the 1980s. This lies behind the catastrophic economic situation in most of the Third World. The 'boom' in the imperialist countries was on the back, not only of many workers in those countries, but especially of the poorest

two-thirds of the people in

the capitalist world.

The imperialist govern-

ments have also tightened

their monetary policies com-

petitively. The US and the

UK, with large deficits to

finance, have raised interest

rates to finance them and to

stop their currencies from

slipping. The non-deficit

countries, especially Japan

and W.Germany, raised their

interest rates in retaliation,

so as to prevent their curren-

cies slipping and inflation

being 'exported' to them.

The result has been a spiral

of rising interest rates.

Debt creation

All these mechanisms,

however, represent one fun-

damental problem: that debt

creation, the claim on future profit, had run far ahead of the production of profit. And this problem in turn rests on the central generator of capitalist crises: produc- tive investment depends on the rate of profit, and the rate of profit depends on productive investment.

The rise in interest rates has crucified the neo-colonial countries strapped with high debt incurred in the early 1980s. It has also con- tributed to a slow down in the imperialist countries. US and British output are now not growing at all, and Japanese growth in output is at the low level of 4 per cent.

Meanwhile, a central problem, the US budget deficit, has gone from bad to worse. The deficit reduction agreed on 30 September, in spite of requiring Bush to junk his pledge of no tax rises, does nothing substantial. It knocks $50bn off the deficit for the coming year (which is the only part of the agreement

Page 25

that means anything; but the expected deficit has risen by $75 billion in the last two months alone, andcurrently stands at $250. With the coming recession is likely to rise to $300bn. The Federal Reserve, the US central bank, has said that it will lower interest rates as a 'reward' for the agreement. If it does so, it will not be a statement of confidence but rather the reverse: an attempt to moderate the recession, and a move which would certainly lead to a further increase in US inflation.

But it is not only stagnating output that signals the recession: speculative values and debt are contracting sharply. Many corporations which took on huge debts, especially but not only through high return - high risk 'junk bonds', are unable to meet interest repayments as their real profits decline. There have been some major bankruptcies in the US.

The Australian buccaneer capitalists like Bond, Elliot and now Murdoch, with their vast debts, are coming unstuck. As commercial rents and property prices collapse, many property companies are in big trouble. The Savings and Loan Associations in the US, the rough equivalent of British building societies, are in massive crisis mainly as a result of property loans going sour. The US government cannot politically afford to let them go bankrupt, and is having to bail them out at a cost now estimated as between $600bn and $1,000bn (roughly the size of Britain's GNP!). Not only many small US banks, but even majors like Chase Manhattan, are in severe difficulties, as a result of Third World loans, the collapse in property prices (itself a product of the S&L crisis), junk bonds and corporate defaults; the bankruptcy of one or more major US banks, and the merger of others, is now thought likely.

But the most worrying contraction is in Japan. In the 1980s Tokyo was the major source of loan finance to the world. Now this source is being choked off not only by a steep rise interest rates but also by a contraction of the banks' capital base. In order to ensure a minimal degree of security, capitalist governments allow banks to create debt only up to a certain multiple of their real assets.

Collapse in value

In Japan, banks are, fairly reasonably, allowed to count stocks, shares and property in their real assets. As these have collapsed in value, so the banks' allowed lending has contracted. This is not some technical quirk, but a

IN DEPTH Japanese investors watch numbers plummet on streetside quote board mechanism typical of capitalist recessions. In expansionary periods, debt is cumulatively created on the basis of collateral of assets, whose value in turn is inflated by debt creation and expansion. In recessions, this goes into cumulative reverse: declining asset values cut debt which creates further decline in produc-

In 1929, the US banking system worked in much the same way that the Japanese one does now, and this was responsible for severity of that crash. Now, as then, a decline of the stock market feeds through to a decline in bank thus directly hitting the economy'. The decline of the Tokyo stock exchange during 1990, unlike the 1987 crash of the US and European stock markets, will thus have a direct and severe impact on the real economy worldwide.

