Eastern Europe have fallen behind in the information technology revolution.
However deep the attachment of the proletariat to the social gains of a non-capitalist system, the knowledge that workers in the West are on average more prosperous and in many respects more free, has exerted a permanent pressure.
While the lives of the East Buropean masses are incomparably better than those of the masses in the "third world", they are still - by the yardstick of the overall development of human productive technique and culture - drab, stultefying and impoverished. Now hundreds of millions of people have decided that to gain a better life they will not go on in the old way, and that their leaders are incapable of going on in the old way: these are the classic conditions for the emergence of pre-revolutionary situations.
The pivotal events of the crisis have occurred in Bast Germany. Until the autumn of 1989 it seemed that Eastem Europe was undergoing two separate courses of development -that of Poland and Hungary towards radical marketisation and political
Tand that of Czechoslovakia, East Germany (and in a different way Romania) remaining true to the Stalinist model. But the mass movement of the East German workers smashed this dichotomy and led directly to the events in Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, leaving the Causescu dynasty in Romania isolated and under seige.
Confusion in the imperialist camp
The response of the imperialist leaders to the events in castern Europe has been one of confusion: only the Christian Democrats in West Germany have responded equanimity, seeing the events as strengthening their hand against their imperialist rivals. Both French and British imperialism have responded with alarm.
Overall, the existing world order depends, for imperialism, on the existence of NATO and the bloc system; the division of Europe; the presence of US troops in Europe to ensure their "leadership" of the Western world; the existence of nuclear powers with special rights and a special status intemationally. While the crisis of Stalinism creates the possibility of historie defeats for the deformed workers" states, it also
creates an epoch of instability which puts in question the whole world order which has ensured the hegemony of the bourgeoisie.
For Thatcher and British capitalism the stakes are clear. Britain's international position depends fundamentally on its status as the possessor of nuclear weapons. This depends in return of the largesse of the USA: Britain's nuclear weapons are in fact provided by the United States - in tum a function of the 'special relationship" by which Britain acts as the USA's junior and faithful ally within the NATO alliance - and in the EC. Already Thatcher has suffered a decisive defeat of the modemisation of battlefield nuclear weapons. Once the bloc system and the nuclear competition are in question, then Britain's usefulness as 'sidekick' to the US is removed.
Evidently for both Britain and France the idea of a united capitalist Germany is anathema. It means the domination of Europe, even more than today, by potentially the most powerful capitalist state in the world. British industry in particular would be totally marginalised. Mitterand's dream of Franco-German joint hegemony of the EC would be in tatters.
France's response to the crisis has been to demand the tighter integration of the European Community to act as a joint pole of attraction for capitalist restoration in the cast, as opposed to leaving this role to West Germany alone. But this is a panic strategy: at the Strasbourg summit West Germany was happy to go along with moves towards faster economic and political integration, because it knows that, whatever the official format, restoration of capitalism in caster Europe, or even just a big increase in trade, will unfold to the advantage of the country with the largest economy, the best geographical conditions and the biggest established links - on all three criteria West Germany itself.
The response of the United States has been cautious. George Bush was careful to insist after the Malta summit that the cold war was by no means over. Otherwise, he said, there would be no justification for US troops in Europe. A world without the bloc system and the fundamental East-West divide would create immense problems for the US, which relies for its leadership of the West on its military and political leadership (and the second depends on the first). Once inter-imperialist competition is SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 20, Dec-Jan 1989-90
more and more reduced just to economic competition, then the USA is in a much weaker position vis-a-vis West Germany and Japan.
While Bush has personally supported moves towards faster European integration, this is not necessarily the position of US capital as a whole. In any case, caught between penetration of castern markets by the EC as a whole or simply that of West Germany, the US is faced with two evils between which it is difficult to decide,
In general, again with the partial exception of the West German leaders, the main response of the imperialist leaders has been to stress order" and "stability". While the discomfiture of the Stalinist leaders may be pleasing to them, the mobilisation of the masses contains a potential which is deeply disturbing. Thus the visit of US Secretary of State Baker to Hans Modrow, giving support for "orderly" change, is an obvious sign of US concems. This is also the source of Thatcher's insistence that the Warsaw Pact must remain, and the process must not go "too fast".
The historic stakes
In the medium lerm there are evidently three possible outcomes of the present upsurge, and they might not be the same for each country. Either capitalism will be restored; or the political revolution will win; or bureaucratic rule will be consolidated. But in an overall historic sense the choice is between the restoration of capitalism and workers power.
In part the outcome depends on the close interaction between the events in East Europe and those in the Soviet Union. If the crisis of perestroika were to result in the fall of Gorbachev and the restoration of a hardline Stalinist leadership. this could well spur a counter-offensive by the bureaucracy in the East European countries. But this seems an unlikely development, and any sharp attempt to restore the previous system of bureaucratic domination, especially one based on force, would result in a gigantic explosion, with incalculable consequences.
