War in the Balkans - 7
The role of Slovenia in the break-up of Yugoslavia
Despite the many conflicting views about the responsibility for the break up of Yugoslavia, two glaring omissions occur consistently. It is not understood that from 1990 onwards Milosevic was intent on creating a Greater Serbia. The role of Slovenia is ignored. To a large extent these are not even two different questions.
Far from opposing Slovene secession, Milosevic welcomed it. Only about five per cent of the population of Slovenia were Serbs. Milosevic had no interest in their fate. Consequently, when Slovenia took the first steps to independence the military intervention by the Yugoslav Peoples’ Army (JNA) was very half hearted. Only one member of the Federal Presidency opposed the withdrawal of JNA troops from Slovenia — Stipe Mesic of Croatia.
During the war in Slovenia Milosevic and General Kadijevic, Chief of Staff of the JNA, did not make a single pronouncement on a war they had no intentions of winning. Not all JNA officers, of course, were in the know. Many of them still believed in a state of the South Slavs. General Adzic protested about the lack of troops available for fighting Slovene secession — to no avail.
Milosevic was certainly willing to launch the most brutal assaults against the much more populous Republics of Croatia and Bosnia. Vast quantities of arms were made available to military and paramilitary formations. Heavy weapons were on hand.
Serbia has resisted the armed might of NATO — the most powerful military alliance on the planet. The failure of the JNA to conduct more than a token campaign in Slovenia can, therefore, hardly be explained by the lack of weapons, troops or squeamishness on the part of Milosevic. There is only one possible explanation: Milosevic had no intention of keeping Slovenia within Yugoslavia because it got in the way of his aim of a Greater Serbia.
While Croatia has often been blamed for the break up of Yugoslavia the role of Slovenia has largely been ignored. The Slovenes are seen as ‘good guys’ since, unlike the Croats, they aren’t tainted with Nazi sympathies. Yet the Slovene leaders engaged in a cynical manoeuvre with Milosevic which allowed them independence after a token display of hostility from Belgrade. Troops were rapidly withdrawn from Slovenia into Croatia.
The Slovenes were almost certainly aware that Milosevic would not let Croatia go so easily. They were equally aware that if Slovenia left the Yugoslav federation Croatia would not stay. Yet all the while the Slovenes were making preparations for their exit they did not inform President Tudjman of Croatia what they were doing. Nor did they warn him of Milosevic’s determination to build a Greater Serbia. They simply washed their hands of any responsibility.
Indeed, the evidence suggests that Tudjman had very little intention of quitting Yugoslavia — although he certainly wanted its restructuring. Independence for him was simply a bargaining point to achieve a stronger position for Croatia within a revamped Yugoslavia. It was Milosevic’s willingness to let Slovenia go — against the opposition of Stipe Mesic, the Croat member of the Federal Presidency — that encouraged Slovene independence. It was Slovenia’s determination to leave that pushed Tudjman into declaring Croatia independent.
Unfortunately for Tudjman, and even more so for millions of people throughout the former Yugoslavia, he found that although Milosevic was more than happy to let Slovenia go he was also willing to use the utmost brutality to achieve his Greater Serbia.