Bourgeois commentators, with their typical wisdom after the event, are now telling us that debt creation and speculation in the 1980s was 'excessive'. The banks are berated for having undertaken 'unwise' lending, having ploughed into dodgy 'fashions' like junk bonds and property. The soaring stock markets, which a little while ago were cited as indices of capitalism's newly-found health, are now criticised for their 'unreality'. This capitalist "self-criticism' underlies the 'new moral tone of the 1990s'. But as we have seen, the speculation and debt arose inevitably out of the excess of money capital and the underlying weakness of the productive economy.

Burst bubble

It is ironic, but to some extent logical, that the bursting of the 1980s capitalist bubble should coincide with the breakthrough in capitalist encroachment in Eastern Europe. In the very long term, if capitalism is restored not only in East Germany but more widely in Eastern Europe, this may offer a 'fix' to the long crisis of world capitalism, by absorbing excess money capital into profitable, productive investment. But in the next few years, as in the last few, Eastern Europe is likely to be a problem more than a solution. The US and the other imperialist powers have had to spend massively on armaments in order to bankrupt the Soviet Union and propel it towards Gorbachevism. They would have to invest massively, with no prospect of substantial returns, in order to further the push towards capitalist restoration. In the short term, this is contributing further to the upward pressure on interest rates, as loan capital is used to finance German reunification, and Germany is becoming a big-time borrower on the international markets.

The Gulf crisis has merely put the icing on this recessionary cake. The size and duration of the oil price rise will affect the severity of the world recession, in a way presently unpredictable. But the Gulf crisis is emphatically not to blame for the recession.

Thatcher's failure

Whatever government policy is adopted, the coming world recession will hit Britain particularly hard. This is because Britain weakest of the economies. It is this that constitutes the failure of Thatcherism. Contrary to what is often thought on the left, Thatcher could not have recreated long term sustained accumulation and high profitability in Britain; such was and is impossible without a renewed long boom of the world economy. What Thatcher might have done would have been to have raised Britain's competitiveness relative to its major rivals. In this she has failed.

The indices of the failure are well-known. Output, taken over the whole period since 1979, has risen much slower than the OECD average. There have been large and everwidening trade and balance of payments

Investment in fixed capacity only reached its 1979 level in 1989. Research and Development (R&D) expenditure has been stagnant here while it has been rising rapidly in other imperialist countries. Costs of labour power per unit of output are rising faster than the OECD average. And now we see the highest inflation rate of the major countries.

Many on the left thought that British capitalism would improve its competitive position through the Tories' and employers successive defeats of the labour movement. The capitalist class seemed to have had big economic successes particularly in the intensification of work, in an increase in the rate of labour productivity, in wage stagnation or

IN DEPTH

"TO- ..or. ing class, and (since the mid-1980s) in a big reduction in the ratio of state spending to GNP.

But capitalist economies, especially modem ones, are not revived as simply as that. Intensification of work by itself can only raise productivity within the limits set by human capacities and endurance. In itself it is not the solution to capitalist competitiveness; if it were, India would be the world's leading capitalist economy.

Exploitation

Intensification of labour is useful if it enables management's ability to rule and hence a dynamic of fast changes in production organisa- tion and technology.

But this requires also a high rate of invest- ment, and this has not been forthcoming. The intensification of work, and the scrap ping of backward capacity, have enabled a substantial rise in average productivity and the average rate of profit. But these have been insufficient to tempt capital into in

Darman: American bL vesting in new produc- tion processes, expan- sion in expanding markets, or R&D. Rather, it has retreated into its most profitable existing 'niche markets'. Yet to be competitive with, for example, France and Germany, let alone Japan, British industry needs to be constantly advancing into new product areas.

This conservatism is also partly respon- sible for Thatcher's failure to build the kind of actively cooperative industrial relations that underpin German and Japanese competitive- ness. Moreover, the success in cutting public expenditure and in privatising has caused an ever-worsening shortage of infrastructure and skilled labour power which is now severely damaging profits. Capitalist economies cannot revive themselves merely by attacking the working class, though that this certainly necessary; capitalism is much more contradic- tory than that.