More likely, the events in Eastern Europe which have now overtaken those in the USSR itself, can easily flow back into the Soviet Union, fuelling demands for an end to the Communist monopoly of power. Such a development would really place Gorbachev's position in jeoparSOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 21, February 1990
SUPPLEMENT Czechoslovakle: the Stalinists tried and falled to invoke workers against students dy: the CPSU's monopoly is central for the continuance of bureaucratic rule in the Soviet Union itself.
Leaving aside some unexpected and momentous event in the Soviet Union, the outcome is much more likely to lie in a protracted triangular struggle between restorationist forces
imperialism: the bureaucracy, or rather those sections of it which want to defend Stalinist rule; and the working class.
In practice, as most dramatically shown by Poland, whole sections of the bureaucracy will aid the process of trying to defeat the workers economically and politically in order to prepare the ground for Wester investment and the restoration of capitalism.
The main obstacle to the restoration of capitalism is the working class itself. The working class in each country must be defeated in a series of frontal battles if property is to be re-privatised, domestic bureaucratic-bourgeoisie established, and the social gains of the masses wiped out. Two obviously related questions are at issue here: the level of mobilisation of the masses, and their overall political consciousness. Both are presently in deep flux.
While a spontaneous fight against austerity can delay the restoration of capitalism, only a conscious fight for a democratic socialist order can lead to the victory of the political revolution. Two central problems mise themselves here.
First, it is an open question to what extent the discrediting of any form of "socialism" and collectivism by the Stalinist rulers has succeeded in driving the masses into the arms of perialist wars could not be ruled out.
capitalism. For example, while in East Germany socialist and collec tivist values seem to be strong, the pull of Western prosperity on sections of the population is also strong.
Beyond that, even those like Vaclev Havel in Czechoslovakia who are suspicious of the West, and even most of those committed to some for of democratic socialism, generally remain commitled to "marketisation" as the sole form of possible cconomic restructuring. This is an historic gain for pro-capitalist ideologues, and a mammoth problem for building a genuine socialist op position.
Secondly, while the restoration of capitalism implies the defeat of Stalinism and an historic vindication of all currents that argue for socialism with democracy, nonetheless the res toration of capitalism in Eastern Europe - especially if combined with a similar outcome in the USSR would be a world historic defeat for the working class.
In this respect it is absolutely irresponsible to ignore - as do state capitalist and bureaucratic collectivist currents - the weight of the deformed workers' states in the world relationship of forces. With their defeat, the continued existence of the Cuban workers' state and of the revolutionary goverment in Nicaragua would be in peril.
Imperialism would be much freer to engage in adventures, not only, for example, towards Vietnam, but against the whole third world. Imperialism rampant would rapidly lead to resurgent militarism, especially in Japan and Germany. New inter-im-
"the main obstacle to the restoration of capitalism is the working class, which must be defeated in a series of frontal battles if property is to be re-privatised, a domestic bureaucratic bourgeoisie established, and the social gains of the masses wiped out" Page 13
"in east European countries women are completely integrated into the workforce, but in general real equality does not exist. In several countries abortion and contraception rights are de facto restricted" Page 14
The reimposition of the imperialist yoke in Easter Europe is a nightmare scenario.
An opposite scenario, the possibility of the emergence of new democratic socialist states, or even a militant fight in that direction, could have an explosive impact on the, working class in every country, but especially on the workers of the advanced capitalist world, including Europe. The danger for imperialism is not just that of the attractive power of democratic socialist states if they are established, but of the lessons of mass mobilisation. Already there is no doubt that political freedoms are greater in East Germany today than they are in any advanced capitalist state. The right to demonstrate is untrammelled, and everyone can inspect their own police file - if it hasn't been destroyed. The power of the secret police, including the right to surveillance, is completely destroyed. The dangers of these lessons spilling over into Western Europe are immense.
To maximise the opportunities for the working class in this situation requires the construction of a revolutionary political leadership - there can be no political revolution without it. We do not define such a leadership as necessarily explicitly Trotskyist; but it must engage in a struggle around the main themes and demands of the political revolution, on the axis of socialism with democracy.
This must include a rejection of marketisation as the main form of economic restructuring, and the building of organisations of workers" power at the level of the factory and throughout society. Through the fight to build organised bodies of support, revolutionary currents and parties in every cast European country, and, and through ceaseless contacts and political intervention, we and our co-thinkers intemationally can make a major contribution to the creation of such a leadership.
The programme of political revolution
The programme of political revolution which we advocate must go beyond attempts at 'reform' of the system and the establishment of parliamentary-type democracy. Key to our demands must be the fight for the self-organisation and political independence of the working class from Stalinist and bourgeois forces. While we do not write off reform Com-
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