Thatcher's entry into the ERM is a desperate attempt to deal with short term problems. Even if it succeeded in its aims, it would do nothing the address the underlying failure. A minor aim is to enable a small cut in interest rates, as sterling receives extra support from other ERM goverments, and thus both mollify some voters and moderate the sharp- ness of the coming recession. The major aim is to replace monetary targets with the ex- change rate of sterling as the 'disciplining'

wage cuts for a large part of the manual work-

force on the British economy - in itself an ad-

mission of the failure of "monetarism', ac- cording to which the money supply was seen as the crucial lever. In the next few years entry into the ERM is thus essentially a mechanism for deflation. We should recall that this is not only Thatcher's policy but Kinnock's.

The ERM will maintain sterling at more- i or-less its current value against the Deutschmark. This halts the softening of 'discipline' which has occurred in the last year with the 10 per cent devaluation of sterling. Given that British inflation is currently three times the ERM average, and will remain

ludget director. A Bush 'yes' man higher for the foreseeable future, this is strongly deflationary. It puts much greater cost and profit pressures on British producers. Either they succumb to these pressures by cut- backs in output and capacity; or they cut their costs, which under present conditions they are only willing to do by cutting wages. For workers this means rising unemployment or wage cuts, but probably both.

Interest rates

The scenario is made worse by the interest rate cut, which will tend to worsen the balance of payments. In fact, it is quite likely that the interest rate will have to rise again, in order to deal with the balance of payments and to stop sterling from falling below its minimum al- lowed rate in the ERM.

Thatcher and Major's calculation appears to be that the current reduction in the interest rate will pave the way for an early election before the British and world recessions really get nasty. They are also going to worsen the recession. But the effects of the recession, cut- ting capacity and cutting wages, will do noth- ing for what we have seen are the real weak- nesses of British capitalism.

Kinnock prepares for war

Now that Britain is in the ERM and Major has lowered interest rates a little, Labour's economic policy looks even thinner than before. Labour has no substantial industrial

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 28, November 1990

policy as such. It has effectively handed this over to the EC, and the EC's policy is largely to try to cut down national goverments' in- dustrial policies.

Labour's economic policy now amounts

to: don't cut taxes any more; spend more on training, tax concessions for R&D, and transport infrastructure. At the best of times this programme would be extremely limited. British investment in these areas is vastly be- hind the OECD average. Moreover, it is not enough to have a change in government policy in these areas; private firms would have to radically change their strategies in order to

use skilled labour power, to un-

dertake R&D themselves and to

use it profitably. Just as Harold

Wilson failed in 1964-6 to inject

'the white hot heat of

technology' into an uninterested

British industry, Kinnock would

fail to inject the white hot heat of

'knowledge' into the economy.

However, Kinnock, if

elected, would not get the oppor

tunity to even try this

programme. The recession will

cut government tax revenue and

raise its spending on unemploy-

ment benefit. In spite of a total

government debt lower than at

any time since 1914, Kinnock

will not borrow for fear of fur-

ther raising interest rates and

also in order not to undermine

City confidence (as he puts it "not spending what we don't have"). As long as the recession lasts, probably 3-4 years, there will therefore be no money for him to spend on 'knowledge infrastructures'. His "big idea' will not even get off the ground.

Renewed assault

The effect of all this is that a Kinnock government, just as much as another Thatcher government, would preside over a sharp reces- sion and the renewed assault on the working class that this involves. Even before the entry into the ERM, and before the international debt crisis has yet taken its major casualties, City pundits were predicting an increase of unemployment by up to 1.5 million in the next two years. Really savage wage cuts in major parts of the economy are on the cards, in the style of the huge wage reductions enforced in the US during the 1980s. The welfare state will be subjected to another slashing, despite Kinnock's "big idea' of education.

The labour movement needs to prepare it- self for this onslaught. But resistance cannot be just national in scope. A world recession will mean attacks on the working class worldwide. Each country's capitalists en- courage workers to compete with other countries to further these attacks. We must build an international workers' response to an international crisis.

Page 27

IN DEPTH

East Europe's winter of crisis

← When 'independent' is a loaded word · Stalled on the road to the capitalist market →

Something wrong on this page?